scholarly journals 儒家生命倫理視野下人工生殖倫理觀之構建

Author(s):  
Caixia WANG ◽  
ZHANG ◽  
Shuo ZHANG

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.隨著人工生殖技術的發展和應用,相伴而來的社會倫理問題也日益增多。為了使該技術真正做到以人為本、為人類的生存和發展而服務,及為人類的圓滿生活造福,探討和構建一種適應現代人工生殖技術發展和應用的倫理觀有十分逼切的需要,以指導並引領人工生殖的研究和運用及發揮技術的正面效應。儒家生命倫理以“仁愛”、“以義制利”、“天人合一”及對人類的終極關懷作為生命科技發展的最高價值判斷標準,為現代人工生殖倫理觀的構建提供了深厚的文化底蘊和理論依據。儒家生命倫理觀不僅能為該技術的應用提供價值標準,而且最重要的是能引領世人以理性的態度,從人與人、人與社會以及人與自然之間三個方面和對人的終極關懷、對現代生命科技發展及其應用進行反思,從人類整體的利益去認識現代生命科技的弊端和危害,從而調整人類自身行為,限制自身欲望,實現人類可持續發展。因此,重新認識和發掘儒家生命倫理思想,從儒家生命倫理視野下構建人工生殖倫理觀有著深遠的社會意義。With the development and application of artificial reproductive technology, humans are able to “artificially reproduce.” However, a series of ethical problems and conflicts have arisen from the practice of artificial reproduction, suggesting that modern artificial reproductive technology serves as a kind of “double-edged sword” – it provides both benefit and harm to human beings. How to attend to the ethical conflicts arising from artificial reproduction, and more importantly, how to develop adequate contemporary ethics to provide guidance to society regarding artificial reproduction, are crucially important ethical tasks that must be addressed. This essay argues that Confucian ethical wisdom and principles should be drawn upon to develop a legitimate Chinese bioethics and a suitable Confucian ethical construction of artificial reproduction in contemporary Chinese society.Based on Confucian ethical wisdom and insights, this essay argues that a Confucian ethical construction of artificial reproduction should include the following principles to direct relevant policy formulation and guide human conduct. The Confucian principle regarding human life is that humans are the most noble of all sentient beings. Regarding the relation between morality and benefit, Confucianism advocates a harmonious association, in which benefit should be pursued under the constraint of morality. Regarding a suitable view of nature, Confucian wisdom emphasizes the unity of Heaven and human – the Dao of Heaven is, in the metaphysical sense, followed by both nature and humanity. Regarding lives and things in the world, Confucianism upholds the ideal of honoring life and caring for things to create an ordered world. Regarding life and death, the Confucian vision is that life should be happy and death should be peaceful. Regarding one’s social responsibility, the Confucian principle is that one must follow the call of righteousness (yi) and should never violate righteousness for one’s self-interest. This essay argues that these valuable intellectual and moral resources should be drawn upon in shaping a contemporary Confucian ethical construction of artificial reproduction.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 140 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

Author(s):  
Jana Bennett

This chapter places Catholic teaching on questions of life and death against the background of a Catholic vision of salvation history, emphasizing that Catholics see no necessary opposition between Christian faith and progress in scientific understanding of the creation. The chapter then considers questions concerning abortion, contraception, and techniques for artificial reproduction. The second half of the chapter focuses on questions concerning death. Catholic teaching views human life in this world as finite, and thus sees death as intrinsic to the current human condition. After considering Catholic teaching on euthanasia, the chapter considers Catholic discussion of war, the death penalty, and care for the environment.


