O papel dos intelectuais numa era de turbulências

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 13-26
Author(s):  
Eduardo C. B. Bittar

O presente artigo aborda a crise de rumos do projeto da modernidade, e é sob este contexto abrangente, do ponto de vista histórico e filosófico, que a pandemia de Covid-19 é analisada. A percepção de que o mundo contemporâneo mergulha no desnorte, na incerteza e na perda de horizontes sociais é analisada, numa perspectiva crítica e propositiva. Com esta proposta, o artigo procura, sobretudo, tratar do papel dos intelectuais, num contexto de crise, acentuando-se a preocupação com a função da palavra. Em face da enorme evidência das Ciências Naturais, ativadas pelo cenário de Covid-19 a oferecerem respostas imediatas, convoca-se, igualmente, à ativação da função que as Ciências Humanas e Sociais, e, também, a Filosofia possuem de atribuírem sentido à experiência de mundo, especialmente em tempos tempestuosos. Defende-se a posição de que a Filosofia tem uma função precípua de defesa do lugar da razão, e, especialmente em contextos tempestuosos, deve representar um lugar reflexivo capaz de ambientar o esclarecimento.   The role of intellectuals in a turbulence era The present article addresses the crisis of directions of the modernity project, and it is under this comprehensive context, from the historical and philosophical point of view, that the Covid-19 pandemic is analyzed. The perception that the contemporary world is plunged into bewilderment, uncertainty and loss of social horizons is analyzed from a critical and purposeful perspective. With this proposal, the article seeks, above all, to deal with the role of intellectuals, in a context of crisis, emphasizing the concern with the function of the word. In view of the enormous evidence from the Natural Sciences, activated by the Covid-19 scenario to offer immediate answers, it is also called upon to activate the function that the Human and Social Sciences, and also Philosophy have to attribute meaning to the experience world, especially in stormy times. It defends the position that Philosophy has a primary function of defending the place of reason, and, especially in stormy contexts, it must represent a reflective place capable of setting the enlightenment. Keywords: Intellectuals. Human and Social Sciences. Pandemic.

Author(s):  
A. V. Sokolov

Natural-science, technocracy and humanistic conceptions of noosphere are considered as the hypothetical future state of society in that Reason will take the priority place. Natural sciences defined the site of noosphere in an evolution of Universe. Now a task to choose the way of transformation of modern civilization in the reasonable shell of Earth, id est noosphere, stands before social sciences. Two ways are possible: technological way of unlimited increase of technical power and humanistic way of inlightening and perfection of man. Both ways are analysed from the point of view of bibliofuturology. Paid attention to the strategic tasks ofRussian Federation, proclaimed by the President Putin. The necessity of the purposeful forming of "noospheric man" as creator and inhabitant of reasonable noosphere is substantiated. The decision role of libraries is shown in this process. Bibliosphere is the primary and central area of noosphere. Studies about a noosphere include bibliofuturology as one of the divisions.


Dreyfus argues that there is a basic methodological difference between the natural sciences and the social sciences, a difference that derives from the different goals and practices of each. He goes on to argue that being a realist about natural entities is compatible with pluralism or, as he calls it, “plural realism.” If intelligibility is always grounded in our practices, Dreyfus points out, then there is no point of view from which one can ask about or provide an answer to the one true nature of ultimate reality. But that is consistent with believing that the natural sciences can still reveal the way the world is independent of our theories and practices.


