scholarly journals Divide to conquer? Strategic parliamentary opposition and coalition government

2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882110428
Author(s):  
Richard Whitaker ◽  
Shane Martin
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Government ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
House Of Commons ◽  
Parliamentary Elections ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Opposition Party ◽  
Policy Conflicts ◽  
Focus Questions ◽  
Opposition Parties

Parliamentary elections often result in the formation of a coalition government. While the legislative process allows actors within a coalition government to monitor each other, little attention has focused on how opposition parties respond to coalition government. We argue that opposition parties have incentives to uncover and highlight differences and tensions within the governing coalition. A strategy by the opposition to use legislative tools to uncover policy conflicts and ministerial drift within the coalition increases intra-coalition tensions, potentially generating electoral costs for the governing parties, and potentially even hastening the coalition’s demise. To test our argument, we build and analyse a new dataset of parliamentary questions in the British House of Commons covering the 2010–15 coalition. As expected, the main opposition party appears to strategically focus questions towards policy areas that uncover intra-coalition tensions. This research highlights the importance of opposition parties in parliamentary democracies.

Minderheitsregierung im Bund? Lehren zum Oppositionsverhalten aus Schweden

2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-158
Author(s):  
Melanie Müller ◽  
Marcus Höreth
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Opposition Party ◽  
Minority Government ◽  
Adequate Understanding ◽  
Alternative Function ◽  
The Government ◽  
German Bundestag ◽  
Western Democracies ◽  
Opposition Parties

Government stability in the German Bundestag is traditionally tied to a parliamentary majority and an opposition minority . Nonetheless, minority governments in other Western democracies show that, despite the lack of a parliamentary majority, they govern stable and effectively together with the opposition . In this article, on the Swedish case, we examine how opposition parties in parliament are involved in the legislative process in a minority government and what patterns they follow in order to maintain governmental stability without neglecting their alternative function . The paper combines theoretical and concep­tual considerations on the adequate understanding of the opposition in the Federal Repub­lic of Germany with empirical findings on cooperation and conflicts between opposition party groups and minority governments . The results show that opposition parties strategi­cally switch between confrontational (Westminster-style) and consensual patterns of behav­ior (republican) . Through this flexible majority finding, opposition parties in parliament can alternately present themselves as policymakers or as an alternative counterpart to the government . This opposition behavior is functionally adequate under the conditions of a pluralized and fragmented party system and the resulting difficulties in forming a stable government majority .

More spotlight, more problems? Westminster parliamentary systems and leadership replacement in large opposition parties

2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (5) ◽  
pp. 588-597 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florence So
Keyword(s):  
Original Data ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Proportional Hazard ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Cox Proportional Hazard ◽  
Parliamentary Systems ◽  
Cox Proportional Hazard Models ◽  
Leadership Turnover ◽  
Opposition Parties

In this article, I argue that Westminster parliamentary systems encourage large opposition parties to replace their leaders between elections. Parliamentary system structures how parties compete over legislative outcomes. In Westminster systems, the government’s dominance in the legislative process promotes an adversarial government–opposition relationship. Subsequently, large opposition parties’ electoral prospects are tied to their ability to discredit the government’s policy agenda. Since this responsibility falls to party leaders, leaders of large opposition parties directly affect their parties’ electoral prospects, and parties are more motivated to replace those who are ineffective in damaging the government’s credibility. Therefore, leaders of large opposition parties in Westminster systems carry a higher risk of replacement than their counterparts in other parliamentary systems. I construct an original data set on party leadership turnover in 14 established parliamentary democracies. Results from Cox proportional hazard models support my claim and suggest that institution influences intraparty dynamics.

scholarly journals “Protect our homeland!” Populist communication in the 2018 Hungarian election campaign on Facebook

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dalma Kékesdi-Boldog ◽  
Tamás Tóth ◽  
Tamás Bokor ◽  
Zoltán Veczán
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Mixed Method ◽  
Election Campaign ◽  
Parliamentary Elections ◽  
Method Analysis ◽  
Communicational Perspective ◽  
Opposition Parties

The research presented in this paper is based on analysis of the Facebook posts of five major Hungarian political parties over the course of the official campaign season leading up to the 2018 parliamentary elections. We conducted a mixed-method analysis on 795 Facebook posts. First, the main topics of the parties were collected. Second, the posts of the parties were analyzed from a populist communicational perspective. Third, we tried to find some correlations between the basic topics and the populist communicational categories. Finally, we outline possible differences and similarities between parties’ communication. Our analysis shows that opposition parties did not have a common communicational strategy on Facebook while ruling parties emphasized both inner and exterior threats that could destabilize Hungary.

Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review

2005 ◽  
Vol 99 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
LANNY W. MARTIN ◽  
GEORG VANBERG
Keyword(s):  
Agency Problems ◽  
Coalition Government ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Legislative Review ◽  
Institutional Mechanism ◽  
Legislative Institutions

Political scientists know remarkably little about the extent to which legislatures are able to influence policymaking in parliamentary democracies. In this article, we focus on the influence of legislative institutions in periods of coalition government. We show that multiparty governments are plagued by “agency” problems created by delegation to cabinet ministers that increase in severity on issues that divide the coalition. We also argue that the process of legislative review presents an important—but understudied—institutional opportunity for coalition partners to overcome these tensions. We evaluate our argument using original legislative data on over 300 government bills collected from two parliamentary democracies. The central implication of our findings is that legislatures play a more important role in parliamentary democracies than is usually appreciated by providing a key institutional mechanism that allows coalition partners with divergent preferences to govern successfully.

