scholarly journals ESTABLISHMENT OF A SYSTEM OF ASSISTANCE TO WAR DISABLED IN THE ACTIVITIES OF A SPECIAL COMMISSION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF MILITARY OFFICERS AND OTHER PERSONS AFFECTED IN THE PROCEEDING OF THE WAR, AS WELL AS THEIR FAMILIES

Author(s):  
P. A. Merkulov ◽  
S. V. Bukalova

The article is devoted to the organizational base of assistance to WWI invalids, the central link of which was a Special Commission of the Supreme Council for the Care of families of persons called up for war. Initially, the implementation of measures to the war invalids was entrusted to the local branches of the Elizabethan Committee, but the scale of the problem required the involvement of local self-government in helping the military-disabled. Zemsky Union and Union of Cities included war invalids in the sphere of their interests and a Special Commission was forced to cooperate with them in developing an all-Russian plan for the care of the military-disabled.

2021 ◽  
pp. 0095327X2098519
Author(s):  
Celeste Raver Luning ◽  
Prince A. Attoh ◽  
Tao Gong ◽  
James T. Fox

With the backdrop of the utility of grit at the individual level, speculation has begun to circulate that grit may exist as an organizational level phenomenon. To explore this potential construct, this study used an exploratory, qualitative research design. This study explored grit at the organizational level by interviewing leaders’ perceptions of what may be a culture of organizational grit. Participants included 14 U.S. military officers. Seven themes emerged relative to the research question: “What do U.S. military officers perceive as a culture of organizational grit?” Themes included professional pride, team unity, resilience-determination, mission accomplishment, core values, growth mindset, and deliberate practice. This study indicated that a culture of organizational grit is likely a combination of converging organizational elements. Overall, findings indicate that there may be a culture of organizational grit in the military and at the least, more research examining the concept is warranted.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 55-78
Author(s):  
Federico Battera

This article explores the differences between two North African military regimes—Egypt and Algeria—which have been selected due to the continuity of military dominance of the political systems. Still, variations have marked their political development. In particular, the Algerian army’s approach to civilian institutions changed after a civilian president was chosen in 1999. This was not the case in Egypt after the demise of the Hosni Mubarak regime of 2011. Other important variations are to be found in the way power has been distributed among the military apparatuses themselves. In the case of Egypt, a principle of collegiality has been generally preserved within a body, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which is absent in the case of Algeria, where conflicts between military opposed factions are more likely to arise in case of crisis. How differences generally impact the stability of military rule in these two cases is the main contribution of this paper.


2021 ◽  
pp. 162-198
Author(s):  
Vipul Dutta

The final chapter looks at the National Defence College (NDC) in Delhi that was inaugurated by India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1960. It is the last of the military institutional creations designed to meet the training needs of senior ranking Indian officers. This chapter will contextualise the emergence of the NDC in the changing perceptions, roles and responsibilities of the Indian Armed forces. It will dwell at length on the post-independence cohort of senior Indian military officers that represented the ‘constituency’ of the NDC, and re-look at their subsequent assignments which symbolised a paradigm shift in the mandate of the armed forces, thereby offering a fresh perspective on the post-independence phase of the military institutional ‘Indianisation’.


Author(s):  
Jiří Jákl

Abstract This article offers a detailed analysis of the category of men known as taṇḍa. Widely attested in literary records and known from Old Javanese inscriptions, the function and social status of taṇḍa has been a controversial issue. Two views pertaining to the identity of these men have been advanced so far. According to most scholars, taṇḍa were high-status officials, often interpreted as military ‘officers’. According to an alternative view, they were low-status military figures and their function was to oversee markets, or they were low-status figures associated with music and performances. This article argues that until at least 1200 CE taṇḍa were court-based, active combatants, who had troops of their own followers at their disposal and were responsible for the military expansion of Javanese states. By the Majapahit period they were integrated as regular troops into the progressively more hierarchical system of the professional standing army, which resulted in their reduced social status.


Author(s):  
Mónica Ricketts

The final chapter discusses in parallel the political histories of Spain and Peru in the final years of imperial rule in South America. Peru did not experience a long national struggle and lacked large elites committed to independence. As in the old metropolis, a constant and violent struggle between men of letters and military officers dominated. After decades of military reform and war, army officers with experience in command and government felt entitled to rule. Old subjects and new citizens were also accustomed to seeing them lead. Men of letters, on the other hand, found limited opportunities to exercise their new authority despite their ambitions. Additionally, both in Spain and Peru, liberal men of letters failed to create a new institutional order in which the military would be subjected to civilian rule. It would take decades for both parts of the former Spanish monarchy to accomplish that goal and allow for peace.


