scholarly journals STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DEFENCE IN CYBERSPACE

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 139-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pallavi Khanna

Given the increasing role and use of cyberspace in our daily lives, it is important to consider the large-scale dynamics of the cyber forum. Shifting the focus from individuals to nation states as participants that engage in activities in cyberspace raises doubts over the status of nations in this domain. Do they continue to remain sovereign entities on such a platform? Do they have the right to defend themselves against attacks from other nations? These questions have been subject to a lot of debate in the context of international law. The aim of this paper is to study the implications of the principle of state sovereignty and selfdefence in cyberspace. The paper focuses on two prime considerations of sovereignty and self-defence in the context of cyberspace and its link to international law. Thus the scope is limited to concepts such as territorial jurisdiction, sovereignty, attribution and selfdefence. While doing so, the researcher seeks to answer questions such as, Is international law applicable to cyberspace? Can cyberspace be called a sovereign domain? Do principles of territorial jurisdiction apply to cyberspace? How does the attribution mechanism work in cyberspace? Under what circumstances are states permitted to exercise the right of self-defence against cyber attacks? and What are the deficiencies in international law governing cyberspace?

2018 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 627-648 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katayoun Shafiee

AbstractThe Iranian government's decision to nationalize its British-controlled oil industry in 1951 was a landmark case in international law. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Iranian government clashed over whether international authorities had the right to arbitrate for them in disputes over the terms of the oil concession. Scholarship in Middle East studies has overlooked the role of concession terms in shaping political disputes in the 20th century. Rather than seeing legal studies of the oil industry on one side and power struggles and resources on the other, this article examines international court proceedings at The Hague to argue that Anglo-Iranian oil transformed international law. Novel mechanisms of economic and legal governance, set up to deal with an expanded community of nation-states, worked as techniques of political power that equipped the oil corporation with the power to associate Iran's oil with foreign control while generating new forms of law and contract that undermined resource nationalism.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 79
Author(s):  
Pshtiwan Mohammed Qader

The present paper examines the problem of cyber-attacks under existing international law. It takes the view that the (United Nations) UN Charter provisions on the use of force can be extended to cyber-attacks by means of interpretation although the relevant provisions do not explicitly address such issue. This Article argues that cyber-attacks resulting in material damage or destruction to property, death or injury to persons, or severe disruption of the functioning of critical infrastructures can be characterized as use of armed force and therefore violate the prohibition contained in article 2(4) of the Charter. However, cyber-attacks not resulting in the above consequences may be illegal intervention in the internal affairs of other states if such attacks are coercive in nature. In addition, the current study discusses that a cyber-attack which amounts to a use of armed force per se is not sufficient to give the victim state the right to self-defense, unless its scale and effects are equivalent to those of a conventional armed attack. Finally, the study concludes that an international cyber treaty is truly necessary to more effectively address cyber-attacks.


1976 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 516-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Feinstein

Dean Acheson frankly reconfirmed the right of self-preservation, when he asserted, “…law simply does not deal with … questions of ultimate power—power that comes close to the sources of sovereignty…. No law can destroy the state creating the law. The survival of states is not a matter of law”. It is beyond the law.Given the existence of man's elementary loyalty to autonomous states, the necessity for using force springs from the need of states to depend fundamentally on self-help in order to guarantee their survival and welfare. This search for security in a system of politics without government, forces the state to be dependent upon military self-help.


Author(s):  
Frederik Harhoff

SommaireL'autodétermination des peuples autochtones suscite la controverse en droit international contemporain depuis que le processus de décolonisation s'est achevé, à la fin des années 1960. Parce qu’ils craignaient avant tout des désordres nationaux, de nombreux pays ont refusé de reconnaître que les peuples autochtones ont le droit de se séparer du territoire national et d'obtenir leur indépendance. Cependant, même la reconnaissance d'un droit moins vaste, soit un droit de recevoir un statut spécial et d'obtenir l'autonomie politique dans le cadre des frontières étatiques existantes, demeure une question litigieuse, car aucune définition claire des bénéficiaires et de la substance de ces droits ne peut être établie. De toute façon, la disparité des conditions politiques, économiques, sociales et climatiques dans lesquelles vivent les peuples autochtones du monde entier rend futile la création d'un seul et unique concept d'autodétermination qui s'appliquerait au monde entier. Pour sortir de cette impasse, on propose d'adopter une approche procédurale, au lieu d'essayer de fixer ces questions dans des termes juridiques stricts.Le fait de qualifier le concept d'autodétermination de processus, au lieu de le décrire comme étant une série de règles exactes et préétablies, a pour avantage d'apporter un élément de flexibilité, car il permet aux deux parties, c'est-à-dire les États et les peuples autochtones, de trouver des appuis pour défendre leurs intérêts et d'imaginer une solution viable qui tienne compte des circonstances particulières de chaque cas. Mais toutes les parties concernées devraient tout d'abord accepter trois conditions préalables:(1) Le droit de sécession immédiate et d'indépendance complète, en tant qu'aspect du droit à l'autodétermination, devrait être réservé aux peuples autochtones des territoires d'outre-mer.(2) Les États ont le devoir de favoriser l'autonomie de leurs peuples autochtones et le fardeau de prouver qu 'ih offrent la plus grande autonomie possible aux peuples autochtones vivant sur leurs territoires.(3) Une fois que des ententes relatives à l'autonomie ont été conclues, les États ne peuvent pas les révoquer, les abréger ou les modifier unilatéralement.L'auteur de cette note examine ensuite le régime d'autonomie du Groenland et conclut que ce régime semble satisfaire aux critères énoncés, bien que la question du statut actuel du Groenland (et des îles Faroe) au sein du royaume danois demeure incertaine sur le plan constitutionnel. Le régime d'autonomie implique un transfert irrévocable des pouvoirs législatifs et administratifs des autorités danoùes aux autorités du Groenland, ce qui a pour effet de créer un régime juridique indépendant au Groenland. Par ailleurs, il est entendu que le régime d'autonomie du Groenland permet d'établir un système judiciaire indépendant, si les tribunaux danois du Groenland ne reconnaissent pas la validité de la Loi d'autonomie du Groenland.


