scholarly journals Algumas aproximações entre a Ética do Futuro, de Hans Jonas, e o modelo aristotélico para a Ecoética proposto por Pierre Aubenque/Some approximations between Hans Jonas’ ethics of future and the Pierre Aubenque’s proposal for the aristotelian model to the

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (10) ◽  
pp. 87
Author(s):  
Sarah Moura
Keyword(s):  
Key Words ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
Hans Jonas ◽  
Key Words Ethics ◽  
Modern Thinking

Este trabalho pretende evidenciar aproximações entre propostas éticas de Hans Jonas (Alemanha,1903-EUA,1993) e Pierre Aubenque (França, 1929-). Ambos corroboram a tese que defende a prudência como a virtude da ética que se faz necessária nesses tempos de hegemonia tecnocientífica e economia baseada no consumo. Estes eminentes pensadores do século XX também apresentam críticas semelhantes em relação ao pensamento moderno, à ética kantiana e à supremacia da razão calculante. Ambos se inspiraram no imperativo categórico de Kant e elaboraram imperativos categóricos para uma nova ética, que o francês denominou ecoética, e o alemão de ética do futuro.Abstract: This work pretends to evidence approximations between the Hans Jonas’s (Germany, 1903-USA, 1993) and Pierre Aubenque’s (France, 1929-) ethical proposals. Both corroborate the thesis that defends the prudence as the necessary moral virtue in this technical-scientific hegemony and economy based on consumption time. These XX century’s eminent philosophers also show similar critiques to the modern thinking, to the Kantian ethics and to the calculating reason supremacy’s. Both felt inspired in the Kant’s categorical imperative to elaborate new categorical imperatives to a new ethics to our time, that the French one called Ecoethics and the Germany one, ethics of future. Key words: Ethics of future; Ecoethics; Prudence.

scholarly journals Recapturing the Meaning of Akhlāq Islāmiyyah: An Analysis of the Article “Akhlak” in the Encyclopedia of Islam

2018 ◽  
pp. 21-39
Author(s):  
Amilah binti Awang Abd Rahman
Keyword(s):  
Key Words ◽  
Qualitative Methodology ◽  
Textual Analysis ◽  
Comparative Method ◽  
Ethical Thought ◽  
Practical Ethics ◽  
Key Words Ethics ◽  
Islamic Thought ◽  
History Of

Abstract This paper will analytically study the Islamic meaning of akhlaq as portrayed by two Western writers in the article entitled “Akhlak” published in the Encyclopedia of Islam. The author highlights the contribution of Western scholars especially Walzer and Gibb to the understanding of history of the development of Islamic thought and disciplines. By employing the qualitative methodology, the author uses textual analysis and comparative method on the writings of both thinkers and others.  Findings indicate that there are several weaknesses in the writing that include limiting the scope of akhlaq to practical ethics of selected virtues, the lacking of clear detachment between akhlaq and ethical thought, and others.  Key words: Ethics, Akhlaq, Philosophy, Islam, Encyclopedia of Islam.

Kantian Ethics and Utopian Thinking

2021 ◽  
pp. 106-126
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Hill, Jr.
Keyword(s):  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Discourse ◽  
Slippery Slope ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
Central Idea ◽  
Kingdom Of Ends ◽  
Utopian Thinking ◽  
Political Ideal ◽  
Moral Rules

Is Kantian ethics guilty of utopian thinking? Good and bad uses of utopian ideals are distinguished, an apparent path is traced from Rousseau’s unworkable political ideal to Kant’s ethical ideal, and three versions of Kant’s Categorical Imperative (and counterparts in common moral discourse) are examined briefly with special attention on the kingdom of ends formulation. Following summary of previous development of this central idea, several objections suggesting that this idea encourages bad utopian thinking are briefly addressed: that we cannot count on everyone to follow ideal rules, that even conscientious people disagree in their moral judgments, and that theories that allow exceptions to familiar moral rules create a “slippery slope” to consequentialism.

scholarly journals Hegel's Critique of Kantian Practical Reason

1998 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 367-412
Author(s):  
Philip J. Kain
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Kantian Ethics

While many philosophers have found Hegel's critique of Kantian ethics to be interesting in certain respects, overall most tend to find it rather shallow and to think that Hegel either misunderstands Kant's thought or has a rather crude understanding of it. For example, in examining the last two sections of Chapter V of the Phenomenology— ‘Reason as Lawgiver’ and ‘Reason as Testing Laws’ (where we get an extended critique of the categorical imperative)- Lauer finds Hegel's treatment to be truncated and inadequate. The only trouble, though, is that like most other readers of the Phenomenology, Lauer does not recognize that Hegel had been examining and criticizing Kantian ethics throughout a much greater part of—indeed, more than half of—Chapter V. Once we do understand this, I think we must concede that Hegel's treatment is hardly truncated and that it cannot be described as shallow or inadequate. I will try to show that Hegel demonstrates a rather sophisticated understanding of, and gives a serious and thorough critique of, Kantian practical reason.