Author(s):  
Fenglin JIN

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.本文對儒道死亡思想進行了深入細緻的比較研究,認為在對待死亡的態度上,儒家重生輕死,對死存而不論;道家則由反對悅生惡死,進而歌頌、讚美死亡。在對死亡本質的認識上,儒家從天命角度出發,認為死由命定,是天意的體現;道家則認為死是氣聚氣散的結果;同時二者又都認為死亡本質上是一種安息。在對待死亡價值問題上,儒家強調把死亡落實到道德價值的開拓上;而道家則堅決反對給死亡以價值判斷,強調避死全身才是人生之根本。在超越死亡的途徑上,儒家認為人只要生治充實,為理想而奮鬥,創造了某種永恆之物,便可超越死亡;而道家則強調通過,“心齋”、“坐忘”,達到與大道合一,從而實現死而不亡。儒進上述對死亡及死後狀態的體認,派生出積極入世、奮發有為和純精神修練、不問世事的截然不同的人生態度和準則,對中國的後世哲學產生了重大而深遠的影響。This essay is a comparative and in-depth analysis of the Classical Confucian (Confucius, Mencius) and Classical Daoist (Lao Zi, Zhuang Zi) views on death. Four aspects of these two philosophies of death (attitude toward death, philosophical articulation of the essence of death, valuation of death, and transcending death) are analyzed and critically contrasted.First, regarding the general attitude toward death, Confucianism is more rational whereas Daoism is more mystical. Confucianism deems that the problem of human life is more important than the problem of human death, and hence speaks little of death. Daoism, however, is strongly against the human tendency to avoid the topic of death. Since human life and human death alternates like the four seasons, death should by no means be detested. On the contrary, death should be greeted with enthusiasm.Concerning the nature of death, Confucianism deems that death is a manifestation of the decree of Heaven, which is beyond our control. Death is fate, and is not subject to our autonomy. Daoism understands life and death in terms of the presence and the dispersion of qi (vital force), which is also beyond human control. Besides, both philosopies concur that death is the time of rest;it is a release from the labor of this world.Regarding the value of death, Confucianism strongly thinks that death, like life itself, should be used to serve the cause of ren and yi (i.e., morality). Hence death can be potentially full of moral significance, and we should try our best to give as much moral meaning to it as possible. We therefore should be prepared to give up our life for the sake of a moral cause. Daoism strongly disagrees with Confucianism in this regard, and takes a naturalistic stance toward death. Since death is an intrinsic part of life, it should neither be delayed nor hastened. Life should be lived to its temporal fullness and should not be sacrificed for any human cause. To die for morality is as bad as to die for financial gain.Lastly, both Confucianism and Daoism try to transcend the negation and annihilation imposed by death. Confucianism thinks that as long as we live altruistically we will not be bothered by death and not be affected by the anxiety over death. Besides, though one's biological life will perish, one can attain immortality through one's lasting influence to subsequent generations. Daoism, on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of being one with the Dao through meditation and other spiritual disciplines. The end result will be a total mindlessness of death.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 36 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.


Author(s):  
Hongwen LI

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.莊子的生命自由觀是一種用自由來定義生命的哲學觀念,其核心內容是追求無待的絕對自由觀,以“吾喪我”來消解人的主體意識、“齊萬物”的平等精神,以及同生死的觀念。無待的自由是指一種絕對的、不依賴於外在條件的自由,它體現為無己、無功和無名。“無待”的主旨就是超越主觀和客觀的對立,超越有限的自我,達到無限而自由的自我。“喪我”便是摒棄偏執的我、固執的我。這個偏執的“我”是封閉的我,是假我;喪失了“我”的“吾”才是開放的我,才是拋棄了偏執的本真之我。莊子的“吾喪我”乃是一種消解主體意識的方式,超越了西方主體哲學的主觀和客觀的二元對立模式。“齊物論”闡發的是平等思想,它包括三個方面:即物物平等、人人平等、人與萬物平等。莊子認為人的生死是自然世界中的一個普通事件,人的身體乃是由外在物質世界元素(氣)假借而成,只是暫時的湊集,終究是要滅亡的。這些哲學觀念對中國生命倫理學的建構具有重要的意義,主要表現在:消解人的主體性和自主性,以區別於西方生命倫理學尊重自主性原則;物物平等、人人平等以及人與萬物平等的思想對生命倫理學提出了更高的要求;以貴生、養生的方法來善待生命,反對對生命的強干涉主義。Freedom is a key concept in the philosophy of Zhuangzi. This kind of freedom requires a deconstruction of the “subject…predicate” logic and an attitude that views all things equally. The ethical views of Zhuangzi focus on the notion of “losing oneself” or “forgetting oneself”, the purpose of which is to subvert the position between subject and object and to see things as they are. Unlike the Western idea of individual autonomy, Zhuangzi’s concept of freedom is based on the interconnectedness between individuals. This essay contends that the Daoist position on the meaning of human life and freedom can serve as a source of inspiration when we consider the many bioethical issues we face today—including the issue of life and death—and how to interpret those issues within the Chinese context.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 4268 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.


