The Clash of Civilizations in the Syrian Crisis

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (31) ◽  
pp. 302-322
Author(s):  
Shoayb Mohammadi ◽  
Vladyslav Butenko ◽  
Zohreh Ghadbeigi ◽  
Masoumeh Ahangaran

The Syrian crisis may be the beginning of a new conflict of civilizations. Ethnic and religious pluralism is clearly evident in this country: Muslims (Sunnis, Druze, Alawites, Shiites and Ismailis); Christians (Orthodox, Catholics, Maronites, Protestants) and Turkmen and Kurdish ethnic minorities. The Syrian crisis of 2011 seemed to go against the ruling elite (Alawis). With the escalation of the conflict, the country gradually became the scene of a civil war characterized by international dimensions. In this way, the conflict became a multilateral battle in which, on the one hand, the participants in it were the local element in the form of the government of Bashar al-Assad and extremist terrorist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra, ISIL and Ahrar al-Sham; and on the other hand, the United States and its European allies, Saudi Arabia and some States of the Persian Gulf; and Iran and the axis of resistance, as well as Russia and China. Due to the presence of diverse cultures and religions, it appears that this will make the Syrian crisis a prelude to a renewed clash of civilizations. This research seeks to answer these questions: What are the basic propositions of the theory of the clash of civilizations and how is it represented in the Syrian crisis? Since, according to Samuel Huntington, the main sources of the clash of civilizations are the foundation of civilizations, religious and cultural antecedents, and cultural and religious identities. Consequently, they are expressions of the clash of civilizations: the war on terrorism, the Syrian crisis, the rise of ISIL and the presence of US military and international interventions, the competition of regional and transnational powers.

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Jonah Taylor

The Syrian crisis can be the beginning of a new civilization conflict. Ethnic and religious pluralism is clearly evident in this country; Muslims: Sunnis, Duroz, Alawites, Shiites, and Ismailis; Orthodox Christians, Catholics, Maronites, Protestants, and Turkmen and Kurdish ethnic minorities. The Syrian crisis in 2011 appeared to be protesting against the ruling elite (Alawi). Due to the presence of various cultures and religions, it seems that this will make the Syrian crisis a prelude to a renewed clash of civilizations. The present research seeks to answer these questions: What are the basic propositions of the theory of the clash of civilizations and how is it represented in the Syrian crisis? Since according to Samuel Huntington, the foundation of civilizations, religious and cultural backgrounds, and cultural and religious identities are the main source of the clash of civilizations; Therefore, the war on terrorism, the Syrian crisis, the emergence of ISIL and the presence of the US military and international interventions, the competition of regional and trans-national powers, is express the clash of civilizations.


2002 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 161-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry N. George

The Greek words `pharmakon' and `pharmakos' allude to the complex relations between political violence and the health or disorder of the body politic. This article explores analogies of war as disease and contagion, and contrasts these with metaphors of war as politically healthy and medicinal - as in Randolph Bourne's notion of war as `the health of the state'. It then applies these to the unfolding US `War on Terrorism' through the concept of `pharmacotic war', by way of examining the disturbing political implications of both unfolding US military actions abroad and the scapegoating of internal `enemies' within the United States. The article then critiques various strategies for interrupting the momentum towards a catastrophic `clash of civilizations' between the US and the Islamic world, and proposes a strategy of broadly based, grassroots political mobilization for opposing this trend.


2012 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 252-271
Author(s):  
Madoka Fukuda

AbstractThis article examines the substance and modification of the “One-China” principle, which the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursued in the mid 1960s. Under this principle, a country wishing to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC was required first to break off such relations with the Republic of China (ROC). In 1964 the PRC established diplomatic relations with France. This was its first ambassadorial exchange with a Western government. The PRC, in the negotiations over the establishment of diplomatic relations, attempted to achieve some consensus with France on the matter of “One-China”. The PRC, nevertheless, had to abandon these attempts, even though it demanded fewer conditions of France than of the United States (USA), Japan and other Western countries in the 1970s. The PRC had demanded adherence to the “One-China” principle since 1949. France, however, refused to accept this condition. Nevertheless, the PRC established diplomatic relations with France before the latter broke off relations with the ROC. Subsequently, the PRC abandoned the same condition in negotiations with the African governments of the Republic of Congo, Central Africa, Dahomey and Mauritania. After the negotiations with France, the PRC began to insist that the joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations should clearly state that “the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China”. However, France refused to insert these words into the communiqué. Afterwards, the PRC nevertheless insisted on putting such a statement into the joint communiqués or exchanges of notes on the establishment of diplomatic relations with the African countries mentioned above. This was done in order to set precedents for making countries accede to the “One-China” principle. The “One-China” principle was, thus, gradually formed in the process of the negotiation and bargaining between the PRC and other governments.


