scholarly journals THE FINANCIAL SITUATION OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN POLAND ACCORDING TO THE NEW RULES OF LIMITING DEBT – THE MACROECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE Abstract: The article presents some evidence for the introduction in 2014 of new rules limiting debt of local governments. Statistical analysis of the distribution of the financial results of each group of local governments indicates that the financial situation of some local governments is difficult. The highest back financing possibilities have regional administrative structures. Other groups of local governments have limited possibilities of debt, in the most difficult situation are districts which do not have the possibility of further indebtedness. Keywords: public debt, central government, local governments, debt limits

Author(s):  
Jerzy Rutkowski
1985 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre-Henri Derycke ◽  
Guy Gilbert

ABSTRACTAfter a sharp increase, the public debt of French local communities has been stabilized in real terms: its amount reached 54 per cent of total public debt in 1980. In the French institutional framework, local government borrowing policy is under the tight control of central agencies. An econometric model of the borrowing behaviour of local governments since 1965 is presented; it emphasizes the role of internal determinants of local debt (needs for investment, self-financing ability of governments), external constraints (e.g. interest rates and the financial resources of lenders, such as households savings), and finally the impact of macroeconomic policy measures from the central government.


Asian Survey ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 497-519 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jing Vivian Zhan

Chinese local governments widely resort to extra-budgetary exaction to finance themselves, which generates side effects that necessitate central intervention. Through statistical analysis, this paper finds that the central government intervenes only selectively, following a logic driven by economic development and political stability.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Antung Deddy Radiansyah

Gaps in biodiversity conservation management within the Conservation Area that are the responsibility of the central government and outside the Conservation Areas or as the Essential Ecosystems Area (EEA) which are the authority of the Regional Government, have caused various spatial conflicts between wildlife /wild plants and land management activities. Several obstacles faced by the Local Government to conduct its authority to manage (EEA), caused the number and area of EEA determined by the Local Government to be still low. At present only 703,000 ha are determined from the 67 million ha indicated by EEA. This study aims to overview biodiversity conservation policies by local governments and company perceptions in implementing conservation policies and formulate strategies for optimizing the role of Local Governments. From the results of this study, there has not been found any legal umbrella for the implementation of Law number 23/ 2014 related to the conservation of important ecosystems in the regions. This regulatory vacuum leaves the local government in a dilemma for continuing various conservation programs. By using a SWOT to the internal strategic environment and external stratetegic environment of the Environment and Forestry Service, Bengkulu Province , as well as using an analysis of company perceptions of the conservation policies regulatary , this study has been formulated a “survival strategy” through collaboration between the Central Government, Local Governments and the Private Sector to optimize the role of Local Government’s to establish EEA in the regions.Keywords: Management gaps, Essential Ecosystems Area (EEA), Conservation Areas, SWOT analysis and perception analysis


Asian Survey ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (5) ◽  
pp. 978-1003
Author(s):  
Jacqueline Chen Chen ◽  
Jun Xiang

Existing studies of the impact of economic development on political trust in China have two major gaps: they fail to explain how economic development contributes to the hierarchical trust pattern, and they do not pay enough attention to the underlying mechanisms. In light of cultural theory and political control theory, we propose adapting performance theory into a theory of “asymmetrical attribution of performance” to better illuminate the case of China. This adapted theory leads to dual pathway theses: expectation fulfillment and local blaming. Using a multilevel mediation model, we show that expectation fulfillment mainly upholds trust in the central government, whereas local blaming undermines trust in local governments. We also uncover a rural–urban distinction in the dual pathway, revealing that both theses are more salient among rural Chinese.


Healthcare ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 493
Author(s):  
Soo-Hyun Sung ◽  
Minjung Park ◽  
Jihye Kim ◽  
Sun-Woo Jeon ◽  
Angela Dong-Min Sung ◽  
...  

Korea is currently executing a pilot program for community care of its aging population and aims to implement community care systems on a national scale by 2025. This study examines the traditional Korean medicine (TKM) service to be provided within community care by understanding the current status of TKM services. The Ministry of Health and Welfare (MoHW) sent official letters to 242 local governments (cities, districts, and counties) from October to November 2019 to survey the status of the public TKM services provided in 2018. The items of the survey included basic demographic information as well as information that could reveal how the program was implemented. In 112 local government jurisdictions (response rate 46.3%), a total of 867 TKM service programs were in place. As a result of the survey, it was revealed that they did not have any service manuals or evaluation results. To provide home-care-based TKM service for the elderly as an integrated part of a community care system, it is necessary to develop, distribute, and evaluate a standard service manual including an evaluation index by the central government.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (12) ◽  
pp. 6615
Author(s):  
Tri Sulistyaningsih ◽  
Achmad Nurmandi ◽  
Salahudin Salahudin ◽  
Ali Roziqin ◽  
Muhammad Kamil ◽  
...  

