scholarly journals Is there a parliamentary peace? Parliamentary veto power and military interventions from Kosovo to Daesh

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Wagner
Keyword(s):  
Security Policy ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
Democratic Peace ◽  
Test Case ◽  
Military Interventions ◽  
War Powers ◽  
Alliance Politics ◽  
Domestic Constraints ◽  
The Military

This article studies the effect of parliamentary involvement on security policy. Building on Democratic Peace Theory, it examines whether democracies with a parliamentary veto power are indeed less likely to participate in military interventions, than democracies without such a veto power, ceteris paribus. By studying patterns of participation across 25 to 35 countries in five military missions, this paper finds modest evidence for such a parliamentary peace and suggests that it depends on the character of the military mission in question. If a mission is framed as a test case of alliance solidarity, as was the case with OEF and the Iraq War, domestic institutional constraints can be trumped by alliance politics. If, however, countries enjoy more discretion in deciding on the use of force, domestic constraints such as parliamentary war powers have a tangible impact on government policy.

Peaceful legislatures? Parliaments and military interventions after the Cold War: Insights from Germany and Italy

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 482-503
Author(s):  
Fabrizio Coticchia ◽  
Francesco N Moro
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
Military Interventions ◽  
War Powers ◽  
Audience Costs ◽  
Opportunity Structures ◽  
Original Analysis ◽  
The Cold War

The article contributes to the growing debate on parliamentary war powers and shows how parliaments matter in shaping both force deployment and force employment. Through original analysis of the Italian and German decision-making on military interventions after the Cold War, the article illustrates how formal and informal constraints shape the opportunity structures faced by executives that are willing to undertake military interventions. Revisiting, and building on, the great deal of research recently emerged on institutional constraints to the use of force, the article details the types of costs – namely, transaction and audience costs – linked to involvement of legislatives in the decision-making and provides empirical support for theories based on parliamentary war powers, adding new dimensions of analysis.

IS JAPAN BACK? MEASURING NATIONALISM AND MILITARY ASSERTIVENESS IN ASIA'S OTHER GREAT POWER

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-35
Author(s):  
Jennifer Lind ◽  
Chikako Kawakatsu Ueki
Keyword(s):  
Social Identity ◽  
East Asia ◽  
Social Identity Theory ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Identity Theory ◽  
Great Power ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
The Past ◽  
Policy Debates ◽  
Over Time

Abstract Observers of East Asia frequently claim that Japanese nationalism is on the rise, and that Tokyo is abandoning its longtime military restraint. To determine whether these trends are indeed occurring, we define and measure Japan's nationalism and military assertiveness; we measure whether they are rising relative to Japan in the past, and relative to seven other countries. Drawing from social identity theory, we distinguish between “nationalism” and a more benign “patriotism.” We find in Japan (1) strong patriotism that is stable over time, and no evidence of rising nationalism. Furthermore we find that (2) military assertiveness remains generally low, but it has risen in terms of decreased institutional constraints and peacekeeping activities. Our findings have important implications for academic debates about nationalism and Japanese security policy, and for policy debates about a nascent balancing effort against China.

Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level Games

1995 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 914-924 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jongryn Mo
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Foreign Country ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Domestic Institutions ◽  
Veto Player ◽  
Domestic Constraints ◽  
International Bargaining ◽  
Informational Effect

Putnam's (1988) conjecture that negotiators can benefit from their domestic constraints implies that they may want to impose domestic constraints on themselves by granting veto power to an agent. I show that a negotiator's decision to employ an agent as veto player depends on the kinds of information available to the foreign country and the alignment of preferences between the negotiator and the agent. When the foreign country has incomplete information about the negotiator's preferences and the negotiator has preferences too divergent from those of the agent, the negotiator will not give veto power to the agent. However, this applies only to an agent with extreme preferences, and a surprisingly large number of agent types will receive veto power. The attractiveness of the agent veto to the negotiator is in part due to its informational effect. By granting veto power to an agent, the negotiator can transmit more information to the foreign country and capture informational gains that would be lost in the absence of the agent veto.

scholarly journals CHANGING OF PARADIGM IN MILITARY-POLITICAL THINKING IN THE DOCTRINES AND STRATEGIES OF MILITARY SECURITY OF UKRAINE OF THE 20th AND 21th CENTURIES

