The plan for a trillion-dollar triad Strategic aircraft and cruise missiles 21 Land-based ICBMs 22 Ballistic-missile submarines 23 Nuclear warheads 24 Nuclear-weapons infrastructure 28

Significance Although North Korea’s nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are still rudimentary by international standards, Pyongyang’s threats of striking targets in the continental United States have more credible technological underpinnings than before. The development of North Korean ICBMs threatens to ‘decouple’ Washington from Seoul and Tokyo, whereby US security commitments to allies become less credible because Pyongyang could attack the US homeland. Impacts Budget battles in Washington preclude extensive investment in mainland US ballistic missile defence systems. However, further integration of Japan and South Korea into the US regional missile defence network is likely. State Department vacancies for ambassadorships and Washington-based Asia policy officials will hinder US reassurance efforts. US interception of North Korean smuggling vessels or overflying missiles risk military-to-military armed clashes.


Significance The Nur satellite was lifted by the two-stage Qased satellite launch vehicle (SLV) into orbit 425 kilometres from earth. This followed a second failed launch in February by the civilian arm of the space programme, which first succeeded in sending a small satellite into orbit in 2009. Although Tehran is still far from possessing a regular launch capability and US Space Command described the satellite as just “a tumbling webcam in space”, US, UK and French officials criticised the move, arguing that the technology could be used to advance Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Impacts US hawks will capitalise on the launch to argue that US adversaries are developing space capabilities that must be countered. Tehran is likely soon to develop cruise missiles finally approaching the 2,000-kilometre range threshold. Iran will focus on fielding missiles with smaller bodies, more manoeuvrable warheads, higher re-entry speeds and lower observability.


2015 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 118-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaganath Sankaran

Pakistan has introduced a new battlefield nuclear weapon, Nasr, into its arsenal. Nasr, a short-range ballistic missile, was first flight-tested in 2011. Pakistani leaders have declared that the weapon is meant to deter India from executing its Cold Start war doctrine. The doctrine was conceived by members of India's army and its strategic community in 2004 as a solution to perceived operational shortcomings of the army in responding to major terrorist incidents involving Pakistanis. It recommends the positioning of smaller army units at the international border with the capability to rapidly invade Pakistan and occupy narrow slices of territory, while denying Pakistan the ability to anticipate the attack and to immediately assemble a counterattack force. The Cold Start war doctrine, however, has since been publicly disavowed by the Indian government, and the Indian army has not reorganized or equipped its troops in a manner consistent with the doctrine. Further, the use of battlefield nuclear weapons inside Pakistan or near the densely populated border regions could potentially cause civilian casualties in the tens of thousands. These factors should dissuade Pakistan from deploying the Nasr missile.


2000 ◽  
Vol 99 (639) ◽  
pp. 339-344
Author(s):  
Celeste A. Wallander

An understanding of Russia's concerns about missile defense “requires an understanding of Russia's new security, military, and foreign policy doctrines; the complex role nuclear weapons play in defense policy; the relationship between Russian conventional and nuclear capabilities; and the priorities for economic reform articulated by President Vladimir Putin's administration.”


Author(s):  
Lucette Santerre

SummaryThe backbone of the legal structure set up to protect us from the use of nuclear weapons, the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), which is a masterpiece of the art of compromise, came into force in March 1971. More than a hundred countries are now Parties to it. The NPT prohibits the transfer of any type of nuclear explosive devices, or of control over such devices, from nuclear-weapons Parties to non-nuclear weapons Parties. However, the Superpowers never intended to transfer such devices or control to other States; they may still possess nuclear weapons on the territories of their non-nuclear allies if they keep control over such arms. For their part, non-nuclear weapons Parties to the NPT committed themselves not to build, or accept transfer or control over, any type of nuclear explosive devices and, in relation to this commitment, to accept safeguards and verifications by the IAEA. Because of the strong commitments imposed to the non-nuclear Parties, the NPT is often regarded as being discriminatory to those States. The gap between nuclear and non-nuclear Parties could be narrowed if the Superpowers gave more importance to another NPT commitment, whereby they undertook, with the other Parties, to pursue negotiations in good faith for the cessation of the arms race and, eventually, for disarmament. However, the SALT talks have brought us cruise missiles and multiple warheads pursuant to the old concept of balance of nuclear power between the USA and the USSR. Will the new START talks and the negotiations on limiting medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe be more productive? The second Conference of the NPT Parties and the Second United Nations special Session on Disarmament both proved disappointing, since no concrete progress was achieved toward non-proliferation objectives.


Author(s):  
C. Dale Walton

This chapter examines how nuclear weapons have influenced international politics, both during and after the cold war. In particular, it distinguishes between the spread of nuclear weapons to more states, which poses an increasing threat to international security, and the decline in the absolute number of nuclear weapons due to the reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. The chapter first provides an overview of the First Nuclear Age — which lasted approximately from 1945 to the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union — before discussing the risks in the Second Nuclear Age. It also considers other contemporary issues such as ballistic missile defences, the cultural dimensions of nuclear weapons acquisition, and the possibility of using nuclear weapons for terrorism. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the prospects for a Third Nuclear Age.


Subject Prospects for North Korea in 2018. Significance 2018 will be Kim Jong-un’s seventh year as supreme leader, a role he inherited on the death of his father Kim Jong-il in December 2011. Turning 34 in January, he has consolidated power and has no known rivals, but he faces grave challenges of his own making: how far and fast to push ahead with nuclear weapons and ballistic missile testing in the face of US threats.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelly Bergstrand ◽  
Christopher Robertson

Abstract This study examines the false ballistic missile alert that occurred in Hawaii in 2018, which presented a unique opportunity for assessing the civic and mobilizing outcomes of a threat. In the days that followed the scare, we conducted an online experiment to investigate its effects on willingness to engage in activism and concerns about broader issues. Our results show that emotions serve as an important mechanism for channeling threat experiences into concern about specific causes. Those most emotionally affected by the missile scare in Hawaii thought it more important to engage in activities to control the spread of nuclear weapons, protect the environment, and address climate change, relative to a control group on the mainland. Both the intensity and type of emotion play a role. These results shed light on the role of threats and grievances in shaping concern about social and environmental issues. They also suggest that emotions may serve as a bridge that can connect personal, concrete, lived-experiences to more abstract, complex, or future-oriented issues and grievances.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-100

On November 29, 2017, North Korea test-fired a ballistic missile that North Korean officials claim can deliver a nuclear warhead to any city in the United States. According to North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un, the missile launch “finally realised” the nation's ambition “of completing the state nuclear force, the cause of building a rocket power.” At the same time, U.S. officials have reiterated that “[t]he United States does not accept a nuclear North Korea.” As a result, North Korea's fast-expanding nuclear weapons program has exacerbated the already fraught relations between the two countries.


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