Why is Stabilization Sometimes Delayed?

2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 286-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Oatley

Existing work on the politics of stabilization has failed to find compelling evidence of a regime-type effect. This article reformulates and reevaluates the regime-type hypothesis. It is argued that regime type does not have an independent impact on the timing of stabilization. Instead, regime type influences the extent to which societal opposition and distributive conflict will delay stabilization. Societal opposition and distributive conflict are likely to delay stabilization in democratic regimes, because governments must worry about maintaining power. Such societal dynamics are less likely to delay stabilization in authoritarian regimes. Using a sample of 92 high-inflation episodes, precisely these regime-specific dynamics surrounding the politics of stabilization were found. Governments in democratic regimes want to stabilize rapidly but often cannot overcome societal opposition and distributive conflict to do so. Authoritarian regimes are substantially less constrained by societal opposition and distributive conflict but have less incentive to stabilize rapidly.

1996 ◽  
Vol 29 (6) ◽  
pp. 635-659 ◽  
Author(s):  
KEVIN NEUHOUSER

Does regime type affect policy outcomes? Do authoritarian regimes have greater policy discretion than democratic regimes? The empirical evidence is ambiguous. Using two cases of failed military populism in Ecuador, the author argues that two authoritarian characteristics—lack of participation in decision making and nonmobilization—frustrated implementation of import substitution policies. Ironically, groups expected to benefit most—industrialists and urban workers—provided the principal opposition. Although the regime needed their cooperation to implement policy, neither group had assurance that its interests were protected. Thus political alliances require more than an exchange of policies for support; regimes must make their commitments credible by permitting the participation in decision making and mobilization of groups whose cooperation is needed for policy implementation. This conclusion is supported by a comparison to Peru (where a military regime encountered similar obstacles) and Argentina (where a democratically elected military officer, Perón, was able to implement import substitution policies).


2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 809-811
Author(s):  
Erik Martinez Kuhonta

A major debate in the literature on the political economy of development centers on the relationship between regime type and economic development. This debate has been heavily influenced by the East Asian development model, where authoritarianism has often gone hand in hand with high growth rates. In South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, development has been propelled by authoritarian or semidemocratic regimes. One key element of this argument is that the repression of labor under these authoritarian regimes has been especially helpful in states' pursuit of high growth rates because it has ensured political stability and checked societal demands.


Author(s):  
Andrea Kendall-Taylor ◽  
Natasha Lindstaedt ◽  
Erica Frantz

Key themes 72 Regime type and conflict 74 Regime type and terrorism 78 Regime type and economic performance 81 Regime type and quality of life 86 Regime type and corruption 89 Regime type and repression 92 Conclusion 94 Key Questions 94 Further Reading 95 So far we have focused on defining different types of political systems. We discussed how to distinguish democracy from autocracy and the rising prevalence of ...


1988 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 287-296
Author(s):  
Gil Shidlo

The conventional literature on the military generally believes that military, non-competitive regimes have a tendency to spend more for national-security purposes and less on welfare provision. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate why do Argentina and Brazil, military non-competitive regimes, have tendencies similar to those of Western democracies where the state’s economic expansion extends beyond that required by strictly economic considerations? In contrast to the rational-comprehensive or ‘technocratic’ model which is often assumed to predominate in bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes an analysis of social and economic policies in Brazil and Argentina highlights the essentially political nature of the policy process in non-democratic regimes.


2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-171
Author(s):  
Susan Turner Haynes

ABSTRACTOne of the most alarming trends of the past decade has been the rise in authoritarianism and the growing support of strongman politics among citizens of democratic regimes. College instructors have a unique opportunity to challenge such thinking at a time when many of their students are still forming their political beliefs. Using a game, instructors not only can show students the perils of authoritarianism, they also can potentially expand students’ appreciation of democracy. This article describes a game suitable for this purpose. Students take on the role of workers, soldiers, and rulers in a military dictatorship to learn about the “guns-and-butter tradeoff” and authoritarian uncertainty.


