scholarly journals Paradigmatic Discord in US Arctic Policy

Author(s):  
L. A. Matiyak

The United States, as one of the five Arctic states, plays what seems at first glance a typical role in the Arctic through their regional policy that uses standard tactical maneuvers, which have proven themselves worthy in other areas of the globe. However, this role is played with unusual passiveness that can be attributed primarily to a lack of an Arctic identity. This is most evident upon comparison with other states of the Arctic "five", which are completely different from each other, and nevertheless are bound by a sense of belonging to the North. The Unites States is the only Arctic state that has not signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, that has taken a firm stance on the sovereignty of the Northwest Passage, that risks increasing tensions with Canada, and that is not developing its icebreaker fleet, which is crucial to operations in the Arctic. This circumpolar strategic ambivalence of a powerful state, that is experienced in conducting foreign affairs, in itself presents significant room for research. Meanwhile, the region's importance is increasing in the changing international environment; it can become a "battlefield" due its strategic geopolitical position and at the same time the "main trophy"due to its abundant hydrocarbon potential. During the recent years, the Arctic has been gradually transforming into a "metaregion" for foreign affairs; its geographically limited borders have spread globally due to an increasing international presence in the Polar Region that has significant energy resources and transportation potential. This is confirmed by the emergence of new actors (including traditionally non-Arctic players), the change in agenda of multilateral discussions (traditional topics, such as protection of the fragile Arctic environment, indigenous peoples of the North, have been complemented with the new "challenges" of energy security, global warming, and militarization), and the strengthening of the institutional framework (the Arctic Council has been more and more influential). In light of the recent tension in Russian-US relations and the rising significance of the Polar Region, US Arctic policy should be the subject of an in-depth analysis of foreign-affairs experts and the government.

Author(s):  
Telesetsky Anastasia

This chapter examines issues of global ocean governance from North American and Arctic perspectives. It first considers the priority global ocean law and policy issues for federal agencies in Canada, Mexico, and the United States in the areas of marine environment protection and traditional maritime security (for example, trafficking and human migration). For each North American State, the chapter identifies any specific interactions between the State and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) that have been highlighted by the State that involve ocean governance competencies. The focus is on a small subset of IGOs and United Nations entities including the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Maritime Organization, World Meteorological Organization, World Customs Organization, and the UN Security Council. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the global ocean governance priorities of the Arctic Council and any interactions between the Arctic Council and UN IGOs on priority matters for the Council.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 703
Author(s):  
Megan Drewniak ◽  
Dimitrios Dalaklis ◽  
Anastasia Christodoulou ◽  
Rebecca Sheehan

In recent years, a continuous decline of ice-coverage in the Arctic has been recorded, but these high latitudes are still dominated by earth’s polar ice cap. Therefore, safe and sustainable shipping operations in this still frozen region have as a precondition the availability of ice-breaking support. The analysis in hand provides an assessment of the United States’ and Canada’s polar ice-breaking program with the purpose of examining to what extent these countries’ relevant resources are able to meet the facilitated growth of industrial interests in the High North. This assessment will specifically focus on the maritime transportation sector along the Northwest Passage and consists of four main sections. The first provides a very brief description of the main Arctic passages. The second section specifically explores the current situation of the Northwest Passage, including the relevant navigational challenges, lack of infrastructure, available routes that may be used for transit, potential choke points, and current state of vessel activity along these routes. The third one examines the economic viability of the Northwest Passage compared to that of the Panama Canal; the fourth and final section is investigating the current and future capabilities of the United States’ and Canada’s ice-breaking fleet. Unfortunately, both countries were found to be lacking the necessary assets with ice-breaking capabilities and will need to accelerate their efforts in order to effectively respond to the growing needs of the Arctic. The total number of available ice-breaking assets is impacting negatively the level of support by the marine transportation system of both the United States and Canada; these two countries are facing the possibility to be unable to effectively meet the expected future needs because of the lengthy acquisition and production process required for new ice-breaking fleets.


Logistics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 23
Author(s):  
Rebecca Sheehan ◽  
Dimitrios Dalaklis ◽  
Anastasia Christodoulou ◽  
Megan Drewniak ◽  
Peter Raneri ◽  
...  

