scholarly journals The Main German Parties Ahead of the 2021 Bundestag Elections

2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (9) ◽  
pp. 25-33
Author(s):  
M. Khorolskaya

The article is devoted to changes in the party-political system of Germany. Elections to the Bundestag are to be held in Germany on September 26. After 16 years of the leadership, Angela Merkel will not run for chancellor. Currently, the main German political parties face challenges. Major parties lose electoral support. The emergence of a new party, the “Alternative for Germany”, split votes, and makes it difficult to form a coalition. Parties should also overcome internal split and find their identity in a changing world. An analysis of the electoral programmes revealed that German political parties seek to return to traditional identity. CDU/CSU moves to the right, seeking to win back the AfG supporters. SPD and FDP in their electoral documents also appeal to their traditional electorate. The AfG’s nomination of lead candidates supported by the right wing of the party also indicates that the “Alternative for Germany” will move towards radical right-wing positions. The Left Party comes out with radical leftist demands, which limits the possibility of its entry into the coalition. The most successful is the Green Party’s electoral strategy. Party leaders abandoned radical demands of their predecessors. Greens advocate a citizen-supported climate program, but pay attention to the economic viability of reforms. According to polls, the black-green coalition (CDU/CSU and Union 90/Greens) seems the most likely. However, in the course of coalition negotiations, the parties may face difficulties in finding a compromise on tax policy and environmental reforms. At the same time, the parties have no significant contradictions on the foreign policy agenda (with the exception of a number of specific issues). Acknowledgments. The article was prepared within the project “Post-Crisis World Order: Challenges and Technologies, Competition and Cooperation” supported by the grant from Ministry of science and higher education of the Russian Federation program for research projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development (Agreement № 075-15-2020-783).

2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (8) ◽  
pp. 72-80
Author(s):  
P. Timofeev ◽  
M. Khorolskaya

The study is focused on the COVID 19 pandemic as a challenge for Franco-German leadership in the European Union. The authors investigate whether joint actions by Berlin and Paris can strengthen the EU’s resilience to crises. As it is shown, the first isolationist reaction of the EU states to pandemic was followed by their attempts to find a common decision. The negotiations on an anti-crisis plan were complicated by the division of the European Union states into opposing camps. Two projects proposed by them – the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the “coronabonds” – reflected the narrow interests of rich, frugal “Northern” and economically modest “Southern” groups, and failed. In contrast, the Franco-German cooperation became a breakthrough. In March-April 2020, Germany and France opposed each other, supporting ESM and coronabonds, respectfully. In May-June 2020, A. Merkel and E. Macron agreed to a compromise and came up with a unified position. While Germany left “frugal” group by agreeing to allocate money to support the “South” without insisting on mandatory reforms, and endorsed the idea of joint debt obligations, France refused to support the “Southern” coronabond project and agreed to the mediation of the EU Commission. That gave new breath to negotiations where a new regrouping of countries took place: the “South” states failing to defend coronabonds supported the Franco-German plan based on subsidies, while the “frugals” put forward an alternative based on loans. The EU Commission’s project which included both proposals was discussed in July 2020: at that moment, the Franco-German tandem backed by the “South” states had to persuade both the “frugal” and the East- European states. Finally, the EU Commission’s plan promoted by Merkel and Macron was adopted, though with serious adjustments. The authors conclude that the Franco-German alliance has confirmed its capability to strengthen the European Union resilience, but its leadership is no longer unconditional, and in the future, they should take into account the interests of the EU regional groups. Acknowledgments. The article was prepared within the project “Post-Crisis World Order: Challenges and Technologies, Competition and Cooperation” supported by the grant from Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation program for research projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development (Agreement № 075-15-2020-783).


