The Musical Diplomacy of Metternich

Diplomatica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 244-277
Author(s):  
Damien Mahiet
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Minister ◽  
Diplomatic Relations ◽  
Presentation Of Self ◽  
Professional Musicians ◽  
Mixed Effect ◽  
Italian Opera ◽  
Historical Image ◽  
Musical Diplomacy

Abstract That festivities are woven into the historical image of the Austrian diplomat, foreign minister, and state chancellor Clemens von Metternich (1773–1859) is in part the byproduct of his investment in music. As an amateur performer, passionate connoisseur, attentive patron, and frequent host, Metternich cultivated an international soundworld that presented opportunities for cooperative performances. Ensemble music and collective listening provided experiences of international concert that gained significance in the context of multilateral congresses and meetings. Musical exchanges, sustained through the activity of women and professional musicians, contributed to fostering diplomatic relations and international presence. In the context of the Restoration’s competing soundworlds, Metternich deployed a patronage of Rossini’s work and Italian opera music, with increasing intensity but mixed effect. This history speaks to the function of music in the presentation of self in international encounters and the resources to be found in the plurality of roles diplomats perform.

The Implementation of Neutrality

2019 ◽  
pp. 13-27
Author(s):  
Stève Sainlaude
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Minister ◽  
Central Problem ◽  
Diplomatic Relations ◽  
Maritime Law ◽  
Equal Distance ◽  
The One ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Strict Reading

On May 13, 1861, the British cabinet published a proclamation of neutrality accompanied by recognition of Southern belligerency. The French followed suit on June 10, 1861 with a proclamation of neutrality that employed the same cautious language to describe the Southern authority. Instead of taking a stance on the central problem, French Foreign Minister Edouard Thouvenel sought to anticipate the conflict’s damage to French interests in the U.S. However, by keeping an equal distance from both belligerents, France displeased the Lincoln administration, which denied that its enemy had any legitimacy to fight. The legal government remained the one in Washington because the French did not recognize the Confederacy as a state. France therefore maintained diplomatic relations with the Lincoln administration, while French relations with the authorities in Richmond remained unofficial. The Declaration of Paris of April 16, 1856 introduced changes to maritime law. It prohibited privateering, exempted nonbelligerent vessels carrying enemy goods from confiscation, and declared that blockades had to be physically effective in order to be legally binding. Thouvenel found it easier to depart from a strict reading of the Declaration of Paris because the text did not clearly specify any practical arrangements for certifying a blockade’s effectiveness.

German-Soviet Relations and the Anglo-Soviet Break, 1927

Slavic Review ◽  
1966 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-83
Author(s):  
Harvey L. Dyck
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Diplomatic Relations ◽  
International Crisis ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Great Debate ◽  
Political Interests ◽  
Soviet Trade ◽  
Foreign Ministry

In May 1927 Sir Austen Chamberlain precipitated the first great international crisis of the post-Locarno period by denouncing the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement and severing Britain's diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Although Germany was not directly involved, the dispute nevertheless was to have a profoundly disturbing effect on German-Soviet relations. By raising the possibility of a wide-ranging diplomatic, economic, and perhaps even military confrontation between London and Moscow, it strained Germany's diplomatic system, which rested on the Locarno Pact (1925) and the Treaty of Berlin (1926). Thus it posed some fundamental questions for the German Foreign Ministry: Were the policies associated with those agreements compatible with each other only in fair weather? Did Germany have the freedom to remain neutral if the dispute should deepen? In short, was it still realistic to believe that Germany could maintain equally intimate ties with London and Moscow? Because Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann had previously denned a balancing role as the sine qua non of Germany's international revival, the imbroglio soon led to a great debate in the Wilhelmstrasse. The issue on which it turned was, as a leading participant observed, “whether Germany's ties with Russia are worth enough to our present and future political interests so that it pays to assume the political expenses and risks involved in maintaining them.”

The Sino-Indonesian Rupture

1968 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 17-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justus M. Van Der Kroef
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Minister ◽  
Diplomatic Relations ◽  
Indonesian Government ◽  
Rapid Deterioration

On October 7, 1967, Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, told anti-communist student demonstrators in Jakarta that Indonesia was moving in the direction of a complete break in diplomatic relations with China. On October 9, after a special cabinet meeting, the Indonesian government announced that it was “suspending” relations with the Peking government, thus effecting a kind of de facto diplomatic break. On October 29, Peking followed suit ordering the “temporary closing” of its embassy in Jakarta. On October 31, a Chinese plane flew the eight remaining Indonesian diplomats in Peking home to Jakarta and picked up the 20 or so remaining Chinese diplomatic staff in the Indonesian capital. These developments climaxed a two-year period of declining Sino-Indonesian relations which began with the abortive communist coup of September 30, 1965. During this time, the erstwhile Sino-Indonesian partnership, once conceived by its creators as the nucleus of a world movement against “neo-colonialism, colonialism and imperialism” deteriorated into bitterness. Three factors in this rapid deterioration deserve particular attention:Peking's alleged involvement in the September 30 coup (usually called Gestapu—from Gerakan tigah puluh September—by acronymminded Indonesians) and her reportedly subsequent subversive burrowing in Indonesia, the anti-communist momentum of Indonesian politics since the coup and its impact on the three million Chinese minority in Indonesia, and the pattern of steadily escalating tensions between the two countries following their respective diplomatic ploys and counterploys.