The analysis in hand provides a brief assessment of the United States’ and Canada’s marine transportation system and relevant search and rescue (SAR) support in relation to the Northwest Passage, with the purpose of examining to what extent these countries’ relevant infrastructure resources are able to meet the expected growth of shipping operations and business activities in the Arctic. Through an extensive literature review, this assessment will specifically describe the most important influences upon the maritime transportation system, with the issue of certain geographical details and the capabilities of existing ports standing out. Additionally, vessel activity trends and vessel traffic routing measure initiatives will be examined. Furthermore, the SAR infrastructure details and means to render assistance to people in distress along the Northwest Passage will be discussed. The reality remains that port characteristics are limited and vessel traffic routing measure initiatives and upgrades to SAR assets are commendable but slow-paced. It is true that both the United States and Canada are taking proper measures to build up infrastructure needs, but they both may run out of time to put adequate infrastructure in place to deal effectively with the changing environment.


1988 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 266-291 ◽  
Author(s):  
James L. Cobban

By the beginning of the twentieth century, Semarang was a major port city and administrative centre on Java. Attainment of this position was due partly to the expansion of its hinterland during the nineteenth century. This expansion was closely related to developments in the means of transportation and the consequent ability of plantation owners to bring the products of their plantations to the port for shipment to foreign markets. By the end of the century virtually the whole economic life of central Java focused upon Semarang. The city also exercised administrative functions in the Dutch colonial administration and generally had been responsible for Dutch interests in the middle and eastern parts of the island. The importance of Semarang as an administrative centre increased after 1906. In that year the government incorporated the city as an urban municipality (stadsgemeente). In 1914 it had consular representation from the United States, Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Italy, Norway, Germany, and Thailand. Subsequently, in 1926 it became the capital of the Province of Central Java under the terms of an administrative reform fostered by the colonial government at Batavia. Status as an urban municipality meant that local officials sitting on a city council would govern the domestic affairs of the city. The members of the city council at first were appointed from Batavia, subsequently some of them were elected by residents of the city. By the beginning of the twentieth century Semarang had enhanced its position as a major port on the north coast of the island of Java. It was one of the foremost cities of the Dutch East Indies, along with Batavia and Surabaya, a leading port and a centre of administration and trade. This article outlines the growth of the port of Semarang during the nineteenth century and discusses some of the conflict related to this growth over living conditions in parts of the city during the twentieth century, a conflict which smouldered for several decades among the government, members of the city council, and the non-European residents of the city, one which remained unresolved at the end of the colonial era.


Polar Record ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 361-371 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timo Koivurova ◽  
Kai Kokko ◽  
Sebastien Duyck ◽  
Nikolas Sellheim ◽  
Adam Stepien

ABSTRACTThe European Union's (EU's) intention of becoming a permanent observer in the Arctic Council and the reluctance of Arctic actors to grant it that status have made the union's aspirations in the Arctic the subject of a continuing debate. The discussion appears to be dominated by geographical considerations and the EU's gradually emerging Arctic policy. This article puts forward a different view of the EU's presence in the region, one drawing on an analysis of relevant EU competences. As a complex international actor, the EU has acquired a broad array of decision-making powers from its member states, powers that partly extend to Iceland and Norway via the EEA Agreement. Moreover, the EU has in many cases become a relevant actor in international negotiations and treaty making processes the outcomes of which are of crucial importance for the governance of the Arctic. Our argument in the third and concluding section is that only by including the EU in Arctic governance can the international community provide better prospects for the union to sensitise its policies and discourses to the Arctic realities and for other Arctic actors to understand how the union functions. This argument is supported by an analysis of the EU's restrictions on the import of seal products and the ensuing litigation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (0) ◽  
pp. 190
Author(s):  
Helge Blakkisrud

