scholarly journals Fiscal Coordinationasthe Key Issue for Functioning Fiscal Federalisam in Multi-Level Countries / Fiskalna koordincija kao ključni faktor funkcioniranja fiskalnog federalizma u složenim državama

Author(s):  
Dinka Antić

According to theory of fiscal federalism the optimum efficiency of the government sector can be ensured only by balancing the degree of centralization and decentralization of fiscal responsibilities between the central and local governments, where a fair distribution of income and economic stability can be provided by the central government, and the efficient use of resources by the local governments. Comparative analysis of the effects of the fiscal decentralization process in the world showed that a different balance of power between central and local governments can threaten the macroeconomic stability of complex countries. In conditions of week central government and strong regional governments, which is the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, fiscal coordination between governments becomes a critical issue of functioning fiscal federalism in complex countries. Theoreticians of the new theory of fiscal federalism, called ‘a second generation theory’, believe that it is necessary to establish an institutional structure that will ensure smooth functioning of fiscal federalism. In that sense fiscal coordination between levels of government is seen as a key tool for running prudent fiscal management in complex countries that can bring the fiscal policy of middle levels of government in line with national fiscal goals.

Yurispruden ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 208
Author(s):  
Fahrul Abrori

 ABSTRAKPandemi Covid-19 yang terjadi di Indonesia membuat pemerintah membuat kebijakan-kebijakan sebagai stimulus untuk menjaga kestabilan masyarakat dan perekonomian. Pemerintah pusat memberikan kewenangan kepada pemerintah daerah untuk mengelola keuangan daerah untuk menangani covid-19 di daerah masing-masing. Hal ini disebabkan karena pemerintah daerah lebih memahami kebutuhan daerahnya. Permasalahan yang diangkat Pertama, bagaimana hubungan Pemerintah Pusat dan Pemerintah Daerah dalam pengelolaan keuangan untuk penanganan pandemi Covid-19? Kedua, Apa peran Pemerintah Daerah dalam pengelolaan keuangan daerah untuk penanganan pandemi Covid-19? Menggunakan metode penelitian yuridis normatif dengan pendekatan perundang-undangan dan pendekatan konsep. Hubungan Pemerintah Pusat dan Pemerintah Daerah dalam Pengelolaan Keuangan untuk Penanganan Pandemi Covid-19 yaitu desentralisasi fiskal yang mana. Peran Pemerintah Daerah dalam Pengelolaan Keuangan Daerah untuk Penanganan Pandemi Covid-19 yaitu dengan melakukan refocusing kegiatan, realokasi anggaran, dan Penggunaan Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah.Kata kunci: Pemerintah Daerah, Pengelolaan Keuangan Daerah, Pandemi Covid-19 ABSTRACTThe Covid-19 pandemic in Indonesia led the government to make policies as a stimulus to maintain the stability of society and the economy. The central government authorizes local governments to manage local finances to deal with covid-19 in their respective regions. This is because the local government better understands the needs of the region. The issue raised first, how is the relationship between the Central Government and Local Government in financial management for the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic? Second, What is the role of local governments in regional financial management for the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic? Using normative juridical research methods with statutory approaches and concept approaches. The relationship between the Central Government and Local Government in Financial Management for the Handling of the Covid-19 Pandemic is fiscal decentralization. The role of local governments in regional financial management for the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic is by refocusing activities, reallocating budgets, and using regional budgets.Keywords: Local Government, Regional Financial Management, Covid-19 Pandemic


2001 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Raksaka Mahi

Indonesia currently adopts a new decentralization policy. In the past, central government had been the major role of regional and cities development. With the new policy, central government has transferred its role in developing cities and regions to the local governments. This policy adopts two complimentary laws. Law No.22/1999, which is basically the devolution policy, has been accompanied by Law No.25/1999, which basically is the fiscal decentralization policy. Both laws reflect that decentralization policy in Indonesia has adopted the concept of "money follows functions".Before the implementation of decentralization policy, the government of cities had been benefited from many facilities built by central government on the city area. With the decentralization policy, it is expected that a reduced role of central government will have a significant impact on the growth of cities in Indonesia. The policy has three major fiscal instruments; a block grant funding, a specific grant and revenue sharing. The block grant funding is considered as the most important instruments of fiscal decentralization in Indonesia. About 80 percent of financial transfer from central to local governments will be in the block grant type of transfer. In the past, the use of transfers was determined by central government specifically. Therefore, the role of block grant was very minimal. With the new fiscal decentralization scheme, the benefits of cities from central government investments are expected to decrease. Therefore, there is a question to what extend the cities will be sustainable in the decentralization era.This paper attempts to answer the impacts of current fiscal decentralization policy on the growth of the cities. The first objective of the paper is to evaluate the current intergovernmental tranfers and their impact to cities revenues. Secondly, by utilizing a regional macroeconometric model, this paper also elaborates the implication of the transfers to the city growth and interregional disparity in Indonesia. 


