scholarly journals Pandangan Axel Honneth tentang Keadilan sebagai Institusionalisasi Kebebasan dalam Relasi Pengakuan

MELINTAS ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-128
Author(s):  
Yasintus Runesi

This article explores Axel Honneth’s normative reconstruction of social liberty as discussed in his book, Freedom’s Right. Honneth’s argument is complex. On one side, he believes that justice can ultimately only be judged in terms of the ideals actually institutionalised in that society. On the other side, he insists that contemporary theories of justice that are guided almost exclusively by the legal paradigm is a theoretical folly. In the first part, this article presents Honneth’s critical reading of the differences between negative and reflexive models of freedom. Then it discusses the ideas of democracy as reflexive cooperation of the ‘we’ in relation to the concept of social freedom. It then reviews Honneth’s argument on justice as institutionalised freedom. The author compares Honneth’s account of solidarity with Enrique Dussel’s views in the fourth part of this article. The conclusion shows that social freedom cannot be realised without a pedagogical process in this exclusion age, and that this process might enlarge the individuals’ horizon of solidarity as future citizens.

2005 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 105-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rémy Delage

Using as the example of the pilgrimage to Sabarimala (Kerala, South India), I propose here to explore the links existing between sources, research hypothesis and research theory in social sciences. The choice of research materials in the process of investigation, sources of knowledge about the studied object, is not mere random sampling; it is processed in accordance with the questions of the researcher. It inevitably assumes a selective dimension. After a critical reading of the sources used by Indian studies, I will highlight on the connections between the sources and the methodological tools on the one hand, and the major research hypothesis about pilgrimage on the other. The links between the data taken from the field and the legitimacy of scientific discourse on India will be examined at the end before providing some keys for the interpretation of Sabarimala phenomenon in South India during the contemporary period.


Author(s):  
Daniel Martin Feige

Der Beitrag widmet sich der Frage historischer Folgeverhältnisse in der Kunst. Gegenüber dem Gedanken, dass es ein ursprüngliches Werk in der Reihe von Werken gibt, das späteren Werken seinen Sinn gibt, schlägt der Text vor, das Verhältnis umgekehrt zu denken: Im Lichte späterer Werke wird der Sinn früherer Werke neu ausgehandelt. Dazu geht der Text in drei Schritten vor. Im ersten Teil formuliert er unter der Überschrift ›Form‹ in kritischer Abgrenzung zu Danto und Eco mit Adorno den Gedanken, dass Kunstwerke eigensinnig konstituierte Gegenstände sind. Die im Gedanken der Neuverhandlung früherer Werke im Lichte späterer Werke vorausgesetzte Unbestimmtheit des Sinns von Kunstwerken wird im zweiten Teil unter dem Schlagwort ›Zeitlichkeit‹ anhand des Paradigmas der Improvisation erörtert. Der dritte und letzte Teil wendet diese improvisatorische Logik unter dem Label ›Neuaushandlung‹ dann dezidiert auf das Verhältnis von Vorbild und Nachbild an. The article proposes a new understanding of historical succession in the realm of art. In contrast to the idea that there is an original work in the series of works that gives meaning to the works that come later, the text proposes to think it exactly the other way round: in the light of later works, the meanings of earlier works are renegotiated. The text proceeds in three steps to develop this idea. Under the heading ›Form‹ it develops in the first part a critical reading of Danto’s and Eco’s notion of the constitution of the artworks and argues with Adorno that each powerful work develops its own language. In the second part, the vagueness of the meaning of works of art presupposed in the idea of renegotiating earlier works in the light of later works is discussed under the term ›Temporality‹ in terms of the logic of improvisation. The third and final part uses this improvisational logic under the label ›Renegotiation‹ to understand the relationship between model and afterimage in the realm of art.