2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (6) ◽  
pp. 107-118
Author(s):  
A. Korotkova

Received 09.12.2020. The article analyzes the activities of the adolescent environmental community “Fridays For Future” in the context of the crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The school climate activist movement was initiated in 2018 in Sweden by 15-year-old Greta Thunberg. It has actively been gaining momentum during the two years of its existence. Thanks to the attention of the media and leading international organizations, it has acquired worldwide fame. But in 2020, due to the spread of coronavirus infection, the FFF was forced to pass the first serious test of strength. In the context of quarantine, it has lost two of its most important components. First, the increased interest of the media, which focused on covering a new burning topic, has dried up. Secondly, street demonstrations, which were the main method of the activists’ struggle, were banned. The author of the article explores actions and new ways of activity that the members of the “Fridays For Future” have adapted to their goals. As a source base for this research, the Internet resources of the movement are investigated which have been developed quite well during its existence. In addition to this network of information, the materials of the mass media that continued to monitor the activities of young climate fighters were also reviewed. In addition, the works of other researchers studying the FFF movement are involved, unfortunately, not many, since the topic is relatively new. The article concludes about the ability of such type of associations as the “Fridays For Future” to maintain stability in crisis situations. This is facilitated by the features of their network device, as well as the generational identity of their participants. The main core of the movement is young students, whose representatives have mastered the new information technologies perfectly. Thanks to this fact, they are able to quickly adjust their methods and software settings, while generally maintaining a common commitment to their goals. Acknowledgements. The article was prepared within the project “Post-Crisis World Order: Challenges and Technologies, Competition and Cooperation” supported by the grant from Ministry of science and higher education of The Russian Federation program for research projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development (Agreement № 075-15-2020-783).


Author(s):  
Elisabeth Ivarsflaten ◽  
Scott Blinder ◽  
Lise Bjånesøy

The “populist radical right” is a contested concept in scholarly work for good reason. This chapter begins by explaining that the political parties usually grouped together under this label are not a party family in a conventional sense and do not self-identify with this category. It goes on to show how political science scholarship has established that in Europe during the past thirty or so years we have seen the rise of a set of parties that share a common ideological feature—nativism. The nativist political parties experiencing most electoral support have combined their nativist agenda with some other legitimate ideological companion, which provides deniability—a shield against charges that the nativist agenda makes the parties and their supporters right-wing extremist and undemocratic. The chapter goes on to explain that in order to make progress on our understanding of how and why the populist radical right persuades citizens, we need to recognize: first, that nativism is the only necessary ingredient without which the populist radical right loses its force; and second, that nativism in contemporary established democracies has tended not to persuade a large share of voters without an ideological companion.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 37
Author(s):  
Hamed Mousavi

Liberal Zionists blame Israel’s five decade long occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip primarily on Revisionist Zionist ideology and its manifestation in right wing parties such as the Likud. They also argue that the “Two State Solution”, the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, will forever solve this issue. This paper on the other hand argues that while the Israeli left have divergent opinions from the revisionists on many issues, with regards to the “Palestinian question” and particularly on the prospects of allowing the formation of a Palestinian state, liberal Zionists have much closer views to the right wing than would most like to admit. To demonstrate this, the views of Theodore Herzl, the founder of political Zionism, David Ben-Gurion, the most important actor in the founding years of the state, as well as the approach of left wing Israeli political parties are examined. Finally, it is argued that none of the mainstream Zionist political movements will allow the creation of a Palestinian state even on a small part of Palestine.


2002 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 619-655 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Gould

A recent trend in the historiography of north India has involved analyses of ‘Hindu nationalist’ motifs and ideologies within both mainstream nationalist discourses and subaltern politics. A dense corpus of work has attempted to provide historical explanations for the rise of Hindutva in the subcontinent, and a great deal of debate has surrounded the implications of this development for the fate of secularism in India. Some of this research has examined the wider implications of Hindutva for the Indian state, democracy and civil society and in the process has highlighted, to some degree, the relationship between Hindu nationalism and ‘mainstream’ Indian nationalism. Necessarily, this has involved discussion of the ways in which the Congress, as the predominant vehicle of ‘secular nationalism’ in India, has attempted to contest or accommodate the forces of Hindu nationalist revival and Hindutva. By far the most interesting and illuminating aspect of this research has been the suggestion that Hindu nationalism, operating as an ideology, has manifested itself not only in the institutions of the right-wing Sangh Parivar but has been accommodated, often paradoxically, within political parties and civil institutions hitherto associated with the forces of secularism. An investigation of this phenomenon opens up new possibilities for research into the nature of Hindu nationalism itself, and presents new questions about the ambivalent place of religious politics in institutions such as the Indian National Congress.


