scholarly journals THE LEVEL STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

2021 ◽  
pp. 7-20
Author(s):  
Сергей Александрович Лебедев
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Classical Theory ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Level Structure ◽  
Classical Approach ◽  
Real Science ◽  
Specific Analysis ◽  
Classical Philosophy ◽  
Integrity System ◽  
Different Levels

В отличие от классической теории научного познания, где выделялось только два уровня научного знания в любой из конкретных наук: эмпирический и теоретический, в современной эпистемологии выделяют четыре качественно различных уровня научного знания: чувственный, эмпирический, теоретический, метатеоретический. Все они отличаются друг от друга по происхождению (эпистемологии), содержанию (онтологии), методам обоснования и критериям истинности(методологии). Несмотря на то, что указанные уровни относительно независимы друг от друга, все они связаны между собой при функционировании любой конкретной науки как некоей целостной системы знания. Основной методологической процедурой обеспечения ее целостности является интерпретация. Она представляет собой конструктивноволевую деятельность мышления по идентификации содержания понятий разных уровней знания. Любая интерпретация всегда заключает в себе существенный момент риска и может быть неверной. Современная неклассическая концепция уровневой структуры научного знания позволяет осуществлять более глубокий и конкретный анализ закономерностей функционирования и развития науки по сравнению с классической эпистемологией. In contrast to the classical theory of scientific knowledge, where there were only two levels of scientific knowledge in any of the specific sciences: empirical and theoretical, in contemporary non-classical epistemology there are four qualitatively different levels of scientific knowledge: sensory, empirical, theoretical and metatheory. All of them differ in their content (ontology), means of genesis (epistemology), method of justification and criteria of truth (methodology). At the same time, although all these levels of scientific knowledge are relatively independent from each other in terms of their ontology and epistemology, they are all interrelated within the framework of the functioning of any particular science as the integrity system of knowledge. The means of achieving such integrity is a procedure of interpretation (identification) of the content of concepts of different levels of scientific knowledge. It is the constructive strong-willed activity. Every interpretation always consists of essential moment of risk and may produce an error. The non-classical approach to the level structure of scientific knowledge developed in the article allows for a deeper and more specific analysis of the laws of the functioning and development of real science, than the classical philosophy of science allowed.

The Theory of Social Relay by M.A. Rozov: Pathway for Understanding

2021 ◽  
pp. 146-160
Author(s):  
Nataliya I. Kuznetsova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
New World ◽  
Social Memory ◽  
Bottom Line ◽  
Russian Philosopher ◽  
Methodological Problems ◽  
The Empirical Analysis ◽  
Goals And Objectives

The article analyzes the problems of modern epistemology in the context of pre­senting the views and philosophical heritage of the famous Russian philosopher Mikhail Alexandrovich Rozov. The relevance of the theory of social relay devel­oped by him and the corresponding “wave” ontology, especially in the period of thematic, terminological and substantial transformations of modern epistemo­logy, is shown. The author carry out the idea that without solving the ontological and methodological problems of the empirical analysis of scientific knowledge, it is impossible to correctly investigate knowledge. The article describes in detail the logic of Rozov’s reasoning, and also demonstrates the scale of M.A. Rozov on the reforming of epistemology and philosophy of science, on the formulation of an urgent agenda, problems, goals and objectives of the study of knowledge. The bottom line is that understanding semiotic objects (scientific knowledge) as phenomena of social memory, which are reproduced according to direct or indi­rect (verbalized) patterns, opens a new world of social relay races. The broad ap­plicability of Rozov’s theory in various empirical contexts is demonstrated, which allows discussing both traditional and modern philosophical and method­ological problems of the natural and socio-humanitarian sciences, as well as in epistemology and philosophy of science.

scholarly journals CONVENTIONAL AND CONSENSUAL CONCEPTIONS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE NATURE

2020 ◽  
pp. 7-26
Author(s):  
Сергей Александрович Лебедев ◽  
Сергей Николаевич Коськов
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Scientific Community ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Scientific Work ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Main Subject ◽  
Pure Experience ◽  
Classical Philosophy ◽  
The One ◽  
Methodology Of Science

В статье излагается содержание двух базовых концепций неклассической философии и методологии науки: конвенционалистской и консенсуалистской теории природы научного знания и научной истины. Каждая из них является альтернативой двум основным парадигмам классической философии и методологии науки: эмпиризму (позитивизму) и рационализму. С точки зрения конвенционализма научное знание не есть ни описание чистого опыта, ни его обобщение. Но оно не является также и результатом некой априорной интуиции и чистого разума. Согласно конвенционализму научное знание - это система доказательной информации, исходные принципы которой имеют характер условных, конвенциональных истин. Отсюда следует, что любая истина в науке не категорична, а условна и имеет форму «если, то». Консенсуалистская концепция природы научного знания возникла в философии науки второй половины XX в. Она была, с одной стороны, обобщением конвенционализма, а с другой - его отрицанием. Если в конвенционализме основным субъектом научного познания является отдельный ученый, то в консенсуалистской эпистемологии таким субъектом является социальный субъект - научное сообщество. Научное познание имеет принципиально коллективный характер как в плане его получения в силу разделения научного труда, так и в плане его легитимации и оценки. Последние операции всегда являются результатом консенсуса научного сообщества. The article examines the content of two basic conceptions of non-classical philosophy and methodology of science: the conventionalist and consensual theory of the nature of scientific knowledge. Each of them is an alternative to the two main paradigms of classical philosophy and the methodology of science: empiricism (positivism) and rationalism. From the point of view of conventionalism, scientific knowledge is neither a description of pure experience nor a generalization of it. But it is also not the result of some a priori intuition and pure reason. According to conventionalism, scientific knowledge is a system of evidence-based information, the initial principles of which have the character of conditional, conventional truths. It follows that any truth in science is not categorical, but conditional and has the form «if, then». The consensual concept of the nature of scientific knowledge emerged in the philosophy of science of the second half of the twentieth century. It was, on the one hand, a generalization of conventionalism; on the other, a negation of it. If in conventionalism the main subject of scientific knowledge is an individual scientist, then in consensual epistemology such a subject is a social subject - the scientific community. Scientific knowledge has a fundamentally collective character, both in terms of its acquisition by virtue of the division of scientific work, and in terms of its legitimization and evaluation. The latest operations are always the result of a consensus of the scientific community.

