The Authoritarian Republic, 1958–1968

Author(s):  
Adeed Dawisha

This chapter discusses events following the demise of Iraq's monarchy in 1958. The demise of the monarchy was met with almost universal approval by the Iraqi people. During the first week after the military coup, huge demonstrations filled the streets of the country's major cities, all proclaiming their devotion and commitment for the infant republic and their support for the new military leaders. While the military's initial political moves suggested a promising proclivity for sharing power with like-minded civilians, it would not be long before those who had a monopoly over coercive force would hold sway over all institutions of the state. For the following decade, the military would radically and consequentially impact the ideas and institutions of governance, democracy, and identity.

2015 ◽  
Vol 59 (5) ◽  
pp. 924-946 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristine Eck

Why do regimes delegate authority over a territory to nonstate militias, in effect voluntarily sacrificing their monopoly over the use of violence? This article argues that two factors increase the probability of states delegating control to a proxy militia, namely, military purges and armed conflict. Military purges disrupt intelligence-gathering structures and the organizational capacity of the military. To counteract this disruption, military leaders subcontract the task of control and repression to allied militias that have the local intelligence skills necessary to manage the civilian population. This argument is conditioned by whether the state faces an armed insurgency in a given region since intelligence, control, and repression are needed most where the state is being challenged. This hypothesis is tested on unique data for all subnational regions within Myanmar during the period 1962 to 2010 and finds that proxy militias are more likely to be raised in conflict areas after military purges.


Author(s):  
Matias Spektor

The John F. Kennedy administration took a bet on the incoming president of Brazil, João Goulart, as he took office on September 8, 1961. Goulart was not a radical socialist, but his opponents portrayed him as an unpredictable nationalist who might unadvisedly fuel the flames of social upheaval and radical revolution, turning Brazil into a second Cuba. Yet, the White House estimated that Goulart was someone they could do business with and sympathized with the idea of Reformas de Base (Goulart’s program of “basic reforms”), which included the extension of labor protections to rural workers, redistributive agrarian reform, and universal suffrage. United States support for Goulart materialized in the form of economic aid, financial assistance via the IMF, and development assistance via the Alliance for Progress partnership. Within a year, however, the tide turned as Goulart failed to comply with American demands that he ban leftists from his cabinet. In a matter of months in 1962, the White House abandoned any hopes of engagement with the Brazilian president. While the crisis that led to Goulart’s fall in March 1964 was the making of domestic political actors within Brazil—as was the military coup to unseat the president—the likelihood and success rate of the golpe grew as the United States rolled out successive rounds of targeted actions against Goulart, including diplomatic and financial pressure, threats of abandonment, support for opposition politicians, collusion with coup plotters, signaling future military support for the plotters in the eventuality of civil war, and the granting of immediate diplomatic recognition for the incoming authoritarian military leaders after the coup. After Goulart, Brazil remained under authoritarian rule for two consecutive decades.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Mouataz El Esrawi

This is a study on Egypt’s brief interlude of civilian rule that lasted for just over a year between June 2012 and July 2013. In June 2012, Mohamed Morsi, the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), ascended to the presidency in what was hitherto Egypt’s most democratic election. Morsi, the first civilian to hold the highest office in the state, was ousted from power in July 2013 in a military coup that was led by General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. This study seeks to explain the downfall of the Morsi regime, through emphasizing the dynamic interplay of three factors: 1) the regime’s mismanagement of relations with powerful and autonomous state institutions (particularly the military) and with broad segments of Egyptian society; 2) its inability to reverse the deterioration in Egypt’s economic performance; and 3) its mishandling of Egypt’s external relations with powerful regional and international players. The thesis contends that while none of the aforementioned factors singlehandedly explains why Egypt’s democratic experiment under Morsi (imperfect as it was) fumbled, their complex interplay created a powerful platform that the military, and its allies within the state and society, exploited to bring down Morsi and the MB. The thesis hopes to contribute to the literature on the domestic and international conditions that can often lead to the faltering of democratic transitions. Keywords: Egypt,


Author(s):  
Adeed Dawisha
Keyword(s):  

This chapter discusses the events following the military coup on July 17, 1968, that ushered in the Ba'thist/Saddamist era. The Ba'thists were in no mood to share power with officers claiming fidelity to the nationalist cause but eschewing membership in the Ba'th Party. Particularly adamant on the necessity for the Party to monopolize power was Saddam Husayn. On July 30, a new Cabinet was formed and announced to the Iraqi public. As the names of the Cabinet Ministers were read, no one would have any doubt that this time the Ba'th Party alone would shape the structure, and command the direction, of the Iraqi state.


