scholarly journals Human dominion and wild animal suffering

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Dustin Crummett

Abstract It may be possible, now or in the future, for humans to technologically intervene to reduce the amount of suffering experienced by wild animals. There is a debate about whether, if humans can do this, they should. Here, I consider the implications for this debate of the theological claim that humans have been granted dominion over the other animals. I argue that it's more plausible to interpret the dominion claim as granting humans (i) the responsibility to care for the well-being of individual animals than to interpret it as giving humans either (ii) the right to do whatever they want to other animals or (iii) the responsibility to care only for the well-being of aggregates of animals (such as whole species). I then show how this understanding of dominion undermines a range of arguments against intervening to reduce wild animal suffering. These arguments claim that humans do not stand in the right sort of relationship for intervention to be obligatory (or perhaps even permissible). But if we possess such dominion, we do stand in the right sort of relationship for it to be obligatory.

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-107
Author(s):  
Cheri Bayuni Budjang

Buying and selling is a way to transfer land rights according to the provisions in Article 37 paragraph (1) of Government Regulation Number 24 of 1997 concerning Land Registration which must include the deed of the Land Deed Making Official to register the right of land rights (behind the name) to the Land Office to create legal certainty and minimize the risks that occur in the future. However, in everyday life there is still a lot of buying and selling land that is not based on the laws and regulations that apply, namely only by using receipts and trust in each other. This is certainly very detrimental to both parties in the transfer of rights (behind the name), especially if the other party is not known to exist like the Case in Decision Number 42 / Pdt.G / 2010 / PN.Mtp


Author(s):  
Agus Arwani

Accountants are the actors who contribute to the establishment and implementation of accounting as a structure. On the other hand the consequences of the application of modern accounting shows the impact of a less than satisfactory. Facts show the number of accounting manipulation scandal that hit the company's financial statements and the low awareness of their social responsibility and the environment implies that very large changes in accounting principals. Accounting reality is part of how accountants take on the role. Deviations reality always brings accountants as party central is how actors and structures form mutually met. Habitus actor '' greedy '' met with accounting (capitalism) as a structure that legitimize it. In reality accountant (agent) looks so lost in the shackles of capitalism, so the agency theory in the form of a conflict of interest, it seems to shift the basis of mutual symbiosis between the interests of management and accountants. Accountants must be returned khittah her as a sovereign profession, he is an ideologue as Rausyan Fikr. All forms of deep-an accountant in worship, glorify the '' number '' in the sense of making all tasks as tasks (treatises) '' prophetic '' to map the right stakeholders fairly and correctly. This can only take place within the frame sovereign  and raise awareness of the Godhead (fervently) to put God at the summit toward accountability. Readiness accountant sharia in entering the MEA in 2017 with preparing the capabilities and expertise of sharia-based accounting standards IFRS, Accounting Sharia must understand the risks of sharia, sharia accounting should be standardized SDI International, science and technology capabilities accountant sharia be reliable.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 7-19
Author(s):  
Clare Palmer ◽  

In this paper, I consider whether we should offer assistance to both wild and domesticated animals when they are suffering. I argue that we may have different obligations to assist wild and domesticated animals because they have different morally-relevant relationships with us. I explain how different approaches to animal ethics, which, for simplicity, I call capacity-oriented and context-oriented, address questions about animal assistance differently. I then defend a broadly context-oriented approach, on which we have special obligations to assist animals that we have made vulnerable to or dependent on us. This means that we should normally help suffering domesticated animals, but that we lack general obligations to assist wild animals, since we are not responsible for their vulnerability. However, we may have special obligations to help wild animals where we have made them vulnerable to or dependent on us (by habitat destruction or by captivity, for instance). I consider some obvious difficulties with this context-oriented approach, and I conclude by looking more closely at the question whether we should intervene, if we could do so successfully, to reduce wild animal suffering by reducing predation.


2003 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 247-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johan Wiklund ◽  
Per Davidsson ◽  
Frédéric Delmar

This study focuses on small business managers‘ motivation to expand their firms. More specifically, we examine the relationships between expected consequences of growth on the one hand, and overall attitude toward growth on the other. Data were collected in three separate studies over a ten-year period using the same measuring instrument. The results suggest that noneconomic concerns may be more important than expected financial outcomes in determining overall attitude toward growth. In particular, the concern for employee well-being comes out strongly. We interpret this as reflecting a concern that the positive atmosphere of the small organization may be lost in growth. We conclude that this concern may be a cause for recurrent conflict for small business managers when deciding about the future route for their firms.


2005 ◽  
Vol 56 ◽  
pp. 22-23
Author(s):  
Michael Wheeler

As a first shot, one might say that environmental ethics is concerned distinctively with the moral relations that exist between, on the one hand, human beings and, on the other, the non-human natural environment. But this really is only a first shot. For example, one might be inclined to think that at least some components of the non-human natural environment (non-human animals, plants, species, forests, rivers, ecosystems, or whatever) have independent moral status, that is, are morally considerable in their own right, rather than being of moral interest only to the extent that they contribute to human well-being. If so, then one might be moved to claim that ethical matters involving the environment are best cashed out in terms of the dutes and responsibilities that human beings have to such components. If, however, one is inclined to deny independent moral status to the non-human natural environment or to any of its components, then one might be moved to claim that the ethical matters in question are exhaustively delineated by those moral relations existing between individual human beings, or between groups of human beings, in which the non-human natural environment figures. One key task for the environmental ethicist is to sort out which, if either, of these perspectives is the right one to adopt—as a general position or within particular contexts. I guess I don’t need to tell you that things get pretty complicated pretty quickly.


