scholarly journals VLOGA ZDRUŽENEGA BOJEVANJA RODOV V OKOLJU HIBRIDNEGA VOJSKOVANJA V KONTEKSTU TRENUTNEGA STANJA IN RAZVOJNIH MOŽNOSTI SV

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
VIKTOR POTOČNIK
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
Cyber Warfare ◽  
Hybrid Warfare ◽  
Hybrid Nature ◽  
Modern Warfare

Prispevek se ukvarja z vprašanjem sodobnega vojskovanja. Narava vojne se v času ne spreminja, spreminjajo pa se oblike in metode, s katerimi se vojne vodijo. V zadnjem času je moderno govoriti o hibridnem vojskovanju, kako ga kdo pojmuje, pa je zelo različno in odvisno od avtorjev. Članek poskuša pokazati, da pod pojmom hibridnega vojskovanja ne najdemo velikih revolucionarnih sprememb v oblikah in metodah vojskovanja in da je za zmago v sodobnem spopadu še vedno zelo relevanten koncept združenega bojevanja rodov, ki pa ga je treba razumeti v okviru sodobnega vojskovališča, katerega glavni značilnosti sta boj v informacijskem prostoru in »hibridnost«. Članek podrobneje pogleda tudi na strukturo enot taktične ravni SV, in sicer z vidika združenega bojevanja rodov in delovanja na hibridnem vojskovališču. The article deals with the problems of modern warfare. The nature of war does not change through time; what changes is the ways and methods of conducting it. Lately, it has been popular to talk about hybrid warfare, but its perceptions vary significantly according to authors. The aim of the article is to show that the term hybrid warfare does not bring anything revolutionary to the ways and methods of warfare and that today, the concept of combined arms is still very relevant for winning a contemporary conflict. However, it has to be perceived from the perspective of a contemporary battlefield whose main characteristics are cyber warfare and its hybrid nature. The article also discusses in detail the structure of the Slovenian Armed Forces’ tactical level in terms of combined arms and »hybrid« warfare.

Analysis of the ways of improvement of Ukraine – NATO cooperation on cybersecurity issues

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 11-15
Author(s):  
Volodymyr Shypovskyi ◽  
Volodymyr Cherneha ◽  
Serhiy Marchenkov
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Cyber Warfare ◽  
The North ◽  
Collective Defense ◽  
Cyber Space ◽  
The Russian Federation ◽  
Modern Warfare ◽  
E Mail

Recent events in Ukraine have shown that, along with the advancement of information technology, methods of conducting modern warfare are being enhanced. Cyberspace is deliberately used by the Russian Federation to commit cyber warfare against Ukraine. Therefore, in order to address their influence effectively, it is important not only successfully deal with its consequences but also to foresee the potential adversaryʼs actions by analyzing their previous operations and incorporating the lessons learned by other countries. Across the globe, including Ukraine, the issue of information security and cyberattacks has become exceedingly urgent. Everybody is aware of the ongoing attacks on information networks of various government agencies and energy firms, cyberattacks on e-mail networks of political parties and organizations around the world. Likewise, despite the steadily growing numbers, cyberattack cases against the individuals and private businesses are not reported as widely as they occur. As a result, The North Atlantic Alliance countries began tackling the issue of cyberthreats much earlier than Ukraine. Consequently, NATO and its allies rely on powerful and robust cyber defenses to ensure the Alliance's core tasks of collective defense. The article discusses methods and strategies for providing cyber defense in NATO member states and recommends ways to increase the level of protection in the state's cyber space, as part of Ukraineʼs national security and defense domain.

Turkey’s Burgeoning Defense Technological and Industrial Base and Expeditionary Military Policy

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (Summer 2020) ◽  
pp. 115-130
Author(s):  
Can Kasapoğlu
Keyword(s):  
21St Century ◽  
Middle Eastern ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
Military Policy ◽  
Horn Of Africa ◽  
Hybrid Warfare ◽  
Industrial Base ◽  
Weapon Systems ◽  
Drone Warfare

As the incumbent Turkish administration strives to pursue more aspiring goals in foreign affairs, Turkey’s military policy is fast developing in line with this vision. The nation’s defense technological and industrial base can now produce various conventional weaponry. Of these, without a doubt, Turkey’s drone warfare assets have garnered the utmost attention among the international strategic community. In tandem, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) have gradually gained an expeditionary posture with forward deployments across a broad axis, ranging from the Horn of Africa to the Gulf and the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, the military’s doctrinal order of battle has been transforming to address the unfolding hybrid warfare challenges in Ankara’s hinterland. Turkey’s proxy warfare capabilities have also registered an uptrend in this respect. Nevertheless, Ankara will have to deal with certain limitations in key segments, particularly 5th generation aircraft and strategic weapon systems which, together, represent a severe intra-war deterrence gap in Turkey’s defense posture. The Turkish administration will have to address this specific shortfall given the problematic threat landscape at the nation’s Middle Eastern doorstep. This study covers two interrelated strategic topics regarding Turkey’s national military capacity in the 21st century: its defense technological and industrial base (DTIB) and its military policy, both currently characterized by a burgeoning assertiveness.

