scholarly journals Research on Strategy Control of Taxi Carpooling Detour Route under Uncertain Environment

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Zhang ◽  
Ruichun He ◽  
Qiang Xiao ◽  
Changxi Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Travel Time ◽  
Traffic Congestion ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Success Probability ◽  
Route Choice ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Uncertain Environment

For the problem of route choice in taxi carpooling detour, considering the uncertainty of traffic and the characteristic of passengers’ noncomplete rationality, an evolutionary game model of taxi carpooling detour route is built, in which prospect theory is introduced and revenue of strategy is replaced by prospect value. The model reflects more really decision-making psychology of passengers. Then the stable strategies of the model are studied, and the influences of detour distance and traffic congestion on detour carpooling success are analyzed, respectively. The results show that when at least one route of which prospect values for two passenger sides are both positive exists, carpooling route can reach an agreement. The route is stable strategy of evolutionary game, and the passengers requiring short travel time tend to select the nondetour route. With the increase of detour distance and traffic congestion rate, the possibility of reaching an agreement decreases gradually; that is, possibility of carpooling failure increases. So taxi carpooling detour is possible under the certain condition, but some measures must be carried out such as constraints of detour distance and mitigation of traffic congestion to improve carpooling success probability. These conclusions have a certain guiding significance to the formulation of taxi carpooling policy.

scholarly journals Research on the Collaborative Application of BIM in EPC Projects: The Perspective of Cooperation between Owners and General Contractors

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Chengshuang Sun ◽  
Min Wang ◽  
Fengyong Zhai
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Simulation ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Dynamic Method ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
Game Model ◽  
General Contractors ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
Reducing Costs ◽  
Collaborative Application

As an effective way to reduce costs and increase efficiency of EPC projects, BIM technology has drawn a lot of attention in numerous countries. Existing studies have failed to reveal the BIM decision-making mechanisms of owners and general contractors in EPC projects in a dynamic method. This study investigates the underlying logic of the collaboration application of BIM by analyzing the dynamic behaviors of owners and general contractors based on evolutionary game model. The results show that the most effective suggestions to promote the BIM collaboration application in EPC projects are “increasing the proportion of BIM application initially strategies,” “increasing incremental revenue of BIM collaborative application,” “reducing costs of BIM collaboration application,” “avoiding excessive hitchhiking,” and “establishing reasonable reward and punishment mechanism.” On the basis of numerical simulation to illustrate the influence of the different initial strategies and parameters on the final decision in different situations, five solutions were proposed for the effective BIM collaboration application between owners and general contractors. This article can facilitate researchers pondering the dynamics of collaboration among stakeholders in projects, and it can also facilitate participants picking up proper strategies for improved collaboration.

scholarly journals Evaluation of the Quality Supervision System for Construction Projects in China Considering the Quality Behavior Risk Transmission

Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (10) ◽  
pp. 1660
Author(s):  
Jingchun Feng ◽  
Yuting Wang ◽  
Ke Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Construction Projects ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Evolutionary System ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Supervision System ◽  
System A ◽  
Low Efficiency ◽  
The Stability

In construction projects, improper quality behavior of a participant results in quality behavior risks, which can transmit to the downstream participants and may cause detrimental effects on the quality of the entity finally constructed. Controlling the transmission of quality behavior risks is the key to effectively supervising and ensuring the quality of construction projects. In this study, the effectiveness of the quality supervision system of construction projects in China was investigated by considering the transmission of quality behavior risks. A multi-player evolutionary game model consisting of the players of quality supervision of a government department, upstream participant (UP), and downstream participant (DP) was generated. By using the system dynamics theory, the game model was simulated to determine the stability of the evolutionary system and to evaluate the effectiveness of China’s current quality supervision system under different scenarios. The results showed that there is no evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in the evolutionary system of the current quality supervision system in China and there are fluctuations in the evolution process. It revealed that high risk exists in the current quality supervision system in China. To resolve the problem of the low efficiency of the current Chinese supervision system, a dynamic penalty and incentive method is developed, which has been proven to be able to effectively control the quality behavior risks in construction projects and hence ensuring the quality of the entity finally constructed.

scholarly journals An Incentive Mechanism for Reporting Phishing E-Mails Based on the Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Mengli Wang ◽  
Lipeng Song
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolution Process ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Important Link ◽  
E Mail