Author(s):  
Adeed Dawisha

This chapter analyzes political developments in Iraq from 1936 to 1958. Any growth of democratic ideas and institutions that had been achieved earlier came to an abrupt halt in 1936 following the military coup. Army officers, custodians of political power between 1936 and 1941, cared little, if at all, about democratic institutions and practices. They were succeeded by civilian governments, openly abetted by the Palace, which systematically interfered in the workings of the country's supposed representative institutions. Political parties and groupings operating within the straitjacket of military government and martial law had all but disappeared from the political scene. And successive governments made certain to emasculate Parliament of even the flimsiest pretense of independence and impartiality.


2021 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 193-222
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Kubiak

Streszczenie 25 kwietnia 1974 w Lizbonie rozpoczął się wojskowy zamach stanu wymierzony w autorytarne państwo. Odniósł błyskawiczny sukces. Przejęcie władzy przez wojsko rozpoczęło ciąg niezwykle turbulentnych wydarzeń o kluczowym znaczeniu dla przyszłości państwa. Za zakończenie owego okresu uznać można 25 listopada 1975 roku.  Wtedy to również wojsko udaremniło kolejną próbę zamachu organizowaną przez oficerów o radykalnie lewicowych poglądach. Celem artykułu jest dokonanie rekonstrukcji przyczyn, które doprowadziły do zamachu oraz omówienie przebiegu wydarzeń między kwietniem 1974 roku a listopadem roku następnego. Okres ten określany jest w artykule mianem Rewolucji goździków. Autor posłużył się metodą studium przypadku, w wariancie ukierunkowanym nie tylko na opis, ale również na zaprezentowanie kontekstu badanego zjawiska. Podłużono się opracowaniami w języku portugalskimi angielskim, a także wyborem portugalskich dokumentów i aktów prawnych. AbstractOn April 25 1974 the military coup d'état aimed at the authoritarian state started in Lisboan. The rebels achieved an instant success. The takeover of power by the military started a series of extremely turbulent events of key importance for the future of the state. The end of this period can be considered November 25 1975. It was also then that the military foiled another attempted conducted by officers with radical leftist views. The aim of the article is to reconstruct the causes that led to the coup d'état in April 1974, to discuss the course of events between April 1974 and November of the following year. The period is referred to in this article as the Revolution cloves. The paper presents the consequences of these events for the further history of the Portugal. The author used the case study method in a variant aimed not only at description but also at presenting the context of the phenomenon under study. The studies in Portuguese and English, as well as the selection of Portuguese documents and legal acts, were extended.  


Author(s):  
А. М. Родригес-Фернандес

В статье рассматриваются основные направления во внутренней и внешней политике Пакистана в конце XX — начале XXI века. Сформировавшаяся в это время правительственная стратегия была не только подготовлена предшествующими 2–3 десятилетиями развития, но и до сих пор является преобладающей либо в открытой, либо в слегка завуалированной форме. Характерно, что именно в этот период (12 октября 1999 г.) произошел военный переворот и новый военный диктатор генерал Первез Мушарраф объявил о задачах экономического оздоровления страны и создания «реальной», то есть мусульманской, демократии. Это означало, что при подавлении антиправительственных и экстремистских группировок новая власть делает резкий крен в сторону государственного исламизма и скрытой поддержке движения «Талибан» в Афганистане и «полосе независимых племён» (территория Пакистана вдоль афганской границы). Важной особенностью этого периода был не потерявший значения в дальнейшем союз исламистов и военной элиты, подготовленной в основном в Англии. Улемы поднимают в нужное время волну общественного недовольства и гражданского неповиновения, а армия устанавливает власть на длительное время и обеспечивает радикальным улемам высокие позиции в государственной иерархии. В статье использованы разнообразные по характеру источники по современной политической, социально-экономической и этноконфессиональной ситуации в Пакистане и Афганистане, включенные в сборник документов пакистанского исследователя Аалима. Интересные детали о военных лидерах Пакистана и реформаторской деятельности правительства к XX — началу XXI века приводятся в библиографических заметках американского эксперта С. Пауэра и пакистанского чиновника Ф. Шотойса. The article treats major trends of Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policy in the late 20th — early 21st centuries. The governmental strategy that was formed in the aforementioned period was prepared by the two or three preceding decades and still prevails in an overt or covert form. It should be noted that during the period there was a military coup (October 12, 1999) and the new military dictator Pervez Musharraf underlined the necessity to revive the economy of the country and to create Muslim democracy. It signified that by suppressing antigovernment extremists the new government favored Political Islamism, covertly supported the Taliban movement in Afghanistan and tribal sovereignty along the Durand Line. An important characteristic of the period was the coalition of the Islamists and the pro-English military elite. The ulama provoked social unrest and civil disobedience while the army usurped the power and enabled radical ulama to acquire high posts in the government. The article analyzes various documents collected by a Pakistani researcher Aalim and dealing with the contemporary political, social, economic, ethnic and confessional situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The article also analyzes bibliographic notes of an American expert S. Power and a Pakistani official Ph. Shotois about the military leaders of Pakistan and the reforms initiated by the Pakistan government in the 20th— early 21st centuries.


