The Long Shadow of Nigeria’s Military Epochs, 1966–79 and 1983–99

Author(s):  
Eghosa Osaghae

Nigeria was a paradigmatic case of military rule that was a defining feature of politics in developing countries between the 1960s and early 1990s. Military rule in Nigeria was symptomatic of state fragility, which provided grounds for coups and self-appointed corrective agendas of successive military governments. Attempts to address fundamental issues of political accommodation and economic development, and enhance the overall promise and potential of military rule were hampered by three major factors. These were the authoritarian and hyper-centralist character of military regimes, partisan character of coups and governments (which led to civil war in 1967–70), and regime-prolongation and self-succession ambitions of military rulers. This chapter discusses the intricacies of military intervention, the nature and legacies of military regime, how they manifested under the different governments, and how and why the changes introduced by them had epochal effects on the country.

1980 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claude S. Phillips

In October 1970, after the civil war had ended, General Yakubu Gowon reiterated his earlier pledge that military rule would be terminated on 1 October 1976, but two years before that date he postponed the return to civilian rule indefinitely on the grounds that Nigerians had not yet demonstrated ‘moderation and self-control in pursuing sectional ends’.1 In July 1975, nine years after his own elevation to Head of the Federal Military Government (F.M.G.), Gowon was removed by a coup d'état led by Brigadier Murtala Mohammed, who cited mismanagement as the immediate reason. However, after the coup, ‘well-placed spokesmen for the new administration…reaffirmed that the goals of the coup were to restore the good image of the military and to create conditions which will make reactive military intervention unnecessary in the future’.2


2017 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nam Kyu Kim ◽  
Alex M. Kroeger

The finding that military regimes are more fragile than other authoritarian regimes represents one of the few stylized facts in comparative politics. However, the existing literature contains substantial differences in the theoretical explanations for military regime instability and operationalizations of military rule. To assess competing explanations, we examine regime and leader instability after distinguishing between collegial and personalist military rule. We show that regime and leader insecurity characterize only collegial military regimes. Particularly, the fragility of collegial military regimes comes from a heightened likelihood of democratization, not more frequent transitions to alternative autocratic regimes. In addition, leaders of collegial military regimes face higher risks of both regular and irregular turnovers than other autocrats. Also, irregular exits of collegial military leaders tend to occur through reshuffling, rather than regime-changing, coups. The results strongly support theories focusing on military officers’ preference for unity over other explanations.


1984 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-238
Author(s):  
Guillermo Makin

THE FOREIGN ADVENTURISM OF THE ARGENTINE MILITARY may have made a few minds more cautious about automatically welcoming the advent of any other future military regime. This point was made more than a decade ago by Stepan in his seminal work on the military in Brazil; what he said then could have been said of most military regimes anywhere:Whatever the future outcome, it is clear that the attraction of military rule – its presumed stability, unity, and ftvity of purpose – has been largely illusory. Even more importantly, the difficulties encountered by the highly professional army of Brazil, with its technocratic civilian allies, illustrate that there can be no apolitical solution to the problems of political development.


2006 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosalind S. Gibson

The first cases of human Zn deficiency were described in the 1960s in the Middle East. Nevertheless, it was not until 2002 that Zn deficiency was included as a major risk factor in the global burden of disease, and only in 2004 did WHO/UNICEF include Zn supplements in the treatment of acute diarrhoea. Despite this recognition Zn is still not included in the UN micronutrient priority list, an omission that will continue to hinder efforts to reduce child and maternal mortality, combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases and achieve the UN Millennium Development Goals for improved nutrition in developing countries. Reasons for this omission include a lack of awareness of the importance of Zn in human nutrition, paucity of Zn and phytate food composition values and difficulties in identifying Zn deficiency. Major factors associated with the aetiology of Zn deficiency include dietary inadequacies, disease states inducing excessive losses or impairing utilization and physiological states increasing Zn requirements. To categorize countries according to likely risk of Zn deficiency the International Zinc Nutrition Consultative Group has developed indirect indicators based on the adequacy of Zn in the national food supplies and/or prevalence of childhood growth stunting. For countries identified as at risk confirmation is required through direct measurements of dietary Zn intake and/or serum Zn in a representative sample. Finally, in at risk countries either national or targeted Zn interventions such as supplementation, fortification, dietary diversification or modification, or biofortification should be implemented, where appropriate, by incorporating them into pre-existing micronutrient intervention programmes.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Jonathan B. Osborne

<p>In 2010 the Kingdom of Tonga experienced a democratic transition that saw the balance of power shift from a hereditary monarchy to the people. Elections were held that for the first time would result in a majority of Tonga’s Parliament comprising of democratically-elected politicians. Parliament was given the responsibility of nominating a Prime Minister from amongst its own ranks, who would in turn became responsible for nominating the Cabinet. These powers were formerly held by Tonga’s hereditary monarchy, whose role was reduced to one more akin to that performed by the modern monarchs of Europe. Since the 1960s, Tonga has received an increasing amount of overseas aid, especially from Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and, latterly, China. Historically, donors have not been overtly concerned with issues of democracy in developing countries, instead relying on the modernist notion that economic development would lead to democratic development. Since the 1980s, however, donors have become increasingly interested in the issue of democracy in developing countries, as a result of the good governance agenda and its successor paradigm, the aid effectiveness agenda. This thesis explores the impact of donors on Tonga’s 2010 democratic transition, concluding that the effect of donors manifested in a variety of direct and indirect ways. A retrospective analysis identifies aspects of Tonga’s 2010 democratic transition that could have been improved, and actions that donors should consider taking if faced with similar circumstances in the future. Finally, the thesis considers how donors can assist the consolidation of Tongan democracy, concluding that support should be targeted towards sustainable economic development, the rule of law, and the public service.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Jonathan B. Osborne