2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michal Nový

AbstractDoes higher turnout support left-wing parties, as many previous studies assume? Theoretical discussions thus far have been relatively inconclusive. This study proposes three different explanatory mechanisms for examining an aggregate-level relationship between turnout and electoral support for political parties in the post-communist milieu. The conventional hypothesis, based on the assumptions of a successful re-stratification of society and the relevance of class voting, states that higher turnout benefits the left. The second hypothesis is derived from the Michigan model of party identification. In this case, political parties with less loyal electorates would be expected to profit from higher rates of electoral participation. However, this article makes the case for a third possible explanation, termed simply “mobilization against the left,” which reverses the conventional hypothesis. The idea is that the more people come to the polls, the stronger the post-communist right-wing parties will be. This analysis includes two Czech regions that can be said to be farthest away from each other in terms of their socioeconomic and political characteristics. Having analyzed the 2010 Czech parliamentary election results across 1444 electoral districts in two regions, Central Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia, we conclude that there is certain empirical evidence that supports the proposed explanatory mechanism regarding the relationship between voter turnout and share of votes for political parties.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-336 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole Doerr

This article examines visual posters and symbols constructed and circulated transnationally by various political actors to mobilize contentious politics on the issues of immigration and citizenship. Following right-wing mobilizations focusing on the Syrian refugee crisis, immigration has become one of the most contentious political issues in Western Europe. Right-wing populist political parties have used provocative visual posters depicting immigrants or refugees as ‘criminal foreigners’ or a ‘threat to the nation’, in some countries and contexts conflating the image of the immigrant with that of the Islamist terrorist. This article explores the transnational dynamics of visual mobilization by comparing the translation of right-wing nationalist with left-wing, cosmopolitan visual campaigns on the issue of immigration in Western Europe. The author first traces the crosscultural translation and sharing of an anti-immigrant poster created by the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), a right-wing political party, inspiring different extremist as well as populist right-wing parties and grassroots activists in several other European countries. She then explores how left-libertarian social movements try to break racist stereotypes of immigrants. While right-wing political activists create a shared stereotypical image of immigrants as foes of an imaginary ethnonationalist citizenship, left-wing counter-images construct a more complex and nuanced imagery of citizenship and cultural diversity in Europe. The findings show the challenges of progressive activists’ attempts to translate cosmopolitan images of citizenship across different national and linguistic contexts in contrast to the right wing’s rapid and effective instrumentalizing and translating of denigrating images of minorities in different contexts.


Vaccines ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (9) ◽  
pp. 1000
Author(s):  
Filip Raciborski ◽  
Piotr Samel-Kowalik ◽  
Mariusz Gujski ◽  
Jarosław Pinkas ◽  
Magdalena Arcimowicz ◽  
...  

We aimed to assess the factors associated with a lack of willingness to vaccinate against COVID-19 among adults in Poland three months after the introduction of mass vaccination against COVID-19 in Poland. This cross-sectional study was carried out between 8 and 18 April 2021 on a representative nationwide sample of 1131 inhabitants of Poland aged 18 and over. Almost one-third of adult inhabitants of Poland (30%; 95%CI: 27.4–32.7%) declared a lack of willingness to vaccinate against COVID-19. Females had higher odds of refusing COVID-19 vaccination compared with males (OR = 1.68; 95%CI: 1.25–2.27). The lack of higher education was significantly (p < 0.001) associated with greater odds of refusing the COVID-19 vaccination. Participants living in rural areas compared with those living in the largest cities (over 500,000 inhabitants) had three times higher odds of refusing the COVID-19 vaccination (OR = 3.20; 95%CI: 1.71–6.01). Respondents who declared willingness to vote for one of the right-wing political parties publicly supporting the anti-vaccination movement in Poland had eight times higher odds (OR = 8.01; 95%CI: 3.65–17.60) of refusing the COVID-19 vaccination compared with other groups. Moreover, those who had three children or more, respondents who declared passivity towards participating in religious practices as well as active internet users had significantly higher odds of refusing the COVID-19 vaccination.


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