scholarly journals Diversity, Social Inquiries, and Epistemic Virtues

2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan E. Adler
Keyword(s):  
Key Words ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
Moral Virtues ◽  
Social Agents ◽  
Epistemic Virtues ◽  
Social Nature ◽  
The Social

A teoria das virtudes epistêmicas (VE) sustenta que as virtudes dos agentes, tais como a imparcialidade ou a permeabilidade intelectual, ao invés de crenças específicas, devem estar no centro da avaliação epistêmica, e que os indivíduos que possuem essas virtudes estão mais bem-posicionados epistemicamente do que se não as tivessem, ou, pior ainda, do que se tivessem os vícios correspondentes: o preconceito, o dogmatismo, ou a impermeabilidade intelectual. Eu argumento que a teoria VE padece de um grave defeito, porque fracassa ao se ajustar à natureza social dos questionamentos (epistêmicos) típicos. Esse e outros defeitos relacionados a esse infectam o paralelo que os teóricos VE traçam entre virtudes epistêmicas e morais. Ao prometer o incremento na proporção de crenças verdadeiras sobre crenças falsas, ou ignorância, as virtudes epistêmicas não podem desempenhar um papel paralelo àquele que Aristóteles reserva às virtudes morais ao prometer o incremento em nossa felicidade e no bem-estar da comunidade. A minha rota para essas críticas é feita das razões sobre por que os agentes (sociais) devem buscar a obtenção de seus objetivos morais e epistêmicos diferentemente nos papéis que atribuem às virtudes. PALAVRAS-CHAVES – Virtude epistêmica. Divisão de trabalho epistêmico. Diversidade. Conhecimento. Falibilidade. Virtude moral. ABSTRACT Epistemic Virtue (EV) theory holds that virtues of agents, like impartiality or openmindedness, rather than specific beliefs, should be at the center of epistemological evaluation, and that individuals with those virtues are better positioned epistemically than if they lacked them or, worse, if they instead had the corresponding vices: prejudice, dogmatism, or close-mindedness. I argue that EV theory suffers from a serious flaw because it fails to accommodate to the social nature of typical (epistemic) inquiries. This and related flaws infect the parallel that EV theorists allege between epistemic and moral virtues. In promising to improve our ratio of true beliefs to either false beliefs or ignorance, the epistemic virtues cannot play a roll parallel to that which Aristotle claims for the moral virtues in promising to increase our happiness and the well-being of the community. The path to these criticisms I introduce by offering reasons for why (social) agents should seek to realize their epistemic and moral goals very differently in the respective roles they accord to the virtues. KEY WORDS – Epistemic virtue. Division of epistemic labor. Diversity. Knowledge. Fallibility. Moral virtue.

Compassionate Moral Realism

2019 ◽  
pp. 139-192
Author(s):  
Sandra Shapshay
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Worth ◽  
Moral Sense ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
Philippa Foot ◽  
Sole Criterion

This chapter reconstructs Schopenhauer’s ethical theory. As with his metaphysical system as a whole, his ethical theory is in part a rejection but also a development of Kant’s ethical theory. The major departure from Kant—and a serious departure indeed—is the jettisoning of the Categorical Imperative and the imperatival form of morality as a whole, for reasons echoed famously by G. E. M. Anscombe, Philippa Foot, and others in the 20th century. In the place of the CI, Schopenhauer puts the feeling of compassion as the foundation of morality, and as the sole criterion for actions of moral worth. What is really novel in Schopenhauer’s ethics, is his synthesis of elements of moral sense theory and a realist foundation he retains from Kantian ethics, a synthesis this chapter calls “compassionate moral realism.”