Author(s):  
Weihua GUO

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.儒家倫理從“天道”的角度賦予人之生命以神聖性和超越性,而輔助生殖技術則通過技術使人之“生命”從神聖性、超越性的形上境遇被拋入到世俗境遇中,生命的“袪魅”成為這一趨勢的集中表現。並由此,引發了“生命”的形上界定和由技術展現世俗化的生命界定之間的矛盾和衝突。儒家倫理為技術干預下的“生命”進行道德辯護的關鍵在於:儒家倫理應以一種辯證、開放的態度為輔助生殖技術展現的世俗化的生命倫理提供形而上學的精神本源基礎。By profoundly intervening in human life, human assisted reproductive technology is challenging the convictions of all well-established ethics, Confucian ethics included. Through such technology, human life is thrown from the divine, transcendent metaphysical situation it has traditionally held into this-worldly circumstances. In particular, human assisted reproductive technology brings with it a series of ethical problems. First, the sanctity of life is put in jeopardy. From this perspective, every human life is unique and independent. However, human assisted reproductive technology has the potential to destroy such uniqueness and independence. Second, human subjectivity is lost. An essential attribute of human life is that humans exist as active subjects to be respected, rather than as passive objects to be manipulated. When human assisted reproductive technology is used to control human life, human subjectivity is thrown into crisis. Finally, the existence of human life is fragmented. Human beings are “group” animals, and they live in families built on the basis of blood and marriage. This basis is usually taken as the origin or foundation of Confucian ethics. However, human assisted reproductive technology (especially AIH and reproductive cloning technology) has broken the traditional family structure. It has caused a crisis in the notion of family as an ethical entity and life becomes nothing but “debris.”In the face of such moral crises, it is time to explore Confucian ethics to help people out of their plight. Traditionally, Confucian ethics has a profound and rich content. It takes human life as valuable, sacred, transcendent and eternal. From the Confucian perspective, human life means not only existence as a natural object, but also existence of value and significance in the universe. In developing a proper Confucian ethics to direct the application of human assisted reproductive technology and guide its technical intervention in human life, this essay argues that we must recognize the following crucial point: a dialectical exploration and an open attitude are needed to enable Confucian ethics to provide the Confucian spirit of metaphysical origins and concerns to a new bioethics of assisted reproductive technology. That is, on the one hand, a bridge must be built to connect the metaphysical condition of real life in Confucian ethics with the technical interference of human assisted reproductive technology. On the other hand, it must be noted that human assisted reproductive technology reveals that the problem domain is not merely a simple technology ethics, but also involves deep philosophical or ethical change. Such exploration provides formal support for considering the ethical problems of human assisted reproductive technology from a comic philosophical view that the Confucian bioethical discourse of life must undertake.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 60 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.


Author(s):  
Yunzhang LIU ◽  
Jinping ZHAO ◽  
Jia XIE

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.構建中國生命倫理學基本原則所秉持的根本方法應是整合。筆者認為,莊子的生命哲學思想與比徹姆 (Tom L. Beauchamp) 和丘卓斯(James F. Childress) 的生命倫理四原則從不同的角度,為這種整合提供了理論資源。莊子的生命哲學內涵豐富,關注生命本身、關注生命的平等和關注生命存在的本真價值與意義;秉持生是適時,死是順應的自然主義生死觀;追求超越世俗的自由“逍遙”的生存狀態;重視“養生”、“可以盡年”,實踐無慾無為的養生觀;主張“以天地為棺槨”,反對“厚葬”的陋習等等,這些都具有積極意義。這些思想歸結起來就是要“和諧”。和諧是自然萬物的存在秩序,是人的身心健康的根本保障,也是我們在構建中國生命倫理學基本原則時所需要把握的核心價值。而比徹姆和丘卓斯的生命倫理四原則從醫療衞生事業的發展與醫療實踐的角度為我們提供了更清晰、更明確去解決生命倫理問題的原則指導。在此基礎上構建起來的中國生命倫理學基本原則是以“和諧”為中心的體現,在多領域中的原則總體,包括人與自然領域的“和諧生態”原則、人與社會領域的“和諧社會”原則、人與自身領域的“和諧人格”原則、人與醫學領域的“和諧醫學”原則等。運用這些基本原則指導人們的現實倫理生活,規範、分析和解決人們現實生活中存在的種種生命倫理問題,推進社會文明的進步與人類自我價值的提升。The four-principles approach to bioethics developed by Beauchamp and Childress in Principles of Biomedical Ethics is no doubt the most well known and influential example in the West of principle-based approaches to resolve ethical issues. The four principles are autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice. This essay explores whether the four principles can be considered a universal core of morality that can be used in China to deal with current bioethical issues. It argues that although the four principles provide general guidelines, their implementation is much more complex. This essay attempts to show that Daoist thought, particularly Zhuangzi’s philosophy of life and death, conveys a certain sense of bioethics and carries profound moral implications that can overcome some of the limitations of principle-based ethics. The synthesis of the two traditions may help contemporary China to deal with various kinds of moral dilemmas. The Daoist notion of the interconnection among human beings and between human beings and nature challenges the Western idea of individualism and individual autonomy.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 553 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.