Pandemic year in Spain. Political outcome

2021 ◽  
pp. 52
Author(s):  
Alexandra Kurakina-Damir
Keyword(s):  
Political Communication ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Image Point ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Parliamentary Elections ◽  
The Past ◽  
Political Forces ◽  
The One ◽  
Regional Elections

Despite well-founded doubts about the viability of the coalition (which had insufficient support of the deputies for the adoption of important laws), a well-built strategy of political communication during the pandemic allowed the cabinet of ministers not only to withstand, but also to strengthen its positions. Over the past year, a number of strategically important decisions, both from a political and image point of view, have been adopted. The coronavirus pandemic has had a significant impact on the legislative process. The solution to the Catalan problem faded into the background. In part, this was due to the need for early parliamentary elections in the region and the alleged regrouping of political forces. The revealed facts of possible financial abuse of the honorary king hurt the image of the Crown, but the measures taken today to restore prestige are bearing fruit. Among the electoral trends noted, it is worth highlighting the strengthening of positions of socialists and rightwing populists (especially following the results of early regional elections in Catalonia), as well as a decline in support for left-wing populism. Ciudadanos' position remains unstable: on the one hand, it managed to slightly regain its position in early 2020, but further growth in support stalled, and poor results in the Catalan elections once again raised the question of whether the party has a future. Conservatives, by contrast, have established themselves as the leader of the bloc. Having lost a share of supporters at the beginning of the study period, they tried with all their might to restore the balance, periodically changing the strategy of actions.

5. Parliamentary government and the legislative process

2021 ◽  
pp. 54-80
Author(s):  
Colin Faragher
Keyword(s):  
Significant Role ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Voting Systems ◽  
House Of Commons ◽  
Essential Information ◽  
Parliamentary Government ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Electoral Law

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter first describes the UK legislature. The legislature of the UK is the Queen in Parliament. Parliament is bicameral, meaning that, apart from the Queen, there are two legislative chambers called the House of Lords and the House of Commons. The House of Lords—composed of life peers, senior bishops, and some hereditary peers—is guardian of the constitution through the work of the House of Lords Constitution Committee and protects the constitution and initiates and revises legislation. The House of Commons—composed of constituency representatives organized on party lines under the whip system—is the principal legislative chamber and plays a significant role in scrutinizing the executive. The discussion then turns to the legislative process, covering electoral law, alternative voting systems, and the devolution of the legislative function including the Wales Act 2017.

10. EU Legislation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ed Beale ◽  
Libby Kurien ◽  
Eve Samson
Keyword(s):  
Direct Access ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
House Of Commons ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
Eu Legislation ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Eu

This chapter examines the ways in which the UK Parliament formally constrains the government and engages with European Union (EU) institutions. The House of Lords and the House of Commons both have processes to ensure that legislation proposed at the EU level has been properly reviewed before it takes effect in UK law. The ‘scrutiny reserve’, which stipulates that ministers should not agree to proposals under scrutiny, is used to elicit information about the government's negotiating position. Parliament also has a role in examining EU legislation and providing direct access to European institutions. The chapter first provides an overview of the EU legislative process, focusing on three principal EU institutions: member states, the European Parliament (EP), and the European Commission. It also considers the formal role of national parliaments in the EU legislative process, the UK Parliament's scrutiny of the EU legislation and its effectiveness, and parliamentary scrutiny after Brexit.

5. Parliamentary sovereignty

2019 ◽  
pp. 99-123
Author(s):  
Anne Dennett
Keyword(s):  
Legislative Process ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
House Of Commons ◽  
Legislative Power ◽  
Legal Limits ◽  
Parliamentary Sovereignty ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Uk ◽  
A Current ◽  
Law Making

This chapter focuses on parliamentary sovereignty. The term ‘Parliamentary sovereignty’ is normally defined as the ‘legislative supremacy of Parliament’. Since the constitutional settlement brought about by the Bill of Rights 1689, the UK Parliament has had unchallenged authority to create primary law. Parliament's legislative supremacy means, therefore, that there is no competing body with equal or greater law-making power and there are no legal limits on Parliament's legislative competence. Parliament has broad legislative power but cannot make unchangeable statutes, and a current parliament can reverse laws made by a previous parliament. Nobody but Parliament can override Acts of Parliament. The Enrolled Bill rule requires that, if a Bill has passed through the House of Commons and House of Lords and received royal assent, the courts will not enquire into what happened before or during the legislative process.

When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancingin Parliamentary Elections

2005 ◽  
Vol 99 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
ORIT KEDAR
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Design ◽  
Institutional Context ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Voter Behavior ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Ongoing Debate ◽  
Parliamentary Elections ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Voter Choice ◽  
The Way

This work develops and tests a theory of voter choice in parliamentary elections. I demonstrate that voters are concerned with policy outcomes and hence incorporate the way institutions convert votes to policy into their choices. Since policy is often the result of institutionalized multiparty bargaining and thus votes are watered down by power-sharing, voters often compensate for this watering-down by supporting parties whose positions differ from (and are often more extreme than) their own. I use this insight to reinterpret an ongoing debate between proximity and directional theories of voting, showing that voters prefer parties whose positions differ from their own views insofar as these parties pull policy in a desired direction. Utilizing data from four parliamentary democracies that vary in their institutional design, I test my theory and show how institutional context affects voter behavior.

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