Scandal at the Opera: Politics, the Press, and the Public at the Inauguration of the Budapest Opera House in 1884

2013 ◽  
Vol 44 ◽  
pp. 88-107
Author(s):  
Markian Prokopovych

On 2 January 2012, a mass demonstration took place in Budapest in front of the Opera House. The rally was the culminating event in a series of street protests that had shaken Hungary during the previous months when many inhabitants of the Hungarian capital, along with their co-nationals elsewhere, felt increasingly uneasy with the symbolic politics initiated by the government of Viktor Orbán and his center-right FIDESZ Party. In particular, the crowd that collected in front of what is still Hungary's most representative institution of culture, on the main boulevard Andrássy út, protested against the inauguration of the new constitution that had come into force the previous day. Despite opposition inside and outside of Hungary, the ruling political elite comprising the prime minister and his political entourage celebrated the new constitution—and themselves—at a gala event in the opera house. A number of other celebratory events in connection with Hungary's new constitution were also staged, among them a controversial exhibition of paintings in the National Gallery, located to date in the Buda Palace, meant to highlight the most important events in recent Hungarian history. Inside the opera house, Orbán and his political supporters listened to a collection of works by, among others, Franz Liszt, Ferenc Erkel, and Béla Bartók, but the composition of the program was a matter of minor importance on that day. Instead, as he and his government representatives congratulated each other that night on their party's achievements in power, the crowd outside the opera house jeered in reference to Hungary's fall in international economic rankings and the methods of rule that they saw as authoritarian, if not dictatorial, and appealed to a wider international community, for example, with slogans such as, “Hey Europe, sorry about my Prime Minister.”

MedienJournal ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 37
Author(s):  
Li Xiguang

The commercialization of meclia in China has cultivated a new journalism business model characterized with scandalization, sensationalization, exaggeration, oversimplification, highly opinionated news stories, one-sidedly reporting, fabrication and hate reporting, which have clone more harm than good to the public affairs. Today the Chinese journalists are more prey to the manipu/ation of the emotions of the audiences than being a faithful messenger for the public. Une/er such a media environment, in case of news events, particularly, during crisis, it is not the media being scared by the government. but the media itself is scaring the government into silence. The Chinese news media have grown so negative and so cynica/ that it has produced growing popular clistrust of the government and the government officials. Entering a freer but fearful commercially mediated society, the Chinese government is totally tmprepared in engaging the Chinese press effectively and has lost its ability for setting public agenda and shaping public opinions. 


Orthodoxia ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 111-124
Author(s):  
F. A. Gayda

This article deals with the political situation around the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Empire in 1912 (4th convocation). The main actors of the campaign were the government, local administration, liberal opposition and the clergy of the Orthodox Russian Church. After the 1905 revolution, the “official Church” found itself in a difficult situation. In particular, anti-Church criticism intensified sharply and was expressed now quite openly, both in the press and from the rostrum of the Duma. A consequence of these circumstances was that in this Duma campaign, for the first time in the history of Russian parliamentarianism, “administrative resources” were widely used. At the same time, the authorities failed to achieve their political objectives. The Russian clergy became actively involved in the election campaign. The government sought to use the conflict between the liberal majority in the third Duma and the clerical hierarchy. Duma members launched an active criticism of the Orthodox clergy, using Grigory Rasputin as an excuse. Even staunch conservatives spoke negatively about Rasputin. According to the results of the election campaign, the opposition was even more active in using the label “Rasputinians” against the Holy Synod and the Russian episcopate. Forty-seven persons of clerical rank were elected to the House — three fewer than in the previous Duma. As a result, the assembly of the clergy elected to the Duma decided not to form its own group, but to spread out among the factions. An active campaign in Parliament and the press not only created a certain public mood, but also provoked a political split and polarization within the clergy. The clergy themselves were generally inclined to blame the state authorities for the public isolation of the Church. The Duma election of 1912 seriously affected the attitude of the opposition and the public toward the bishopric after the February revolution of 1917.


1978 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 230-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pnina Lahav

Israel's press plays a distinctive role in the country's political structure. Comprised of 27 dailies and 135 magazines, some with distinctive partisan affiliation and others committed to political neutrality, it has wide circulation and enjoys considerable political influence.Israeli newspapers were not always as independent as they are today. During the struggle for liberation, the press placed itself at the disposal of theYishuv(Jewish community) leadership, to be used as a political tool for promoting the objectives of the Jewish population in Palestine. Only in the fifties, after the establishment of the sovereign state of Israel, did the press begin to develop consciousness of its distinct and autonomous role in the political process.Several institutions founded by the press itself have moulded it into a politically viable establishment: the Editors' Committee, the Press Council, the National Union of Journalists and the Union of the Daily Papers. The Editors' Committee is the most powerful and long standing of the four. Organised in 1948 by the chief editors of the Hebrew dailies, it functions as an intermediary between the Government and the public in matters concerning important policy decisions.


