Wertfreiheit und Rechtfertigung von Normen im Positivismusstreit / The Positivist Dispute on a Value-Free Science and the Vindication of Norms
AbstractThe discussion between HABERMAS and ALBERT concerning the problem of ‘Wertfreiheit’ has not yet been finally solved. For this reason it would seem desirable to clarify both positions. In the course of such an explanation, it becomes apparent that the reason for the lack of results between HABERMAS and ALBERT lies in the fact that both authors are talking at cross-purposes. Whereas ALBERT tries to prove that social sciences can be purely empirical and value-free (i.e. containing no value-judgements), HABERMAS is concerned basically not with the question of value-judgements but with that of the value-basis (Wertbasis). On the whole ALBERT assumes that the norms of modern sciences are meaningful and sensible; HABERMAS questions their foundations. His thesis on the ‘technical interest’ (technisches Interesse) does not therefore refer as ALBERT seems to believe to the question of the applicability of empirical sciences but represents an attempt to offer a foundation for these sciences. Admittedly he is only able to make his criticism by presupposing an interest in ‘herrschaftsfreie Kommunikation’ for the explanation of which HABERMAS has suggested several possibilities without as yet having achieved more than initial steps.