Author(s):  
Yungling WANG

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.二O O 六年春,中國發生了一次女子虐貓引發民眾憤怒的事件。許多批評者措詞激烈,不少媒體也介入了對該事件的報道和評論。在這種報道和評論中,包括記者和專家在內,幾乎毫無例外地對女子虐貓的行為給予了否定,他們認為女子虐貓行為殘忍變態,激進者認為虐貓行為侵犯動物權利,中國應當對動物權利保護立法。但是這些認識和評論或者源於生活經驗,或者源於道德直覺,或者源於糢糊不清的道德認知,卻缺乏其正理性的深入的哲學或者倫理學思考,在儒家生命倫理學看來是荒謬的。對動物權利的主張起源於動物保護運動, 今天的主要代表人物是辛格和湯姆.雷根 (Tom Regan)。但在儒家生命倫理學看來,他們關於動物與人平等和動物享有權利的觀點都是站不住腳的。儒家生命倫理學認為, 萬物之中人為貴, 人的地位無可爭辯地高於動物。儒家思想家幾乎從來沒有把動物放在與人平等的地位上加以考慮, 而是把人放在差等之愛的最高地位。此外,在儒家思想體系中, 動物不但地位低下,而且其心智、認識、行為均不可與人相比。儒家思想家會同意湯姆.雷根關於人是“生活的主體”的觀點,但卻不承認動物也能成為“生活的主體”,理由很簡單,動物沒有父子之親,沒有男女之別,沒有行為規範。儒家經典著作認為,人獸之別,還在於人有禮,而動物則沒有。在儒家看來,道德與倫理只與人類生活有關,而與動物無闕,人與動物的關係不能成為道德之一倫。總之,動物權利無法得到儒家生命倫理學的辯護。動物權利論危害甚大。抬高動物的權利地位,其實質就是降低人類的權利地位,傷害人類,或者說反人類。主張為動物權利或動物福利立法,是十分危險的事情。In the spring of 2006, a Chinese woman maltreated a cat and caused indignation in Chinese society. Many individuals launched critiques on the woman with severe tongue, and public media took part in the report and critique of the incident. Some individuals argue that the woman infringed animal rights and the Chinese government should formulate a law to protect animal rights. This essay draws on Confucian moral and intellectual resources to contend that animals do not have rights and the Chinese government should not issue any law on animal rights.The proposition of animal rights came from the modern Western "animal-protecting movement". The primary representative scholars who attempt to argue for animal rights are Peter Singer and Tom Regan: they hold that human beings and animals are equal and animals should have rights. This view, however, cannot fit into Confucian bioethics. On the Confucian view, human beings are the noblest beings in the world. The status of human being is without question higher than the status of animals. Confucian scholars would never give a position to animals that would be same as human beings. Although Confucian scholars can agree with Tom Regan on the view that human beings are "the subjects of life," they cannot accept the view that animals could be "the subjects of life." The Confucian arguments are very clear: Animals do not have the virtue of qin (intimacy) between the father and the son; they do not have the virtue of bie (difference) between the male and the female; and they do not have behavior norms (de). In short, human beings and animals are essentially difference, on Confucianism, because human beings can cultivate the virtues based on the practice of rituals (li, 禮), while animals do not have the practice of rituals at all. Accordingly, from the Confucian perspective, morality or ethics is only related with human life, but is outside of animal life. The relationship between human beings and animals does not belong to the moral relationship. In a word, animal rights cannot be accepted by Confucian bioethics.Upholding animal rights is consequently undesirable. Heightening animal status is equivalent to debasing human status. This is to harm human beings. This paper concludes that legalizing animal rights is very dangerous.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 169 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (01) ◽  
pp. 111-135
Author(s):  
Sami Ud Din ◽  
Dr. Dost Muhammad

Armed struggle is an issue of life- and -death judgments and that’s why it needs solid justification from ethical and religious principles. Defending human life and preserving the society from anarchy, disintegration and destruction sometimes waging armed struggle become necessary and a group of people or nation is compelled to do so. Now one of the important aspects in this regard is, in which circumstances the nation is allowed for an armed struggle. All of the major world religions provide guidelines in this domain from strong militancy to absolute pacifism and just war theory. Islam too acknowledges the right of defense and preserving life to human beings. This paper seeks to map out the ideological approaches to armed struggle in Islam. The important scriptures from the holy Quran, Narrations of the holy prophet are briefly introduced and the relevant verses are extracted and summarized in the light of exegesis.