Author(s):  
Casey-Maslen Stuart ◽  
Clapham Andrew ◽  
Giacca Gilles ◽  
Parker Sarah

This chapter analyses the preamble of the ATT. The preamble of an international treaty typically sets out its purpose and the context of its adoption. The ATT is unusual in that in addition to eighteen preambular paragraphs it contains a set of eight principles in accordance with which the states parties are ‘determined to act’. Each of the preambular paragraphs includes an acknowledgement of the right of all states to manufacture, develop, acquire, import, export, transfer, and retain conventional arms and related items and capabilities for self-defence and security needs and in order to participate in peace support and humanitarian operations. This right, however, does not create any obligation for states to do so and such rights must be exercised in accordance with international law.


Author(s):  
Shannon Bosch ◽  
Marelie Maritz

South Africa has adopted two pieces of legislation since 1998 aimed at restricting one of the fastest growing sectors of the global economy: the private security industry. Not only is this legislation completely unique, but it appears wholly at odds with international opinion. In this article we place private security contractors (PSCs) under the microscope of international law, exploring the role they play in armed conflicts, and the status afforded them by international humanitarian law (IHL). We address the issue of prohibited mercenarism, questioning whether PSCs should be categorised as mercenaries. We then shift our focus to the South African legislation and discuss the ambit of its application as compared with international law obligations to outlaw mercenaries. We discuss the likelihood of successful prosecution of PSCs, and the potential penalties that PSCs might face in terms of the South African legislation. Lastly we consider the constitutional challenges which might emerge as this legislation, and a proposed amendment to the South African Citizenship Act threaten the constitutionally protected rights of South African PSCs to practise a profession and enjoy citizenship.


Author(s):  
Chris O'Meara

States invariably justify using force extraterritorially by reference to their inherent right of self-defence. In so doing, they accept that the exercise of such right is conditioned by the customary international law requirements of necessity and proportionality. To date, these requirements have received little attention. They are notorious for being normatively indeterminate and operationally complex. As a breach of either requirement renders ostensibly defensive action unlawful, increased determinacy regarding their scope and content is crucial to how international law constrains military force. This book examines the conceptual meaning, substance and practical application of necessity and proportionality as they relate to the right of self-defence following the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945. It provides a coherent and up-to-date description of the applicable contemporary international law and proposes an analytical framework to guide its operation and appraisal. This book contends that necessity and proportionality are conceptually distinct and must be applied in the foregoing order to avoid an insufficient ‘catch-all’ description of (il)legality. Necessity determines whether defensive force may be used to respond to an armed attack and where it must be directed. Proportionality governs how much total force is permissible and prohibits excessive responses. Both requirements are shown to apply on an ongoing basis throughout the duration of an armed conflict prompted by self-defence. Compliance with necessity and proportionality ensures that the purposes of self-defence are met (and nothing more) and that defensive force is not unduly disruptive to third-party interests and to international peace and security.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Łukasz Kułaga

The Use of Drones in Combating International Terrorism from the Perspective of ‘ius ad bellum’Summary The increasing practice of using armed unmanned aerial vehicles (military UAVs, commonly known as drones) by some countries to eliminate suspected terrorists raises a number of controversies from the perspective of international law. These controversies are also related to the specific features of military UAVs, which make it possible to kill targeted individuals without risk to the military personnel of the country concerned, and thereby may encourage the abusive interpretation of the applicable legal regulations. This article discusses these issues from the perspective of ius ad bellum, in particular the right to self-defence. It shows the main controversial points on the scope of invoking the right to self-defence in such cases, in particular the possibility of invoking the right to self-defence in response to an attack by a non-state entity, the question of pre-emptive self-defence, the importance of the severity of the force used as a condition allowing for the use of force in self-defence, and the relevance of the principles of proportionality and necessity. The article also presents an outline of the vast and highly controversial issues associated with the definition of terrorism from the point of view of international law.


Author(s):  
Christina Eckes

The European Union (EU) cannot make a plausible claim to sovereignty under international law. However, what the EU can do and what it also does is, is to act as if it were sovereign and claim certain rights that are considered core elements of state sovereignty. This article argues that the Court of Justice’s (ECJ) conception of the EU legal order as autonomous provides the EU with a core element of state sovereignty: jurisdictional sovereignty. Autonomy construed by the ECJ is best understood in conceptual legal and absolute terms. It is meant to shield the ECJ’s conceptual legal claims from interference. Legal autonomy as construed by the ECJ is not relative as many authors have claimed. It cannot come about in an incremental or relative manner. It cannot be based on arguments relating to the status of a self-contained regime of international law that gradually distances itself from the general rules of international law. It is a conceptual claim giving birth to the assumption of apriority that can only be made in categorical terms. In this way it is similar to sovereignty. The article first sets out how the autonomy of the EU legal order is best understood. It examines the ECJ’s case law in light of legal theoretical considerations and relates it to the separation thesis of Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law. It then explains that autonomy is of such relevance to the EU legal order because the aprioristic character of EU law remains essentially contested. This relevance indirectly explains why the Court so cautiously protects the autonomy of the EU legal order. Finally, the article examines the Court’s reasoning in Opinion 1/17 in light of the identified absolute conception of autonomy.


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