Moral Theory in the Fiction of Isabelle de Charrière: The Case of Three Women

Hypatia ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Emma Rooksby
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Isabelle De Charriere

Not all those who write philosophy are recognized as philosophers. In this paper I argue that Dutch writer Isabelle de Charrière, usually known as a novelist, is actually engaged in doing moral philosophy. In the second half of the eighteenth century, Charrière wrote novels about characters who endorsed moral theories and commitments. Her novels track the dilemmas that these characters face in trying to live according their moral theories and commitments. I consider the case for treating fiction as philosophically valuable, and argue that Charrière's novels fall into the category of philosophically valuable fiction.

Descriptive Moral Theories

2020 ◽  
pp. 45-72
Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Problem ◽  
Moral Language ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Moral Problems ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
Moral Philosophers

This chapter develops an alternative, descriptive understanding of moral theory in order to reconcile two apparently conflicting insights; the insight of the critics of moral theory into the problems of the dominant conception of moral theory and the insight into the relevance that we still attribute to the positions traditionally conceived as theories such as Kantianism and utilitarianism. Building on the work of theory-critics, but without giving up the notion of moral theory, the chapter presents a view according to which theories are descriptive rather than prescriptive and serve heuristic and elucidatory purposes. Inspired by the notion of grammar found in the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, it is furthermore claimed that theories are descriptions which provide overviews of various normative structures of concerns—or moral grammars—and which may serve two different purposes, providing either general descriptions of the logic of our moral language or descriptions that elucidate a specific moral problem. According to this view, moral philosophers must accept the co-existence of a plurality of moral theories that describe a plurality of moral grammars, and they must give up the idea that moral theories are mutually exclusive. Moreover, the development of the second purpose reveals that theories cannot be the sole tool of moral philosophy, they need to be supplemented with grammatical investigations of the particularities involved in moral problems. Moral theories can be helpful, but they are never sufficient when addressing a problem in moral philosophy.

Needs, Moral Demands and Moral Theory

Utilitas ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 251-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
SORAN READER ◽  
GILLIAN BROCK
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Moral Practice ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Moral Demandingness ◽  
Moral Demands

In this article we argue that the concept of need is as vital for moral theory as it is for moral life. In II we analyse need and its normativity in public and private moral practice. In III we describe simple cases which exemplify the moral demandingness of needs, and argue that the significance of simple cases for moral theory is obscured by the emphasis in moral philosophy on unusual cases. In IV we argue that moral theories are inadequate if they cannot describe simple needs-meeting cases. We argue that the elimination or reduction of need to other concepts such as value, duty, virtue or care is unsatisfactory, in which case moral theories that make those concepts fundamental will have to be revised. In conclusion, we suggest that if moral theories cannot be revised to accommodate needs, they may have to be replaced with a fully needs-based theory.

Moral Philosophy and Moral Life

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Moral Subject ◽  
Moral Position ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Alternative Understanding

This is a work in moral philosophy and its ambition is to contribute to a renewed understanding of moral philosophy, the role of moral theory, and the relation between moral philosophy and moral life. It is motivated by the belief that the lack of a coherent answer to the question of the role and status of moral philosophy and the theories it develops, is one of the most important obstacles for doing work in moral philosophy today. The first part of the book untangles various criticisms of the dominant view of moral theories that challenges the explanatory, foundational, authoritative, and action-guiding role of these theories. It also offers an alternative understanding of moral theory as descriptions of moral grammar. The second part investigates the nature of the particularities relevant for an understanding of moral life, both particularities tied to the moral subject, her character, commitments, and moral position, and particularities tied to the context of the subject, her moral community and language. The final part marks a return to moral philosophy and addresses the wider question of what the revised conception of moral theories and the affirmation of the value of the particular mean for moral philosophy by developing a descriptive, pluralistic, and elucidatory conception of moral philosophy. The scope of the book is wide, but its pretensions are more moderate, to present an understanding of descriptive moral philosophy which may spur a debate about the status and role of moral philosophy in relation to our moral lives.