Author(s):  
Hongwen LI

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.現代生物科技的廣泛應用引發了一系列社會、法律和倫理問題,它帶來的負面效應正如它的正面效果一樣多。現代生物科技的基本邏輯體現在:它採取還原論的思維模式,秉承改善生命的宗旨,以及持有技術樂觀主義的態度。作者運用莊子的哲學思想對現代生物科技展開一般性批評。作者指出,現代生物科技首先表現出強烈的反自然性,它向自然提出過分要求,干擾、阻止事物順其自然、按其本性來展示自己。現代生物科技還表現出異化特徵,主要體現在物質化和資本化兩個方面。物質化將人的活動限制在物的層面,片面追求物的有用性;資本化則導致生物資本主義的發展。用莊子道家的語言,技術的非自然性和異化的直接原因是“道”“技”分離。因此,為了走出現代生物技術的陷阱,應該採取莊子“道技合一”的方式,實現“技不離道”、“以道馭技”、“道法自然”之完美結合。Biotechnology is a field of applied biology that involves the use of living organisms and bioprocesses such as engineering, technology, and medical research. This paper highlights the social, legal, and moral issues brought about by modern biotechnology. It is particularly concerned with materialism, capitalism, and commercialism where biotechnological means are explored and exploited without ethical boundaries. The result of biotechnological abuse is that we human beings will become increasingly alienated from our authentic nature and being.Daoism was one of the major philosophical traditions of ancient China, based on the teaching of Laozi and Zhuangzi. This paper focuses on the Daoist view of human life and its relation to the natural world from Zhuangzi’s perspective. It will be contended that we must put “human flourishing” – the Dao – first, before we care about the utility of science and technology – the Ji. According to Daoism, true human self-realization depends on the unity between the Dao and the Ji.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 138 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.


KronoScope ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Steineck

AbstractThe issue of brain death touches directly on questions pertaining to our understanding of what it means to be human. Technological progress made possible the sustaining of signs of life in individuals who seem dead to the world. The concept of brain death was introduced to describe this phenomenon, and to answer some of the normative questions that were raised by it. In my article, I approach the problem of brain death with a focus on its temporal aspects. First I sketch out some general features of human life and death in terms of the theories of time of J. T. Fraser and G. Dux. Then I describe and analyze various definitions of brain death and criteria for its testing.The two most important variants are 'whole brain death' as the death of the organism, and 'cerebral death' as the death of the person. I discuss arguments in favor of, and against these concepts and analyze the framework and structuring of temporalities involved in each of them. I conclude that the extant theories in favor of 'brain death' are unsatisfactory, for factual and conceptual reasons. Most importantly, they neglect essential factors of personal identity. Because they employ a naturalistic concept of the human body, they fail to grasp its expressive quality and its function as a medium of communication. Furthermore, they fail to grasp the social dimension of personal identity. Because the concepts of 'brain death' as a criterion for the determination of death fail, we should regard brain-dead people as living human beings, and decide about their treatment accordingly.


Asian Studies ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-128
Author(s):  
Hisaki HASHI

Contrary to occidental philosophy, which is to grasp and solidify the principles of essential being (ontos on), Buddhism seeks to understand the existence of human beings and the significance of suffering in human life. In the East Asian languages human beings are described as “inter-beings” in that they are enveloped by the topos of life and death. From breath to breath, our life is bound to the moments of emerging and vanishing, being and non-being in an essential unity. Dōgen’s philosophical thinking integrated this conception with the embodied cognition of both the thinking and the acting self. In the phenomenological point of view, Heidegger, in his early work, emphasizes that being is bound to a fundamental substantiality, which borders on the Abgrund, falling into nothingness. With Dōgen, the unity-within-contrast of life and death is exemplified in our breathing because it achieves a unity of body and cognition which can be called “corpus”. In perfect contrast, the essential reflection for Heidegger is that of grasping the fundament of being in the world, which represents the actualization of a thinking-being-unity. The goal of this comparison is to fundamentally grasp what is the essentiality of being, life, and recognition (jikaku 自覚), bound to embodied cognition in our globalized world.


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