Price Ceilings as Focal Points for Tacit Collusion: Evidence from Credit Cards
2003 ◽
Vol 93
(5)
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pp. 1703-1729
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Keyword(s):
We test whether a nonbinding price ceiling may serve as a focal point for tacit collusion, using data from the credit card market during the 1980’s. Our empirical model can distinguish instances when firms match a binding ceiling from instances when firms tacitly collude at a nonbinding ceiling. The results suggest that tacit collusion at nonbinding state-level ceilings was prevalent during the early 1980’s, but that national integration of the market reduced the sustainability of tacit collusion by the end of the decade. The results highlight a perverse effect of price regulation.
Keyword(s):
2018 ◽
Vol 29
(2)
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pp. 304-315
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Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
2021 ◽
Vol ahead-of-print
(ahead-of-print)
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Keyword(s):
2017 ◽
Vol 133
(1)
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pp. 129-190
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Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
2020 ◽
Vol 9
(5)
◽
pp. 1349-1358
2020 ◽
Vol 7
(1)
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