Willy Brandt's Eastern Policy

Worldview ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 14-16
Author(s):  
Donald Brandon
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
East Germany ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
Cultural Exchange ◽  
West Germany ◽  
Diplomatic Relations ◽  
Social Democrats ◽  
East European ◽  
The Soviet Union

Five years ago West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard and Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder launched a tentative “Opening to the East” which marked a break with Konrad Adenauer's relatively rigid approach to, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The “Grand Conbtion” of the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats continued the experiment from 1966-1969. The Hallstein Doctrine—no diplomatic relations with any country which had such relations with East Germany (the Soviet Union being the sole exception)—was abandoned. West Germany established diplomatic relations with the maverick Rumanian regime, and re-established relations with Tito's Yugoslavia. Several trade and cultural exchange agreements were entered into with East European Communist nations.

scholarly journals Russia – EU: Dialogue without Dialogue

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-15
Author(s):  
Dmitriy Danilov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
The Political ◽  
Diplomatic Relations ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Czech Republic ◽  
Political Dialogue ◽  
The Eu

The article deals with the problems of political and diplomatic relations between Russia and the European Union. The key event was the meeting of Josep Borrel as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Moscow in February 2021. The Russian side considered it as an opportunity to outline the prospect of resuming the political dialogue interrupted by the European Union in 2014, notably in the context of the reviewing a strategy on Russia initiated by the EU. The author analyzes the differences in the approaches of European countries and institutions in the context of the ongoing aggravation of Russia – EU relations. The main result of the meeting was not its «ineffectiveness», but, on the contrary, its obvious counterproductive effect. The EU has even more consolidated its policy of deterring Russia and increasing sanctions pressure, which actually closes the prospect for systemic dialogue. In this context, the political and diplomatic conflict in connection with the mass expulsion of Russian diplomats by the Czech Republic (the «Czech case») and the narrowing of opportunities to compensate for the EU-Russia dialogue shortcomings by bilateral tracks are also considered. In conclusion, some finding are presented regarding the perspective Russian reaction.

scholarly journals Wan light of Lithuania in Bucharest. The sources of a non-declared divorce (1918-1926)

2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-24
Author(s):  
Florin Anghel
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Minister ◽  
Diplomatic Relations ◽  
Regional Politics ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
Political Consequences ◽  
Bilateral Relations ◽  
Between The Acts ◽  
Common Interests ◽  
Cordon Sanitaire ◽  
The Impact

Between the Acts of Union and, respectively, of Independence of 1918 and 1926 Romania and Lithuania shared no strategic interests or common regional politics. Although the Bucharest diplomacy insistently asked Warsaw to debate over its Baltic policy, at the end the Romanian-Polish anti-Soviet alliance became one of the most important pieces of so-called “cordon sanitaire” geopolitics, which included Baltic and Black Seas regions countries, but no Lithuania. Both states became locked in cold relations with no contacts and no recognition (until August 1924), which was due to regional politics, but contrary to common interests. The diplomatic relations, officially opened in August 1924, lacked any practical political consequences. The Kaunas coup d’état of December 1926 had little political and media impacts in Bucharest and, in the rarely definitions of Antanas Smetona new nationalist regime, most of Romanians condemned it (contrary with their attitude towards the coup d’état of Warsaw in May 1926). It was only in the last half of the ‘30s that between Bucharest and Kaunas new avenues in bilateral relations had opened, the impact of the fortunate decision of foreign minister Nicolae Titulescu in 1934 to create a Romanian Legation to cover Lithuania.

Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law

1996 ◽  
Vol 90 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-93
Author(s):  
Marian Nash ◽  
(Leich)
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Law ◽  
United States Of America ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
The United States ◽  
Diplomatic Relations ◽  
Socialist Republic ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
Contemporary Practice

By notes exchanged at a signing ceremony in Hanoi, Vietnam, on August 5, 1995, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam confirmed the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam by mutual consent on July 12, 1995.

A ‘New Chapter’ in Australia–Timor Bilateral Relations? Assessing the Politics of the Timor Sea Maritime Boundary Treaty

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca Strating
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
Diplomatic Relations ◽  
Gas Field ◽  
Bilateral Relations ◽  
Maritime Boundary ◽  
Timor Leste ◽  
History Of ◽  
Timor Sea ◽  
Policy Shift

Abstract The signing of the 2018 Maritime Boundary treaty was described by Australia’s then Foreign Minister Julie Bishop as opening ‘a new chapter’ in diplomatic relations with Timor-Leste. This contribution examines the importance of the treaty to bilateral relations. It provides a brief history of the Timor Sea disputes, explains Timor-Leste’s policy aims, and analyses Australia's foreign policy shift on the boundary delimitation issue. While there are positive signs in resolving the boundary dispute, uncertainty over the development of the Greater Sunrise gas field may impact bilateral relations in the future.

Political Censorship: Some Reflections on its Validity in Israel's Constitutional Law

1976 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pnina Lahav
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
Foreign Country ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
The Other ◽  
Secret Message ◽  
Diplomatic Relations ◽  
The Press ◽  
The Government

On 19 January 1976, the Government of Israel announced its intention to impose censorship on two categories of information:(1) Information about the existence or content of a document relating to Israel's foreign affairs which is classified “top secret” or similarly classified and which is addressed from Israel to a foreign country or from a foreign country to Israel.(2) Information relating to a visit by an Israeli official to a foreign country or a visit by a foreign official to Israel, or a meeting between an Israeli and a foreign official—when no diplomatic relations obtain between Israel and that country and when the visit or meeting was not conducted in public nor officially announced in Israel.This step was the Government's response to a series of leakages which appeared in the preceding weeks in the press in Israel. Two publicized items had particularly outraged the Government. One item discussed President Ford's secret message to Prime Minister Rabin. The other item disclosed a secret visit by Foreign Minister Allon to Europe.

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