Author(s):  
Carol Graham

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the book's main themes. This book considers the extent to which the American Dream—and the right to the pursuit of happiness—is equally available to all citizens today. Building on the author's research on well-being and on mobility and opportunity in countries around the world, the book explore the linkages between the distribution of income, attitudes about inequality and future mobility, and well-being in the United States, and also provides some comparisons with other countries and regions. This scholarship is distinct from existing work on inequality in its focus on the well-being–beliefs channel and its implications for individual choices about the future.


Author(s):  
Gautam Shroff

‘Predicting the future’—the stuff of dreams one might imagine; the province of astrologers and soothsayers, surely. Perhaps not, the scientific mind might retort: after all, is it not the job of science to discover laws of nature, and thereby make precise, verifiable predictions about the future? But what if we were to claim that prediction is neither fanciful nor difficult, and not even rare. Rather, it is commonplace; something that we all accomplish each and every moment of our lives. Some readers may recall the popular video game, pong, where the goal is to ‘keep the puck in play’ using an electronic paddle. Figure 2 shows images of two different pong games in progress. In addition to the paddle and puck, the players’ eye gaze is also being tracked. The image on the left shows the player’s eyes tracking the puck itself. On the other hand, in the right-hand image, the player is already looking at a point where she expects the puck to travel to. The player on the left is reactive; she simply tracks the puck, and as the game gets faster, she eventually misses. The right player, in contrast, is able to predict where the puck will be, and most of the time she gets it right. Further, we often see her eyes dart faster than the puck to multiple regions of the field as she appears to recalculate her prediction continuously. What kind of player do you think you are? As it happens, almost all of us are predictive players. Even if we have never played pong before, we rapidly begin predicting the puck’s trajectory after even a few minutes of playing. The ‘reactive player’ in this experiment was in fact autistic, which apparently affected the person’s ability to make predictions about the puck’s trajectory. (The neurological causes of autism are still not well known or agreed upon; the recent research from which the images in Figure 2 are taken represent new results that might shed some more lightonthisdebilitatingcondition.) So it appears that prediction, as exhibited by most pong players, is far from being a rare and unusual ability. It is in fact a part and parcel of our everyday lives, and is present, to varying degrees, in all conscious life.


2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 114-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleni Panagiotarakou

The focus of this paper is on the “right to place” as a political theory of wild animal rights. Out of the debate between terrestrial cosmopolitans inspired by Kant and Arendt and rooted cosmopolitan animal right theorists, the right to place emerges from the fold of rooted cosmopolitanism in tandem with environmental and ecological principles. Contrary to terrestrial cosmopolitans—who favour extending citizenship rights to wild animals and advocate at the same time large-scale humanitarian interventions and unrestricted geographical mobility—I argue that the well-being of wild animals is best served by the right to place theory on account of its sovereignty model. The right to place theory advocates human non-interference in wildlife communities, opposing even humanitarian interventions, which carry the risk of unintended consequences. The right to place theory, with its emphasis on territorial sovereignty, bases its opposition to unrestricted geographical mobility on two considerations: (a) the non-generalist nature of many species and (b) the potential for abuse via human encroachment. In a broader context, the advantage of the right to place theory lies in its implicit environmental demands: human population control and sustainable lifestyles.


1992 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 118-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Griffin

I want to look at one aspect of the human good: how it serves as the basis for judgments about the moral right. One important view is that the right is always derived from the good. I want to suggest that the more one understands the nature of the human good, the more reservations one has about that view.I. OneRoute toConsequentialismMany of us think that different things make a life good, with no one deep value underlying them all. My own list includes: enjoyment, accomplishing something with one's life, deep personal relations, certain sorts of understanding, and the elements of a characteristically human existence (autonomy, liberty).Most of us also think that moral right and wrong are based, in some way or other, in how well individual lives go, and that the moral point of view is, in some sense or other, impartial between lives. Utilitarianism is a prominent, but not the only, way of spelling out this intuition. There is no reason why an account of the human good needs to be confined, in the classical utilitarian way, to happiness or to fulfillment of desire (on the usual understanding of that notion). Nor is there any reason why impartiality has to be confined to maximizing the good, counting everybody for one and nobody for more than one. We may generalize.Let us broaden the notion of the good. We might say, for instance, that though happiness is a good, so are the other items on my list. But though broadened, this notion of the good stays within the confines of individual goods; it still has to do with human well-being, with what promotes the quality of one person's life.


2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyle Johannsen

In light of the extent of wild animal suffering, some philosophers have adopted the view that we should cautiously assist wild animals on a large scale. Recently, their view has come under criticism. According to one objection, even cautious intervention is unjustified because fallibility is allegedly intractable. By contrast, a second objection states that we should abandon caution and intentionally destroy habitat in order to prevent wild animals from reproducing. In my paper, I argue that intentional habitat destruction is wrong because negative duties are more stringent than positive duties. However, I also argue that the possible benefits of ecological damage, combined with the excusability of unintended, unforeseeable harm, suggest that fallibility should not paralyse us.


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