Truth, Happiness and Obligation: the Moral Philosophy of William Wollaston

Philosophy ◽  
1976 ◽  
Vol 51 (195) ◽  
pp. 35-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stanley Tweyman
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Philosopher ◽  
Theories Of Truth ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
The Third ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
Opening Section

William Wollaston, a leading British moral philosopher of the eighteenth century, has fallen into obscurity primarily, I believe, for two reasons. In the first place, it is usually supposed that Wollaston's moral theory was refuted by Hume in the opening section of the third book of the Treatise of Human Nature. Secondly, Wollaston's theory, or parts thereof, have been assigned pejorative labels such as ‘odd’ and ‘strange’, which create the impression that it is not a moral philosophy which can be taken seriously. In this paper I attempt to deal with the second of these reasons by setting forth what I take to be Wollaston's meaning in certain key sections of his work, The Religion of Nature Delineated, especially in so far as they help to shed light on his theories of truth and happiness, and the relation of these to his theory of obligation. Wollaston will be found to be a moral philosopher with important things to say, and therefore to be a moral philosopher with a theory worth taking seriously. If I am correct in my interpretation of Wollaston, then it can also be established that Hume has not refuted Wollaston in the opening section of Book III of the Treatise. But here my attention will be confined entirely to Wollaston's own moral theory.

scholarly journals Challenge of time as a moral imperative

Human Affairs ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wendy Drozenová
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
New Technologies ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Political Decision ◽  
Temporal Dimension ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Political Decision Making ◽  
Ethical Requirement

AbstractThe aim of this essay is to consider how the dominant moral theories can be applied to the discourse of disaster situations. In specific times, specific values take priority. Therefore, this article will consider how moral theory deals with time. Kant’s moral philosophy has influenced ethics enormously, but rejects the idea of a temporal dimension in ethics; consequently, modern ethics has not devoted sufficient attention to the temporal dimension. Nonetheless, Kantian ethics established the basic principles of respect for human beings as ends in themselves, and for autonomy of rational beings; thus it cannot be ignored. In political decision-making, simply having good intentions does not suffice; they must be accompanied by responsibility. Both the ethics of consequentialism and virtue ethics (the virtue of wisdom) deal with responsibility for the future. Hans Jonas developed a concept of responsibility concerned particularly with the risks associated with new technologies and the ethical requirement to avoid disasters. “Uncertainty may be our permanent fate -

The Critique of Moral Theories

2020 ◽  
pp. 15-44
Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Martha Nussbaum ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
Moral Practice ◽  
Influential Points ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Classic Papers

This chapter surveys criticisms raised against moral theory from positions such as virtue ethics, particularism, anti-theory, and Wittgensteinian moral philosophy in order to identify the most central and damaging objections. It locates the origin of theory critique in two classic papers by Iris Murdoch and Elizabeth Anscombe and proceeds to give an overview of the most influential points of criticism from the second half of the twentieth century. This overview is contrasted with an explication of the dominant understanding of moral theory presented in the work of Martha Nussbaum, which allows for an identification of the crucial objections to moral theory, here presented in the form they take in the work of Bernard Williams. The objections are that theories cannot provide a foundation for moral practice, and that they do not possess the authority necessary to serve as action-guiding in any substantial sense. The conclusion of the chapter is that proponents of the dominant understanding of moral theory cannot offer convincing answers to these objections, and that this points to a need to re-evaluate our understanding of both the role and the form of moral theories.

Nietzsche and Contemporary Ethics

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Robertson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Value Theory ◽  
Critical Assessment ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Ethical Thought ◽  
Normative Authority ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Principal Parts

Nietzsche is one of the most subversive ethical thinkers of the Western canon. This book offers a critical assessment of his ethical thought and its significance for contemporary moral philosophy. It develops a charitable but critical reading of his thought, pushing some claims and arguments as far as seems fruitful while rejecting others. But it also uses Nietzsche in dialogue with, so to contribute to, a range of long-standing issues within normative ethics, metaethics, value theory, practical reason, and moral psychology. The book is divided into three principal parts. Part I examines Nietzsche’s critique of morality, arguing that it raises well-motivated challenges to morality’s normative authority and value: his error theory about morality’s categoricity is in a better position than many contemporary versions; and his critique of moral values has bite even against undemanding moral theories, with significant implications not just for rarefied excellent types but also us. Part II turns to moral psychology, attributing to Nietzsche and defending a sentimentalist explanation of action and motivation. Part III considers his non-moral perfectionism, developing models of value and practical normativity that avoid difficulties facing many contemporary accounts and that may therefore be of wider interest. The discussion concludes by considering Nietzsche’s broader significance: as well as calling into question many of moral philosophy’s deepest assumptions, he challenges our usual views of what ethics itself is—and what it, and we, should be doing.

