Voting for Democracy: Campaign Effects in Chile's Democratic Transition

2015 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 67-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Taylor C. Boas
Keyword(s):  
Survey Data ◽  
Transition To Democracy ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Vote Choice ◽  
Political Regime ◽  
Campaign Effects ◽  
Global Context ◽  
Transitions To Democracy ◽  
Discernible Effect ◽  
Augusto Pinochet

AbstractIn a global context in which authoritarian regimes often hold elections, defeating dictators at the polls can play a key role in transitions to democracy. When the opposition is allowed to campaign for votes in such elections, there are strong reasons to believe that its efforts will be more persuasive than those of the authoritarian incumbent. This article examines the effect of televised campaign advertising on vote choice in the 1988 plebiscite that inaugurated Chile's transition to democracy. Using matching to analyze postelectoral survey data, it shows that the advertising of the opposition's no campaign made Chileans more likely to vote against dictator Augusto Pinochet, whereas the advertising of the government's yes campaign had no discernible effect. These findings suggest that the no campaign played an important causal role in the change of political regime.

Heterodox Shock in Brazil: Técnicos, Politicians, and Democracy

1991 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 163-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lourdes Sola
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Regime Change ◽  
Foreign Debt ◽  
Transition To Democracy ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Political Regime ◽  
The Political ◽  
Focal Points ◽  
Economic Uncertainty ◽  
Social Dimensions

The recent experiences of transition to democracy in Latin America have taken place in circumstances which suggest a need to rethink the political and social dimensions of inflation. The experience of the 1980s reveals that the once familiar road which led from an inflationary spiral and a rising foreign debt to the collapse of democracy can also be travelled by other types of regime. The crisis of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, Chile apart, reflected an inability to deal with those same focal points of political and economic uncertainty. The sequence which runs from high (or hyper) inflation to political regime change may be neutral, in the sense that it is indifferent to whether the regimes affected are democratic or authoritarian.

Institutional Legacies

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donatella della Porta ◽  
Massimiliano Andretta ◽  
Tiago Fernandes ◽  
Eduardo Romanos ◽  
Markos Vogiatzoglou
Keyword(s):  
Social Movements ◽  
Social Movement ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Transition To Democracy ◽  
Political Regime ◽  
Social Rights ◽  
Political Rights ◽  
Political Opportunities ◽  
Protest Policing ◽  
Institutional Legacies

Chapter 3 addresses the institutional legacy (that is, the set of formal and informal rules that regulate the exercise of power in a political regime) of the transition to democracy, particularly those institutional dimensions that are more relevant for social movements—what social movement studies have defined as political opportunities. After setting the theoretical framework by specifying the main qualities of democracy the research has addressed, the chapter covers the legal and constitutional provisions on civil (especially protest) rights, political rights (right to resistance, majoritarian versus consensual assets), and social rights as well as practices—particularly with regard to protest, citizens’ participation, protest policing, and concertation.

Regime Type and Political Destabilization in Cross-National Perspective

2016 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Slinko ◽  
Stanislav Bilyuga ◽  
Julia Zinkina ◽  
Andrey Korotayev
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Political Stability ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Political Regime ◽  
Sufficient Evidence ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Regime Types ◽  
The Asymmetry ◽  
National Perspective ◽  
The Cold War

In this article, we re-analyze the hypothesis that the relationship between the type of political regime and its political instability forms an inverted U shape. Following this logic, consistent democracies and autocracies are more stable regimes, whereas intermediate regimes (anocracies) display the lowest levels of political stability. We re-test this hypothesis using a data set that has not been previously used for this purpose, finding sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis pertaining to the aforementioned U-shaped relationship. Our analysis is specifically focused on the symmetry of this U shape, whereby our findings suggest that the U-shaped relationship between regime types and sociopolitical destabilization is typically characterized by an asymmetry, with consistently authoritarian regimes being generally less stable than consolidated democracies. We also find that the character of this asymmetry can change with time. In particular, our re-analysis suggests that U-shaped relationship experienced significant changes after the end of the Cold War. Before the end of the Cold War (1946-1991), the asymmetry of inverted U-shaped relationship was much less pronounced—though during this period consistent authoritarian regimes were already less stable than consolidated democracies, this very difference was only marginally significant. In the period that follows the end of the Cold War (1992-2014), this asymmetry underwent a substantial change: Consolidated democracies became significantly more stable, whereas consolidated autocracies became significantly more unstable. As a result, the asymmetry of the U-shaped relationship has become much more pronounced. The article discusses a number of factors that could account for this change.

scholarly journals A VIA DEMOCRÁTICA AO AUTORITARISMO

2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 108
Author(s):  
Paulo César Nascimento
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Hannah Arendt ◽  
Transition To Democracy ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
The Will ◽  
Hugo Chavez

Este artigo analisa as teorias de Aristóteles, Tocqueville e Hannah Arendt a respeito de como alguns aspectos da democracia como a busca do igualitarismo e o voto majoritário podem conduzir ao despotismo. Examinando os casos da democratização da Rússia pós-comunista e o sistema político da Venezuela durante a presidencia de Hugo Chavez, o texto procura demonstrar a importância das idéias daqueles pensadores para a compreensão de regimes autoritários legitimados pelo voto popular.---The democratic route of autoritarismThis article reviews the theories of Aristotle, Tocqueville and Hannah Arendt with respect to some elements of democracy such as the pursue of egalitarianism and the reliance on the will of the majority that can lead to despotism. On the basis of post-communist Russia’s transition to democracy and Venezuela’s political system under the presidency of Hugo Chavez, the article shows the importance of those thinker’s insights to understand current authoritarian regimes which rely on popular vote.keywords: democracy, autoritarian regimes, voting.