2010 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Vigvári

The paper discusses the reasons and possible resolutions of the contradictions in the Hungarian local government system, and proposes methods to resolve them. The nature of the Hungarian system cannot be described by classical normative theories of fiscal federalism. The operation of Hungarian local governments is determined rather by the decentralisation of conflicts stemming from the reduction of state responsibilities, and the resulting municipal behaviour. The second generation theory of fiscal federalism pays particular attention to the institutional guarantees of fiscal discipline shown by the lower levels of government sector. Actors in the Hungarian system, a system that functions as a ‘conflict container’, try to offset the financial pressures, weighing heavily on them by borrowing and by contingent liabilities. While central government has transferred new duties to local governments from year to year, it has reduced the amount of fiscal subsidies. Until a long-term comprehensive reform is implemented, consequent risks must be treated in the short run, as well.


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (7) ◽  
pp. 1379-1384
Author(s):  
Cordelia Onyinyechi Omodero

Fiscal decentralization is one of the strategies applied to involve both the national and local governments in environmental management. Although, this study tries to examine its effectiveness in Nigeria which has been ambiguous. Using a multiple regression method, the study examines the effect of revenue fiscal structure on CO2 emission management in Nigeria from 2007 to 2020. Controlling pollution through the fiscal system is exceedingly difficult. According to the t-statistic results, it is only the central government that has a significant favorable influence on pollution management. State and local governments have a minimal impact on CO2 emissions reduction. This outcome leads to a suggestion that resource accumulation powers should be equitable with a higher consideration to the state and local governments which have a greater burden of controlling pollution in the rural areas where majority of the citizens have their abodes. The government at all levels should guarantee that the country's environmental policies and regulations are effectively implemented in order to reduce carbon emissions and other types of environmental pollution.


Land ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 389
Author(s):  
Caihua Zhou

The participation of a third party of the environmental service enterprise theoretically increases the level and efficiency of soil pollution control in China. However, Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may have a negative impact on the behaviors of participants, especially the local government. First, this paper conducts a positioning analysis on participants of the third-party soil pollution control in China and discusses the behavioral dissimilation of the local government under fiscal decentralization. Second, taking the government’s third-party soil pollution control as a case, a two-party game model of the central government and the local government is established around the principal-agent relationship, and a tripartite game model of the central government, the local government, and the third-party enterprise is designed around the collusion between the local government and the third-party enterprise. The results show that Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may lead to the behavioral dissimilation of local governments, that is, they may choose not to implement or passively implement the third-party control, and choose to conspire with third-party enterprises. Improving the benefits from implementing the third-party control of local governments and third-party enterprises, enhancing the central government’s supervision probability and capacity, and strengthening the central government’s punishment for behavioral dissimilation are conducive to the implementation of the third-party soil pollution control. Finally, this study puts forward policy suggestions on dividing the administrative powers between the central and local government in third-party control, building appraisal systems for the local government’s environmental protection performance, constructing environmental regulation mechanisms involving the government, market and society, and formulating the incentive and restraint policies for the participants in the third-party soil pollution control.


Author(s):  
Sonia D. Gatchair

Local governments, like their central government counterparts, must demonstrate increased fiscal responsibility. Although the Jamaican finance ministry has overall responsibility for direction and control of fiscal management at all levels of government, successful implementation cannot be achieved solely by the finance ministry's efforts, but requires the inputs of other actors, including central government, local authorities, the private sector, and civil society groups. This chapter examines the strategic use of collaborations among local authorities and other stakeholders in the implementation of fiscal management policies, in particular revenue-raising efforts in Jamaica, a small island state. The study examines relationships/partnerships (collaborative governance) focusing on the actors, structure, and processes in the implementation of fiscal policy reforms in local authorities. It finds that deliberate efforts must be made to manage complexity arising from overlapping networks with unclear boundaries and fluidity in participation and leadership.


