scholarly journals Dual processes, dual virtues

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakob Ohlhorst
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Norm ◽  
Dual Processes ◽  
Cognitive Foundations ◽  
Context Specific ◽  
Virtue Responsibilism

AbstractI argue that virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism are complementary. They do not give competing accounts of epistemic virtue. Rather they explain the excellent functioning of different parts of our cognitive apparatus. Reliabilist virtue designates the excellent functioning of fast and context-specific Type 1 cognitive processes, while responsibilist virtue means an excellent functioning of effortful and reflective Type 2 cognitive processes. This account unifies reliabilist and responsibilist virtue theory. But the virtues are not unified by designating some epistemic norm that both aim at. Instead, I unify them through their cognitive foundations. Because Type 1 and Type 2 cognition are complementary, reliabilist and responsibilist virtues are complementary. Thereby, this dual-process theory of epistemic virtue gives a naturalised account of virtues as well as an explanation of how reliabilism and responsibilism relate. This approach offers a solution for both the generality problem and the situationist challenge to virtue epistemology; additionally it preserves the epistemological autonomy of each virtue type.

scholarly journals Categorization, Fast and Slow

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 205-212
Author(s):  
Василь Старко
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
New York ◽  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Linguistics ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Psychological Review ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories

The title of this study is inspired by Daniel Kahneman’s best-selling book Thinking, Fast and Slow. In it, the Nobel Prize winner explains in great detail the working of two systems of human reasoning: System 1, which is fast, automatic, associative, subconscious, involuntary and (nearly) effortless, and System 2, which is slow, intentional, logical, conscious, effortful and requires executive control, attention, and concentration. This distinction applies to human categorization as well. Each of the two labels refers, in fact, to a set of systems, which is why the designations Type 1 and Type 2 processes are preferable. The default-interventionist architecture presupposes the constant automatic activation of categories by Type 1 processes and interventions of Type 2 processes if necessary. Type 1 categorization relies on the ‘shallow’ linguistic representation of the world, while Type 2 uses ‘deep’ extralinguistic knowledge. A series of linguistic examples are analyzed to illustrate the differences between Type 1 and Type 2 categorization. A conclusion is drawn about the need to take this distinction into account in psycholinguistic and linguistic research on categorization. References Barrett, F., Tugade, M. M., & Engle, R. (2004). Individual differences in working memorycapacity in dual-process theories of the mind. Psychological Bulletin, 130(4), 553–573. Chaiken, S., & Trope, Y. (Eds.). (1999). Dual-process theories in social psychology. NewYork, NY: Guilford Press. Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlledcomponents. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 5–18. Evans, J. St. B. T., & Stanovich, K. (2013) Dual-process theories of higher cognition:Advancing the debate. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8(3), 223–241. Geeraerts, D. (1993). Vagueness’s puzzles, polysemy’s vagaries. Cognitive Linguistics,4(3), 223–272. Heider, Eleanor Rosch (1973). On the internal structure of perceptual and semanticcategories. In: Cognitive Development and the Acquisition of Language, (pp. 111–144).T. E. Moore, (ed.). New York: Academic Press Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgement and choice. American Psychologist, 58,697–720. Kahneman, D. (2015). Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002). Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitutionin intuitive judgement. In: Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,(pp. 49–81). T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman, (eds.). Cambridge, MA: CambridgeUniversity Press. Lakoff, G. (1973). Hedges: A study in meaning criteria and the logic of fuzzy concepts.Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2, 458–508. Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things. Chicago, London: University ofChicago Press. Reber, A. S. (1993). Implicit Learning and Tacit Knowledge. Oxford, England: OxfordUniversity Press. Stanovich, K. E. (1999). Who is Rational? Studies of Individual Differences in Reasoning.Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Stanovich, K. E., & West, R F. (2000). Individual difference in reasoning: implications forthe rationality debate? Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 23, 645–726. Старко В. Категоризаційні кваліфікатори// Проблеми зіставної семантики. 2013,№ 11. С. 132–138.Starko, V. (2013). Katehoryzatsiini kvalifikatory. Problemy Zistavnoyi Semantyky, 11,132–138. Sun, R., Slusarz, P., & Terry, C. (2005). The interaction of the explicit and the implicit inskill learning: A dual-process approach. Psychological Review, 112, 159–192. Teasdale, J. D. (1999). Multi-level theories of cognition–emotion relations. In: Handbookof Cognition and Emotion, (pp. 665–681). T. Dalgleish & M. J. Power, (eds.). Chichester,England: Wiley. Wason, P. C., & Evans, J. St. B. T. (1975). Dual processes in reasoning? Cognition, 3,141–154. Whorf, B. L. (1956). The relation of habitual thought and behavior to language. In:Language, Thought, and Reality. Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf, (pp. 134–159). Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press. (originally published in 1941) Wierzbicka, A. (1996). Semantic Primes and Universals. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.

