scholarly journals Research on Behavior Incentives of Prefabricated Building Component Manufacturers

Information ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (7) ◽  
pp. 284
Author(s):  
Pinbo Yao ◽  
Hongda Liu
Keyword(s):  
Incremental Cost ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Development Stage ◽  
Mature Stage ◽  
Positive Externalities ◽  
Initial Stage ◽  
Material Component ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost

Based on the positive externalities of prefabricated buildings, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between the government and material component vendors and analyzes the changes in the behavior of the government and component vendors in different stages of the advancement of prefabricated buildings. Based on data modeling and equation prediction analysis, it can be found that the expansion of the incremental cost of construction at the initial stage inhibits the enthusiasm of the government. Thus, the government’s incentive behavior effectively affects the behavior of component vendors, and fiscal taxation and punishment policies will promote component vendors to provide prefabricated components. In the development stage, the government’s fiscal policy influence that weakens and affects component vendors’ behavior mainly comes from the incremental costs and benefits of components. Additionally, the difference between the builder’s incremental cost and the sales revenue narrowed. At this time, the behavior prediction of both parties tends to be steady. In the mature stage, prefabricated buildings will mainly rely on market forces, and the government can gradually withdraw from the market. The cost variable tends to be lower, and it can be predicted that component vendors tend to supply components, while the government tends to restrict policies.

Media Capture and Bias in the Market for News

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Abhra Roy
Keyword(s):  
Media Bias ◽  
The State ◽  
Actual State ◽  
Noisy Signal ◽  
Free Press ◽  
State Of The Economy ◽  
The Media ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost

Abstract We analyze a model of media bias under government capture and a free press. The government wants citizens to invest in a project. Citizens gain from investing only if the state of the economy is good. The state is unobserved. The media firm receives a noisy signal about the actual state and makes a report about whether or not the state of the economy is good. Citizens read the report and decide whether or not to invest. In this context, we show that media bias under government capture may be smaller (greater) than that under free press if the cost of investment is sufficiently high (low) provided that the signal noise is below a certain threshold. Finally, we show that the difference between the bias under government capture and free press diverges (converges) when the cost of investment is sufficiently high (low) in response to a reduction in noise.

scholarly journals Subject Behavior of Collaborative Innovation in Civil-Military Integration: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Xiaodi Xu ◽  
Zilong Wang ◽  
Yongfeng Zhu ◽  
Xiaochun Luo
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Absorption Capacity ◽  
Technology Spillover ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Government

Based on the evolutionary game mode, this study constructs the evolutionary game model of collaborative innovation in civil-military integration considering the reward-punishment mechanism of the government. The subject behavior of core enterprises and noncore enterprises in the collaborative innovation of civil-military integration is investigated from a microperspective. The results suggest that the key factors influencing the enthusiasm of enterprises to participate in collaborative innovation are the level of technology spillover, technology absorption capacity, the share of excess benefits, the reward for active participation in collaborative innovation, and the punishment for passive participation. The game evolution result of the two parties will converge to (actively participate in collaborative innovation, actively participate in collaborative innovation) when the government rewards obtained by the party actively participating in collaborative innovation exceed the technology spillover loss and the excess benefits exceed the difference between the acquired technology spillover and the penalty for passive participation. These findings may provide a decision-making reference for the government to formulate the strategy of collaborative innovation in civil-military integration.

scholarly journals The difference between the magnetic diurnal variations on ordinary and quiet days at Kew Observatory

1915 ◽  
Vol 91 (630) ◽  
pp. 370-381
Keyword(s):  
Magnetic Force ◽  
Mean Value ◽  
Magnetic Elements ◽  
New Material ◽  
The Mean ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Government ◽  
Government Grant ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Large Disturbance

§1. While investigating the nature of the diurnal inequality of the magnetic elements at Kew Observatory, I have discovered a somewhat remarkable relationship between the inequalities derived respectively from quiet days and from ordinary days ( i. e. all days expert those of large disturbance). The period whose records were employed consisted of the 11 years 1890 to 1900. During that period five days were selected for each month by the Astronomer Royal as typical of quiet conditions. An analysis of the diurnal inequalities at Kew on these days was given in an earlier paper. Use is also made of the diurnal inequalities derived from 209 disturbed days, being the days of principal disturbance from 1890 to 1900. The new material employed consists of diurnal inequalities based on all the days of the 11 years, excluding the 209 highly disturbed days but including the quiet days. The cost of measuring the curves was defrayed by a grand from the Government Grant Committee. The diurnal variation in the horizontal components of magnetic force is often advantageously studied by considering the vector which represents the force to whose action the departure from the mean value for the day may be ascribed.

scholarly journals Agricultural cooperatives participating in vegetable supply chain integration: A case study of a trinity cooperative in China