2005 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keir A. Lieber ◽  
Gerard Alexander

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many observers predicted a rise in balancing against the United States. More recently, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 has generated renewed warnings of an incipient global backlash. Indeed, some analysts claim that signs of traditional hard balancing can already be detected, while others argue that in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. grand strategy has generated a new phenomenon known as soft balancing, in which states seek to undermine and restrain U.S. power in ways that fall short of classic measures. There is little credible evidence, however, that major powers are engaging in either hard or soft balancing against the United States. The absence of hard balancing is explained by the lack of underlying motivation to compete strategically with the United States under current conditions. Soft balancing is much ado about nothing: the concept is difficult to define or operationalize; the behavior seems identical to traditional diplomatic friction; and, regardless, specific predictions of soft balancing are not supported by the evidence. Balancing against the United States is not occurring because contemporary U.S. grand strategy, despite widespread criticism, poses a threat to only a very limited number of regimes and terrorist groups. Most countries either share U.S. strategic interests in the war on terrorism or do not have a direct stake in the confict. As such, balancing behavior is likely only among a narrowly circumscribed list of states and actors being targeted by the United States.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 97-103
Author(s):  
Marie C. Jipguep-Akhtar ◽  
Tia Dickerson ◽  
Denae Bradley

In 2020, the United States was shaken by concurrent crises: the COVID-19 pandemic and protests for racial equality. Both crises present significant challenges for law enforcement. On the one hand, the protests for racial equality drew the public’s attention to the criminal justice system’s disparate treatment of Blacks and other people of colour. On the other hand, the pandemic required the expansion of police duties to enforce public health mandates. To ensure compliance, law enforcement may arrest, detain, and even use force to prevent the transmission of communicable diseases that may have an irreversible impact on human health, such as COVID-19. Policing, however, is at a critical point in America. The government is expanding police powers for the sake of public health; all the while, public indignation about police (ab)uses of power has fuelled calls for its defunding. It is therefore important to explore Americans’ views of policing pandemics during periods of social unrest, focusing on the recognition that socio-economic and racial inequities shape perceptions. The data from this project derives from surveys with Americans on the specific topics of race, policing, racial protests, and COVID-19. The study finds that Americans perceive the police as legitimate overall; however, there are divergences based on race, gender, and marital status. These differences may contribute meaningful insights to the current discourse on police legitimacy in America.


1973 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. J. Sharpe

In his celebrated study of American democracy written in 1888, Lord Bryce reserved his most condemnatory reflections for city government and in a muchquoted passage asserted: ‘There is no denying that the government of cities is the one conspicuous failure of the United States. The deficiencies of the National government tell but little for evil on the welfare of the people. The faults of the State governments are insignificant compared with the extravagance, corruption and mismanagement which mark the administration of most of the great cities'sangeetha.


PMLA ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 126 (2) ◽  
pp. 422-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geraldine Heng

[G]reat devastation [was] inflicted on the Iraqi people by the crusader-Zionist alliance. …—World Islamic Front[T]here is a Zionist Crusader war on Islam. … I call on mujahedin and their supporters … to prepare for long war against the Crusader plunderers. …—Osama Bin Laden, “Bin Laden”This war is fundamentally religious. … the most ferocious, serious, and violent Crusade campaign against Islam ever since the message was revealed to Muhammad. …—Osama Bin Laden, “West”[T]his Crusade, this war on terrorism, is gonna take a while.—George W. BushThis is no less than a clash of civilizations—the … reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.—Bernard Lewis, “Roots”In a lead 1990 article for the atlantic monthly, bernard lewis, a well-known historian of islamic studies, conjured the catchphrase “clash of civilizations” to narrate what he saw as fundamental relations of enmity between Islamicate societies and the countries of “the West”—“the West” being shorthand for polities that bear the legacies of Christendom, the Crusades, and the European Enlightenment—since the seventh-century emergence of Islam. Three years later, Samuel Huntington, a well-known political scientist, picked up Lewis's theme and, in an article for Foreign Affairs, embroidered it into a theory of global relations to fill what Huntington saw as the political vacuum that had materialized after the cold war's closure (“Clash”). (In 1945–90, the rhetoric of civilizational clash seemed to have been adequately, if temporarily, filled by superpower contests between the United States and the Soviet Union and their allies/surrogates.)