The human is considered as the important link in the phishing attack, and the e-mail security provider encourages users to report suspicious e-mails. However, evidence suggests that reporting is scarce. Therefore, we study how to motivate users to report phishing e-mails in this paper. To solve the problem, a tripartite evolutionary game model among e-mail security providers, e-mail users, and attackers is constructed. We obtain the desired evolutionary stable strategy through solving the replicator dynamics equations. Moreover, the evolution process to the desired evolutionary stable strategy is derived, which can guide the e-mail security provider to make a reasonable incentive mechanism. Lastly, we experiment with a large real-world e-mail network. The experiment results show that our model is effective and practical.

scholarly journals Green Product Quality Supervision Strategy in Online Shopping With Consumer Evaluation and Complaint

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hui He ◽  
Siyi Zhang ◽  
Lilong Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Product Quality ◽  
Online Shopping ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategy ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Green Product ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Strategy Combination

Green consumption is an important foundation for achieving stable and long-term economic development goals. With the rapid development of e-commerce and people’s widespread attention to sustainability, more and more consumers purchase green products online. Therefore, we consider consumer feedback mechanisms including evaluation and complaint and construct an evolutionary game model of green product quality supervision with the participation of governmental supervision department, third-party e-commerce platform, online seller and consumer, which analyzes the four parties’ evolutionary stable strategies. To verify the theoretical results, we conduct a numerical simulation by Matlab 2020b. Moreover, we study the conditions that make evolutionary stable strategy combination exist based on Lyapunov’s First Method. And we find that when consumer chooses complaint, (0, 0, 1) is likely to become an only evolutionary stable strategy combination. At this time, the online seller chooses to provide high-quality green product, third-party e-commerce platform chooses not to strengthen inspection, and governmental supervision department chooses to strictly supervise. Conversely, when the consumer chooses no complaint, (1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 1) may become an evolutionary stable strategy combination. At this time, the online seller cannot be stable in providing high-quality green product. What’s more, governmental supervision department increases the penalty, which can incentivize a third-party e-commerce platform to strengthen inspection. Third-party e-commerce platform increases the reward and can promote online seller to provide high-quality green product. On the one hand, this paper enriches the theoretical basis of online shopping green product quality supervision. On the other hand, compared with existing literature, it extends the main body of the evolutionary game to four paries and broadens the application scope of the game model. In addition, it has put forward feasible suggestions for the government supervision department to strengthen the quality supervision, and provided decision-making support for the third-party e-commerce platform to assume the responsibility of quality inspection.

scholarly journals Research on Taxi Driver Strategy Game Evolution with Carpooling Detour

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Zhang ◽  
Ruichun He ◽  
Changxi Ma ◽  
Mingxia Gao
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Traffic Congestion ◽  
Strategy Choice ◽  
Taxi Driver ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Strategy Game ◽  
Evolution Game

For the problem of taxi carpooling detour, this paper studies driver strategy choice with carpooling detour. The model of taxi driver strategy evolution with carpooling detour is built based on prospect theory and evolution game theory. Driver stable strategies are analyzed under the conditions of complaint mechanism and absence of mechanism, respectively. The results show that passenger’s complaint mechanism can effectively decrease the phenomenon of driver refusing passengers with carpooling detour. When probability of passenger complaint reaches a certain level, the stable strategy of driver is to take carpooling detour passengers. Meanwhile, limiting detour distance and easing traffic congestion can decrease the possibility of refusing passengers. These conclusions have a certain guiding significance to formulating taxi policy.

Behavior Analysis of Together-Conspired Bidding Based on the Evolutionary Game

2012 ◽  
Vol 209-211 ◽  
pp. 1513-1516
Author(s):  
Qian Li
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Behavior Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Theoretical Basis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Research Work ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Periodic Fluctuation ◽  
Construction Market

Based on the “replication dynamics” ideas, the paper establishes asymmetric evolutionary game model of together-conspired bidding using evolutionary game theory, and obtains its evolutionary stable strategy under the present governmental supervision that surround-bidder and accompanying-bidder’s proportion is periodic fluctuation of the center stability, explains the reason why together-conspired bidding is difficult to be prevented effectively. In order to find the decisive factor of the evolutionary drift, further investigation shows that the evolutionary drift is converged to the different evolutionary stable properties when evolution conditions change, such as the supervision target, supervision strength. Through the analysis to the punishment extent on surround-bidder and accompanying-bidder, the conclusion is arrived that the strength of punishment and execution on the surround-bidder can effectively control together-conspired bidding, which provides the theoretical basis to governmental supervision department for the management and research work on together-conspired bidding in the construction market.