Concern, Respect, and Cooperation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Garrett Cullity
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Fundamental Principle ◽  
Simple Set ◽  
Collective Activity ◽  
Complexity Results ◽  
Concern For Others ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Moral Responsibilities

Three things often recognized as central to morality are concern for others’ welfare, respect for their self-expression, and cooperation in worthwhile collective activity. When philosophers have proposed theories of the substance of morality, they have typically looked to one of these three sources to provide a single, fundamental principle of morality—or they have tried to formulate a master-principle for morality that combines these three ideas in some way. This book views them instead as three independently important foundations of morality. It sets out a plural-foundation moral theory with affinities to that of W. D. Ross. There are major differences: the account of the foundations of morality differs from Ross’s, and there is a more elaborate explanation of how the rest of morality derives from them. However, the overall aim is similar. This is to illuminate the structure of morality by showing how its complex content is generated from a relatively simple set of underlying elements—the complexity results from the various ways in which one part of morality can derive from another, and the various ways in which the derived parts of morality can interact. Plural-foundation moral theories are sometimes criticized for having nothing helpful to say about cases in which their fundamental norms conflict. Responding to this, the book concludes with three detailed applications of the theory: to the questions surrounding paternalism, the use of others as means, and our moral responsibilities as consumers.

scholarly journals The Moral Philosophy of Maria Montessori

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
PATRICK FRIERSON
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Social Solidarity ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Moral Concepts ◽  
Maria Montessori ◽  
Individual Character ◽  
Individual Self ◽  
Shared Agency

Abstract This paper lays out the moral theory of philosopher and educator Maria Montessori (1870–1952). Based on a moral epistemology wherein moral concepts are grounded in a well-cultivated moral sense, Montessori develops a threefold account of moral life. She starts with an account of character as an ideal of individual self-perfection through concentrated attention on effortful work. She shows how respect for others grows from and supplements individual character, and she further develops a notion of social solidarity that goes beyond cooperation toward shared agency. Partly because she attends to children's ethical lives, Montessori highlights how character, respect, and solidarity all appear first as prereflective, embodied orientations of agency. Full moral virtue takes up prereflective orientations reflectively and extends them through moral concepts. Overall, Montessori's ethic improves on features similar to some in Nietzschean, Kantian, Hegelian, or Aristotelian ethical theories while situating these within a developmental and perfectionist ethics.

Epilogue

2021 ◽  
pp. 241-242
Author(s):  
Thaddeus Metz
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
African Country ◽  
Good Position ◽  
African Students ◽  
Intellectual Traditions ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Sub Saharan ◽  
Political Philosopher ◽  
Do So

At the end of the first chapter (1.5), I noted that, since having moved to an African country, I have considered myself to have had a moral obligation to engage with its intellectual traditions when teaching and researching. I would have rightly felt guilt had I taught merely Western ethics to African students and contributed only Euro-American-Australasian perspectives to journals published in the sub-Saharan region. Having been principally trained as an analytic moral and political philosopher, I have been in a good position to articulate normative-theoretic interpretations of African morality, to evaluate these moral theories by appealing to intuitions, and to apply them to a range of practical controversies. Now, it would be welcome if the relational moral theory I have defended in this book could explain why I had a duty to make such a contribution to the field. And indeed it does. I have had an obligation of some weight to teach and research African philosophical ideas as I am particularly able to do so for a reason that is by now familiar to the reader. In the way that a newly trained doctor has an obligation of some weight to give something back to his country before emigrating (...

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