The Subtle Knife

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 25
Author(s):  
Peter Rautenbach
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Psychological Effects ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Cyber Warfare ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Hybrid Warfare ◽  
Key Concepts ◽  
Polar Opposite

This article looks to tie together the polar opposite of hybrid warfare and nuclear deterrence. The reason for this is that hybrid warfare and its effects on nuclear deterrence need to be explored as there appears to be substantial increases in hybrid warfare’s usage. This article found that hybrid warfare has an erosion like effect on nuclear deterrence because it increases the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used. This may be due to both the fact that hybrid warfare can ignore conventional redlines, but also because the cyber aspect of hybrid warfare has unintended psychological effects on how deterrence functions. how does this relate to nuclear war? In short, cyber warfare attacks key concepts which make nuclear deterrence a viable strategy including the concepts of stability, clarity, and rationality. Therefore, hybrid warfare increases the chance of nuclear use.

The Reaction of the Armed Forces to Hybrid Threats - the Greek Case

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-89
Author(s):  
Demetrios Tsailas
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Planning ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Basic Knowledge ◽  
Thought Process ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Hybrid Warfare ◽  
Strategic Intent ◽  
Logical Method ◽  
Hybrid Threats

We know that the strategy must create the basic knowledge that links both the ways and the means to achieve the desired political goals and strategic results. This logical method is a continuous thought process that provides strategic intent and informs ways, creating links to strategic planning that lead to the use of means, in military operations. This factor is the element that includes calculating, sleight and creating a logic or chain of results in strategy. In this paper, after considering a strategy distillation, we will analyze the context of hybrid warfare in strategic planning, which is of particular concern to us in Greek-Turkish relations.

Get off my cloud: cyber warfare, international humanitarian law, and the protection of civilians

2012 ◽  
Vol 94 (886) ◽  
pp. 533-578 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cordula Droege
Keyword(s):  
Cyber Security ◽  
Traffic Control ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Cyber Warfare ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Civilian Population ◽  
Oil Pipeline ◽  
Cyber Space

AbstractCyber warfare figures prominently on the agenda of policymakers and military leaders around the world. New units to ensure cyber security are created at various levels of government, including in the armed forces. But cyber operations in armed conflict situations could have potentially very serious consequences, in particular when their effect is not limited to the data of the targeted computer system or computer. Indeed, cyber operations are usually intended to have an effect in the ‘real world’. For instance, by tampering with the supporting computer systems, one can manipulate an enemy's air traffic control systems, oil pipeline flow systems, or nuclear plants. The potential humanitarian impact of some cyber operations on the civilian population is enormous. It is therefore important to discuss the rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) that govern such operations because one of the main objectives of this body of law is to protect the civilian population from the effects of warfare. This article seeks to address some of the questions that arise when applying IHL – a body of law that was drafted with traditional kinetic warfare in mind – to cyber technology. The first question is: when is cyber war really war in the sense of ‘armed conflict’? After discussing this question, the article goes on to look at some of the most important rules of IHL governing the conduct of hostilities and the interpretation in the cyber realm of those rules, namely the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution. With respect to all of these rules, the cyber realm poses a number of questions that are still open. In particular, the interconnectedness of cyber space poses a challenge to the most fundamental premise of the rules on the conduct of hostilities, namely that civilian and military objects can and must be distinguished at all times. Thus, whether the traditional rules of IHL will provide sufficient protection to civilians from the effects of cyber warfare remains to be seen. Their interpretation will certainly need to take the specificities of cyber space into account. In the absence of better knowledge of the potential effects of cyber warfare, it cannot be excluded that more stringent rules might be necessary.