After a period of relative neglect in the 1990s and early 2000s, the Arctic is back on the agenda of the Russian authorities. To ensure efficient coordination and implementation of its Arctic strategy, the government in 2015 established a State Commission for Arctic Development. It was to serve as a platform for coordinating the implementation of the government’s ambitious plans for the Arctic, for exchange of information among Arctic actors, and for ironing out interagency and interregional conflicts. Based on a case study of the State Commission for Arctic Development, this article has a twofold goal. First, it explores the current Russian domestic Arctic agenda, mapping key actors and priorities and examining the results achieved so far. Second, it discusses what this case study may tell us the about policy formulation and implementation in Russia today. We find that while the government’s renewed focus on the Arctic Zone has yielded some impressive results, the State Commission has been at best a mixed success. The case study demonstrates how, in the context of authoritarian modernization, the Russian government struggles to come up with effective and efficient institutions for Arctic governance. Moreover, the widespread image of a Russian governance model based on a strictly hierarchic “power vertical” must be modified. Russia’s Arctic policy agenda is characterized by infighting and bureaucratic obstructionism: even when Putin intervenes personally, achieving the desired goals can prove difficult.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brandon C. Halaychik

The Russian Federations drive to reestablish itself as a global power has severe security implications for the United States, its Arctic neighbors, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a whole. The former Commander of United States Naval Forces Europe Admiral Mark Ferguson noted that the re-militarization of Russian security policy in the Arctic is one of the most significant developments in the twenty-first century adding that Russia is creating an “Arc of steel from the Arctic to the Mediterranean” (Herbst 2016, 166). Although the Russian Federation postulates its expansion into the Arctic is for purely economic means, the reality of the military hardware being placed in the region by the Russians tells otherwise. Implementation of military hardware such as anti-air defenses is contrary to the stipulated purposes of the Russian Government in the region. Therefore is the Russian Federation building strategic military bases in the Arctic to challenge the United States hegemony due to the mistreatment against the Russians by the United States and NATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union.


Author(s):  
Valery Zhuravel ◽  

The Arctic has always been in the field of close attention of the Russian leadership. This was especially true in 2020. This year, a number of important strategic planning documents were adopted that define the country’s state policy in the Arctic zone for the next 15 years. These are: The Fundamentals of State policy in the Arctic Zone until 2035 and the Strategy for the development of the Russian Federation’s Arctic zone and ensuring national security for the period up to 2035. In parallel, work continued improving the federal authorities activities on the exploration and development of the Arctic. New members of the State Commission for Arctic development approved including their powers expanded. The newly formed Ministry of the Russian Federation for development of the Far East and the Arctic has begun its activity. Simultaneously, the Government decided on the extension of the Far East development institutions competence in the Arctic zone. The attention of the public was drawn to the planned major infrastructure projects in all the subjects of the Russian Arctic. The author, drawing attention to a wide list of planned major arctic infrastructure projects in all the subjects of the Russian Arctic zone, expresses doubts about the possibility of their implementation, taking into account the existing and potential difficulties. The article points to the need to use the experience in the advancement and development of the Arctic, acquired in 2020, during the Russian presidency of the Arctic Council in 2021–2023.


2010 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 273
Author(s):  
Michael J Kelly ◽  
Sean Watts

In the aftermath of the Cold War, many began to question the continuing efficacy, or at least call for reform, of collective security structures such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations Security Council. Yet, North East Asia never enjoyed a formal, institutionalised collective security structure. As Russia and the United States recede and China emerges in North East Asia, this article questions whether now is the time to consider such an arrangement. Financially, Japan and South Korea are locked into a symbiotic relationship with China (as is the United States), while the government in Beijing continues to militarise and lay territorial and maritime claims to large areas of the region. Moreover, the regime in North Korea, with its new nuclear capabilities, remains unpredictable. Consequently, central components to the question of collective security in North East Asia are the equally vexing questions of what to do about North Korea and whether a new formalised security arrangement would include or exclude the People's Republic of China.


Nordlit ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Torbjørn Pedersen

This article discusses what role(s) member governments want the Arctic Council to have in Arctic affairs. It compares the foreign policies of the five littoral states of the Arctic Ocean: Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States. It identifies and examines three determining debates on a ministerial level over the Arctic Council and the issues it might address: The first debate preceded the Arctic Council's creation in 1996; the second thrived as the five Arctic littoral states convened in Ilulissat, Greenland in 2008; and the third followed a political shift inthe United States in 2009.


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