Author(s):  
Mehmet Serkan Tosun ◽  
Dilek Uz ◽  
Serdar Yılmaz

There have been important developments in the decentralization of the government structure in Turkey since the early 1980s. This paper examines the link between fiscal decentralization and local borrowing within Turkish provinces. It first discusses local government reforms throughout the history of the Turkish Republic with the focus on recent reform efforts and current local government structure. It then provides an empirical analysis of the effects of decentralization in Turkish provinces using cross-sectional and panel data approaches, and spatial econometrics. The dataset consists of 67 provinces from 1980 to 2000, and separately cross-sectional data on all 81 provinces for the year 2000. Using decentralization measures such as number of local governments per capita and ratio of own-source municipal revenue to total provincial tax revenue, and specific characteristics of the municipalities the analysis examines whether variations in local decentralization across these provinces and across time have had a significant impact municipal borrowing in those provinces.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 118-138
Author(s):  
Benedictus Raksaka Mahi ◽  
Syarah Siti Supriyanti

The volatility of expenditures sub-local derived from central government transparency in transfers to local governments may aggravate sublocal economy. This study aims to analyze the eect of fiscal decentralization to the level of volatility of local government spending in 230 sub-local in Indonesia. We use two periods, before and after the implementation of Law No. 28 Year 2009. The regression results indicate that the volatility of local government spending may decrease if the degree of fiscal decentralization increases, especially at the time when districts implement that law. As responsive taxation can provide incentives for smooth spending for sub-local government. ================================= Volatilitas belanja pemerintah kabupaten/kota yang berasal dari ketidakpastian transfer pemerintah pusat kepada pemerintah daerah dapat memperburuk perekonomian kabupaten/kota. Penelitian ini bertujuan menganalisis pengaruh desentralisasi fiskal terhadap tingkat volatilitas belanja riil pemerintah pada 230 kabupaten/kota di Indonesia serta membandingkan data sebelum dan sesudah implementasi UU No. 28 Tahun 2009. Hasil menunjukkan semakin tinggi derajat desentralisasi fiskal, cenderung menurunkan volatilitas belanja riil pemerintah kabupaten/kota karena kemampuan fiskal kabupaten/kota cenderung meningkat setelah implementasi UU tersebut. Pajak properti merupakan sumber penerimaan daerah yang dapat diprediksi sehingga pemerintah kabupaten/kota dapat mengelola belanja daerahnya dengan lebih pasti dan terukur.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 141
Author(s):  
Trust Madhovi

This paper examines the impact of social accountability mechanisms on the fiscal management challenges facing local government bodies in Zimbabwe. The paper hypothesises that there is a positive relationship between the use of social accountability mechanisms or tools by local authorities and the effectiveness of their fiscal management policies to mobilize more revenue for service delivery. In this study, both quantitative and qualitative methods are adopted in gathering and analysing data from central government officials, Goromonzi Rural District Council employees and members of the public. The results of the study reveal that the local government body faces a number of fiscal management challenges that include a shrinking tax base, non-payment of taxes, resistance to successive budgets; lack of implementation; lack of monitoring and evaluation. Council has implemented participatory budgeting to deal with some of these challenges. While results show a significant improvement in tax collection, some of the challenges have persisted. The paper proposes some recommendations useful to central government, policy makers, civil society organisations, local government officials and the general public. The paper manages to demonstrate that the implementation of social accountability tools can have positive impacts on the fiscal management challenges facing local governments. 


2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (7) ◽  
pp. 1234-1255
Author(s):  
Mohammad Arzaghi ◽  
Andrew Balthrop

Rents from natural resources can alter the relationship between central and local governments by providing a new source of government financing. We develop a model to explore the relationship between fiscal decentralization and resource abundance. Our model indicates that natural resource rents can detach central government expenditures from the tax base so that the central government can spend more to persuade a fractious periphery to remain under central government control. Thus, other things being equal, higher natural resource rents can result in less decentralized government expenditures. We empirically explore the relationship between fiscal decentralization and natural resource rents using a panel of 60 countries over the past 40 years. Empirical results support our economic model: A 1% increase in natural resource rents as a fraction of gross domestic product results in government expenditures that are 0.53% less decentralized.


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