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. e0253668
Author(s):  
Lu Wang ◽  
Jianli Luo ◽  
Yuxia Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Rural China ◽  
Development Stage ◽  
Supply Chain Integration ◽  
Mature Stage ◽  
Agricultural Cooperatives ◽  
Start Up ◽  
Actor Networks ◽  
The Government ◽  
Internal Integration

Supply chain integration plays an important role in the development of the vegetable industry in terms of vegetable quality, vegetable safety, and vegetable security in rural China. This paper explores how agricultural cooperatives integrate the vegetable supply chain by taking a trinity cooperative as an example in China. It explains the translation concatenation of supply chain integration for this cooperative by constructing actor networks in four development stages, including the seed stage, start-up stage, development stage, and mature stage. The findings show that supply chain integration in production cooperation, supply & sales cooperation, and credit cooperation is a useful trinity cooperative model of supply chain integration for investigating vegetable supply chain integration through internal integration and external integration. This paper suggests that cooperatives in the vegetable supply chain should facilitate close coordination among different shareholders and further improve the efficiency of supply chain integration. The government should provide training opportunities and funding to encourage cooperatives to participate in supply chain integration within the vegetable industry.

scholarly journals PENERAPAN STRUKTUR PONDASI TITIK SEBAGAI PENGGANTI PONDASI BATU BATA DALAM UPAYA PENCAPAIAN BIAYA YANG LEBIH EKONOMIS (STUDI KASUS RUMAH JABATAN PUSKESMAS KUMBE KABUPATEN MERAUKE)

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (01) ◽  
pp. 10-17
Author(s):  
Biatma Syanjayanta ◽  
Hilarius Chandra Syanjayakusuma ◽  
Julvan Rifai Patiekom
Keyword(s):  
Structure Design ◽  
Design Model ◽  
Soil Conditions ◽  
Literature Study ◽  
Total Length ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Government ◽  
Sand And Gravel ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Foundation Structure

Merauke Regency is a coastal area with muddy soil conditions, Merauke district is a very rare area of sand and gravel material, because of these conditions the community and housing business actors use red brick as a foundation structure material for houses, especially simple housing. Meanwhile, generally red bricks have a non-structural function.In this study the author tries to plan and compare costs in terms of the design model of the continuous foundation structure of red bricks with a point structure design model, in order to achieve a safe, comfortable and economical design result.This research was conducted by direct observation (survey) to the research location, namely in the Kumbe health center, Malind district, Merauke district. In addition, the author also conducted a literature study on the standards of prices and wages in the related institutions, analyzed the prices of the plan drawings, concluded the results of the research so that it became an input for the government / related agencies and the community.From the results of this study, it can be concluded that there is a very significant price difference. The difference reaches Rp. 14,670,000.00, where the design of a continuous foundation with a total length of its foundation is 60,953 M1, the cost reaches Rp. 41,120,000.00. While the design of the point foundation with the same total length, the cost only reaches Rp. 26,450,000.00.   Kata kunci : Struktur Pondasi Titik., Estimasi Teknis., Struktur Pondasi Menerus.

scholarly journals Evolutionary game analysis of environmental pollution control under the government regulation

2022 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kui Zhou ◽  
Qi Wang ◽  
Junnan Tang
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Incentive Strategies ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Reward And Punishment

AbstractThis paper studied a tripartite evolutionary game of stakeholders in environmental pollution control. Most previous studies on this issue are limited to a focus on system dynamics with two-party game problems and lack a spatial analysis of strategy evolution. The parameters adopted are too few, and the influencing factors considered are too simple. The purpose of the paper is to introduce more parameters to study, which will have an important impact on the strategy choices of participants and the evolution path of the strategy over time. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of sewage enterprises, governments and the public. We establish a payment matrix and replicator equations as our method, and we also implement parameter simulations in MATLAB. In summary, we found that the reward and punishment mechanism plays an important role in environmental pollution control. Specifically: intensifying rewards and penalties will help encourage sewage enterprises to meet the discharge standard and the public to participate in pollution control action. However, increased rewards will reduce government's willingness to adopt incentive strategies; Government's reward for public's participation in the action must be greater than the increased cost of participation; Reducing the cost of sewage enterprise can also encourage them to implement standard emissions. The research presented in this paper further improves standard emissions and designs reasonable reward and punishment mechanism.

scholarly journals Analisis Kebijakan Program Peremajaan Sawit Rakyat Melalui Badan Pengelola Dana Perkebunan Kelapa Sawit (BPDPKS) Di Kabupaten Labuhanbatu Selatan.