Author(s):  
J. Bobrova ◽  
J. Bobrov

The effective command and control of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other elements of the defense forces with the aim toachieve the high-level of defense capability of the state which are inextricably related with the appropriate normalization andexercising the practical events of democratic civil control of the military organization of the state.The process of reforming the defense sector is aimed at transforming the system of unified command and control andmilitary command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The establishment of a new system of command and control provides for aclear delimitation of authority between the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the functioning of new typesand branches of troops (forces). Additionally, it is provided for the separation of the functions of planning, generation andimplementation of means and forces within the Armed Forces, and the Ministry of defense has transformed from the body ofmilitary command to the central body of executive authority, responsible for the reform and implementation of the state policy inthe military sphere and the sphere of defense, the military policy in terms of staff, the technical policy and the policy in terms ofdefense purchases etc. One of the major tasks of the Ministry of Defense is the exercise within the framework of authority ofdemocratic civil control of the activity of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the military-political and administrative command andcontrol of the military organization.The gender equality requires the establishment of equal rights and opportunities for men and women in the matters ofmilitary service, participation in the protection of the state – not only on a legislative but also on a practical level. For a longperiod of time the military profession was solely masculine. It has been related with the significant physical, moral-psychologicalpressure on a human being, the necessity to be firm in overcoming the hard and difficult daily military routine. Currently, the roleof the woman in a society has undergone significant changes. The latter have also touched the military sphere. It is therefore theissue of democratic civil control of the military organization of the state is to be considered through the prism of its genderaspect. For the sole, gender element of this control is the finest measure of its effectiveness, the indicator of absolute control ofcivic society in the military sphere, which assures the accountability of military to civil personnel and totally includes thepossibility of a military coup d’état in a state.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-263
Author(s):  
Muhamad Rofiq Muzakkir

This article aims to propose an alternative explanation to the existing scholarship about the factors behind the failure of Egypt to transform into a democratic country after having experienced the major moment of the Arab Spring. I argue that the theological discourse of the ʿulamāʾ and their commitment to one of the currents of Islamic political thought in the premodern period contributed to the miscarriage of the Arab Spring. In doing so, I focus on unpacking the discourse of the previous grand muftī of Egypt, ʿAlī Jumʿah (Ali Gom’ah), on the military coup against the democratically elected president from the Muslim Brotherhood, Muḥammad Mursī (Mohammed Morsi). On several occasions, Jumʿah conveyed discourses that supported and justified the actions of the military leaders who took power. I trace ʿAlī Jumʿah’s discourse on the coup through three medieval scholars’ views on the usurpation of power (al-istīlāʾ ʿalá l-imārah). I compare ʿAlī Jumʿah’s discourse to that of al-Māwardī, al-Ghazālī, and Ibn Jamāʿah, three prominent political theorists and jurists in the medieval period. I argue that the tendency to conform with tradition led ʿAlī Jumʿah to formulate his undemocratic discourse. In this article, I examine several notions from the Islamic legal field that ʿAlī Jumʿah employed to justify the coup. I also argue that in addition to following the standard norms from the medieval period, ʿAlī Jumʿah also departed from such norms in several aspects. I contend that his discourse during the Arab Spring has had severe implications for both the Islamic legal field and the political trajectory of Egypt.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 157-165
Author(s):  
Mansoor Mohamed Fazil

Abstract This research focuses on the issue of state-minority contestations involving transforming and reconstituting each other in post-independent Sri Lanka. This study uses a qualitative research method that involves critical categories of analysis. Migdal’s theory of state-in-society was applied because it provides an effective conceptual framework to analyse and explain the data. The results indicate that the unitary state structure and discriminatory policies contributed to the formation of a minority militant social force (the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam – The LTTE) which fought with the state to form a separate state. The several factors that backed to the defeat of the LTTE in 2009 by the military of the state. This defeat has appreciably weakened the Tamil minority. This study also reveals that contestations between different social forces within society, within the state, and between the state and society in Sri Lanka still prevail, hampering the promulgation of inclusive policies. This study concludes that inclusive policies are imperative to end state minority contestations in Sri Lanka.


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