Author(s):  
Richard Mulgan

The accountability of governments to their citizens is usually framed within a relationship of principal and agent in which the government, as agent, is obliged to answer to the citizens as agents. It is also commonly located within a structure of representative democracy where political leaders are elected by, and answerable to, the voters. However, these two theoretical frames do not adequately capture the relations of government to their citizens or the parameters of government accountability. Governments increasingly operate through non-hierarchical networks that are not subject to the vertical accountability assumed in principal-agent theory. Instead, networks offer alternative, informal accountability mechanisms based on horizontal relationships. These are evident, for example, in the responsiveness of professionals to their clients and the mutual accountability of network members to one another. These mechanisms have a sufficient share in the characteristics normally associated with accountability, including the obligations to inform, discuss, and accept consequences, for them to count as mechanisms of accountability in the usual sense. Redefinition of accountability, for instance to exclude the requirement of answering to another person or body, while understandable, is not essential. Accountability mechanisms also function without the support of effective democratic elections. For instance, formal institutions of horizontal accountability, such as courts and anti-corruption agencies, can operate in non-democratic regimes and are better seen as conditions of representative democracy rather than as consequences. Partially democratic or authoritarian regimes also exhibit various forms of social accountability in which civil society organizations call governments directly to account without recourse to state-based agencies of accountability. Large authoritarian regimes can encourage limited accountability processes as a means of bringing public pressure to bear on recalcitrant cadres. To be effective, however, all such measures require at least some legally robust support from government institutions.


Author(s):  
Karen A. Rasler ◽  
William R. Thompson

A central cleavage in the war making-state making literature is between advocates of the notion that warfare has been the principal path to developing stronger states and critics who argue that the relationship no longer holds, especially in non-European contexts. It is suggested that the problem is simply one of theoretical specification. Increasingly intensive warfare, as manifested in European combat, made states stronger. Less intensive warfare, particularly common after 1945, is less likely to do so. Empirical analysis of a more representative data set on state capacity (revenues as a proportion of gross domestic product [GDP]), focusing on cases since 1870, strongly supports this point of view. The intensiveness of war is not the only factor at work—regime type and win/loss outcomes matter as well—but the relationship does not appear to be constrained by the level of development.


2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-48
Author(s):  
John A Doces

This article studies the effect of political regime type on economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. Democracy promotes growth because it conditions government consumption so that consumption is used for public purposes rather than private needs and this in turn leads to faster growth. By conditioning consumption towards public goods and away from private goods, we should see that consumption in democratic regimes is associated with more public goods like roads and education while in authoritarian regimes consumption yields less of these goods. Likewise, consumption should be associated with falling fertility in democratic regimes and rising fertility in authoritarian regimes. Using several measures of growth, the empirical estimates from a large- n fixed-effects regression show that democracy conditions consumption so that the latter is associated with faster growth. Moreover, the empirical analysis indicates that government consumption in democratic regimes is associated with more education completion and lower fertility rates.


2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 413-414 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ellen Lust

This response points to three critical problems in Explaining the Unexpected. First, the authors' contention that scholars ignored “everyday contestation,” including changing citizen-state relations, emerging venues of political participation, and the potential for mobilization, is based on a selective reading of the literature on politics in the Arab world before 2011. Second, their assertion that existing paradigms hindered scholars' ability to understand change mischaracterizes the literature on enduring authoritarianism. Scholars did not argue that regime breakdown was impossible before 2011 but rather sought to understand why authoritarian regimes were sustained. Long before the uprisings, they recognized the factors that could make breakdown possible. Third, Howard and Walters' conclusion that Middle East scholars' fundamental paradigms and their focus on regime type will lead them to treat “utterly remarkable waves of mass mobilization as politically inconsequential” is misplaced. The literature has and continues to explore a wide range of issues that extend far beyond democratization, and recent scholarship has examined varied aspects of the diverse political processes and outcomes witnessed since 2011. Explaining the Unexpected misses the mark on many points, but it does provide a useful platform for scholars to reflect on problems facing comparative politics. These include the blinders resulting from the normative biases underpinning the discipline and the need for a nuanced discussion about how, and to what extent, scholars facing rapid, regional transformations can learn from the study of similar experiences in other regions.


ISRN Oncology ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 2011 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rajiv Lochan ◽  
Helen L. Reeves ◽  
Anne K. Daly ◽  
Richard M. Charnley

The extremely poor outcome from pancreas cancer is well known. However, its aetiology less well appreciated, and the molecular mechanisms underlying this are poorly understood. Tobacco usage is one of the strongest risk factors for this disease, and this is a completely avoidable hazard. In addition, there are well described hereditary diseases which predispose, and familial pancreas cancer. We have sought here to summarise the role of tobacco-derived carcinogens and the mode of their tumorigenic action on the pancreas. There is compelling evidence from animal and human studies (laboratory including cell line studies and epidemiologic) that tobacco derived carcinogens cause pancreas cancer. However, the manner in which they do so is not entirely apparent. There is also compelling evidence that synergism with genetic and other life-style factors—like diet obesity—results in a multifactorial causation of the disease. Ascertaining the role of tobacco carcinogens in the development of this cancer and their interaction with other risk factors will enable novel therapeutic and preventative strategies to improve outcome from this appalling malignancy.


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