Making Morality Work

Author(s):  
Holly M. Smith

Moral theories can play both a theoretical and a practical role. As theories, they provide accounts of which features make actions right or wrong. In practice, they provide standards by which we guide our choices. Regrettably, limits on human knowledge often prevent people from using traditional moral theories to make decisions. Decision makers labor under false beliefs, or they are ignorant or uncertain about the circumstances and consequences of their possible actions. An agent so hampered cannot successfully use her chosen moral theory as a decision-guide. This book examines three major strategies for addressing this “epistemic problem” in morality. One strategy argues that the epistemic limitations of agents are defects in them but not in the moral theories, which are only required to play the theoretical role. A second strategy holds that the main or sole point of morality is to play the practical role, so that any theory incapable of guiding decisions must be rejected in favor of a more usable theory. The third strategy claims the correct theory can play both the theoretical and practical role through a two-tier structure. The top tier plays the theoretical role, while the lower tier provides a coordinated set of user-friendly decision-guides to provide practical guidance. Agents use the theoretical account indirectly to guide their choices by directly utilizing the supplementary decision-guides.Making Morality Work argues that the first two strategies should be rejected, and develops an innovative version of the third strategy.

Author(s):  
Holly M. Smith

Chapter 1 describes the central issue addressed by the book and then outlines the common philosophical responses to this issue and the type of solution for which the author will argue. The central issue is that we are epistemically limited agents who must contend with false beliefs or uncertainty in trying to ascertain and do what is right according to traditional moral theories. Common responses to this “epistemic problem” for morality include the “Austere” Response (sticking with traditional theories even though they are often unusable); the “Pragmatic” Response (abandoning traditional theories in favor of more user-friendly ones); and the “Hybrid” Response (seeking the advantages of both approaches in a two-tier structure that marries a traditional moral theory with more usable decision-guides). The advantages and disadvantages of all three responses will be assessed in subsequent chapters.


Author(s):  
Holly M. Smith

Chapter 9 turns to further epistemic barriers for decision makers: the problems of (nonmoral) ignorance and (nonmoral) uncertainty. The concepts of “ignorance” and “uncertainty” are elucidated, the problem of uncertainty is defined, and it is argued that the problem of ignorance should be treated as a special case of the problem of uncertainty. The three salient attempts to solve the problem are the Pragmatic, Austere, and Hybrid approaches. Combined solutions to the problem of error and the problem of uncertainty are explored, and it is argued that the only feasible approaches marry the Austere Response to the problem of error with the Hybrid Response to the problem of uncertainty in a two-tier system. The top-tier code provides the correct theoretical account of right and wrong, while the lower-tier rules provide associated decision-guides. Consistency requires that different normative terms be used by the top-tier rules and by the lower-tier rules.


2016 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
John Perry

AbstractRecent work on the morality of hell spans the various subdisciplines of theology, with the ironic exception of theological ethics. An adequate defence of hell requires a positive account of how God's eternally tormenting some humans is beautiful, just and worthy of worship. This suggests a short-term and long-term task. The short-term task, which this article pursues, tests whether an adequate moral theory is available by evaluating three possible candidates, the third of which is the most interesting, as it offers a historicist defence of hell: we believe hell is cruel only because of aversions to cruel and unusual punishment that emerged in modernity. Nonetheless, all three defences are inadequate, suggesting a longer term goal: we need either better moral theories or better accounts of hell, as well as greater analytic clarity regarding theological statements of the form,I want doctrineyto be true but believe doctrinexis true.


Author(s):  
Garrett Cullity

Three things often recognized as central to morality are concern for others’ welfare, respect for their self-expression, and cooperation in worthwhile collective activity. When philosophers have proposed theories of the substance of morality, they have typically looked to one of these three sources to provide a single, fundamental principle of morality—or they have tried to formulate a master-principle for morality that combines these three ideas in some way. This book views them instead as three independently important foundations of morality. It sets out a plural-foundation moral theory with affinities to that of W. D. Ross. There are major differences: the account of the foundations of morality differs from Ross’s, and there is a more elaborate explanation of how the rest of morality derives from them. However, the overall aim is similar. This is to illuminate the structure of morality by showing how its complex content is generated from a relatively simple set of underlying elements—the complexity results from the various ways in which one part of morality can derive from another, and the various ways in which the derived parts of morality can interact. Plural-foundation moral theories are sometimes criticized for having nothing helpful to say about cases in which their fundamental norms conflict. Responding to this, the book concludes with three detailed applications of the theory: to the questions surrounding paternalism, the use of others as means, and our moral responsibilities as consumers.


Author(s):  
Holly M. Smith

Chapter 8 explores the Austere and Hybrid Responses to the problem of error. The two types of response are described in both ideal and non-ideal versions. Both are found wanting, but the Austere Response emerges as best. Codes endorsed by the Austere approach cannot be shown to meet the “goal-oriented” desiderata of maximizing social welfare, facilitating social cooperation and long-range planning, or guaranteeing the occurrence of the ideal pattern of actions. But Austere-endorsed codes do satisfy the conceptual desiderata for “usable” moral theories in the core (but not the extended) sense of “usability.” They are usable despite the agent’s false beliefs, and they provide agents with the opportunity to live a successful moral life according to the modest conception of this life. This chapter concludes that the only remedy for the problem of error is an Austere code containing a derivative duty for agents to gather information before acting.