When Reflection Hurts: The Effect of Cognitive Processing Types on Organizational Adaptation to Discontinuous Change

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marlon Fernandes Rodrigues Alves ◽  
Vincenzo Vastola ◽  
Simone Vasconcelos Ribeiro Galina ◽  
Maurizio Zollo
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processing ◽  
Organizational Adaptation ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Organizational Level ◽  
Simulation Game ◽  
Discontinuous Change ◽  
Organizational Responses ◽  
Individual Level

Technological breakthroughs, institutional disruptions, and natural disasters often alter the course of organizations and entire industries. Such discontinuous changes threaten organizations’ survival by affecting the value of the knowledge accumulated in routines and capabilities. Although it is widely acknowledged that managerial cognition is a critical antecedent of organizational responses to discontinuous change, the role of type 1 (intuitive) and type 2 (reflective) processing in the adaptation of shared patterns of behavior, that is, routines, remains understudied. Drawing on dual-process theory, we propose that particular features of type 1 processing render this approach superior to type 2 processing, especially in highly ambiguous environments in which information is limited and difficult to verify. We tested our hypotheses in a longitudinal experiment linking individual-level factors with organizational-level practices of routine adaptation. Experienced managers, paired in 80 groups, developed routines in a first round of a simulation game; in a second round, we then introduced a discontinuous change making previous routines obsolete in order to observe how they adapted. The data show that priming type 1 processing facilitates organizational adaptation more than type 2 processing by providing faster, more routinized, efficiently coordinated, and optimal responses. In addition, type 1 appears to be more functional in highly ambiguous environments, whereas type 1 and type 2 processes yield similar levels of performance under low levels of ambiguity. Overall, our study advances the understanding of the nondeliberative dimension of organizational adaptation to discontinuous change.

scholarly journals Assessing the association between thinking dispositions and clinical error

2017 ◽  
Vol 94 (1107) ◽  
pp. 3-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Kinnear ◽  
Nick Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Limited Information ◽  
Predictive Capability ◽  
Thinking Dispositions ◽  
Incorrect Answer ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
Clinical Error

BackgroundDual-process theory suggests that type 1 thinking results in a propensity to make ‘intuitive’ decisions based on limited information. Type 2 processes, on the other hand, are able to analyse these initial responses and replace them with rationalised decisions. Individuals may have a preference for different modes of rationalisation, on a continuum from careful to cursory. These ‘dispositions’ of thinking reside in type 2 processes and may result in error when the preference is for ‘quick and casual’ decision-making.MethodsWe asked clinicians to answer a cognitive puzzle to which there was an obvious, but incorrect, answer, to measure their propensity for ‘quick and casual’ decision-making. The same clinicians were also asked to report the number of clinical errors they had committed in the previous two weeks. We hypothesised an association between committing error and settling for an incorrect answer, and that the cognitive puzzle would have predictive capability.Results90 of 153 (59%) clinicians reported that they had committed error, while 103 (67%) gave the incorrect ‘intuitive’ answer to the cognitive puzzle. There was no statistically significant difference between clinicians who committed error and answered incorrectly, and those who did not and answered correctly (χ2(1, n=1153)=0.021, p=0.885).ConclusionsThe prevalence of clinical error in our study was higher than previously reported in the literature, and the propensity for accepting intuitive solutions was high. Although the cognitive puzzle was unable to predict who was more likely to commit error, the study offers insights into developing other predictive models for error.

scholarly journals Smooth coping: an embodied, Heideggerian approach to dual-process theory

2021 ◽  
pp. 105971232110173
Author(s):  
Zachariah A Neemeh
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Process Model ◽  
High Capacity ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Reflective Thought ◽  
Dual Process Theories