2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
CURTIS H. MARTIN

The loss of life that resulted from the sinking of the fisheries training vessel Ehime Maru by the nuclear submarine USS Greeneville off Hawaii in February 2001 exemplifies the risks to United States–Japan alliance relations posed by US global military deployments. Following a pattern of incidents involving the US military in Japan itself, the collision violated Japanese expectations of benevolence from its stronger partner and put considerable pressure on the government to seek public apology and reassurance. This article examines the interplay of culture, national security interests and domestic politics in framing both perceptions and diplomacy during the crisis. While differences at both the cultural and security levels complicated diplomacy, asymmetry in the respective domestic political stakes, combined with overriding and largely congruent security interests, helped the United States to provide Japan with the requisite reassurance. After a decade of alliance drift, both Japan and the United States were determined to forestall defection by their alliance partner.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 203
Author(s):  
Robert Pustoviit ◽  
Oleg Kuklin ◽  
Mykhailo Kryvoruchko

Relevance. Kleptocratic economy, as an institutional system, is oriented towards a key function that involves gaining wealth by the ruling elite through the introduction of non-market transaction costs for companies and households, which is based on administrative, bureaucratic, and political violence. For this purpose, the kleptocratic states create such systems of state institutional management that give the authorities the possibility of rent-oriented behaviour, which impedes the functioning of the real sector of the economy and encourages the shadow one. Under such circumstances, transaction costs are redirected to administrative intervention into the market mechanism, rather than aimed at increasing its efficiency; property rights are not clearly specified; the level of uncertainty about rules and norms of economic behaviour increases, and the motivational system of business activity is distorted. As a result, on the one hand, inefficient allocation of resources and slow economic growth (decline) are observed, and on the other hand, there is the redistribution of income in favour of the ruling elite and its excessive enrichment, that is detrimental to the welfare of the majority of the population. The aim of the article is to analyse the political-economic formation of a kleptocratic basis, which in the future transforms the state and its economy into kleptocratic formations; defining ways of counteraction and institutional capacity for transformations in the direction of Ukraine’s aspirations for European integration. Methodological basis. The methodological basis of the research is the work of domestic and foreign scientists in the field of institutionalism and kleptocratic economy. The models of the development of a kleptocratic state and the influence of kleptocratic factors on the socio-economic processes in the country have been studied with the application of the method of analysis, systematization, and generalization. Results. It is determined that in order to liquidate the grounds of kleptocratic economy, it is of primary necessity to eliminate institutional obstacles that interfere with the unification of the legal and shadow sectors of the economy and ensure their institutional formalization. This requires the introduction of effective ways of restraining the ruling elite in order to restrict corruption abuses of the government and its close reigning coalition with special privileges and bureaucracies and form an institutional structure, in which firms and households have clearly defined property rights and also have the possibility to protect contractual rights provided by formal institutes. Particular attention should be paid to the ways of civil society’s monitoring the state information policy and methods of adopting laws, which is, the institutional foundation that guarantees the openness of information as to the actions of government institutions. According to the results of the study, definite measures are proposed, the implementation of which will ensure the opportunities for Europeanization, particularly in Ukraine. The emphasis is placed on the fact that the important factors of counteracting the kleptocratic economy are the wage reform and the “transparent” selection of employees in the public administration sector on the basis of their professional qualities only.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 419-448
Author(s):  
Cláudio Júnior Damin

O artigo aborda a relação existente entre guerra e opinião pública nos Estados Unidos. O artigo foca na análise do caso da Guerra do Iraque iniciada em março de 2003 durante os mandatos de George W. Bush. Esse conflito insere-se no contexto dos ataques terroristas de 11 de setembro de 2001, sendo parte constitutiva da chamada “guerra global contra o terrorismo”. A primeira hipótese de trabalho é a de que inicialmente e reproduzindo padrões históricos anteriores, a guerra foi amplamente aprovada pela população norte-americana, processo que se prolongou por alguns meses e influenciou decisivamente para a reeleição do presidente republicano em 2004. Como segunda hipótese assevera-se que, passado algum tempo, o humor da opinião pública sofreu uma inflexão, diminuindo a aprovação popular à guerra e tendo como importante desdobramento a derrota dos republicanos na eleição de 2008, com o conflito ainda em curso. Espera-se mostrar, portanto, como a Guerra do Iraque pode ser dividida em duas fases distintas, sendo a primeira de bônus para o governo de George W. Bush e seus correligionários republicanos e a outra de ônus a partir do crescimento do número de baixas militares norte-americanas e da crise de credibilidade do governo no que concerne às perspectivas de vitória definitiva no conflito.Abstract: The article discusses the relationship between war and public opinion in the United States. The article focuses on the analysis of the case of the Iraq War that began in March 2003 during the administration of George W. Bush. This conflict is within the context of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, being a constituent part of the "Global War on Terrorism." The first hypothesis is that initially and reproducing previous historical standards, the war was widely approved by the American population, a process that was prolonged for a few months and influenced decisively to the re-election of Republican president in 2004. As a second hypothesis asserts that, after some time, the mood of public opinion has undergone a shift, reducing the public approval of the war and with the important effect the defeat of the Republicans in the 2008 election. It is expected, therefore, to show how the Iraq War can be divided into two distinct phases, with the first bonus for the George W. Bush and his fellow Republicans and other liens being from the growing number of U.S. military casualties and the crisis of credibility of the government with regard to the prospects of ultimate victory in the conflict.


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