Critical Realism

2021 ◽  
pp. 69-72
Author(s):  
Dominik Giese ◽  
Jonathan Joseph
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Critical Realism ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Science And Society ◽  
The Real ◽  
Critical Realist ◽  
Ontological Question ◽  
The World

This chapter evaluates critical realism, a term which refers to a philosophy of science connected to the broader approach of scientific realism. In contrast to other philosophies of science, such as positivism and post-positivism, critical realism presents an alternative view on the questions of what is ‘real’ and how one can generate scientific knowledge of the ‘real’. How one answers these questions has implications for how one studies science and society. The critical realist answer starts by prioritizing the ontological question over the epistemological one, by asking: What must the world be like for science to be possible? Critical realism holds the key ontological belief of scientific realism that there is a reality which exists independent of our knowledge and experience of it. Critical realists posit that reality is more complex, and made up of more than the directly observable. More specifically, critical realism understands reality as ‘stratified’ and composed of three ontological domains: the empirical, the actual, and the real. Here lies the basis for causation.

Perceptual Paradigms

2021 ◽  
pp. 23-42
Author(s):  
William Fish
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Good Thing ◽  
Philosophical Thinking ◽  
Philosophy Of Perception ◽  
Visual Science ◽  
Research Programmes

Everyone would agree that contemporary philosophical thinking and theorizing about perception should both be aware of, and consistent with, the findings of visual science. Yet despite this consensus, there is little discussion—and even less agreement—about how this should work in practice. This chapter proposes that we can gain useful insights by bringing some tools from the philosophy of science to bear on this question. Focusing on the disagreement between Burge and McDowell as to whether or not disjunctivism in the philosophy of perception is ‘directly at odds with scientific knowledge’ (Burge 2005, 29), the chapter suggests that interesting insights can be gained by seeing this debate through a Kuhnian lens—as a clash of paradigms (or, more strictly, Lakatosian research programmes)—and then investigate the methodological consequences that flow from this. It contends that looking at this debate through this lens not only sheds light on why it can seem so intractable, but also provides us with reassurance that this might be a good thing.

1. The methods and fruits of science

2021 ◽  
pp. 7-22
Author(s):  
David Wallace
Keyword(s):  
Dark Matter ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Method ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Real Science ◽  
The World ◽  
Key Topics ◽  
Theory Test

This chapter briefly discusses central key topics in the philosophy of science that the remainder of the book draws upon. It begins by considering the scientific method. ‘Induction’—the idea that we construct scientific theories just by generalizing from observations—is a very poor match to real science. ‘Falsification’—Popper’s idea that we create a theory, test against observation, and discard it if it fails the test—is much more realistic, but still too simple: data only falsifies data given auxiliary assumptions that can themselves be doubted. The issues are illustrated through an example from modern astrophysics: dark matter. The chapter then explores how we can resolve issues of underdetermination, where two theories give the same predictions. Finally, it introduces ‘scientific realism’, the view that our best theories tell us things about the world that go beyond what is directly observable.

Archē

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard McKirahan
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
Technical Term ◽  
Scientific Principles ◽  
Basic Entity

Archē, or ‘principle’, is an ancient Greek philosophical term. Building on earlier uses, Aristotle established it as a technical term with a number of related meanings, including ‘originating source’, ‘cause’, ‘principle of knowledge’ and ‘basic entity’. Accordingly, it acquired importance in metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of science, and also in the particular sciences. According to Aristotle’s doctrine of scientific principles, all sciences and all scientific knowledge are founded on principles (archai) of a limited number of determinate kinds.

Social Organization of Science

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Carrier
Keyword(s):  
Social Organization ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Social Epistemology ◽  
Social Roles ◽  
Scientific Communities ◽  
Science Section ◽  
The Social ◽  
Organization Of Science ◽  
Knowledge Claims

The social organization of science as a topic of philosophy of science mostly concerns the question of which kinds of social organization are most beneficial to the epistemic aspirations of science. Section 1 addresses the interaction among scientists for improving epistemic qualities of knowledge claims in contrast to the mere accumulation of contributions from several scientists. Section 2 deals with the principles that are supposed to organize this interaction among scientists such that well-tested and well-confirmed knowledge is produced. Section 3 outlines what is supposed to glue scientific communities together and how society at large is assumed to affect the social organization of these communities. Section 4 attends to social epistemology (i.e., to attempts to explore the influence of social roles and characteristics on the system of scientific knowledge and confirmation practices).

scholarly journals The levels problem in psychopathology

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus I. Eronen
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Psychiatric Disorders ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Pragmatic Approach ◽  
Multiple Levels ◽  
Different Levels

Abstract Psychiatric disorders are studied at multiple levels, but there is no agreement on how these levels are related to each other, or how they should be understood in the first place. In this paper, I provide an account of levels and their relationships that is suited for psychopathology, drawing from recent debates in philosophy of science. Instead of metaphysical issues, the focus is on delivering an understanding of levels that is relevant and useful for scientific practice. I also defend a pragmatic approach to the question of reduction, arguing that even in-principle reductionists should embrace pluralism in practice. Finally, I discuss the benefits and challenges in integrating explanations and models of different levels.

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