Author(s):  
Graham Dominy

This chapter examines the role of the garrison in the British Empire's establishment of a colonial state in Natal during the period 1840s–1860s. It first explains how the garrison transformed Pietermaritzburg from a Trekker settlement to a Victorian colonial capital before considering the ways in which the British Crown used pageantry and propaganda to reinforce the prestige of the colonial state while masking the military weakness of the garrison in relation to the colony's potential enemies. It then discusses the garrison's “punitive expeditions”—almost as an extension of the parading on the barrack square of Fort Napier—in response to panic and rumors of invasions. Ironically, those raids provoked “panics” among the African population; such panics fed the almost pathological fear that the settlers had of a “native” rising or “combination.” The chapter also looks at the appointment of British military officers in various civil posts in the colony and concludes with an assessment of the Zulu invasion scare of 1861 and the question that it raised regarding payment for the garrison.


2012 ◽  
Vol 106 (2) ◽  
pp. 326-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
JESSICA L. WEEKS

How do domestic institutions affect autocratic leaders’ decisions to initiate military conflicts? Contrary to the conventional wisdom, I argue that institutions in some kinds of dictatorships allow regime insiders to hold leaders accountable for their foreign policy decisions. However, the preferences and perceptions of these autocratic domestic audiences vary, with domestic audiences in civilian regimes being more skeptical of using military force than the military officers who form the core constituency in military juntas. In personalist regimes in which there is no effective domestic audience, no predictable mechanism exists for restraining or removing overly belligerent leaders, and leaders tend to be selected for personal characteristics that make them more likely to use military force. I combine these arguments to generate a series of hypotheses about the conflict behavior of autocracies and test the hypotheses using new measures of authoritarian regime type. The findings indicate that, despite the conventional focus on differences between democracies and nondemocracies, substantial variation in conflict initiation occurs among authoritarian regimes. Moreover, civilian regimes with powerful elite audiences are no more belligerent overall than democracies. The result is a deeper understanding of the conflict behavior of autocracies, with important implications for scholars as well as policy makers.


2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 13-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Holger Albrecht ◽  
Dina Bishara

Though there are many expectations regarding the interim character of the current political order, the future of Egyptian democracy remains highly uncertain. A closer look at the take-over of power by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is imperative to an understanding of a political system at a decisive crossroads, but also of the path-dependent implications of the military’s engagement in politics. We project that, irrespective of the institutional framing and the results of the current political transformation, the military will play a decisive role in the country’s political future. In addressing its role during the current revolutionary events, we account for the reason for the military’s engagement in politics, the path of the take-over of political power, and the military’s management of politics. Thus, our analysis will attempt to provide preliminary answers to three questions: When and how did the Egyptian military intervene directly in revolutionary politics? Why did it intervene? And how does it manage the transformation?


1976 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur N. Gilbert

In the eighteenth century, most military crimes were tried at the Regimental level. In theory, the military law of the day decreed that the General Courts Martial be reserved for major offenses: those that might result in capital sentences or lashings of great magnitude. Murder, rape, robbery, and other crimes deemed capital undgr eighteenth century civil law, were tried at the General Courts Martial, as were specific military crimes that seriously affected the ongoing life of the armed forces—mutiny, desertion, and the like. As one would expect, there were many more petty crimes than major offenses. Still, the General Courts Martial books show a surprisingly small number of cases, even in wartime, when the army grew precipitously to meet a military threat.For most soldiers, crime and punishment was administered by the Regimental Courts, yet we know very little about them. There are no Regimental Courts Martial records to speak of and few surviving accounts of their procedures. What we do know suggests that they were very important to those military officers who were responsible for the order and discipline of the British army.Until 1718, the rules and procedures governing Regimental Courts Martial were vague and uncertain. In that year, a modest attempt was made to codify RCM procedures. It was decreed that the RCM could inflict corporal punishment for such crimes as neglect of duty and disorderly conduct in quarters, among others, and that all such trials had to be conducted by five commissioned officers. Conviction was decided by a plurality of votes. Significantly, the oath, used previously when officers were called upon to serve as judge and jury, was eliminated in Regimental Courts Martial cases. As a result, the Judge Advocate noted some years later, “since that time the Prisoner has not had the benefit of that great and I may say, only security to be fairly and impartially tried.”


Author(s):  
Michel S. Laguerre

Since the independence of Haiti in 1804, the military has played a central role in the governance of the republic, often accessing the presidency through the recurrent phenomenon of the coup d’état, which serves as both a principal mechanism for the transmission of power from one government to another and for reinforcing the domination of the military over the civilian population. The 19th-century model of the coup d’état reflected the de facto decentralization of the military as it was carried out through rebellions concocted and headed by army battalions stationed in the rural provinces. The U.S. occupation (1915–1934), by locating or relocating the military elite, the most prominent military bases, the largest contingent of the military officers and rank and file in the capital city, contributed to the reengineering of a new national infrastructure that facilitates a new model of the coup d’état to emerge: One that germinates among the high command of the military; one that takes the form of a corporate intervention; one that is made possible because of the high command’s control over tactical military weapons, including the heavy military equipment located in the capital city; and one that is swift, thereby preventing any provincial military base from mounting a meaningful or successful military counter-coup.


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