2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 266-292
Author(s):  
Christian Krijnen

AbstractContemporary philosophy of recognition represents probably the most prominent direction that presently claims to introduce an updated version of classical German idealism into ongoing debates, including the debate on the nature of sociality. In particular, studies of Axel Honneth offer triggering contributions in Frankfurt School fashion while at the same time rejuvenating Hegel’s philosophy in terms of a philosophy of recognition. According to Honneth, this attempt at a rejuvenation also involves substantial modification of Hegelian doctrines. It is shown that Honneth underestimates the implications of Hegel’s thoughts about the theme, method and systematic form of philosophy. As a consequence, Honneth’s social philosophy is, on the one hand, in need of a plausible foundation. This leads, on the other hand, to a different construction of the social within philosophy than Honneth offers.


2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 653-663
Author(s):  
Slavenko Sljukic

The main goal of Kenneth R. Westphal?s How Hume and Kant Reconstruct Natural Law: Justifying Strict Objectivity without Debating Moral Realism is to defend the objectivity of moral standards and natural law and thus avoid the discussion about moral realism and its alternatives by interpreting Hume and Kant in a constructivistic sense. The reason behind the author?s disagreement with both: moral realism and non-realism (its alternative) is our inability to properly understand and answer one of the two parts in Socrates? question to Euthyphro: ?Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved?? Moral realists cannot provide an answer to its second part, since it is not possible to prove that moral standards are not artificial; conversely, moral non-realists cannot provide an answer to its first part, since it is not possible to avoid the relatitvity of moral standards. The author tends to solve this problem by avoiding the confrontation between moral realism and non-realism and thus choosing the constuctivistic stance that, as he argues, can be found in both Hume?s and Kant?s theories. The main point of this stance is that moral standards are indeed artificial, yet not arbitrary. He proves this by pointing out that both Hume and Kant treat the moral standards as a social fact (that is, artificial), but also as objective. Westphal points out that Hume explicitly writes about moral standards as a social fact, while showing that, at the same time, his theory of justice, which precedes all of the moral standards, is established independently of his theory of moral sentiments (potentially leading to moral relativism). In this manner, he provides the objectivity of those standards. On the other hand, Kant?s theory is interpreted as advanced, yet similar to Hume?s in its structure. The crucial similarity is that both Hume and Kant interpret the moral standards as a social fact (that is, as an artificial) and, at the same time, as the objective ones. Kant, unlike Hume, provides this objectivity by using a specific moral criterion - a categorical imperative. Those assumptions will be used as the main premises of a distinctively inspiring interpretation of Hume?s and Kant?s theories of justice.


Author(s):  
Stanley Souza Marques ◽  
Marcelo Andrade Cattoni De Oliveira

The article takes up the criticisms directed by Axel Honneth to the basic structure of the dominant conceptions of justice, but merely to point out the general outlines of his alternative project of justice normative reconstruction. If John Rawls and Michael Walzer structure theories of distributive justice very consistently and in order to get to the autonomy protection (already taken so) in a more sophisticated way, that to be satisfied it transcends the (mere) obligation of not interfering in the realization of individual life projects, Honneth proposes the radicalization of justice's demands. It is because he pays his attention to the mutual expectation of consideration. This point would be the new texture of the social justice. In this sense, the principles of fair distribution leave the scene to make way for principles which guidelines are directed towards the society basic institutions involved in a new goal: to set up favourable contexts for the success of plural reciprocal relationships.


1985 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert J. van der Veen ◽  
Philippe Van Parijs

In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick contrasts entitlement theories of justice and “traditional” theories such as Rawls', utilitarianism or egalitarianism, and advocates the former against the latter. What exactly is an entitlement theory (or conception or principle) of justice? Nozick's book offers two distinct characterizations. On the one hand, he explicitly describes “the general outlines of the entitlement theory” as maintaining “that the holdings of a person are just if he is entitled to them by the principles of justice in acquisition and transfer, or by the principle of rectification of injustice (as specified by the first two principles of just acquisition and transfer)” (Nozick, 1974, p. 153). On the other hand, his famous “Wilt Chamberlain” argument against alternative theories is first said to apply to (all) “non-entitlement conceptions” (p. 160), and later to any “end-state principle or distributional patterned principle of justice” (p. 163) — which amounts to an implicit characterization of an entitlement conception (theory, principle) as a conception of justice which is neither end-state nor patterned.


