The organisation of markets as a key factor in the rise of Holland from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century: a test case for an institutional approach

2012 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 347-378 ◽  
Author(s):  
BAS VAN BAVEL ◽  
JESSICA DIJKMAN ◽  
ERIKA KUIJPERS ◽  
JACO ZUIJDERDUIJN

Although the importance of New Institutional Economics and the institutional approach for understanding pre-industrial economic development and the early growth of markets are widely accepted, it has proven to be difficult to assess more directly the effects of institutions on the functioning of markets. This paper uses empirical research on the rise of markets in late medieval Holland to illuminate some of the factors behind the development of the specific institutional framework of markets for land, labour, capital and goods, and some effects of these institutions on the actual functioning of the markets. The findings are corroborated by a tentative comparison with the functioning of markets in Flanders and eastern England.

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 125
Author(s):  
André Cutrim Carvalho

The present article seeks to discuss the meaning (s) of frontiers in Brazil and the role of institutions in the process of economic development through the new institutional economics. Any pattern of collective behavior characterizes an institution, and as such determines the “rules of the game”. The frontier represents a socio-economic relationship of production because the structure of society in building a frontier is dominated (in)directly by capital. In Brazil, the movement to occupy land on the frontier does not usually occur through contingent smallholders, but rather through a mixture of different social segments, such as: migrants, “landless” males, farmers and entrepreneurs, all seeking land to occupy, to produce and to speculate. The main conclusion is that a developed institutional system may help to promote economic development by structuring the surrounding environment and stimulating the process of cooperation, innovation and learning in the frontier regions of Brazil.


2006 ◽  
Vol 45 (4II) ◽  
pp. 965-980 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omar Azfar

The last 50 years of development economics have seen hopes for global development raised high and dashed time and again. While there has been positive, sometimes even impressive, growth in many countries, in most of the world experience has not matched expectations. The accumulation of physical capital and human capital, liberalisation and privatisation have all been proposed as the elixirs of growth. While all these arguments have some merit, by themselves they are incomplete solutions to the problem of development. The disappointing performance of the post-Communist transition, the slow growth of the 1970s and 80s in Africa and Latin America, and the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s were all rooted in poor governance. Good governance involves aligning the incentives of agents with the interests of principals in both economic and political spheres. This paper describes some insights from New Institutional Economics on how best to design these incentives.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jun Li ◽  
Wanrong Li ◽  
Yongchuan Shi

Business gang refers to the enterprise cluster formed by geographical relationship, which has always been the focus of research on entrepreneurship and regional economic development. The research of new institutional economics shows that culture, as an informal system, will change the social psychology, thinking mode and behavior of economic individuals, and provide a good environment for the growth of start-ups, thus affecting economic activities and economic development. Taking the five modern business gangs in China as the research subject, this paper uses the comparative method to analyze the regional cultural differences of the five modern business gangs, as well as the differences of the entrepreneurs’ psychological characteristics and startup behaviors. Through the analysis of the economic data of the provinces where the modern business gangs are located, this paper summarizes the differences of economic development in different regions. It is concluded that regional culture has a significant impact on the development of modern business gangs and regional economy. It is necessary to give full play to the advantages of regional culture and promote the high-quality development of modern business gangs and regional economy.


2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 511-516 ◽  
Author(s):  
YOUNG BACK CHOI

Abstract:In his critique of the newer approach in economic development emphasizing institutional reforms, Ha-Joon Chang, in his article titled ‘Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History’, equates New Institutional Economics with the program of liberal reforms for least developed countries (LDCs) and blames the former for the alleged failure of the latter. He argues with some justice that the dominant discourse in New Institutional Economics insufficiently appreciates the complexity of institutions; as a consequence, the difficulty of transplanting institutions is largely discounted. His case, however, is marred by his attempt to push down his ideological biases by marshalling inchoate, highly questionable and often contradictory ideas as facts. Going beyond a critical examination of the New Institutional Economics inspired discourse in development economics, he advocates his own version of beneficial development policies for LDCs – namely, economic democracy and industrial policies. His proposals are not only highly questionable, but they amount to adopting a double standard of exempting himself from the very criticisms he levies against New Institutional Economics – ignoring the difficulty of importing foreign institutions. Presuming to play God, like many development economists, he ignores the essential fact that an unwilling horse cannot be made to drink.


