Behavior Strategy Analysis Based on the Multi-Stakeholder Game under the Plastic Straw Ban in China

Since 1 January 2021, China has banned nondegradable disposable straws in the catering industry. To promote the enforcement of the ban of plastic straws and improve the relationship between economic development and environmental protection, based on the evolutionary game method, this paper constructs the game model from the supply side and the demand side, respectively. Subsequently, through the dynamic equation, stable system evolution strategy is obtained. Furthermore, simulation is conducted to test the influence of the main parameters in the model on the evolution of system strategy. The results show that (1) the change of the government strategy mainly depends on its regulation costs and revenue, while the production strategy of a company is affected by the government and consumer strategies. (2) From the perspective of enterprise supply, government subsidies can promote technological innovation and develop new plastic straw substitutes. However, government penalties have little effect on violating enterprises. In addition, from the perspective of enterprise demand, with the collaboration of enterprises and consumers, it is easier for enterprises to carry out technological innovation. (3) Consumer acceptance of the substitutes for disposable plastic straws as well as online comments have a decisive influence on the enterprises’ selections for research and development (R&D) strategies.

METHODOLOGY FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF REGULATION COSTS IN THE BANKING MARKET

Purpose – In the field of the economics’ regulation researchers so far have built the conceptual framework showing how the deadweight loss of market failures decrease and costs of the government intervention increase with the increased level of the government intervention. In order to quantify relationships between the level of intervention, intervention costs and the deadweight loss with econometric models it is important to understand how to quantify the regulation costs as a part of intervention costs. The objective of the research presented in this paper is to find the appropriate methodology for the quantification of the regulation costs in the banking market. Research methodology – literature review (regarding theories), mathematical methods for quantification and econometric methods for validation purposes. Findings – research shows that in the assessment of regulation costs three main stakeholders should be included – microprudential regulator, macroprudential regulator and financial regulation’s policy maker. Research presents their cost assessment methodology. Its validation shows that in general methodology works as expected, i.e., higher government intervention levels lead to higher regulation costs, however this general rule has exceptions, which in authors’ view indicates that other factors have an impact on the cost levels. Research limitations – research shows how to assess the costs of main stakeholders based on the publicly available information. More precise view could be obtained if in the cooperation with authorities more details on certain cost items are received. Practical implications – research results will be used to assess all government intervention costs (other positions include compliance costs and other indirect costs) and finalize the quantification of the framework. Quantified framework could be used for more precise policy making regarding the regulation of the banking market. Originality/Value – research shows how to quantify the regulation costs of the banking market as currently there are only conceptual ideas.

EVALUATION OF GREEN MANUFACTURING IMPLEMENTATION ON REGULATION, COSTS, AND KNOWLEDGE

Introduction: This study aims to analyze whether there is motivation of knowledge, regulations, and costs on the effect of the application of Green Manufacturing. Part of green manufacturing has been implemented. However, its implementation is not easy for various reasons and it has not a significant effect on the industrial world from several sectors. Methods: Data collection methods include questionnaires and interviews. This study uses primary data obtained through direct respondents. The statistical analysis tool in this study uses SPSS.Results: Based on the results of data analysis and discussion, it shows that the knowledge variable has a positive effect on the motivation to implement green manufacturing. In addition, the second variable, namely regulation, also shows a positive effect on the motivation to implement green manufacturing. However, the third variable shows that costs have a negative effect on the motivation to implement green manufacturing.Conclusion and suggestion: The results of the analysis prove that the tempe business motivation in Ngawi on implementing green manufacturing tends to be low. This requires synergy between the government and tempe entrepreneurs to applicate the green manufacturing. For the government, there is a need some socialization regarding the application of green manufacturing so that your knowledge of the application of green manufacturing will increase.