2021 ◽  
pp. 120-126
Author(s):  
Mykhailo Tsiurupa
Keyword(s):  
Security Policy ◽  
Military Strategy ◽  
New Paradigm ◽  
Political Thinking ◽  
Main Thesis ◽  
Political Response ◽  
Military Security ◽  
The Creation ◽  
New Generation ◽  
The Military

The time limits of the life of one generation are about 25-30 years, so lived in the struggle for building its own state and its armed defence, this time for Ukraine goes down in the history of the first generation of creation and attempts to comply with four military doctrines (1993-2004-2012-2015), in which our own defence course was proclaimed. The theoretical basis of these official documents of significance were certain paradigms of military-political thinking, according to which Ukraine did not consider it a continuation of politics. The direction and principles of military policy (defence or security policy in European terminology) for modern Ukraine from the mid-20s of the XIX century, as well as 100 years ago, again came to the fore in connection with the implementation of previously abstract concepts " annexation "," occupation "," war ", which allegedly did not exist for our country in recent history. But today they have been embodied or, in the image of Franz Kafka, "reincarnated" into threatening forms of Russia's military practice against our state, the end of which is not yet visible in the near future. The military-theoretical and political response was the "Military Strategy of Ukraine" in 2021, which "opened" a new generation of paradigms of militarypolitical thinking. The main thesis is the belief that the protection of sovereignty and strengthening of military security is the military-theoretical and political response was the "Military Strategy of Ukraine" in 2021, which "opened" a new generation of paradigms of military-political thinking. The main thesis is the belief that the protection of sovereignty and strengthening of military security is the creation of a "comprehensive defence system" with the integration of all forces of the state and civil society, law enforcement agencies and volunteers, administrative regions and territorial communities. The military-theoretical and political response was the "Military Strategy of Ukraine" in 2021, which "opened" a new generation of paradigms of military-political thinking. We will prove that this is a philosophy of military security instead of the previously expressed doctrinal military-political ideas of entrusting a matter of national importance to the forces of the defence sector. The new generation of public life Ukraine will begin with a new paradigm of militarypolitical thinking, the central idea of which is the transition from hopes for the political levers of defence for international cooperation to the creation of a system of comprehensive national security with the synergistic potential of Ukrainianity.

Myanmar: Civil–Military Relations in a Tutelary Regime

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Bünte
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
The Government ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Myanmar has had one of the longest ruling military regimes in the world. Ruling directly or indirectly for more than five decades, Myanmar’s armed forces have been able to permeate the country’s main political institutions, its economy, and its society. Myanmar is a highly revealing case study for examining the trajectory of civil–military relations over the past seven decades. Myanmar ended direct military rule only in 2011 after the military had become the most powerful institution in society, weakened the political party opposition severely, coopted several ethnic armed groups, and built up a business empire that allowed it to remain financially independent. The new tutelary regime—established in 2011 after proclaiming a roadmap to “discipline flourishing democracy” in 2003, promulgating a new constitution in 2008, and holding (heavily scripted) elections in 2010—allowed a degree of power-sharing between elected civilian politicians and the military for a decade. Although policymaking in economic, financial, and social arenas was transferred to the elected government, the military remained in firm control of external and internal security and continued to be completely autonomous in the management of its own affairs. As a veto power, the military was also able to protect its prerogatives from a position of strength. Despite this dominant position in the government, civil–military relations were hostile and led to a coup in February 2021. The military felt increasingly threatened and humiliated as civilians destroyed the guardrails it had put in place to protect its core interests within the tutelary regime. The military also felt increasingly alienated as the party the military had established repeatedly failed to perform in the elections.

British security policy and the Sunningdale Agreement: the consequences of using force to combat terrorism in a liberal democracy1

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron Edwards
Keyword(s):  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Liberal Democracies ◽  
Security Forces ◽  
Counter Terrorism ◽  
Relevant Today ◽  
Conservative Government ◽  
Democratic Control ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Military