2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (137) ◽  
pp. 365
Author(s):  
Erick Lima

No esforço a seguir, gostaria de apresentar as direções mais gerais pelas quais se dá a discussão na filosofia contemporânea da noção hegeliana de reconhecimento. Depois de recordar a origem desse conceito, recupero um contexto epistemológico de discussão no qual a noção de intersubjetividade agregada à noção de reconhecimento se faz presente (1). Em seguida, procuro coordenar, a partir da recente discussão travada por Robert Pippin e Axel Honneth, a relação entre o programa de “reconstrução normativa” e a tese de que estaria em jogo, na filosofia hegeliana, uma “socialidade da razão” (2). Finalmente, a partir dessa rápida retomada, aprofundo a questão de pertinência da noção de reconhecimento no âmbito da filosofia prática, da filosofia social e da teoria crítica (3).Abstract: The paper aims at presenting the main features of the contemporary debate on Hegel’s concept of recognition. To begin with, we attempt to recover the epistemological context in which the comprehension of intersubjectivity, linked to the notion of recognition, seems to have great influence (1). Secondly, based on the discussion between Robert Pippin and Axel Honneth about neo-Hegelianism in practical philosophy, we investigate the relation between “normative reconstruction” and “sociality of reason” (2). Finally, the paper focuses on the importance of recognition in philosophical branches such as practical philosophy and critical theory.


2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 106-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Čarna Brković

This article's concern is epistemological in that it seeks understanding of the nature of ethnographic knowledge production. Its background assumption is that decolonization of anthropology requires decolonization of anthropological epistemology. The article argues that anthropology is not so much a study of the ‘Other’, but an effort to acquire knowledge by translating across some sort of socio-historically established difference. Anthropologists do not acquire knowledge necessarily by translating between modern, Western European, and non-modern, ‘Other’ conceptual arrangements. Instead, the anthropological production of knowledge requires an effort to figure out the relevant differences and similarities between an anthropologist, their interlocutors, and their audiences, as well as a translation across these differences and similarities. In order to demonstrate this point, the article focuses on 19th- and 20th-century ethnographic discussions of rural joint families called zadruga in the Balkans. Through a critical reading of two works on zadruga, it demonstrates that anthropologists in the Balkans were epistemologically eclectic, in that they could make use of strategies of both ‘anthropology abroad’ and ‘auto-anthropology’, or combine and reverse them. While this instance of epistemological eclecticism is the result of widespread uncertainties concerning the status of the ‘modern’ and the ‘non-modern’ as organizational categories in the Balkans, it has direct implications for the production of anthropological knowledge generally.


Principia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcin Trzęsiok

Music occupies a special place in George Steiner’s thinking: “Three areas: the essence and name of God, higher mathematics and music (what is the connection between them?) are located at the limits of language” (Steiner, Errata). The seemingly rhetorical question in parentheses turns out to be a source of deep controversy, the essence of which is revealed in historical-genealogical reflection. Steiner attempts to incorporate Romantic metaphysics within the traditional scholastic symbiosis of Biblical creationism and Pythagoreanism, which reveals his philosophy of music to be entangled in a range of contradictions. On the one hand, a critical reading of Steiner's works uncovers the difficulties posed by the attempt to reconcile pre- and post-Enlightenment culture; on the other hand, the still unused opportunities offered by Romanticism and its modernist continuations are clearly visible. Musical aesthetics, rooted in the idea of infinity, plays a crucial role in these divagations.


Author(s):  
Axel Gosseries

The first debate in this article has to do with the very possibility of intergenerational justice beyond our obligations towards members of other generations while they coexist with us. Here, we ask ourselves whether we owe anything to people who either have died already, or are not yet born. Differences in temporal location mean that people may not exist at the same time — be it only during part of their life — which raises special ethical challenges. It is one thing to decide whether we owe anything to the next generation(s). It is another to define what we owe them. Most standard theories of justice have tried to answer this difficult question. This article focuses on a comparison between a reciprocity-based and an egalitarian account of justice between generations. It then turns, on the one hand, to a brief discussion of alternative theories and, on the other hand, to implementation issues.


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