<p>In 2010 the Kingdom of Tonga experienced a democratic transition that saw the balance of power shift from a hereditary monarchy to the people. Elections were held that for the first time would result in a majority of Tonga’s Parliament comprising of democratically-elected politicians. Parliament was given the responsibility of nominating a Prime Minister from amongst its own ranks, who would in turn became responsible for nominating the Cabinet. These powers were formerly held by Tonga’s hereditary monarchy, whose role was reduced to one more akin to that performed by the modern monarchs of Europe. Since the 1960s, Tonga has received an increasing amount of overseas aid, especially from Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and, latterly, China. Historically, donors have not been overtly concerned with issues of democracy in developing countries, instead relying on the modernist notion that economic development would lead to democratic development. Since the 1980s, however, donors have become increasingly interested in the issue of democracy in developing countries, as a result of the good governance agenda and its successor paradigm, the aid effectiveness agenda. This thesis explores the impact of donors on Tonga’s 2010 democratic transition, concluding that the effect of donors manifested in a variety of direct and indirect ways. A retrospective analysis identifies aspects of Tonga’s 2010 democratic transition that could have been improved, and actions that donors should consider taking if faced with similar circumstances in the future. Finally, the thesis considers how donors can assist the consolidation of Tongan democracy, concluding that support should be targeted towards sustainable economic development, the rule of law, and the public service.</p>


2012 ◽  
pp. 4-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. North ◽  
J. Wallis ◽  
S. Webb ◽  
B. Weingast

The paper presents a summary of the forthcoming book by the authors and discusses the sample study of the 9 developing countries. While admitting the non-linearity of economic development they claim that the developing countries make a transition from the limited access orders (where the coalition of powerful elite groups plays a major role, that is based on personal connections and hampers free political and economic competition) to the open access orders with democratic government and efficient decentralized economic system. The major conclusion of this article is that what the limited access societies should do is not simply introducing open access institutions, but reorganizing the incentives of the elites so that to limit violence, provide economic and political stability and make a gradual transition to the open access order beneficial for the elites.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 156-159
Author(s):  
Roy PP

Monica Ali was born in 1967 in Dhaka, Bangladesh, but grew up in England. Her English mother met her Bangladeshi father at a dance in northern England in the 1960s. Despite both of their families` protests, they later married and lived together with their two young children in Dhaka. This was then the provincial capital of East Pakistan which after a nine-month war of independence became the capital of the People`s Republic of Bangladesh. On 25 March 1971 during this civil war, Monica Ali`s father sent his family to safety in England. The war caused East Pakistan to secede from the union with West Pakistan, and was now named Bangladesh.


2000 ◽  
Vol 39 (4II) ◽  
pp. 1057-1073
Author(s):  
Abdul Hakem

Pakistan with an estimated population of around 142.5 million in mid 2001 is the seventh most populous country in the world and fourth in Asia and Pacific countries. The historical trends indicate a continuously increasing growth in population (Table 1). The population of the area now constituting Pakistan was 16.6 million in 1901. Since then the population has increased over eight-fold. Annual growth rates have risen from 1 percent in the first three decades of the century to around 2 percent in the next three decades and after peaking at little over 3 percent in the 1960s, has started showing a declining trend. Currently it is estimated that Pakistan’s population is growing at around 2.1 percent, still a very high rate of annual growth in population. Major contributing factor to the fast growth in population of Pakistan has been high fertility which has remained high for a very long period. It is evident that nearly 100 million population has been added to the population of Pakistan since 1961, that is, during the last four decades. Such rapid growth in population has several adverse implications for the socio-economic development of the country which has been offsetting the gains in social and economic development.


1993 ◽  
Vol 32 (4I) ◽  
pp. 411-431
Author(s):  
Hans-Rimbert Hemmer

The current rapid population growth in many developing countries is the result of an historical process in the course of which mortality rates have fallen significantly but birthrates have remained constant or fallen only slightly. Whereas, in industrial countries, the drop in mortality rates, triggered by improvements in nutrition and progress in medicine and hygiene, was a reaction to economic development, which ensured that despite the concomitant growth in population no economic difficulties arose (the gross national product (GNP) grew faster than the population so that per capita income (PCI) continued to rise), the drop in mortality rates to be observed in developing countries over the last 60 years has been the result of exogenous influences: to a large degree the developing countries have imported the advances made in industrial countries in the fields of medicine and hygiene. Thus, the drop in mortality rates has not been the product of economic development; rather, it has occurred in isolation from it, thereby leading to a rise in population unaccompanied by economic growth. Growth in GNP has not kept pace with population growth: as a result, per capita income in many developing countries has stagnated or fallen. Mortality rates in developing countries are still higher than those in industrial countries, but the gap is closing appreciably. Ultimately, this gap is not due to differences in medical or hygienic know-how but to economic bottlenecks (e.g. malnutrition, access to health services)


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