This chapter assesses the nine specific clauses in the Sunningdale Agreement that dealt with the implications for security policy in Northern Ireland. It analyses the consequences that these clauses had in Britain’s war against terrorism, especially as the Conservative government sought to shift the operational focus away from military-led counter-insurgency to a law enforcement-led counter-terrorism strategy. Although the policy of ‘police primacy’ did not emerge as Britain’s preferred option for tackling terrorism until 1975-76, this chapter argues that the seeds were sown by the British Government’s approach to the Sunningdale Agreement and the urgency by which it sought a cross-border arrangement with the Republic of Ireland that would enhance the security forces’ powers of pursuit, arrest and extradition. Indeed, the chapter asks whether the Conservative Party’s return to power in 1979 finally heralded a renewed vision for ‘police primacy’ in a more systematic way than that enacted by the Labour Government between 1974 and 1979. The chapter also highlights the theme of democratic control over the military instrument that would remain constant right up to the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 and beyond. Indeed, it makes the case - pace Evelegh (1978) and Neumann (2003) – that the British government’s use of the military instrument as an option of last resort is fundamental to our understanding of Britain’s long war on Irish terrorism. This is relevant today, of course, particularly as Britain faces another (albeit much less sustained) armed challenge from dissident republicans. In conclusion, the chapter reflects on how liberal democracies more broadly have responded to the challenge posed by terrorism.

‘What We Are Fighting For’: Democracies’ Justifications of Using Armed Force since the End of the Cold War

2021 ◽  
pp. 293-310
Author(s):  
Anna Geis ◽  
Wolfgang Wagner
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
Democratic Peace ◽  
Strong Impact ◽  
Military Interventions ◽  
Hegemonic Discourse ◽  
Liberal Peace ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Normative Order ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Over Time

While this volume’s Part IV is devoted to internal and external oppositions to ‘liberal peace’ in the early and mid-twentieth century, Anna Geis and Wolfgang Wagner introduce Part V by turning to paradoxes of democratic warfare and its justification in the last three decades: Democratic warfare has a strong impact on the development of domestic, regional, and international normative orders and has in a number of cases been conducted without the authorization of the UN Security Council. Drawing on insights of the ‘democratic peace’ scholarship, this chapter investigates justifications offered by democratic governments and members of parliaments after 1990 when seeking to legitimate or to reject a participation in military interventions. Such justification patterns have changed over time during the period of liberal hegemony since they always reflect the interplay between changing domestic constellations of interest and power, hegemonic discourse within the state and the surrounding normative order. The chapter presents empirical research on justifications that democratic actors have brought forward in Western parliaments (with regard to the Gulf War, Kosovo, Iraq War, Afghanistan, and the fight against ‘Daesh’ in Iraq and Syria).

Democratic Politics and Foreign Affairs

2020 ◽  
pp. 13-36
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Wagner
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
Democratic Politics ◽  
Democratic Peace ◽  
Modern Democracy ◽  
Role Of Government ◽  
Foreign And Security Policy

Whether foreign policy should be exempted from democratic politics has been discussed since the early days of modern democracy. While this debate has oscillated between executive-friendly and democracy-friendly positions, it has neglected the role of political parties as essential actors in democratic decision-making and in providing cues to the public more broadly. Institutionalist and ideational theories of the so-called Democratic Peace in particular have neglected political parties, even though they silently assume that foreign and security policy is a matter of party-political contestation. Therefore, the theoretical framework outlined in this chapter also draws on scholarship in Foreign Policy Analysis that examined the role of ‘government ideology’. It suggests two propositions to inform the empirical analyses, namely 1) that foreign affairs are systematically contested, rather than shielded from democratic politics; 2) that party-political contestation is structured along the left/right dimension.

La minorité en Etat bicommunautaire: quatre études de cas

1971 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 477-496
Author(s):  
Jacques Benjamin
Keyword(s):  
Middle East ◽  
The State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Ethnic Composition ◽  
Community Relations ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
Major Power ◽  
Minority Community ◽  
Cultural Constraints

The fate of the minority in a bi-communal state cannot easily be studied using contemporary theories of integration. This article employs a certain number of variables, regrouped under the concepts of institutional constraints and cultural constraints, which allow for measurement of the strength of the minority. Four countries are studied, all in process of development: Cameroon and Mauritius in Africa, and Cyprus and Lebanon in the Middle East. From the point of view of institutional constraints, the following variables are considered relevant: the statutory “ethnic” composition of the legislative assembly, the type of executive (presidential or responsible cabinet), and the type of protective veto power which rests with the minority. Finally, the state of inter-community relations prior to independence, the presence or absence of a major Power protecting the minority community, and the philosophy of the régime as understood by the country's leaders serve as indicators of cultural constraint.

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