The Churches, the State and Modern War

Worldview ◽  
1968 ◽  
Vol 11 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 3-4
Author(s):  
J. F.
Keyword(s):  
Spiritual Care ◽  
Military Service ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
International Affairs ◽  
World Council Of Churches ◽  
Care And Support ◽  
World Council ◽  
Modern Warfare ◽  
The Military ◽  
Modern War

At its meeting in Uppsala, Sweden this summer, the World Council of Churches endorsed a principle that invites prolonged national discussion. With only a few negative votes, the 720 delegates adopted a resolution that endorses selective conscientious objection. The pertinent section from the 4,000 word statement entitled “Towards Justice and Peace in International Affairs” reads as follows:“Protection of conscience demands that the churches should give spiritual care and support not only to those serving in armed forces but also to those who, especially in the light of the nature of modern warfare, object to participation in particular wars they feel bound in conscience to oppose, or who find themselves unable to bear arms or to enter the military service of their nations for reasons of conscience. Such support should include pressure to have the law changed where required.”

scholarly journals THE STRUCTURING OF ORGANIZATIONAL AND DOCTRINE OF STATE DEFENSE IN FACING HYBRID WARFARE

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 309
Author(s):  
Novky Asmoro ◽  
Andi Sutomo ◽  
Teguh Haryono ◽  
Rizki Putri
Keyword(s):  
Descriptive Analysis ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
White Paper ◽  
National Defense ◽  
National Interests ◽  
Hybrid Warfare ◽  
Unconventional Warfare ◽  
The Face ◽  
Hybrid Threats ◽  
Military Campaign

<div><p class="Els-history-head">Defense Doctrine and Strategy are designed to be able to synergize the performance of military and non-military components to protect and maintain Indonesia's national interests. The current doctrine of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) Military Campaign is still dominant in dealing with military threats, even though based on the 2018 Indonesian Defense White Paper, the TNI must also be able to deal with hybrid threats. With its adaptive nature to changing threats, problems will arise if the military campaign doctrine has not accommodated the TNI's strategy and way of acting in dealing with hybrid threats. The defense doctrine must be able to accommodate the integration of military and non-military components is facing various types of warfare and threats such as military threats, non-military threats, and hybrid threats. Especially for the kind of hybrid threats namely cyber threats, terrorism, and other unconventional threats. Through an analytical descriptive analysis based on qualitative methods, it is hoped that the proper organization and doctrine will be disentangled in the face of this model war. Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) as the war organizations that prioritize a modern universal perspective are a necessity as one of the efforts offered. This needs to be supported by the doctrine of national defense which accurately defines how an effort against hybrid warfare can transform from conventional to unconventional warfare and the actors involved.  Military or TNI organizations that prioritize a modern universal perspective are supported by the doctrine of national defense which accurately maps how an effort against hybrid warfare could transform from conventional warfare to unconventional.</p></div>

scholarly journals Hybrid and cyber warfare - international problems and joint solutions

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 23-48
Author(s):  
Darko Trifunović ◽  
Darko Obradović
Keyword(s):  
Public Diplomacy ◽  
Political Leadership ◽  
Cultural Barriers ◽  
Cyber Warfare ◽  
Hybrid Warfare ◽  
The Balkans ◽  
State Apparatus ◽  
Administrative Employees ◽  
Hybrid War ◽  
Media Narratives

Hybrid warfare is a significant threat to National Security and Countries in last 10 years. Hybrid activities are not new, but environment of cyberspace is completely different than before. We are witnessing a great expansion of the aforementioned fifth combat space, which knows no borders, fences, social or cultural barriers. Hybrid war as a form of endangering the security of sovereign states is primarily based on subversive activities in order to paralyze the state apparatus with the ultimate goal of changing the political leadership. This change of political leadership in the earlier period of history was far simpler and most often began and ended with armed aggression, the use of armed rebellion, or a coup. As modern societies increasingly turn to reliable alliances, mechanisms of collective security, conventional methods have become for quite some time less effective and outdated. The use of disinformation as an integral method of Hybrid Warfare has its roots in the concept of "ideological subversion". Ideological subversion is a term firstly defined by KGB in 1970th. KGB invented “Ideological subversion” as a tool of special warfare against civilians and administrative employees. To make it easier to follow the case study, the authors of the Hybrid War operation divide it into four phases: Demoralization, Destabilization, Crisis, and Stabilization. For Russia, the Balkans hold significant historic, cultural, and religious connections—shared ties that are actively propagated, and at times exaggerated, by Russian public diplomacy efforts and media narratives.

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES AS STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN HYBRID WARFARE

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 408-412
Author(s):  
Laurenţiu GRIGORE
Keyword(s):  
Critical Infrastructures ◽  
Hybrid Warfare ◽  
Strategic Objectives ◽  
Hybrid Nature ◽  
Future War

Abstract:  The current and future war is of hybrid nature, in which military actions are complementary to actions of economical, political, ideological and diplomatic nature. In this communication, I refer to the domains in which we encounter critical infrastructures and I demonstrate that these critical infrastructures are objectives of strategic importance for both the defender and the attacker.

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