scholarly journals Undemocratic Centralism and Neo-Corporatism: The New British Constitution

1969 ◽  
pp. 540
Author(s):  
Norman Lewis

Professor Lewis argues that Britain's lack of a constitutionally entrenched bill of rights, combined with the failure of the English courts to sufficiently protect individual rights and interests, has served to create a void of adequate protections for those freedoms which seen as being fundamental to a parliamentary democracy. Furthermore, the author argues that the parliamentary system of government in Britain has devolved from a forum of rational discourse, into a party system, and more recently into a quasi-presidential system where ultimate power lies with the Prime Minister. The devolution of the parliamentary system, when combined with the lack of adequate protections of civil liberties, is seen as creating a system of "undemocratic centralism", examples of which are These factors, Professor Lewis argues, are indicative of Britain's need of a more adequate system of checks and balances, and a Charter of Rights similar to Canada's, each of which can be achieved by a new Constitutional "settlement''.

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hoolo 'Nyane

ABSTRACT Lesotho has a bicameral parliamentary system based on the British model. While the National Assembly is clearly a representative House elected by the citizenry, the purpose, structure and legislative powers of the Senate as the Second Chamber have been a matter of considerable controversy throughout the history of parliamentary democracy in the country. The National Assembly generally has the upper hand not only in the legislative process but also in the broader parliamentary system - it chooses the Prime Minister, it places its confidence in the government and it can withdraw such confidence. The fact that the model generally gives the National Assembly the upper hand is a matter of common cause. What is in question, though, is the nature and extent of the limitation of the powers of the Senate in terms of the Constitution. This article investigates this question and contends that the composition of, and restrictions on, the Senate need to be reviewed in order to enable the Chamber to play a meaningful role in Lesotho's parliamentary democracy . Key words: Constitution of Lesotho, Bicameralism, Senate, National Assembly, Powers of the Second Chamber


Asian Survey ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 461-484 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jüürgen Rüüland

The ouster of President Joseph Estrada initiated a new constitutional debate in the Philippines. In view of the fixed term of office, which allows for removal of a malperforming president only by way of an impeachment, political analysts are demanding a shift from the existing presidential to a parliamentary system of government. This article argues that such a shift does not necessarily solve the problems blamed on the 1987 Constitution, such as the rigidities of the presidential term, executive-legislative gridlock, presidential concentration of power, political instability, a weak party system, populism, and patronage. It proposes incremental reforms by amending the 1987 Constitution where needed, without scrapping the presidential system of government.


Author(s):  
Aybala TAALAYBEK KIZI

Özet: Hükümet sistemlerinin sınıflandırılmasında kullanılan başlıca ölçüt, yasama ve yürütmenin birbirleri ile olan ilişkisidir. Gayet bu kuvvetler katı bir biçimde birbirlerinden ayrılıyorlarsa başkanlık sisteminden, yumuşak biçimde ayrılıyorlarsa parlamenter sistemden söz edilir. Fransa bir Yarı-Başkanlık Hükümet sistemin örneğidir. Hükümet parlamentodan doğmaz ama parlamento hükümeti görevden alabilir. Bazı yazarlar Fransız politik sistemini “süper başkanlık sistemi” olarak tanımlar. Cumhurbaşkanı, başkanlık sistemindeki başbakandan daha çok yetkiye sahiptir. Halk tarafından seçilen ve önemli yetkileri haiz bir başkan ile parlamentoya bağımlı bir başbakandan oluşan ve genellikle "yan-başkanlık" (semi-presidential) ya da son dönemde ortaya atılan yeni bir formülasyonla "başbakanlı-başkanlık" denilir. Anahtar kelimeler: Hükümet sistem, Fransa, Yarı-Başkanlık, Cumhurbaşkan, Anayasa, Yürütme, Yasama, Parlamento, Senato, Başkanlık. Abstract: The main criterion used in the classification of government systems is the relationship between legislative and executive. It is quite possible to talk about the presidential system if these forces are strictly separated, and It is the parliamentary system if they are separated softly between each other. France is an example of a Semi- Presidential Government system. The government is not powered by parliament, but parliament can dismiss the government in the same time. Some authors define the French political system as a "super presidential system." The president has more powers than the prime minister in the presidential system. A "semi-presidential" government system usually composed of a chairman elected by the people and having a significant mandate and a prime minister dependent on parliament. Key words: Government , France, Semi-Presidency, President, Constitution, Executive, Legislative, Parliament, Senate, Presidency. Аннотация: Мамлекеттик системасынын жашыруун үчүн пайдаланылуучу негизги критерийи мыйзам чыгаруу жана аткаруу бутактарынын ортосундагы байланыш болуп саналат. Эгерде укуктары так бөлүнгөн болсо президенттик башкаруу системасы, ал эми бул ыйгарым укуктарына жумшак бөлүү таандык болгон учурда президенттик башкаруу системасын тууралуу сөз кылуу мүмкүн эмес. Франция бир аралаш башкаруу системасынын бир мисалы болуп саналат. Өкмөт ыйгарым укуктарын парламент тарабынан албайт, бирок парламент өкмөттү таркатууга укугу бар болот. Айрым изилдөөчүүлөрдүн ою бойунча Француз башкаруу системасында өкмөт башчысы президенттик башкаруу системасында премьер-министрдин укутарына карагандан көп ыйгарым укуктарга ээ болот, Түйүндүү сөздөр: Мамлекеттик Башкаруу Системасы, Франция, Аралаш Башкаруу Система, Президент, Конституция, Аткаруу бийлиги, Мыйзам чыгаруу Билиги, Парламент, Сенат, Президенттик республика.