Riding the tiger of performance legitimacy? Chinese villagers' satisfaction with state healthcare provision

2020 ◽  
pp. 019251212092748
Author(s):  
Kerry Ratigan
Keyword(s):  
Survey Data ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Structured Interviews ◽  
Healthcare Provision ◽  
Course Of Action ◽  
Low Expectations ◽  
Original Survey ◽  
Policy Failures

Authoritarian regimes often rely on performance legitimacy, but cannot always fulfill policy promises, thereby undermining the regime. In 21st-century China, a reliance on performance legitimacy may seem unwise, as policy outcomes have been mixed. However, the Chinese government has managed to navigate gaping inequality and ineffective social policy. Why have policy failures not produced greater discontent? Using my original survey data to examine rural healthcare, I argue that the Chinese government is pursuing an objectively minimal but subjectively sufficient course of action in healthcare provision. Regression analysis of my survey data, coupled with responses from open-ended questions and semi-structured interviews, demonstrates that the deficiencies in current policy have not threatened regime legitimacy because villagers have low expectations for state provision of healthcare. The data also suggest that, as China continues to urbanize, villagers' expectations are likely to rise, presenting new policy challenges for the state.

Corporatism, Totalitarianism, and Transitions to Democracy

1994 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 108-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
BAOHUI ZHANG
Keyword(s):  
Social Movements ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
The Other ◽  
Institutional Conditions ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Transitions To Democracy ◽  
Institutional Legacies

Recent studies of democratization generally emphasize the role of elites and political pacts in transitions to democracy. They usually give little attention to the institutional conditions for elite's successful pact making. This article argues that although choices by elites are important, pact making does require certain institutional conditions. By examining the democratization experiences of Spain, Brazil, the Soviet Union, and China in 1989, this article argues that only some types of authoritarian regimes have the historical possibility of following a pacted transition. Specifically, the author argues that corporatist regimes have unique advantages in following such a path. On the other hand, the totalitarian institutional legacies of once-entrenched communist regimes left democratic oppositions as broadly based social movements and their leaders with strong populist tendencies. These, the author argues, create structural obstacles to democratization through elite's pactmaking for these regimes.

scholarly journals Democracy, consumption, and growth in sub-Saharan Africa

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-48
Author(s):  
John A Doces
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Sub Saharan Africa ◽  
Political Regime ◽  
Government Consumption ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
Empirical Estimates ◽  
Democratic Regimes ◽  
Sub Saharan

This article studies the effect of political regime type on economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. Democracy promotes growth because it conditions government consumption so that consumption is used for public purposes rather than private needs and this in turn leads to faster growth. By conditioning consumption towards public goods and away from private goods, we should see that consumption in democratic regimes is associated with more public goods like roads and education while in authoritarian regimes consumption yields less of these goods. Likewise, consumption should be associated with falling fertility in democratic regimes and rising fertility in authoritarian regimes. Using several measures of growth, the empirical estimates from a large- n fixed-effects regression show that democracy conditions consumption so that the latter is associated with faster growth. Moreover, the empirical analysis indicates that government consumption in democratic regimes is associated with more education completion and lower fertility rates.

Democracy and Quality of Life in Asian Societies

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 343-357
Author(s):  
SHINYA SASAOKA ◽  
KATSUNORI SEKI
Keyword(s):  
Quality Of Life ◽  
Survey Data ◽  
Hierarchical Modeling ◽  
Causal Effect ◽  
Political Regime ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Satisfaction With Democracy ◽  
Country Level ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractThis article examines whether democracy affects quality of life. Scholars have conducted surveys to investigate whether democracy is likely to lead to good quality of life. There are two contested views to the relationship: some suggest that democracy has a positive causal effect on quality of life, whereas others contend that democracy does not play such a role. Previous findings are supported by cross-national statistical analysis with aggregated survey data. However, aggregated survey data may cause ecological fallacy. Also, in order to ascertain the extant research, it would be beneficial to test the hypothesis by incorporating both individual- and country-level variables. Therefore, this paper applied hierarchical modeling to investigate the regularity. Both individual-level perception of democracy and country-level political regime data were incorporated in our empirical model. Our findings suggest that individual-level satisfaction with democracy has positive causal effect on one's quality of life, whereas the country-level characteristic of the political regime has no effect.

Democratic transitions and monetary policy: are democratic central banks different?

2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-180
Author(s):  
Christian Bjørnskov ◽  
Martin Rode
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Democratic Transitions ◽  
Market Institutions ◽  
Transitions To Democracy ◽  
Electoral Democracy ◽  
Short Run ◽  
Competing Hypotheses

Empirical studies have shown democracies to be more supportive of pro-market institutions than authoritarian regimes; however, to date, it is virtually unknown through which channel democracy might actually create institutional improvements. In addition, causality between democracy and economic institutions is anything but clear, as competing hypotheses highlight. In this article, we examine the possible association of democratisation and political instability with sound monetary policy and the independence of central banks, both of which can be considered central pillars of an economic policy aimed at producing overall prosperity. Results mainly indicate that stable transitions to democracy are followed by strongly improved access to sound money and more independent central banks, probably because stable shifts to electoral democracy create incentives for policymakers to refrain from using monetary policy for short-run gains. Conversely, we also find evidence that especially unstable democratic transitions could impede the establishment of a more independent central bank, making inflationary policies and high money growth more likely.

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