Dual-process theories divide cognition into two kinds of processes: Type 1 processes that are autonomous and do not use working memory, and Type 2 processes that are decoupled from the immediate situation and use working memory. Often, Type 1 processes are also fast, high capacity, parallel, nonconscious, biased, contextualized, and associative, while Type 2 processes are typically slow, low capacity, serial, conscious, normative, abstract, and rule-based. This article argues for an embodied dual-process theory based on the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. According to Heidegger, the basis of human agents’ encounters with the world is in a prereflective, pragmatically engaged disposition marked by readiness-to-hand ( Zuhandenheit), sometimes equated with “smooth coping.” Examples of smooth coping include walking, throwing a ball, and other embodied actions that do not require reflective thought. I argue that smooth coping primarily consists of Type 1 processes. The Heideggerian dual-process model yields distinctly different hypotheses from Hubert Dreyfus’ model of smooth coping, and I will critically engage with Dreyfus’ work.

scholarly journals Dual-Process Theory as a Theory of the Classification of Information Processing Acts

Diametros ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vitaliy Nadurak
Keyword(s):  
Information Processing ◽  
Qualitative Difference ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Clear Cut ◽  
Conscious Control

The article proposes a consideration of the dual-process theory of higher cognition as a theory of the classification of acts of information processing. One of the reasons why the dual-process approach has been criticized is the fact that the information processing process can sometimes have characteristics that undermine a clear-cut attribution to one of the two traditionally defined opposite types. To avoid this criticism, it is proposed that the object of classification should not be the processes of information processing, but separate acts of combining two units of information. Unlike a process, a particular act of information processing at a particular moment in time cannot simultaneously have opposite characteristics, nor can it simultaneously have and not have some characteristic. In order to show the qualitative difference between various information processing acts as falling individually into either Type 1 or Type 2 processing, it is proposed to classify them by a feature that is present in one type and absent in another. It is suggested to take conscious control as such a feature. As a result, in the information processing acts corresponding to Type 2 category, units of information are combined in a consciously controlled way, whereas in the acts to be considered as Type 1, those units either already are combined or combine autonomously due to the existence of indirect associative connections.

A Dual-Process Analysis of Design Idea Generation

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dylan Moore ◽  
Jonathan Sauder ◽  
Yan Jin
Keyword(s):  
Design Education ◽  
Design Thinking ◽  
Process Analysis ◽  
Idea Generation ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Intuitive Thinking ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Analytical Approaches

A traditional engineering education primarily teaches students to use analytical methods when solving problems, which are effective in most real-world situations. However, heavily analytical approaches often hinder creative output and therefore more intuitive methods have the potential to increase novelty in design. Dual-process theory is an established model in psychology and human decision making that separates fast, intuitive Type 1 processes from slow, analytical Type 2 processes, but to this point has not been applied to engineering design methodology. A exploratory dual-process pilot study of a design experiment using retrospective protocol analysis exposed the difference in novelty of ideas produced by intuitive and analytical thinking. The preliminary results suggest that Type 1 intuitive thinking is correlated with a higher average idea novelty up to a threshold. An equal balance of Type 1 and Type 2 thinking maximized novelty potential. Understanding this relationship and the importance of intuitive thinking in the design process is important to improving the effectiveness of conceptual design thinking and has implications in design education and modeling cognitive design processes.

Inner Speech and Outer Thought

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Frankish
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Function ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Inner Speech ◽  
Conscious Thought ◽  
Complex Problems ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories

It is plausible to regard inner speech as an activity, whose functions are continuous with those of outer speech. Yet there is also a case for thinking that inner speech has a cognitive role, as a vehicle for conscious thought. This chapter reconciles these apparently conflicting claims by showing how outer speech can itself play a cognitive role. Drawing on dual-process theories of reasoning, it develops a view of conscious (‘Type 2’) thinking as an activity, initially performed in outer speech. By engaging in self-directed speech, we can break down complex problems into subproblems that can be solved by nonconscious (‘Type 1’) processes, thereby vastly extending our reasoning powers. It is as the subsequent internalization of such ‘outer thinking’ that inner speech has a cognitive function. The chapter also extends this account to show how acts of inner speech can function as judgements and decisions.

