scholarly journals U.S. - China: “Power Transition” and the Outlines of “Conflict Bipolarity”

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 210-231
Author(s):  
Denis Andreevich Degterev ◽  
Mirzet Safetovich Ramich ◽  
Anatoly Vladimirovich Tsvyk

This article focuses on the phenomenon of global rivalry between China and the United States in terms of power transition theory, which is scientifically new and relevant due to the increased attention to the so-called Thucydides trap, in which, as some experts claim, both states have fallen. This paper presents a different vision of the global rivalry for leadership in the shaping of a new world order, which has already taken the form of overt non-violent confrontation and manifests itself in technological and trade wars as well as scientific and cultural rivalries. Nevertheless, despite the non-violent nature of the rivalry, this process is followed by an increase in the military capabilities of states, mainly projected in the basins of the Pacific and Indian Oceans (Indo-Pacific region). The methodological basis of the paper is power transition theory, which has been developed over the past 60 years by A.F. Organsky, J. Kugler, D. Lemke, R. Tammen and other researchers, united in the TransResearch Consortium. The authors argue that the analytical prism of this theory is more relevant to the analysis of current global rivalry than the classical neorealist balance of power approach. Through the prism of the theory the issues of rebalancing the global system of economic governance are analyzed. Also, a comparative analysis of the US-Japanese and US-Chinese trade and technological wars is carried out. Both the military and aggregate capabilities of two countries on a global scale and in the Indo-Pacific region are examined. The conclusion contains findings and comments on the impact of U.S. - China rivalry on the system of international relations.

Author(s):  
Francisco Cabral ◽  

This article seeks to cover the Dynamics between China and the United States of America through the perspective of Power Transition Theory. This analysis aims to dispute the notion that the nature of Power Transitions has a tendency towards bellicism between the Actors in question. Through the study of the theoretical matrix behind China’s internal and external politics, this article establishes how Beijing has accumulated a power that’s as deep and prolific as it is dependent on the very international order that its precepts appear to denounce. Keywords: Power Transition; Balance of Power; World Order; Pluralism; Solidarism


2019 ◽  
Vol 05 (03) ◽  
pp. 317-341
Author(s):  
Serafettin Yilmaz ◽  
Wang Xiangyu

Dissatisfaction is a major concept in power transition theory, which postulates that a rapidly rising power tends to be dissatisfied with the international system and would thus attempt to reform or replace it, whereas the hegemonic power would, by default, be satisfied with and work to maintain the status quo. This paper, however, offers an alternative outlook on the reigning-rising power dynamics by examining the conditions for and implications of hegemonic dissatisfaction and rising power satisfaction. It argues that although China, as a potential systemic challenger harboring grievances against the existing global regimes, has been a recurrent subject for studies, it is the United States, the established hegemon, that appears increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo. The U.S. dissatisfaction is informed by a set of internal and external factors often justified with a reference to China as a challenger, and is manifested in a number of anti-system strategies, including unconventional diplomatic rhetoric, as well as withdrawal from various international institutions or attempts to undermine them. The U.S. discontent, as contrasted with China’s satisfaction as a rising power, has a number of potential geopolitical and economic implications at the bilateral, regional, and global levels, endangering the viability and sustainability of the universally accepted political and economic regimes.