Compulsion or Attractiveness - A False Dichotomy? A Kantian Perspective on the Sources of Moral Motivation

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 21-34
Author(s):  
Maria Schwartz
Keyword(s):  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
Single Source ◽  
Personal Integrity ◽  
Christine Korsgaard ◽  
False Dichotomy ◽  
Push And Pull ◽  
Common World

The essay questions the dichotomy between ‘push’ and ‘pull’ motivation to act morally, asking for the motivational power of Kant’s categorical imperative instead, its functionality as well as its sources. With reference to Christine Korsgaard it can be shown that personal integrity together with the notion of an ideal common world form one single source of motivation, grounded in exercising our autonomy. In a last step this outline of a kantian ethics of automony is related to the notion of God, whose role is illustrated in Kant’s Religion Within in a surprising way.

scholarly journals Debates acerca das apropriações da ética kantiana

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (9) ◽  
pp. 95-134
Author(s):  
Gustavo Da Encarnação Galvão França
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
Moral Thought ◽  
Moral Realist ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
German Philosopher ◽  
Contemporary Author

Este artigo procura colocar em foco a interpretação de John Rawls (1921-2002) acerca da ética de Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Sendo Rawls, talvez, o autor contemporâneo que mais ecos encontrou lançando uma teoria política original que reclama para si uma herança kantiana, faz-se de grande importância esclarecer os pontos centrais de sua apropriação e os questionamentos levantados por outros comentadores de Kant que possuem leituras conflitantes do filósofo de Königsberg. Assim, tratarei, em primeiro lugar, do forte formalismo que Rawls atribui a Kant, derivado, em grande parte, de seu foco na primeira formulação do imperativo categórico em detrimento das demais. Em seguida, abordarei a consequência particular que o professor de Harvard extrai daí e que batiza de construtivismo ético: além de o imperativo categórico se constituir num procedimento vazio de teste das máximas particulares, esse procedimento verdadeiramente cria os princípios morais a partir da razão. Anteriormente à atividade racional, inexistem fatos morais. Por fim, trarei um brevíssimo resumo das críticas dirigidas por outros autores a essa caracterização construtivista do pensamento moral kantiano, buscando apresentar os argumentos dos que preferem enquadrar Kant como um realista em moral. Debates surrounding appropriations of Kantian ethics: doubts about John Rawls' constructivism  Abstract: This article seeks to throw light on John Rawls’s (1921-2002) interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) ethics. Being Rawls, perhaps, the contemporary author that has found more repercussion proposing a political theory which claims a kantian inheritance, it’s greatly important to clarify the central points of his appropriation and the questionings arisen by others Kant’s commentators which have conflicting views about the German philosopher. Therefore, first of all, I will consider the Strong formalism that Rawls attributesto Kant, derived mainly of his focus on the categorical imperative’s first formulacion, to the detriment of the others. Then, I willl talk about the particular consequence the Harvard’s professor draws from that, which he baptizes ethical constructivism: not only the categorical imperative is simply an empty procedure to test the particular maxims, but also this procedure truly creates the moral principles from reason alone. Previous to the racional activity, there is no moral facts. Finally, I will bring a brief summary of the critics made by other authors to that constructivist caracterization of the kantian moral thought, trying to introduce the arguments of those who prefer to classify Kant as a moral realist.

scholarly journals A responsabilidade como princípio ético em H. Jonas e E. Levinas: uma aproximação

2006 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Evaldo Antonio Kuiava
Keyword(s):  
Life Forms ◽  
Ethical Principle ◽  
The Self ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Conceptual Representation ◽  
Hans Jonas ◽  
Guiding Principle ◽  
Key Words Ethics ◽  
To Come