Cost Consensus Algorithm Applications for EV Charging Station Participating in AGC of Interconnected Power Grid

In order to more effectively reduce the regulation costs of power grids and to improve the automatic generation control (AGC) performance, an optimization mathematical model of generation command dispatch for AGC with an electric vehicle (EV) charging station is proposed in this paper, in which a cost consensus algorithm for AGC is adopted. Particularly, virtual consensus variables are applied to exchange information among different AGC units. At the same time, the actual consensus variables are utilized to determine the generation command, upon which the flexibility of the proposed algorithm can be significantly enhanced. Furthermore, the implement feasibility of such an algorithm is verified through a series simulation experiments on the Hainan power grid in southern China, where the results demonstrate that the proposed algorithm can effectively realize an autonomous frequency regulation of EVs participating in AGC.

The Greening of Terminal Concessions in Seaports

Port authorities around the world are pursuing a greening of port management in view of safeguarding their license to operate, and increasing their economic and environmental competitiveness. This paper analyzes how port authorities, via the design and implementation of concession agreements, can contribute to a further greening of port management. The paper presents a typology of green instruments applicable to a terminal concession setting. The instruments are evaluated on overall feasibility and suitability in a concession context, but also on more specific criteria related to implementation issues, contribution to green strategies, and targets of port authorities and regulatory/enforcement aspects. The evaluation matrix is based on the output of a structured workshop with port managers and concession experts in a sample of European ports. We demonstrate that a variety of regulatory, investment, and pricing measures are available to port authorities to include green targets in terminal concession agreements. Not all instruments have the same likeliness of being embraced or implemented by port authorities, in part because of a low perceived contribution, high associated regulation costs, or simply because the port authority is unlikely to have jurisdiction in that specific area. Measures related to information reporting and some types of harm-based standards, design standards, and technology specifications are relatively easy to implement in a concession setting. The results also show that many of the measures with a higher expected contribution to innovation and environmental objectives are typically also the ones with higher regulation costs, which might post a higher complexity in terms of their implementation in a concession setting. We further argue that initiatives toward the greening of concession procedures can only reap full benefits if these actions are embedded in a chain approach toward the environment (ship, port, terminal, warehouse, and inland transport).

Public–Private Monopoly

This article presents comparative statics of organizational modes of natural monopoly in public utilities with a focus on co-ownership and co-governance. Private monopoly lowers output and increases the price to maximize profit; public monopoly incurs higher costs due to the lack of know-how; and a regulated monopoly results in regulation costs to overcome informational asymmetries. A public–private partnership arises as an efficient organization mode when it enables the internalization of private know-how and saves regulation costs due to correspondingly sufficient private and public residual control rights. Public–private partnerships support higher prices than marginal costs due to rent sharing, with its upper price frontier decreasing in private residual control rights.

The High Cost of Regulating Development

Housing prices have risen in the United States and Hong Kong mostly because of the high regulation costs of development. In each of the developed countries, a very large array of complex regulations has made development difficult and effectively prevented housing supply from responding to demand. The problem is not market competition, but government regulations that prevent markets from functioning properly. The rising ratio of capital to income is almost entirely due to the rise of housing. What begins initially as inequality in housing wealth gets transmitted into the next generation and is transformed into other forms of inequality, in particular inequality in opportunities, with other distributional consequences.

APPLYING CLASSICAL FOREST REGULATION METHODS TO SMALLHOLDINGS WITH COOPERATIVE CONSTRAINTS

ABSTRACT This study aims to assess the cooperative regulation process of forestry producers in comparison to the traditional individual regulation of properties. Twenty (20) forest properties are studied as examples of the development of three forest regulation scenarios: 1) individual regulation, 2) group regulation, and 3) cooperative regulation. The Net Present Value (NPV) of each of the scenarios is optimized according to mathematical programming models and compared to a baseline scenario without forest regulation. According to the proposed cooperative regulation, properties had a proportion factor for annual net revenue distribution calculated from results of the baseline scenario. By comparing the NPV maximization results from scenarios 1 and 3 with the non-regulation scenario, the cost for individual regulation is on average 25%, while being only 11% for cooperative regulation, that is, a 14% reduction in property regulation costs. Additionally, cooperative regulation had the advantage of dividing properties into fewer areas when compared to individual regulation.