Author(s):  
Steve Chan

The idea of power transition, or power shift, has recently been much in vogue in scholarly, policy, and even popular discourse. It has, for example, motivated a resurgent interest in the power-transition theory and the danger of the so-called Thucydides trap. China’s recent rise has especially motivated an interest in these topics, engendering concerns about whether this development means that China is on a collision course with the United States. These concerns stem from the proposition that the danger of a system-destabilizing war increases when a rising power catches up to a declining hegemon and challenges the latter’s preeminent position in the international system. Thucydides’s famous remark about the origin of the Peloponnesian War, claiming that “it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this inspired in Sparta that made war inevitable” in ancient Greece, has frequently been invoked to support this view. Whereas power shift is a generic term referring to any change in the balance of capabilities between two or more states, power transition is a more specific concept pointing to a reversal of positions whereby a rising latecomer overtakes a previous dominant power in the international system (or at least when this latecomer approaches power parity with the dominant power). Power-transition theory presents a contemporary version of Thucydides’s explanation of the Peloponnesian War. It calls attention to the changing power relationships among the world’s major states and provides a seemingly cogent framework to understand the dynamics that can produce war between these states and their respective allies. A careful reader will immediately find the preceding paragraph unsatisfactory as it contains several important ambiguities. For instance, what do we mean by “major states” or “great powers,” and what do we have in mind when we refer to changes in their relative “power”? Also, does the power-transition theory claim that war is likely to break out when there is a change in the identity of the world’s most powerful country? Or does it also say that war is likely to occur even in the absence of a late-rising state overtaking, and therefore displacing, an incumbent hegemon? If so, how closely does the late-rising state have to match the incumbent’s power capabilities before the power-transition theory predicts a war between them? Would the latecomer have to reach at least 80%, 90%, or even 95% of the incumbent’s power before an approximate parity between the two is achieved? Does the power-transition theory pertain only to the relationship between the world’s two most powerful states, or does it apply to other states? And if power transition is a necessary but insufficient condition for war, what are the other pertinent variables and their interaction effects with power shifts? Finally, what do we mean by war or systemic war? The answers to these questions are not self-evident. How they are dealt with—or not—is in itself suggestive of the power relations in the world being studied by scholars and these scholars’ positions in this world and their relations to it.


Author(s):  
Nasa'i Muhammad Gwadabe

The apparent eroding in the hegemonic power of the United States and the sustained growth of China has triggered debate as to whether the rise of China will be peaceful or conflictual. Structural realism posits that the world is characterised by the anarchic ordering principle in which there is no central authority sitting above the states. Therefore, the absence of a “leviathan” on the international system automatically makes every state equal on the system which created an atmosphere of competition for the maximisation of power for survival. On a similar line of reasoning, the Power Transition theory as a variant theory within realism postulates that when the international system is structured based on the principle of hierarchy, peace will reign. It means that when international relations are regulated and influenced by a dominant power, the international system becomes stable. But the emergence of a dissatisfied powerful nation to challenge the hegemon usually ends up in war. Based on this assumption, Power Transition theorists argued that the rise of China to rival the dominance of the United States could not be peaceful. The Power Transition theory has influenced many academics to have the belief that the two nations will end up in “Thucydides’ Trap”. This belief has aggravated the matter beyond the reasonable level and has instilled panic in the mind of foreign policymakers which could jeopardise world peace and international cooperation. Hence, this paper aims to critically evaluate the deficiency of the Power Transition theory in the 21st century in explaining the current United States-China relations and the prospect of peace or war between the two nations using process tracing. Accordingly, in this paper, it is argued that in the 21st century, an armed confrontation between the United States and China is highly unlikely. Because in today’s world, nations (including the United States and China) are intertwined by the forces of globalisation which created inexorable economic interdependence. Additionally, there is rapid advancement in military technology and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction which came with the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Consequently, there is a need to revisit the Power Transition theory to accommodate contemporary factors. The inclusion of the current variables into the Theory will make it applicable and adequately fit in the discourse of international relations and global politics of the 21st-century international system.