2018 ◽  
pp. 65-78
Author(s):  
Jarosław SZYMANEK

The paper attempts to address the question of whether the prime ministerial system has already emerged as a separate system of governance that differs from classical systems, and whether it can no longer be treated as a certain sub-class in an extensive range of parliamentary systems, but rather as a new type of system in its own right. The principal issue appears to be whether the inherent properties of the prime ministerial variety of governance are sufficiently distinct, significant and different from the parliamentary system, however broadly understood, to give the former a status of a separate governance system from the methodological point of view. It should be observed that the contemporary British system, which serves as a foundation for our deliberations on the prime ministerial form of governance, has deviated from the classical or typical parliamentary system far enough to actually take the direction of a separate system of governance, namely prime ministerial governance. Firstly, this is evidenced by the removal of the monarch from the political system and establishing executive power as a virtually one-element entity concentrated in the Cabinet, and embodied by its leader. Secondly, the figure of Prime Minister is highly emphasized as he is elected ‘under the guise of common elections’ and he successfully monopolizes the work of his entire Cabinet, becoming a certain ‘trademark’ of this Cabinet, which is well supported by the principle of joint accountability of all Cabinet members, a principle that is exceptionally strictly and consistently implemented in the British system. The ongoing politological processes that tend to presidentialize and personalize politics are only accelerating these changes and making them even more apparent. The consequence in Britain is that it is the Prime Minister who accrues the power to govern and he by no means falls under the principle of classical parliamentary systems, where the government leader is only “the first among equals”. Thirdly, the House of Commons has practically lost its controlling power over the Cabinet, as primarily evidenced in the absence of a vote of no confidence, which would serve as a tool of political accountability of executive power before the legislative, the essence of any form of parliamentary governance. Fourthly, in a highly specific, deeply endemic party system which entails that various links between government and parliament typical of the parliamentary style of democracy are de facto transferred onto the internal party stage, this to an extent also explains the relevance of the division between government and opposition, a division which is neither as clear, nor as far-reaching as in the case of other parliamentary systems. All this allows us to conclude that the British system is sufficiently different to be deemed new in comparison to a typical or classical parliamentary system. The transformations that have taken place there have gone far beyond the proper, or classical, model of parliamentary governance thus forming not only a sub-class, but a separate type (or model) of governance.


Author(s):  
Yahaya Baba

The chapter examines the crises that triggered the collapse of the colonially imposed parliamentary system in Nigeria. The parochial nature of regional structures and the fragility of party institutions heightened mutual suspicion, disenchantment, and violence among different segments of the country. This led to military intervention through coups and counter coups, which then ordained the adoption of a presidential system in 1979, 1989, and 1999. This was based on the assumption that presidentialism facilitates national integration. Two of the presidential arrangements (1979) and (1989) collapsed and the relative stability achieved in the Fourth Republic is again being undermined by the growing culture of executive dominance. Evidence exists that the executive treats the legislature and judiciary as subordinate rather than co-equal branches of government. The overbearing powers of the presidency undermines checks and balances and the preponderance of executive dominance in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic suggests that Nigeria is drifting dangerously towards hyper-presidentialism.


2021 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 335-340
Author(s):  
Laura Phillips Sawyer

A long-standing, and deeply controversial, question in constitutional law is whether or not the Constitution's protections for “persons” and “people” extend to corporations. Law professor Adam Winkler's We the Corporations chronicles the most important legal battles launched by corporations to “win their constitutional rights,” by which he means both civil rights against discriminatory state action and civil liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights and the Constitution (p. xvii). Today, we think of the former as the right to be free from unequal treatment, often protected by statutory laws, and the latter as liberties that affect the ability to live one's life fully, such as the freedom of religion, speech, or association. The vim in Winkler's argument is that the court blurred this distinction when it applied liberty rights to nonprofit corporations and then, through a series of twentieth-century rulings, corporations were able to advance greater claims to liberty rights. Ultimately, those liberty rights have been employed to strike down significant bipartisan regulations, such as campaign finance laws, which were intended to advance democratic participation in the political process. At its core, this book asks, to what extent do “we the people” rule corporations and to what extent do they rule us?