Author(s):  
Alex Rosenberg

Each of the sciences, the physical, biological, social and behavioural, have emerged from philosophy in a process that began in the time of Euclid and Plato. These sciences have left a legacy to philosophy of problems that they have been unable to deal with, either as nascent or as mature disciplines. Some of these problems are common to all sciences, some restricted to one of the four general divisions mentioned above, and some of these philosophical problems bear on only one or another of the special sciences. If the natural sciences have been of concern to philosophers longer than the social sciences, this is simply because the former are older disciplines. It is only in the last century that the social sciences have emerged as distinct subjects in their currently recognizable state. Some of the problems in the philosophy of social science are older than these disciplines, in part because these problems have their origins in nineteenth-century philosophy of history. Of course the full flowering of the philosophy of science dates from the emergence of the logical positivists in the 1920s. Although the logical positivists’ philosophy of science has often been accused of being satisfied with a one-sided diet of physics, in fact their interest in the social sciences was at least as great as their interest in physical science. Indeed, as the pre-eminent arena for the application of prescriptions drawn from the study of physics, social science always held a place of special importance for philosophers of science. Even those who reject the role of prescription from the philosophy of physics, cannot deny the relevance of epistemology and metaphysics for the social sciences. Scientific change may be the result of many factors, only some of them cognitive. However, scientific advance is driven by the interaction of data and theory. Data controls the theories we adopt and the direction in which we refine them. Theory directs and constrains both the sort of experiments that are done to collect data and the apparatus with which they are undertaken: research design is driven by theory, and so is methodological prescription. But what drives research design in disciplines that are only in their infancy, or in which for some other reason, there is a theoretical vacuum? In the absence of theory how does the scientist decide on what the discipline is trying to explain, what its standards of explanatory adequacy are, and what counts as the data that will help decide between theories? In such cases there are only two things scientists have to go on: successful theories and methods in other disciplines which are thought to be relevant to the nascent discipline, and the epistemology and metaphysics which underwrites the relevance of these theories and methods. This makes philosophy of special importance to the social sciences. The role of philosophy in guiding research in a theoretical vacuum makes the most fundamental question of the philosophy of science whether the social sciences can, do, or should employ to a greater or lesser degree the same methods as those of the natural sciences? Note that this question presupposes that we have already accurately identified the methods of natural science. If we have not yet done so, the question becomes largely academic. For many philosophers of social science the question of what the methods of natural science are was long answered by the logical positivist philosophy of physical science. And the increasing adoption of such methods by empirical, mathematical, and experimental social scientists raised a second central question for philosophers: why had these methods so apparently successful in natural science been apparently far less successful when self-consciously adapted to the research agendas of the several social sciences? One traditional answer begins with the assumption that human behaviour or action and its consequences are simply not amenable to scientific study, because they are the results of free will, or less radically, because the significant kinds or categories into which social events must be classed are unique in a way that makes non-trivial general theories about them impossible. These answers immediately raise some of the most difficult problems of metaphysics and epistemology: the nature of the mind, the thesis of determinism, and the analysis of causation. Even less radical explanations for the differences between social and natural sciences raise these fundamental questions of philosophy. Once the consensus on the adequacy of a positivist philosophy of natural science gave way in the late 1960s, these central questions of the philosophy of social science became far more difficult ones to answer. Not only was the benchmark of what counts as science lost, but the measure of progress became so obscure that it was no longer uncontroversial to claim that the social sciences’ rate of progress was any different from that of natural science.


2009 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 395-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sepehr Ghazinoory ◽  
Reza Ghazinouri

What we must keep in mind is that although nanotechnology is an emerging and high technology, it is still technology or, in other words, it has an instrumental nature and in order to study its effect on societies we have to consider the role of instruments’ evolution in societies and study nanotechnology as the most recent part of this trend. In this article we study the nature of modern technologies, role of technology based economy on different social and political aspects of developing countries; we have a review on the concept of social and political modernity and describe how development of nanotechnology will accelerate those countries’ modernization from social and political point of view in addition to modernizing their economy. So this paper is a cross‐disciplinary study between nanotechnology and social sciences. There are two different scenarios about the future of nanotechnology. One is the proof of radical nanotechnology and the other is the acceptance of the claim that nanotechnology is only an enabling technology. In the present paper, we studied the effects of both scenarios. The obstacles to modernity in Iran and potential effect of nanotechnology on them are studied as a case study. Santrauka Nors nanotechnologija yra nauja ir pažangi technologija, ji tėra tik instrumentas. Norint įvertinti jos reikšmę visuomenei, reikia išnagrinėti panašių instrumentų raidą visuomenėse ir vertinti nanotechnologiją kaip naujausią tendenciją. Šiame straipsnyje ištirta šiuolaikinių technologijų prigimtis, technologijos vaidmuo žinių ekonomikoje skirtingais besivystančių šalių socialiniais ir politiniais periodais, apžvelgtos socialinio ir politinio šiuolaikiškumo sąvokos, apibūdinta, kaip išsivysčiusios nanotechnologijos pagreitins šalių modernizaciją socialiniu ir politiniu požiūriu be jų ekonomikos modernizavimą. Šis straipsnis yra nanotechnologijos ir socialinių mokslų tarpdisciplininė studija. Yra du skirtingi nanotechnologijos ateities scenarijai: pirmasis teigia, kad nanotechnologija sukels radikalių pokyčių; antrasis skelbia, kad nanotechnologija yra tiktai galimybių suteikimo technologija. Šiame straipsnyje tyrinėti abiejų scenarijų padariniai, tirtos kliūtys šiuolaikiškumui Irane įsitvirtinti ir nanotechnologijos poveikis šaliai.