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-147
Author(s):  
Jannes Maringan Siahaan ◽  
Tumpal H.S. Siregar ◽  
Elisabeth Siahaan
Keyword(s):  
Oil Palm ◽  
Government Funding ◽  
Maintenance Period ◽  
Land Area ◽  
Structured Interviews ◽  
Average Value ◽  
Program Policy ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost

his study aims to analyze the policies of the community oil palm rejuvenation program through the oil palm plantation fund management agency (BPDPKS) in South Labuhanbatu Regency. The data analyzed were obtained from the research location in Aek Raso Village, Torgamba Subdistrict, South Labuhanbatu Regency by conducting structured interviews with 165 farmers who applied for aid. This rejuvenation program policy has requirements consisting of administrative aspects and financing aspects. Research shows that the value of aid funds provided by the government in implementing oil palm rejuvenation has not been able to support the costs required. The percentage of farmers who have 2 ha of land area is 78.8% while those who have 4 ha of land area are 21.2%, the age of productive farmers is 68% while 32% of age is not productive. Farmers who have a legality of land as much as 36% and who are not legal as much as 64%. This policy has not been specific to the location proven from the data of 282 farmers who are members of the Gapoktan, there are 16% have not been able to take advantage of the policy. Costs needed by farmers from the beginning of planting until the maintenance period of the 3rd year is Rp. 60,364,349. Through indicative costs set by the government of Rp. 66,437,000, the difference in average value of farmers' needs is less than that set by the government, which is valued at Rp. 6,072,651, or 9.14%. Based on government funding of Rp. 25,000,000, - / ha / farmer then to meet the cost of rejuvenation of oil palm, farmers need matching funds with an average value of Rp35,364,349 / ha / farmer or 59% of the total funds.

Chinese Green Building Government Incentive Method Research of the Basic Incremental Cost View

2015 ◽  
Vol 744-746 ◽  
pp. 2277-2280
Author(s):  
Jing Fei Li ◽  
Yu Jia Li ◽  
Jie Wang
Keyword(s):  
Life Cycle ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Incremental Cost ◽  
Government Policy ◽  
Green Building ◽  
Positive Externalities ◽  
Life Cycle Perspective ◽  
The Government ◽  
Whole Life Cycle

According to the positive externalities and pre-public goods attribute of Chinese Green Building, it is freely to give the benefit to society, the government needs to make a policy to help the Green Building become internalization for decreasing the incremental cost, and improve the development of the Green Building. Basic the analyzing of economics of Green Building properties, and the incremental cost in whole life cycle perspective to give some government policy for reducing the incremental cost. It can provide the preference of the guidance of Green Building for government, and improving the development of Green Building.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of Chinese Food Quality considering Effort Levels

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Song Yang ◽  
Jincai Zhuang ◽  
Aifeng Wang ◽  
Yancai Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Food Quality ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
Initial Strategy ◽  
Food Quality And Safety ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost

Food safety accidents occur frequently, which has caused great harm to people’s health. With the consideration that food quality requires the joint efforts of all members of the food supply chain and that quality-improving efforts for food have a positive external effect, we focus on the quality-improving effort level, which is very important for food quality and safety. This paper builds an evolutionary game model and employs the replicated dynamic equation to study evolutionarily stable strategies of suppliers and producers. Furthermore, simulation experiments are conducted to verify the modeling analyses and demonstrate the influences of game parameters. The research results show that the behavioral strategies are closely related to the factors such as the ratios of the input to the output, the cost of quality-improving efforts, the hitchhiking benefits, and the initial strategy. Only when the punishing dynamics of the government exceeds a certain value, both participants can choose the quality-improving effort strategy. Based on the results, this paper has provided some inspiration for policy-making of government institutions.

scholarly journals Exploration of the difference in results of economic submissions to the National Institute of Clinical Excellence by manufacturers and assessment groups

2007 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deven Chauhan ◽  
Alec H. Miners ◽  
Alastair J. Fischer
Keyword(s):  
Cost Effectiveness ◽  
Incremental Cost ◽  
Clinical Excellence ◽  
Economic Evaluations ◽  
Technology Appraisal ◽  
Single Technology Appraisal ◽  
Cost Estimates ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Cost

Objectives:A recent study showed that estimates of cost-effectiveness submitted to National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) by manufacturers had significantly lower incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) than those submitted by university-based Assessment Groups. This study extends that analysis.Methods:Data were abstracted from relevant NICE documentation for thirty-two of eighty-two possible appraisals.Results:The results from the analysis showed that sources of the difference in ICERs appear to be the effectiveness estimates relating to the comparator technology and the cost estimates relating to the technology under evaluation. That is, manufacturers estimated lower average benefits for the comparator technology and lower costs relating to the technology under evaluation compared with estimates submitted by the Assessment Groups.Conclusions:These findings may be particularly important, given the introduction of the “Single Technology Appraisal.” Considerable difficulties were encountered when undertaking this study, highlighting, above all else, the complexity of explaining why results from economic evaluations purporting to answer the same question diverge.

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