scholarly journals The Agendas of Public Administration Reforms in Lithuania: Windows of Opportunity in the Period 2004 – 2017

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-114
Author(s):  
Vitalis Nakrošis

Abstract The article analyses changes in the reform agendas of the Lithuanian government in the period 2004 – 2017. Instead of exploring the systemic and formal agendas of administrative reforms based on government strategies and programmes, it focuses on the institutional and actual agendas of Lithuanian authorities using a set of 20 reform initiatives. In addition to the analysis of the institutional context, we also assess a coupling logic and the exercise of political or bureaucratic entrepreneurship during reform policy making. The article finds that budgetary constraints and the reform policy priorities of the Lithuanian governments explain the ambitious agendas of administrative reforms during the 2008 – 2012 government and, to a lesser extent, during the 2016 – 2020 government. The political logic of coupling and political entrepreneurship dominated the flow of the reform process when these governments were in office, producing the top-down approach to reform policy making. In contrast, the 2004 – 2006, 2006 – 2008 and 2012 – 2016 governments relied strongly on a policy-centred logic of coupling together with bureaucratic entrepreneurship, which resulted in the bottom-up approach to administrative reforms in the country.

2020 ◽  
Vol 52 (9) ◽  
pp. 1299-1332
Author(s):  
Manto Lampropoulou ◽  
Giorgio Oikonomou

The aim of this article is to explore the implications of the delegation of powers from central bureaucracies to semi-autonomous agencies for public administration under policy conditionality. Focusing on Greece, we argue that agencification reforms that were introduced during the economic adjustment programs (2010–2018) have changed the role of the administrative apparatus in policy-making and implementation. Based on two exemplary case studies, tax administration and state assets management, the empirical findings illustrate the political dynamics that induced organizational transformation and show how policy conditionality has changed the domestic agencification pattern and has rebalanced the institutional, functional, and democratic dimensions of agencies.


Author(s):  
Jonathan W. Keller

This chapter focuses on the leadership styles of political executives—that is, the ways in which executives relate to constituents, advisers, and other leaders in the political domain. The scholarship on this topic, spanning the fields of political science, psychology, management science, and public administration, provides answers to fundamental questions about when leaders matter and which aspects of leadership style generate specific policy-making processes and outcomes. General conclusions include the dual importance of contextual factors and political skill in shaping leaders’ effectiveness, and the central roles played by leaders’ task versus relations orientations and sensitivity to the political context. Significant progress in this field will require more research on non-Western leaders, rigorous comparative analysis of political executives, methodological refinement in measuring leadership styles, ‘bridge-building’ among balkanized academic subfields, and more systematic efforts to identify areas of consensus and gaps within the existing scholarship.


Author(s):  
Jennifer N. Brass

Since the 1980s, international and Kenyan-based NGOs have come to play a pivotal position in the governance of service provision in Kenya. Not only do they provide services directly to citizens, but they also engage in indirect provision, collaborative provision, and policy-making related to service provision locally or nationally. As such, NGOs have come to form part of the de facto organizational composition of the Kenyan public administration. The political economy effects of this NGO participation have been mixed: service provision has expanded, particularly where there is collaboration in delivery, and there has been some movement toward greater line-ministry accountability and participatory development techniques. At the same time, however, NGOs may lend legitimacy to undeserving local or national political regimes, may reduce the possibility for democratic accountability for service provision, and may thrive at the expense of Kenya state capacity.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 82-118
Author(s):  
YANA TOOM ◽  
◽  
VALENTINA V. KOMLEVA ◽  

The article studies the main stages and features of the evolution of the public administration system in the Republic of Estonia after 1992. This paper presents brief geographical and socio-economic characteristics that largely determine the development of the country’s public administration. The evolution of the institution of the presidency, executive, and legislative powers are considered. The role of parliament and mechanisms for coordinating the interests of different groups of the population for the development of the country is especially emphasized. The authors analyze the state and administrative reforms of recent years, which were aimed at improving the quality of services provided to the population, increasing the competitiveness of different parts of Estonia, as well as optimizing public spending and management structure. The introduction of digital technologies into the sphere of public administration, healthcare, education, and the social sphere is of a notable place. Such phenomena as e-residency, e-federation, and other digital projects are considered. The development of a digital system of interstate interaction between Estonia and Finland made it possible to create the world’s first e-federation, and the digitization of all strategically important information and its transfer to cloud storage speaks of the creation of the world’s first e-residency, a special residence of data outside the country’s borders to ensure digital continuity and statehood in the event of critical malfunctions or external threats.