Dialogue ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 297-326
Author(s):  
Stéphane Courtois

AbstractThe general aim of this paper is to question the idea that hermeneutic and critical social sciences have to be conceived as specific embodiments of the scientific enterprise. This idea is rather implicit in Habermas's work, but has its grounds in his thesis about the argumentative unity of all sciences, upheld for the first time in 1973. Such a point of view turns out to be untenable for two reasons. First, the indiscriminating inclusion of the hermeneutic and critical social sciences in scientific enterprise raises problems of consistency with regard to the systematic guidelines of The Theory of Communicative Action. Moreover, the thesis of argumentative unity of the sciences itself is incompatible with Habermas's methodological conception of the role of Verstehen in the social sciences developed in section 1.4 of the book. Finally, the author argues that this conception calls for another understanding of the status and role of the hermeneutic and critical disciplines, which is outlined in some detail.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vladimir Drekalović

Ever since its beginnings, mathematics has occupied a special position among all sciences, natural, as well as social sciences and humanities. It has not only provided a role model in terms of methodology, particularly when it comes to natural sciences, but other sciences have always relied on mathematics extensively both in their development and for solving various open questions. The beginning of the 21st century foregrounded the issue of the so-called explanatory role of mathematics in science. However, the reference literature features only a few examples as illustration of this role. This paper aims at showing that those examples, even though they are used for illustrating precisely the same purpose, also illustrate various explanatory scopes which mathematical tools can reach within a scientific explanation. Some of these examples also show how mathematics, unfortunately, provides false credibility to scientific explanations.


Author(s):  
Osei Yaw Akoto ◽  
Benjamin Amoakohene ◽  
Juliet Oppong- Asare Ansah

Studies have sought to establish the ‘territory of reference’ or ‘patterns of referentialities’ of I, we and you (tri-PP) in academic lectures across disciplinary supercommunities (DSs): Humanities, Social Sciences and Natural Sciences. These studies are largely from L1 context, and also report on only referents common to the three DSs, without giving attention to those at the interface of two DSs. This study, therefore, is the first attempt to examine the referents of the tri-PP at the interface of two DSs in academic lectures, using a corpus from the L2 context. A corpus of over one hundred thousand words was built for the study, and AntConc was used to search for the occurrences of the tri-PP. Drawing on the contexts and co-texts, the authors determined the referents of the tri-PP. It was found that across the tri-PP, some referents were shared by two DSs. The findings further deepen understanding of the ‘pointing’ role of personal pronouns in classroom lecturer talk and “degree of cross-disciplinary diversity…” Keywords: academic lectures, discourse referent, disciplinary variation, personal pronouns


2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Surya Sari Faradiba ◽  
Sikky El Walida

Peranan Statistika sebagai salah satu bidang ilmu yang berfungsi untuk merencanakan, mengumpulkan, menganalisis, menginterpretasi, dan merepresentasikan data sebagai dasar untuk pengambilan keputusan sangat penting bagi perkembangan ilmu pengetahuan dan teknologi. Oleh karena itu, tidak mengherankan jika Statistika banyak digunakan dalam berbagai disiplin ilmu lain, antara lain ilmu alam, ilmu sosial, maupun ilmu humaniora. Mengingat tidak semua pengguna statistika memiliki latar belakang pendidikan Matematika, maka penggunaan alat bantu program SPSS menjadi alternatif yang patut dipertimbangkan. Sayangnya, dalam aplikasinya, pengguna SPSS lebih banyak sekedar mengikuti langkah-langkah prosedural tanpa memahami mengapa mereka melakukan hal tersebut. Dampaknya, pengguna SPSS banyak yang merasa kesulitan dalam melakukan analisis data statistik dan semakin tidak menyukai statistika. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui kondisi kecemasan statistik pada mahasiswa yang menggunakan SPSS. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan mayoritas mahasiswa dalam penelitian ini (n = 105, 73,4%) tidak menunjukkan kecemasan terhadap statistik melalui empat domain utama yang diukur. Tiga puluh satu siswa (21,7%) menunjukkan kecemasan dalam satu domain, empat siswa (2,8%) menunjukkan kecemasan dalam dua domain dan tiga siswa (2,1%) menunjukkan kecemasan dalam tiga domain. Tidak ada siswa dalam penelitian ini yang menunjukkan kecemasan pada keempat domain sekaligus yang diukur. The role of Statistics as one of the fields of science that functions to plan, collect, analyze, interpret, and represent data as a basis for decision making is very important for the development of science and technology. Therefore, it is not surprising that Statistics is widely used in various other disciplines, including natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities. Given that not all statistical users have a Mathematics education background, the use of SPSS program tools is an alternative that should be considered. Unfortunately, in the application, SPSS users are more just following procedural steps without understanding why they are doing it. The impact is that many SPSS users find it difficult to analyze statistical data and increasingly dislike statistics. This study aims to determine statistical anxiety conditions in students using SPSS. The results of this study indicate that the majority of students in this study (n = 105, 73.4%) did not show statistics anxiety through the four main domains measured. Thirty-one students (21.7%) showed anxiety in one domain, four students (2.8%) showed anxiety in two domains and three students (2.1%) showed anxiety in three domains. There were no students in this study who showed anxiety in all four domains as well as being measured.


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