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Sisay A. Temesgen

Abstract The Ethiopian Federal Democratic Republic (EFDR) Constitution is promulgated in 1994. Under Article (45) of the EFDR the country is restructured from presidential to parliamentary system of government. Since then, the country has been ravaged by the gross violation of the liberty of citizens and the crisis of national unity and consensus among the diversified ethnic groups. The impact of the parliamentary system in aggravating those critical challenges and the comparative advantage of presidantialism is the most ignored political research topic. In this Article, I investigated that the blurry separation of powers of the parliamentary structure of the country has created fusion of powers which has undermined the system of checks and balances. Thus, the executive organ of the government has enabled to concentrate unchecked and unaccountable power which has manifested in the gross violation of the liberty of citizens. Likewise, Article (73) of EFDR has declared that the prime minister and council of ministers of the country to be appointed by the legislators. This has deprived their boarder popular base and authenticity; and equivocally undermined their potency and decisiveness in addressing the existing crisis of national unity and consensus. Comparatively, the presidential structure of government is defined by the firm separation of powers and genuine system of checks and balances. The direct popular election of the president enables the president and council of ministers to secure broader popular base and authenticity. Thus, it is advantageous over parliamentarian structure in terms of protecting the liberty of citizens and addressing the crisis of national unity and consensus in Ethiopia.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peshraw Mohammed Ameen

In this research we dealt with the aspects of the presidential system and the semi-presidential system, and he problematic of the political system in the Kurdistan Region. Mainly The presidential system has stabilized in many important countries, and the semi-presidential concept is a new concept that can be considered a mixture of parliamentary and presidential principles. One of the features of a semi-presidential system is that the elected president is accountable to parliament. The main player is the president who is elected in direct or indirect general elections. And the United States is a model for the presidential system, and France is the most realistic model for implementing the semi-presidential system. The French political system, which lived a long period under the traditional parliamentary system, introduced new adjustments in the power structure by strengthening the powers of the executive authority vis-à-vis Parliament, and expanding the powers of the President of the Republic. In exchange for the government while remaining far from bearing political responsibility, and therefore it can be said that the French system has overcome the elements of the presidential system in terms of objectivity and retains the elements of the parliamentary system in terms of formality, so it deserves to be called the semi-presidential system. Then the political system in the Kurdistan Region is not a complete parliamentary system, and it is not a presidential system in light of the presence of a parliament with powers. Therefore, the semi-presidential system is the most appropriate political system for this region, where disputes are resolved over the authority of both the parliament and the regional president, and a political system is built stable. And that because The presence of a parliamentary majority, which supports a government based on a strategic and stable party coalition, which is one of the current problems in the Kurdistan region. This dilemma can be solved through the semi-presidential system. And in another hand The impartiality of the head of state in the relationship with the government and parliament. The head of state, with some relations with the government, can participate in legislative competencies with Parliament.


1982 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 421-460 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Bowman ◽  
Michael Wallerstein

The 1891 civil war that led to the downfall of President José Manuel Balmaceda is without doubt one of the most visible episodes of Chilean history. Already the subject of a voluminous bibliography by 1894 (Echeverría y Reyes, 1894), the “revolution's” importance to historians of Chile actually increased over time as a new generation of scholars came to view it not merely as a discrete event of limited intrinsic interest but as an important key to understanding Chile's subsequent political and economic development. In retrospect, the conflict came to be seen as a “crucial watershed” in Chilean history (Blakemore, 1974: 243), marking the replacement of a presidential system—1833-1891—notable in nineteenth-century Latin America for political stability, by a parliamentary system—1891-1924—notorious for political and monetary disorder.


Balcanica ◽  
2006 ◽  
pp. 143-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dusan Batakovic

Given that the issue of the functioning of parliamentary democracy in Serbia 1903-1914 has not been thoroughly explored, an attempt is made to define the capacities of Serbia?s parliamentary system confronted with military interferences in political processes. The paper looks at the conflict between the democratic forces, led by the Prime Minister Nikola Pasic and his Radicals, and a group of conspirators within the army, which in 1911 formed a clandestine society "Unification or Death" (Black Hand), led by D. Dimitrijevic Apis. Political influence of the army significantly increased with the dynastic change effected in 1903. In a predominantly rural society (almost 90 percent of the population) the army took up the function of the middle class and its mission to expedite the process of national liberation. Due to unconstitutional and non-parliamentary actions of military circles the period may be described as one of fragile but functional democracy. Seeking to suppress the army's praetorian aspirations, Pasic and the Radicals took various measures to force it into its constitutional role. Sharpened during the First World War, the conflict led in 1917 to a show trial known as the Salonica Trial. The leaders of the Black Hand were sentenced to death and executed. Similar trials stood by military conspiracies in other European countries during the Great War show that democracy is always threatened in times of extreme crisis such as war. In that sense, Pasic may have deemed the extreme measures against the Black Hand necessary for the preservation of the democratic system established in 1903.


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