Author(s):  
Michelle Belco ◽  
Brandon Rottinghaus

The president serves dual roles in the political system: one who “commands” by pursuing his or her agenda using unilateral orders and one who “administers” and who works to continue proper government function, often with the support of Congress. In a reassessment of the literature on unilateral power, this book considers the president’s dual roles during the stages of the policy-making process. Although presidents may appear to act “first and alone,” the reality is often much different. Presidents act in response to their own concerns, as well as assisting Congress on priorities and the need to maintain harmonic government function. The authors find support for both the model of an aggressive president who uses unilateral orders to push his or her agenda, head off unfavorable congressional legislation, and selectively implement legislation, and they find support for a unifying president who is willing to share management of government, support Congressional legislative efforts, and faithfully implement legislation. At the same time, presidents self-check their actions based on the ability of Congress to act to overturn their orders, through a shared sense of responsibility to keep government moving and out of respect for the constitutional balance. The shared nature of unilateral orders does not preclude an active president, as presidents remain strong, central actors in the political system.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-71
Author(s):  
Bahawal Shahryar

Abstract An optimally designed tax amnesty scheme can serve as a strategic component in a larger tax reform process. Such a reform can particularly assist in the tax collection efforts of developing economies like Pakistan. Pakistan’s tax amnesty schemes in 2018 and 2019 helped grow the tax base substantially. India’s and Indonesia’s schemes in 2016 also showed promise. My study compares the recent tax amnesties adopted by these three countries (Pakistan, India and Indonesia). Based on these experiences, I propose improvements in the composition of Pakistan’s tax amnesty design. An optimal tax policy cannot rely only on wide-spread enforcement, particularly in countries with large underground economies--like Pakistan, India and Indonesia. Instead, it should focus more on the optimal amnesty design alongside targeted enforcement efforts, aimed especially at documenting and taxing large underground economic activities.


1973 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 661-664 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Vaison

Normally in political studies the term public policy is construed to encompass the societally binding directives issued by a society's legitimate government. We usually consider government, and only government, as being able to “authoritatively allocate values.” This common conception pervades the literature on government policy-making, so much so that it is hardly questioned by students and practitioners of political science. As this note attempts to demonstrate, some re-thinking seems to be in order. For purposes of analysis in the social sciences, this conceptualization of public policy tends to obscure important realities of modern corporate society and to restrict unnecessarily the study of policy-making. Public policy is held to be public simply and solely because it originates from a duly legitimated government, which in turn is held to have the authority (within specified limits) of formulating and implementing such policy. Public policy is public then, our usual thinking goes, because it is made by a body defined somewhat arbitrarily as “public”: a government or some branch of government. All other policy-making is seen as private; it is not public (and hence to lie essentially beyond the scope of the disciplines of poliitcal science and public administration) because it is duly arrived at by non-governmental bodies. Thus policy analysts lead us to believe that public policy is made only when a government body acts to consider some subject of concern, and that other organizations are not relevant to the study of public policy.


1977 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 615-624 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee Sigelman ◽  
William G. Vanderbok

The bureaucratization of the political process that characterizes twentieth century politics in many countries has not bypassed Canada—as evidenced by skyrocketing rates of government employment and expenditure and, even more dramatically, by the ever-expanding policy-making power of Canadian bureaucracy. One observer sees the civil service as occupying an increasingly strategic role in Canadian politics, a condition thatreflects in part the expanding role of modern government into highly technical areas, which tends to augment the discretion of permanent officials because legislators are obliged to delegate to them the administration of complex affairs, including the responsibility for drafting and adjudicating great amounts of sub-legislation required to “fill in the details” of the necessarily broad, organic statutes passed by Parliament. Some indication of the scale of such discretion is found in the fact that, during the period 1963–8, an annual average of 4,130 Orders-in-Council were passed in Ottawa, a substantial proportion of which provided for delegating authority to prescribe rules and regulations to ministers and their permanent advisers. By contrast, the number of laws passed annually by Canadian federal parliaments is rarely over one hundred.


2012 ◽  
Vol 40 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 635-663 ◽  
Author(s):  
James C. Schopf

Abstract Democratisation has brought a new, riskier pattern of corruption to Korea. More groups and institutions have secured a role in a more inclusive democratic policy making process. As a result, corruption schemes now require the consent of a wide and diverse set of veto players, often including the political opposition, producing expansive democratic ‘corruption webs’. The key democratic element of competition for votes rewards opposition members in the web for blowing the whistle. Increased likelihood of exposure and punishment deter many from corruption, which has subsequently declined in Korea under democracy, as measured by perception polls, experience surveys and objective measures of elite rent exchange. The Roh Moo-hyeon NACF scandals demonstrate that democratic corruption webs also mitigate damage from scandals — forcing participants to limit rent exchange to minimise exposure to clean veto players. Democratic oversight ensures that even bribe-taking officials implement policy according to publicly-declared objectives. Finally, competition for votes encourages timely exposure of democratic corruption rackets.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document