scholarly journals The Decision-Making Analysis on End-of-Life Vehicle Recycling and Remanufacturing under Extended Producer Responsibility Policy

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (20) ◽  
pp. 11215
Author(s):  
Syed Abdul Rehman Khan ◽  
Danish Iqbal Godil ◽  
George Thomas ◽  
Muhammad Tanveer ◽  
Hafiz Muhammad Zia-ul-haq ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Expected Profit ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Game Model ◽  
The Third ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategies ◽  
Dual Cycle ◽  
The Government

This research develops a dual-cycle ELV recycling and remanufacturing system to better understand and improve the efficiency of the ELV recycling and remanufacturing businesses. For the flawless operation of this system, the researchers employed evolutionary game theory to establish a game model between original vehicle manufacturers (OVMs) and third-party recyclers with the government involved. This research presents evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) that could promote an ELV recycling and remanufacturing system. Results show that OVMs’ expected profit difference between choosing and not choosing authorization is crucial in their ESS. The licensing fee plays a part of OVMs’ expected profit difference. Based on the results, optimal ESS could be achieved when the OVMs’ expected profit difference between choosing authorization and not choosing authorization and the third-party recyclers’ profit when paying the licensing fee are both positive. Then, the two groups’ involvement in dual-cycle ELV recycling and the remanufacturing system can be ensured. This research implicates the government to devise appropriate reward and punishment strategy to encourage OVMs and third-party recyclers to collaborate for efficient recycling and remanufacturing systems. Particularly, the government is suggested to impose strict restrictions on OVMs to carry ELV recycling and provide support to promote recycling quantity standards. Hence, the ELV recycling and remanufacturing system would be strengthened, thus improving waste management which is crucial for both environmental and resource efficiency.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of Firms’ Technological Strategic Choices: A Perspective of the Behavioral Biases

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Yingqing Zhang ◽  
Ruguo Fan ◽  
Ming Luo ◽  
Mingman Chen ◽  
Jiaqin Sun
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Spillover Effect ◽  
Intellectual Property Protection ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Probability Weighting ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Behavioral Biases

To reveal the mechanisms of firms’ technological strategic choices between innovation and imitation, an evolutionary game model is proposed from the perspective of the behavioral biases. First, behavioral biases such as reference point dependence, loss aversion, and probability weighting can be defined and modeled based on the prospect theory. Second, according to the firm theory, a Cournot or Stackelberg game modeled with a technology spillover effect and intellectual property protection is applied to portray the interaction between firms. Third, an improved evolutionary game model is provided by incorporating behavioral biases into the framework of the decision-making process. Finally, the simulation analysis of some important factors, such as intellectual property protection, patent fees, innovation risks, decision-making attitudes, and consumers’ price preference on firms’ technological strategic choices, is presented. The corresponding results show that (1) innovation risk is an important factor affecting the technological strategic choices of firms, (2) increasing the intellectual property protection and the patent fee for technology transfer can effectively control the spillover effect of technology, (3) there is a partial U-shaped relationship between the consumers’ price preference and innovation, and (4) the behavioral biases such as reference point dependence, loss aversion, and probability weighting will change the perception of payoff and risk and will eventually induce firms to adopt the innovation strategy.

scholarly journals An Evolutionary Game Model on Public Participation in Public-Private Partnerships

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Danrong Song ◽  
Yan Sun ◽  
Yu Fan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Public Participation ◽  
General Public ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Utility ◽  
Public Private Partnerships ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Private Investor ◽  
Cooperative Behaviors ◽  
The Government

Effective participation of the general public in public-private partnerships (PPPs) can coordinate the multidemands of stakeholders and improve the scientificity of decision-making on infrastructure and public utility projects. However, excessive public participation may aggravate the complexity of PPPs and delay the progress of developing PPP projects. Accordingly, the appropriate participation of the general public is essential in the implementation of PPPs. This study examines the boundary conditions and the effective thresholds of public participation in adjusting the cooperative behaviors of both the government and the private investor in PPPs through an analysis of the evolution paths and dynamic balances of the strategy choices between the two parties. The results indicate that public participation in PPPs has the particularity of adjusting the partnership between the two parties. The results also suggest that public participation is not always effective and there are differences in the degree of public participation in the various strategy behaviors in which the government and the private investor choose to cooperate.

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