Author(s):  
Manolis Manioudis ◽  
Giorgos Meramveliotakis

In recent years, the concept of “institutions” has become central in scientific and political discourse. This reflects an increasing awareness of the role of institutions in the functioning of economies and in economic development more generally. Many of the catchphrases articulated within new institutional economics such as “institutions,” “organisations,” “transaction costs,” “property rights,” and “contracts” have become very common in orthodox economics discourse. This development is intellectually stimulating and interesting because it raises some fundamental issues with regard to the role and functioning of institutions. These concepts are seated on Smith's idea of the “harmony of interests.” However, Smith sees power as dominant in the formation of institutional framework. This chapter aims to provide a Smithian critique based on the notion of power, arguing that the formation of institutions and institutional framework cannot be considered apart from the intrinsic power relations which are vested in society.


2015 ◽  
Vol 62 (s1) ◽  
pp. 11-18
Author(s):  
Joanna Dzionek-Kozłowska ◽  
Rafał Matera

Abstract Many thinkers made attempts to explain differences in economic development between countries, and point out what should be done to foster development. We review briefly some spectacular theories focused on these fundamental problems. We use the tools of economic analysis and the methods characteristic especially for institutional economics and economic history. However, the paper’s central aim is to analyse and assess one of the newest voices in that still open discussion coming from Acemoglu and Robinson and presented in their “Why Nation Failed? The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty”. Their book is brimmed with compelling illustrations, which we acknowledge as its strongest point. While the accuracy and coherence of their generalisations leave much to be desired. The analysis of those examples let to infer that the most important element encouraging or hampering economic development is the common participation of the people in economic and political processes.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 020-036
Author(s):  
Vitaly L. Tambovtsev ◽  

The institutional approach in economic science arose, as is known, more than a century ago and is now called "the original institutional economics." In the middle of the last century, an alternative version of this approach emerged, called the "new institutional economics". Over the past forty years, in the institutional approach, it has been declared the creation of a significant number of new economic institutionalisms, such as cognitive, critical, monetary, “incomplete”, “new new”, generic, post-institutionalism, post-Keynesian, and legal institutionalisms. This article is devoted to the analysis of the main provisions of the listed above institutionalisms in economics, in order to answer the question whether they are alternatives to the previously created original and new institutional economics, or whether they clarify some details in these basic institutionalisms. The study showed that the most developed part of the institutionalisms that have arisen in recent decades expands the fields and methods of research within either the original institutionalism or the new institutional economics, without suggesting the grounds that would go beyond the foundations of the named "basic" institutionalisms. Based on this, the article concludes that the growth in the number of institutionalisms indicates the development of "basic" institutionalisms, and not that they have exhausted the research opportunities inherent in them.


Author(s):  
An Quoc Chau

Economic institutions play an indispensable role in creating an impetus for economic development. Although the concepts of institutions and economic institutions are not new in Vietnam, their connotation and nature remain controversial. This paper aims to clarity the connotation and the nature of institutions and economic institutions, thereby reflecting their roles in economic development. On the basis of the theoretical background, the study evaluates the qu lity of Vietn m’s e onomi institutions n offers suggestions so as to increase their quality.


2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
AVNER GREIF ◽  
JOEL MOKYR

AbstractProfessor McCloskey makes many telling and insightful points in her survey and criticism of what she terms the new institutional economics; yet there are a number of shortcomings to her paper. One is that she has bundled together a variety of quite disparate approaches to the role institutions play, and refers to them as ‘neo-institutionalist’. We unbundle these different strands, and show that an undifferentiated critique is unwarranted. A second argument made by her is that an institutional approach cannot explain either the Industrial Revolution or what she calls ‘the Great Enrichment’. We show that this conclusion is unwarranted and results from an overly narrow definition of institutions.


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