2020 ◽  
Vol 135 (575) ◽  
pp. 860-891
Author(s):  
Ian Cawood

Abstract While the problem of political corruption in mid-nineteenth century Britain has been much studied, the experience of corrupt behaviour in public bodies, both new and long established, is comparatively neglected. This article takes the example of one of the first inspectorates set up after the Great Reform Act, the Factory Office, to examine the extent of corrupt practices in the British civic state and the means whereby it was addressed. It examines the changing processes of appointment, discipline and promotion, the issues of remuneration and venality, and the relationships between inspectors, workers, factory owners, the government and the wider civil service, and the press and public opinion. The article argues that the changing attitudes of the inspectors, especially those of Leonard Horner, were indicative of a developing ‘public service ethos’ in both bureaucratic and cultural settings and that the work of such unsung administrators was one of the agencies through which corrupt behaviour in the civic structures of Victorian Britain was, with public support, challenged. The article concludes that the endogenous reform of bureaucratic practice achieved by the factory inspectorate may even be of equal significance as that which resulted from the celebrated Northcote–Trevelyan Report of 1854.


2018 ◽  
Vol 167 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Fisher ◽  
David Marshall ◽  
Kerry McCallum

Traditionally politicians have been dependent on political news media to get their message across to the public. The rise of social media means that politicians can bypass the Press Gallery and publish directly to their target audiences via Facebook, Twitter and other social media platforms. This article argues that Prime Minister John Howard’s (1996–2007) use of talk back radio and early forays on YouTube were pivotal in the trend towards ‘disintermediation’ in Australian politics. It draws on two studies. One involving interviews with 87 key media actors from the Howard era including journalists, broadcasters, politicians and media advisers; and a second, which includes fresh interviews with contemporary press secretaries. This article examines the shift from a ‘mass media logic’ to a ‘hybrid logic’, considered from a mediatization theoretical position. We also ask important questions about the press gallery’s ongoing relevance in the digital era, when politicians preside over their own social media empires.


Significance Rifts within the political elite are deepening, evidenced by the departure of former Prime Minister Jean Ravelonarivo -- and his cabinet -- last month. However, the installation of a new administration does not portend stability. Impacts The central bank's decision to cut its benchmark interest rate to 8.3% from 8.7% will facilitate borrowing by firms and households. This is unlikely to boost GDP growth given the countervailing effects of political volatility and low commodity prices. The UN secretary general's appeal (on an official trip earlier this month) for the government to tackle graft is unlikely to be heeded. If Madagascar experiences another coup, the Southern African Development Community bloc will likely expel it -- again.


Significance The issue of media independence has become a fraught one under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's administration, with perceptions rising among journalists and the public that the government is subjecting the media to political pressure. Critics of the administration speak of censorship and threats to freedom of expression. Japan's ranking in the World Press Freedom Index has fallen from 22nd in 2011-12, before Abe took office, to 61st in 2015. Impacts The government seems likely to try to marginalise the criticisms of constitutional scholars, like it marginalises its other critics. International media as well as domestic journalists are likely to feel some pressure from the authorities. In the near term, the issue is unlikely to destabilise the government, or derail passage of security legislation.


Subject The political impact of the 'Panamagate' scandal. Significance A five-member Supreme Court bench on April 20 ordered the constitution of a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) to probe the legitimacy of the offshore assets (mostly in the United Kingdom and Qatar) of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his family. In coming months, the Court bench will monitor and oversee the investigation in which both civilian law enforcement and military intelligence will participate. Impacts The government will avoid challenging the military’s foreign policy this year. The scandal will increase pressure on the political elite to ensure public probity. A military coup is highly improbable at present.


Significance On October 23, President Reuven Rivlin passed on the task of forming the government to Benny Gantz, leader of the centrist Blue and White alliance, after incumbent Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu failed. Neither the centre-left bloc nor the bloc of religious and right-wing parties (led by Netanyahu's Likud) has a majority without Yisrael Beiteinu, but so far Gantz and Netanyahu have failed to find an acceptable compromise despite pressure from Lieberman and Rivlin to form a unity administration. Meanwhile, Netanyahu himself faces an impending indictment on corruption charges. Impacts Consecutive rounds of elections will create a strain on the public finances. Netanyahu will refuse any power rotation deal where he is not given the premiership first. Another election, especially if coupled with an indictment, will accelerate a trend of public fatigue with Netanyahu.


1974 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 371-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donley T. Studlar

Relationships between the public and the political elite in Britain are generally thought to be explicable in terms of a ‘strong leadership’ hypothesis, according to which the public responds to initiatives put forward by leading political actors. Reflecting the popular will is not thought to be a highly prized activity among British politicians, who supposedly share the general cultural expectation that the public defers to the wisdom of those more knowledgeable than themselves, the public being content with the opportunity to pronounce electorally on the fitness of the Government at least once every five years. Occasionally voices are heard demanding that more attention be paid to the wishes of the general public, as in recent years in regard to the Common Market and capital punishment, but these demands have so far gone unheeded.


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