A responsabilidade enquanto princípio ético, embora seja evocada pelos filósofos clássicos, desde a antiguidade ao existencialismo, assume novas perspectivas a partir do pensamento de Hans Jonas e Levinas. Ambos a colocam como centro da ética. Com Jonas a responsabilidade não é mais centrada no passado e no presente. A sua preocupação é com o futuro da humanidade, com as gerações futuras e com a sobrevivência das mesmas. Diferente de Platão, Jonas não está preocupado com a eternidade, mas com o tempo vindouro, compatível com a era da ciência e da tecnologia, cuja responsabilidade passa a ser o alicerce, o princípio orientador para as decisões que possam interferir nas diferentes formas de vida. Levinas, por sua vez, também se afasta da tradição filosófica na medida em que não aceita mais a tese de que a responsabilidade é decorrente da liberdade. A responsabilidade não nasce de uma boa vontade, de um sujeito autônomo que quer livremente se comprometer com o outro ser. Ela nasce como resposta a um chamado. A responsabilidade é o fundamento primeiro e essencial da estrutura ética, a qual não aparece como suplemento de uma base existencial prévia. Aquém do ser se encontra uma subjetividade capaz de escutar a voz, sem palavras de um dizer original, e aponta para uma outra dimensão do eu. Prévio ao ato de consciência, anterior ao sujeito intencional, o eu já responde a um chamado. A responsabilidade pelo outro ser precede a representação conceitual ou a mediação de um mandamento ético. Ela é obediência a uma vocação, a uma eleição pelo bem além do ser. A responsabilidade determina a liberdade do eu, pois esta não consegue mais se justificar por ela mesma. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Ética. Liberdade. Jonas. Levinas. Responsabilidade. ABSTRACT Responsibility qua ethical principle, however evoked by classical philosophers from Antiquity through existentialism, assumes new perspectives since the contributions of Hans Jonas and Levinas. Both place it at the center of ethics. With Jonas, responsibility no longer focuses on past and present. His concern is rather with the future of humankind, with future generations and their survival. Contrary to Plato, Jonas is not concerned with eternity, but with the time to come, compatible with the era of science and technology, whose responsibility becomes the groundwork and guiding principle for decisions that might interfere in different life forms. As for Levinas, he also departs from the philosophical tradition insofar as he rejects the thesis that responsibility results from freedom. Responsibility does not stem from a good will, from an autonomous subject who freely wants to be engaged with another being. Responsibility rather emerges as response to a call, it is the first, essential ground of ethical structure, which cannot appear as a supplement of a previous existential basis. Even before Being, one finds a subjectivity capable of listening to a voice, without words, of an originary saying, and points to another dimension of the self. Previous to the act of consciousness, anterior to the intentional subject, the self already responds to the call. Responsibility towards the other being precedes the conceptual representation or the mediation of an ethical commandment. It is obedience to a vocation, to an election by the Good beyond Being. Responsibility determines the freedom of the self, since the lattercan no longer be justified by itself. KEY WORDS – Ethics, Freedom, Jonas, Levinas, Responsibility.

scholarly journals Normes internationales de justice et globalisation de l’ethique

2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Cathérine Audard
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Key Words ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
International System ◽  
International Norms ◽  
Key Words Ethics

O artigo procura mostrar que sem uma comunidade civil democratizante de justificação, em lugar do atual sistema internacional, as normas da justiça global não passam de uma ficção, uma mera expressão do imperialismo cultural e político, um instrumento de controle e dominação dos povos em escala mundial, segundo um modelo colonizador ampliado que torna as declarações dos direitos humanos inoperantes. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Direitos humanos. Ética. Habermas. Justiça global. Normas internacionais. Rawls. ABSTRACT The article seeks to show that without a civil, democratizing community of justification, replacing the current international system, the norms of global justice remain a fiction, a mere expression of cultural and political imperialism, an instrument of control and domination of the peoples worldwide, according to an enlarged colonizing model which render the declarations of human rights inoperative. KEY WORDS – Ethics. Global justice. Habermas. Human rights. International norms. Rawls.

scholarly journals ETHICS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTDOI: 10.5773/rgsa.v4i1.223

2010 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 228
Author(s):  
Daniel Arruda Coronel ◽  
José Maria Alves da Silva ◽  
Alex Leonardi
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
Economic Perspective ◽  
Specific Focus ◽  
The Relationship

O objetivo deste artigo é tecer considerações hermenêuticas e filosóficas sobre ética, economia e meio ambiente, enfocando, mais especificamente, a relação entre o imperativo categórico formulado por Kant e a questão do desenvolvimento sustentável. Para isso, considerou-se como elemento de ligação a perspectiva econômica de Georgescu-Roegen. Embora a economia, a ética e a biologia constituam campos distintos de especialização, o trabalho procurou mostrar as razões pelas quais essa perspectiva pode ser vista como uma área de interseção entre estas três disciplinas. Conclui-se que as recomendações de Georgescu-Roegen, contidas no seu chamado “programa bioeconômico mínimo”, estão de acordo com os preceitos fundamentais da ética kantiana, no que respeita à questão do desenvolvimento sustentável. Palavras-chave: Ética; Desenvolvimento Sustentável; Kant; Georgescu-Roegen; Bioeconomia Abstract The objective of this article is to bring hermeneutic considerations and philosophies concerning ethics, economy and environment, with a specific focus on the relationship between Kant's categorical imperative and the issue of sustainable development. The economic perspective of Georgescu-Roegen has been considered, for this purpose. Although economy, ethics and biology constitute distinct fields of specialization, this work seeks to show reasons for which this perspective could be seen as an intersection between the three disciplines. The article concludes with the message of Georgescu-Roegan, held in his saying “minimal bioeconomic program” in accordance with the fundamental precepts of the Kantian ethics, in respect to the issue of sustainability. Keywords: Ethics; Sustainable Development; Kant; Georgescu-Roegen; Bioeconomy

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