This paper, which is focused on evaluating the policies and institutional control of the Brantas River Basin, East Java, Indonesia, aims to review government regulations on watershed governance in Indonesia. A qualitative approach to content analysis is used to explain and layout government regulations regarding planning, implementation, coordination, monitoring, evaluation, and accountability of the central and local governments in managing the Brantas watershed, East Java, Indonesia. Nvivo 12 Plus software is used to map, analyze, and create data visualization to answer research questions. This study reveals that the management regulations of the Brantas watershed, East Java, Indonesia, are based on a centralized system, which places the central government as an actor who plays an essential role in the formulation, implementation, and accountability of the Brantas watershed management. In contrast, East Java Province’s regional government only plays a role in implementing and evaluating policies. The central government previously formulated the Brantas watershed. This research contributes to strengthening the management and institutional arrangement of the central government and local governments that support the realization of good governance of the Brantas watershed. Future research needs to apply a survey research approach that focuses on evaluating the capacity of the central government and local governments in supporting good management of the Brantas watershed.


Urban Studies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 806-826
Author(s):  
Fan Fan ◽  
Ming Li ◽  
Ran Tao ◽  
Dali Yang

China has adopted a transfer-based fiscal decentralisation scheme since the mid-1990s. In the 1994 tax sharing reform, the central government significantly raised its share of government revenue vis-à-vis local governments by taking most of the newly created value-added tax on manufacturing. One aim for the adoption of the transfer-based fiscal scheme was to channel more funds to less developed regions and rural areas, and to alleviate growing interregional inequality and urban–rural income disparity. In 2002 and 2003 the Chinese central government further grabbed 50% and 60%, respectively, of the income taxes previously assigned only to local governments while providing more fiscal transfers to the country’s poor regions and the countryside. Utilising the 2002–2003 change in China’s central–local tax sharing regime as an exogenous policy shock, we employ a Simulated Instrumental Variable approach to causally evaluate the effects of the policy shock on growth, interregional inequality and urban–rural disparity. We find the lower local tax share dis-incentivised local governments and led to lower growth. Although higher central transfers helped to reduce interregional inequalities in per capita GDP and per capita income, the equalising effects were only present for urban incomes. We argue that transfer-based decentralisation without bottom-up accountability was detrimental to economic growth and had limited impact on income redistribution.


Author(s):  
Ruxin Wu ◽  
Piao Hu

Central environmental protection inspections have completed their goal of full coverage of 31 provinces in China, and more than 17,000 officials have been held accountable. The media has evaluated the effectiveness of central environmental protection inspections using the notions of “instant results” and the “miracle drug of environmental governance.” Can this approach effectively promote local environmental governance? This paper takes the treatment effect of central environmental protection inspections on air pollution as an example. Using the method of regression discontinuity, central environmental protection inspections are found to have a positive effect on the air quality index (AQI), but this effect is only short term and unsustainable. Additionally, there are inter-provincial differences. Judging from the research results on sub-contaminants, the treatment effect of central environmental protection inspections on air pollution is mainly reflected in PM10, PM2.5 and CO. Under the current situation in which PM10 and PM2.5 are the main assessment indexes, this phenomenon indicates that due to the political achievements and promotion of local officials and for reasons of accountability, it is more effective for the central government to conduct specific environmental assessments through local governments than to conduct central environmental protection inspections.


2013 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yue Xie

In response to worsening social instability in China, among grassroots communities in the poorer central and western provinces in particular, the Chinese central government has made budgetary arrangements, since 2003, to increase investment at the grassroots level to improve the capacity of local governments to maintain social order. However, this action by central government has created a dilemma for local cadres: how to perform their duty to maintain social stability while also balancing a heavy fiscal burden caused in part by the receipt of insufficient additional budgetary subsidies from higher government. This paper is an account of and an analysis of how local cadres in China perform their official duties when faced with this dilemma.


Land ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 389
Author(s):  
Caihua Zhou

The participation of a third party of the environmental service enterprise theoretically increases the level and efficiency of soil pollution control in China. However, Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may have a negative impact on the behaviors of participants, especially the local government. First, this paper conducts a positioning analysis on participants of the third-party soil pollution control in China and discusses the behavioral dissimilation of the local government under fiscal decentralization. Second, taking the government’s third-party soil pollution control as a case, a two-party game model of the central government and the local government is established around the principal-agent relationship, and a tripartite game model of the central government, the local government, and the third-party enterprise is designed around the collusion between the local government and the third-party enterprise. The results show that Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may lead to the behavioral dissimilation of local governments, that is, they may choose not to implement or passively implement the third-party control, and choose to conspire with third-party enterprises. Improving the benefits from implementing the third-party control of local governments and third-party enterprises, enhancing the central government’s supervision probability and capacity, and strengthening the central government’s punishment for behavioral dissimilation are conducive to the implementation of the third-party soil pollution control. Finally, this study puts forward policy suggestions on dividing the administrative powers between the central and local government in third-party control, building appraisal systems for the local government’s environmental protection performance, constructing environmental regulation mechanisms involving the government, market and society, and formulating the incentive and restraint policies for the participants in the third-party soil pollution control.


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