scholarly journals The Research of the Marketing Channel Conflict Based on the Analysis of the Game Theory

2009 ◽  
Vol 3 (8) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying Liu
Author(s):  
Charles Roddie

When interacting with others, it is often important for you to know what they have done in similar situations in the past: to know their reputation. One reason is that their past behavior may be a guide to their future behavior. A second reason is that their past behavior may have qualified them for reward and cooperation, or for punishment and revenge. The fact that you respond positively or negatively to the reputation of others then generates incentives for them to maintain good reputations. This article surveys the game theory literature which analyses the mechanisms and incentives involved in reputation. It also discusses how experiments have shed light on strategic behavior involved in maintaining reputations, and the adequacy of unreliable and third party information (gossip) for maintaining incentives for cooperation.


Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 1443
Author(s):  
Zhiyuan Dong ◽  
Ai-Guo Wu

In this paper, we extend the quantum game theory of Prisoner’s Dilemma to the N-player case. The final state of quantum game theory of N-player Prisoner’s Dilemma is derived, which can be used to investigate the payoff of each player. As demonstration, two cases (2-player and 3-player) are studied to illustrate the superiority of quantum strategy in the game theory. Specifically, the non-unique entanglement parameter is found to maximize the total payoff, which oscillates periodically. Finally, the optimal strategic set is proved to depend on the selection of initial states.


10.5772/6232 ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Meng

This paper proposes a game-theory based approach in a multi–target searching using a multi-robot system in a dynamic environment. It is assumed that a rough priori probability map of the targets' distribution within the environment is given. To consider the interaction between the robots, a dynamic-programming equation is proposed to estimate the utility function for each robot. Based on this utility function, a cooperative nonzero-sum game is generated, where both pure Nash Equilibrium and mixed-strategy Equilibrium solutions are presented to achieve an optimal overall robot behaviors. A special consideration has been taken to improve the real-time performance of the game-theory based approach. Several mechanisms, such as event-driven discretization, one-step dynamic programming, and decision buffer, have been proposed to reduce the computational complexity. The main advantage of the algorithm lies in its real-time capabilities whilst being efficient and robust to dynamic environments.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 122-126
Author(s):  
Aleksandra L. Grinikh ◽  
◽  
Leon A. Petrosyan ◽  

In the paper n-person prisoner's dilemma on the network is investigated. A cooperative game with the pairwise interaction of players is constructed. The model is a modification of the classic 2-person prisoner's dilemma problem in the game theory. Network interaction provide an ability to take into account the in uence only to the adjacent players from the whole set of players. The feature of the game is found that allows to make a decision about necessity of playing dominated strategy by a few players. This solution is based on the number of the adjacent players. The work is a continuation of the paper published earlier by Grinikh A.L. and Petrosyan L.A. in 2021.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 370-379
Author(s):  
Oksana Korolovych ◽  
Olha Chabaniuk ◽  
Natalia Ostapiuk ◽  
Yurii Kotviakovskyi ◽  
Nelia Gut

The conditions for doing business at this stage are often similar in a game in which you need to calculate your actions a few steps ahead. At the same time, it is important to highlight several possible current options and make the necessary decision at the control moment. Moreover, each of the options formed should be justified, understandable and take into account the risk factors and available resources.Today, the main problem of assessing and minimizing the risk of “unfriendly takeover” is due to the fact that in most cases the raider is a player who acts quite legitimately and relies on the loopholes of the current legislative framework. Therefore, it is easier to identify possible actions of the raider and to avoid them within the limits of the reverse game than to deal with the consequences.The purpose of the research is to study the specificity of the individualized assessment and minimization of the risk of “unfriendly takeover” by using elements of game theory.It has been taken into account that the effect of individualization in assessing the risk of unfriendly takeover of enterprises can possibly be achieved on the basis of the application of game theory, the elements of which provide simulation of the unfriendly takeover process within the mathematical description of the inherent combinations of attack/defence as if they actually occurred in time both within one state of the external environment and for their given set.The results allowed forming mathematical decision-making models based on the elements of the antagonistic game “raider-target enterprise” and “raider games with the external environment”, which proved the possibility to: 1) identify possible functions of wins/losses; 2) combinations of attacks that can be neglected (that is, from the point of view of the rationality of decisions, will be rejected by the raider); 3) the ranking of the raider’s “attack combinations” for the reliability of their use during “unfriendly takeover”. Under such conditions, the target company can provide not only a detailed assessment, but also an effective minimization of the risk of “unfriendly takeover” and allocate the best combination of protection.


Author(s):  
Tuğçe Kızıltuğ ◽  
Erdal Dağıstan

It is an important issue for small family businesses, which cannot keep up with the development of technology, you maintain their current position in the competition market and to increase their share of efficiency. Small family businesses meet a need about 80% of food production. Withdrawg these enterprise from the market may bring about a sudden drop in food supply. The aim of this study is to demonstrate to providing marketing training to small family businesses, how farmers can increase skills, production and profitability. Realization of these expectations will be possible with the support of big business or the public. In this study, using the game theory, possible strategies between two players (project founder and farmer) were taken into consideration and the gains to be obtained at each stage were found. As a result, it was concluded that cooperating with the investment institution and the farmer who received the training would increase the profit. This result is underlie of trust, cooperation and organization. Thus, while the production increases, the shortage of qualified personnel will decrease and contribution to employment will be provided. It will also contribute to overcoming technology-related marketing problems.


2021 ◽  
Vol 237 ◽  
pp. 01025
Author(s):  
Yanying Zhang ◽  
Gui Jiang ◽  
Ziwei Yu

The pollution problem of SMEs is an important problem to be solved in the process of China’s economic development. Based on the game theory, this paper takes the government and SMEs as the two sides of the game, constructing the game theory model of pollution control of SMEs, putting forward the strategies to promote the pollution control of SMEs according to the analysis results of the model.


2021 ◽  
pp. 2141012
Author(s):  
Dongping Li ◽  
Yingchun Yang ◽  
Qiang Yue ◽  
Liqi Cheng ◽  
Jie Song ◽  
...  

Clustering is an essential part of data analytics and in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN). It becomes a problem for causes such as insufficient, unavailable, or compromised data in the face of uncertainties. A solution to tackle the instability of clusters due to missed values has been proposed. The fundamental theory determines whether to incorporate an entity into a group if it is not clear and probable. One of the main issues is identifying requirements for three forms of decision definition, including an entity in a cluster, removing an object from a group, or delaying a decision (defer) to involve or rule out a group. Current studies do not adequately discuss threshold identification and use their fixed values implicitly. This work explores using the game theory-based Possibility Clustering Algorithm for Incomplete Data (PCA-ID) framework to address this problem. In specific, a game theory will be described in which thresholds are determined based on a balance between the groups’ precision and generic characteristics. The points calculated are used to elicit judgments for the grouping of unknown objects. Experimental findings on the deep learning datasets show that the PCA-ID increases the overall quality considerably while maintaining comparable precision levels in competition with similar systems.


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