If you think about it more, do you want it more? The case of fairtrade

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (12) ◽  
pp. 2556-2581 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roman Konopka ◽  
Malcolm John Wright ◽  
Mark Avis ◽  
Pamela M. Feetham
Keyword(s):  
Block Design ◽  
Brand Choice ◽  
Consumer Preference ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
The Impact

Purpose There are substantive disagreements about whether encouraging deliberative thinking increases consumer preference in low-involvement product categories. The authors draw on dual-process theory to add rare experimental evidence to this debate. They also investigate whether the effect of deliberative thinking increases with familiarity of the stimuli, as different theories of memory yield different predictions on this point. Finally, they provide evidence on whether the effectiveness of the Fairtrade logo arises more from mere exposure or attention to the ethical claim. Design/methodology/approach The context for the research is the use of ethical logos in packaged coffee, as this provides a realistic setting for the desired experimental manipulations. The fieldwork consists of two sets of trade-off experiments – rankings based conjoint analysis (n = 360) and best-worst scaling with a balanced incomplete block design (n = 1,628). Deliberative thinking is manipulated in three ways: by varying logos between visual (Type 1 processing) and lexical (Type 2 processing) treatments, by post hoc classification of time taken, and by imposing either time constraints (Type 1) or cognitive load (Type 2) on the completion of the task. Familiarity is manipulated by varying logos between the Fairtrade and a fictional Exchange Ethics logo. Findings Consumers do have higher preferences in the deliberative treatment conditions; thinking more results in an 18 per cent increase (Cohen’s d = 0.25) in the preference for choices that display an ethical cobranded logo. Surprisingly, the impact of deliberation is not greater for the more familiar Fairtrade logo than the fictional Exchange Ethics logo. This result is inconsistent with strength-based theories of memory, as these predict that deliberation will have a greater effect for more familiar stimuli. However, it is consistent with newer theories of memory that acknowledge familiarity can lead to activation confusion, reducing retrieval of pre-existing knowledge into working memory. The research also shows that the Fairtrade logo has substantial utility to consumers, and that this is approximately 59 per cent due to the ethical claim and 41 per cent due to the familiarity of the logo. Research limitations/implications In field conditions, attempts to manipulate deliberation may not be effective or may simply result in reduced attention. Also, the costs of increasing deliberation may outweigh the benefits obtained. Practical implications The research confirms the heuristic value of the Fairtrade logo and shows that the effectiveness of ethical logos may increase with additional deliberation by shoppers. Originality/value There is relatively little work in marketing that applies dual-process theories to investigate consumer behaviour. The present study extends the use of dual-process theories in marketing, demonstrates a new method to investigate the effect of deliberation on brand choice and shows how deliberation magnifies the effect of endorsing logos, including unfamiliar logos.

scholarly journals A test of two processes: The effect of training on deductive and inductive reasoning

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel Gloria Stephens ◽  
John C Dunn ◽  
Brett Hayes ◽  
Michael Kalish
Keyword(s):  
Argument Structure ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Model Parameters ◽  
Dimensional Model ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Single Process ◽  
Logic Training

Dual-process theories posit that separate kinds of intuitive (Type 1) and reflective (Type 2) processes contribute to reasoning. Under this view, inductive judgments are more heavily influenced by Type 1 processing, and deductive judgments are more strongly influenced by Type 2 processing. Alternatively, single-process theories propose that both types of judgments are based on a common form of assessment. The competing accounts were respectively instantiated as two-dimensional and one-dimensional signal detection models, and their predictions were tested against specifically targeted novel data using signed difference analysis. In two experiments, participants evaluated valid and invalid arguments, under induction or deduction instructions. Arguments varied in believability and type of conditional argument structure. Additionally, we used logic training to strengthen Type 2 processing in deduction (Experiments 1 & 2) and belief training to strengthen Type 1 processing in induction (Experiment 2). The logic training successfully improved validity-discrimination, and differential effects on induction and deduction judgments were evident in Experiment 2. While such effects are consistent with popular dual-process accounts, crucially, a one-dimensional model successfully accounted for the results. We also demonstrate that the one-dimensional model is psychologically interpretable, with the model parameters varying sensibly across conditions. We argue that single-process accounts have been prematurely discounted, and formal modeling approaches are important for theoretical progress in the reasoning field.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document