2021 ◽  
pp. medethics-2020-107103
Author(s):  
Stephen David John ◽  
Emma J Curran

Lockdown measures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic involve placing huge burdens on some members of society for the sake of benefiting other members of society. How should we decide when these policies are permissible? Many writers propose we should address this question using cost-benefit analysis (CBA), a broadly consequentialist approach. We argue for an alternative non-consequentialist approach, grounded in contractualist moral theorising. The first section sets up key issues in the ethics of lockdown, and sketches the apparent appeal of addressing these problems in a CBA frame. The second section argues that CBA fundamentally distorts the normative landscape in two ways: first, in principle, it allows very many morally trivial preferences—say, for a coffee—might outweigh morally weighty life-and-death concerns; second, it is insensitive to the core moral distinction between victims and vectors of disease. The third section sketches our non-consequentialist alternative, grounded in Thomas Scanlon’s contractualist moral theory. On this account, the ethics of self-defence implies a strong default presumption in favour of a highly restrictive, universal lockdown policy: we then ask whether there are alternatives to such a policy which are justifiable to all affected parties, paying particular attention to the complaints of those most burdened by policy. In the fourth section, we defend our contractualist approach against the charge that it is impractical or counterintuitive, noting that actual CBAs face similar, or worse, challenges.


2011 ◽  
pp. 3031-3039
Author(s):  
Jeremy Aarons

This article surveys and explores the relationship between epistemology and knowledge management (KM). Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature and extent of human knowledge (Klein, 1998b). Knowledge management is clearly deeply indebted to many ideas derived from epistemology. Much of the seminal work in KM discusses epistemology in a fair amount of detail, and explicitly appeals to insights from epistemology in developing a theoretical account of KM. In particular, the groundbreaking works by Sveiby (1994, 1997, 2001), Nonaka (1994), and Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) make explicit appeal to the philosophical insights in epistemology, which has provided the groundwork for much of their pioneering work in knowledge management. One would thus expect there to be a fairly intimate connection between epistemology and knowledge management. The relationship between these two fields, however, is far from straightforward.


Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen

This chapter develops an alternative, descriptive understanding of moral theory in order to reconcile two apparently conflicting insights; the insight of the critics of moral theory into the problems of the dominant conception of moral theory and the insight into the relevance that we still attribute to the positions traditionally conceived as theories such as Kantianism and utilitarianism. Building on the work of theory-critics, but without giving up the notion of moral theory, the chapter presents a view according to which theories are descriptive rather than prescriptive and serve heuristic and elucidatory purposes. Inspired by the notion of grammar found in the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, it is furthermore claimed that theories are descriptions which provide overviews of various normative structures of concerns—or moral grammars—and which may serve two different purposes, providing either general descriptions of the logic of our moral language or descriptions that elucidate a specific moral problem. According to this view, moral philosophers must accept the co-existence of a plurality of moral theories that describe a plurality of moral grammars, and they must give up the idea that moral theories are mutually exclusive. Moreover, the development of the second purpose reveals that theories cannot be the sole tool of moral philosophy, they need to be supplemented with grammatical investigations of the particularities involved in moral problems. Moral theories can be helpful, but they are never sufficient when addressing a problem in moral philosophy.


2021 ◽  
pp. 241-242
Author(s):  
Thaddeus Metz

At the end of the first chapter (1.5), I noted that, since having moved to an African country, I have considered myself to have had a moral obligation to engage with its intellectual traditions when teaching and researching. I would have rightly felt guilt had I taught merely Western ethics to African students and contributed only Euro-American-Australasian perspectives to journals published in the sub-Saharan region. Having been principally trained as an analytic moral and political philosopher, I have been in a good position to articulate normative-theoretic interpretations of African morality, to evaluate these moral theories by appealing to intuitions, and to apply them to a range of practical controversies. Now, it would be welcome if the relational moral theory I have defended in this book could explain why I had a duty to make such a contribution to the field. And indeed it does. I have had an obligation of some weight to teach and research African philosophical ideas as I am particularly able to do so for a reason that is by now familiar to the reader. In the way that a newly trained doctor has an obligation of some weight to give something back to his country before emigrating (...


2011 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 45-60
Author(s):  
Ben Ali ◽  
Samar Mouakket

E-business domains have been considered killer domains for different data analysis techniques. Most researchers have examined data mining (DM) techniques to analyze the databases behind E-business websites. DM has shown interesting results, but this technique presents some restrictions concerning the content of the database and the level of expertise of the users interpreting the results. In this paper, the authors show that successful and more sophisticated results can be obtained using other analysis techniques, such as Online Analytical Processing (OLAP) and Spatial OLAP (SOLAP). Thus, the authors propose a framework that fuses or integrates OLAP with SOLAP techniques in an E-business domain to perform easier and more user-friendly data analysis (non-spatial and spatial) and improve decision making. In addition, the authors apply the framework to an E-business website related to online job seekers in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The results can be used effectively by decision makers to make crucial decisions in the job market of the UAE.


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