Author(s):  
Steve Chan ◽  
Huiyun Feng ◽  
Kai He ◽  
Weixing Hu

What motivates states to act the way they do? This book focuses on a particular kind of motivation inclining a state to challenge the existing norms, rules, and institutions of international order. Specifically, it addresses the concept of revisionism, which has loomed large in international relations narratives but has remained largely understudied until recently. The authors offer a critique of the existing discourse on revisionism and investigate the historical origin and evolution of the foreign policy orientations of revisionist states in the past. They moreover introduce an ensemble of indicators to discern and compare the extent of revisionist tendencies on the part of contemporary China and the United States. Questioning the facile assumption that past episodes will repeat in the future, they argue that “hard” revisionism relying on war and conquest is less viable and likely in today’s world. Instead, “soft” revisionism seeking to promote institutional change is more relevant and likely. They attend especially to contemporary Sino-American relations and conclude that much of the current discourse based on power-transition theory is problematic. Contrary to this theory, a dominant power is not inevitably committed to the defense of international order, nor does a rising power usually have a revisionist agenda to challenge this order. The transformation of international order does not necessarily require a power transition between China and the United States, nor does a possible power transition between these two countries necessarily augur war.


Author(s):  
Rosemary Foot

Like the study of China itself, theorists of power transition have lately experienced a resurgence of interest in their arguments. As China has emerged as the world’s second-largest economy, with the second-largest military budget, and has become more assertive internationally under a seemingly more powerful president, the picture painted is one of growing morbidity: war between China, the putative rising dissatisfied power, and the United States, the declining hegemon, has allegedly become highly probable. This chapter critiques these arguments and highlights the restraints on conflict that generally are given insufficient attention in power transition approaches that deal with the Sino-American relationship. The chapter argues that historical awareness among leaders, state agency, and complex economic trends that are central to the understanding of this hybrid world order, together with the domestic preoccupations of these two central protagonists, are factors that work to inhibit the outbreak of war.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (10) ◽  
pp. 149-166
Author(s):  
Dmitry V. Gordienko ◽  

The paper examines the interests of Russia, the United States and China in the regions of the world and identifies the priorities of Russia's activities in Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Asia-Pacific region, the Arctic, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, their comparative assessment with the interests of the United States and China. An approach to assessing the impact of possible consequences of the activities of the United States and China on the realization of Russia's interests is proposed. This makes it possible to identify the priorities of the policy of the Russian Federation in various regions of the world. The results of the analysis can be used to substantiate recommendations to the military-political leadership of our country. It is concluded that the discrepancy between the interests of the United States and China is important for the implementation of the current economic and military policy of the Russian Federation.


2021 ◽  
pp. 932-950
Author(s):  
Vladislav Vyacheslavovich Emelyanov

Every few decades, the world order changes due to various geopolitical, economic and other circumstances. For example, as a result of globalization, the world order has undergone significant changes in the last forty years. Globalization has led to the destruction of the postwar world order, as well as to world leadership by the United States and the West. However, in recent decades, as a result of globalization, the U.S. and the West began to cede their leadership to developing countries, so there is now a change in the economic structure of relations in the world system. Today the center of economic growth is in the East, namely in Asia. There are no new superpowers in the world at the moment, but the unipolar world will cease to exist due to the weakening of the U. S. leadership, which will lead to a change in the world order. A new leader, which may replace the U. S., will not have as wide range of advantages as the USA has. Most likely, the essence of the new order will be to unite the largest countries and alliances into blocks, for example, the USA together with the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the EU, etc. The article outlines forecasts of GDP growth rates as well as the global energy outlook; analyzes the LNG market as well as the impact of the pandemic on the global oil and gas market; and lists the characteristics of U. S. geopolitics.


2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Nir Gazit ◽  

The murder of George Floyd by a police officer in the United States in May 2020 and the subsequent turmoil, as well as the violence against migrants on the US-Mexican border, have drawn major public and media attention to the phenomenon of police brutality (see, e.g., Levin 2020; Misra 2018; Taub 2020), which is often labeled as ‘militarization of police’. At the same time, in recent years military forces have been increasingly involved in policing missions in civilian environments, both domestically (see, e.g., Kanno-Youngs 2020; Schrader 2020; Shinkman 2020) and abroad. The convergence of military conduct and policing raises intriguing questions regarding the impact of these tendencies on the military and the police, as well as on their legitimacy.


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