scholarly journals Integrasi Sains dan Agama dalam Perspektif Epistemologi Keilmuan Islam Kontemporer

2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Moh. Turmudi

Artikel ini membahas tentang bagaimana pandangan epistemologi keilmuan Islam kontemporer memandang integrasi sains dan agama, dimana wacana ini saat ini menjadi topik yang banyak diperbincangkan para peneliti dan para ahli, bahkan perguruan tinggi keagamaan Islam di Indonesia juga berusaha membuat model integrasi sains dan agama sebagai visi dan misi, dan jargonnya. Dalam kerangka pengembangan epistemologi Keilmuan di dunia Muslim, review ulang epistemologi sains di Barat juga penting untuk terus dicermati sebagaimana yang telah dikemukakan oleh Thomas Kuhn (teori normal science dan revolutionary science) yang mengkritisi logical positivism. Demikian pula telaah sintesis terhadap rasionalisme dan empirisisme dari mazhab Kantian; model deconstruction Derrida; telaah tentang episteme dari Foucoult; wacana tentang adanya hegemoni kekuasaan (model Gramsci) terhadap perjalanan ilmu; maupun aspek kritisisme dari Habermas. Kesemuanya itu dapat memperkaya wacana dialektis antara agama dan sains di masa depan. Suatu hal yang tidak kalah pentingnya dalam mengembangkan epistemologi keilmuan dalam dunia muslim, analisis Ian G. Barbour tentang upaya pengembangan dialog maupun integrasi antara agama dan sains dapat kita lakukan. Hal ini digunakan sebagai studi perbandingan terhadap teori Islamization of knowledge ala Faruqian dan Naquibian, maupun teori scientification of Islam model Fazlur Rahman (Rahmanian). Demikian pula dimensi spirituality of science sebagaimana yang ditawarkan Seyyed Hossein Nasr.

Author(s):  
Leonardo Díaz

RESUMENA finales de los años 80s, Thomas Kuhn y Charles Taylor fueron invitados a un debate en La Salle University. Taylor defendió que las ciencias naturales no son ciencias hermenéuticas, pues se fundamentan en datos puros, carentes de significado. Kuhn rechazó la tesis de la existencia de datos puros, sosteniendo que las ciencias naturales operan con significados y poseen una base hermenéutica. En la postura de Kuhn pueden apreciarse ambivalencias como resultado de sus viejos compromisos teóricos con el proyecto explicativo formulado en La estructura de las revoluciones científicas y como mostraré, vinculado a la existencia de una tensión entre dos perspectivas filosóficas sobre la ciencia.PALABRAS CLAVEHERMENÉUTICA, CIENCIA NORMAL, CIENCIA REVOLUCIONARIA, TENSIÓN, CIENCIAS HUMANASABSTRACTBy the end of the 1980s, Thomas Kuhn and Charles Taylor participated in a debate at La Salle University. Taylor defended that natural sciences are not hermeneutical sciences, since they are based on the pure, meaningless data. Kuhn rejected the thesis of the existence of pure data, arguing that natural sciences work with meanings and have a hermeneutic foundation. Kuhn’s position presents ambivalences as a result of his former theoretical commitments with the explicative project formulated in The Structure of the Scientific Revolutions and as I will show, linked to the existence of a tension between two philosophical perspectives on science.KEYWORDSHERMENEUTICS, NORMAL SCIENCE, REVOLUTIONARY SCIENCE, TENSION, HUMAN SCIENCES


2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-19
Author(s):  
Ilya T. Kasavin ◽  
Vladimir N. Porus ◽  

The article examines the problem of interpreting normal and revolutionary science in the concept of Thomas Kuhn. It is shown that the “normal science” is the central concept of the Kuhn’s history of science, designed in accordance with the normative definition of science adopted by him. Such a story serves an internal purpose – to justify the special epistemical status of expert knowledge. But there is also an external goal – to establish professional science as an institution with special epistemological status and social function, which is situated in a center of intellectual power and property. Historians are those who are forced to constantly rewrite history – either following the methodology of “rational reconstruction” or responding to the challenges of their time. To be a “conservative” or a “revolutionary” in the history of science is a choice made not only for philosophical reasons, but also under the influence of the general socio-cultural situation of the epoch.


Dialogue ◽  
1971 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
William R. Shea

The mainstream of the philosophy of science in the second quarter of this century—the so-called “logical empiricist” or “logical positivist” movement—assumed that theoretical language in science is parasitic upon observation language and can be eliminated from scientific discourse by disinterpretation and formalization, or by explicit definition in or reduction to observational language. But several fashionable views now place the onus on believers in an observation language to show how such a language is meaningful in the absence of a theory.In the present paper, I propose to show why logical positivism failed to do justice to the basic empirical and logical problems of philosophy of science. I also wish to consider why the drastic reaction, typified by Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, fails t o provide a suitable alternative, and to suggest that the radical approaches of recent writers such as Mary Hesse and Dudley Shapere hold out a genuine promise of dealing effectively with the central tasks that face the philosopher of science today.


2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 142-161
Author(s):  
Alexander M. Dorozhkin ◽  
Anna V. Sakharova ◽  

The article is devoted to the analysis of some specific characteristics of the language of normal science described by Thomas Kuhn. We would like to draw attention to two problems associated with some features of the concept of paradigms. The first problem relates to the question, how scientists belonging to one paradigm record the position of a group of scientists adhering to another paradigm. Precisely, the article examines how the problem of “synchronous fragmentation of knowledge” is solved in the language of science. The second issue concerns the age of “normal” knowledge and the question, how the anomalous content of knowledge can appear and accumulate, and what is the status of scientists developing the “anomalous” knowledge. We reveal some possible parameters by which we can determine the early stage of the functioning of normal science, the periods of its heyday and decline. In this article, we try to find an approach to these problems by examining the natural language of scientists, using techniques of content analysis, as well as complex linguistic analysis, including discursive, semantic and pragmatic components. Linguistic analysis can’t finally solve the problems of philosophical analysis of scientific knowledge, in particular, the state of the paradigm concept by Thomas Kuhn. But it helps us to identify the boundaries of paradigms, as well as the state of normal knowledge. The problem of fragmentation of knowledge by paradigms, as well as the problem of “aging” of knowledge inside a “normal science” are not directly expressed by scientists. But they can be recorded by analysis of everyday language, which often becomes entangled with the language of science. The high rate of words that semantically indicate the “obvious” knowledge in scientific texts points to a “good” state of the paradigm. And vice versa, the words denoting “improbable” indirectly indicate its crisis state or express an attitude to the knowledge belonging to a different paradigm. The analysis of the data shows that the alleged complete replacement of Kuhn's concept of a paradigm by the concept of “trading zones” by Peter Galison does not appear to be accomplished. Just as the concept of scientific paradigm did not completely replace the falsificationalism, the Galison’s “trading zones” do not fully reflect the real state of affairs in science. Therefore, the Kuhnian paradigms are recorded at the lexical level in the communication of scientists.


Horizons ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-236
Author(s):  
Joseph Martos

AbstractThe traditional understanding of the sacramentality of marriage, introduced by Augustine, systematized by the medieval scholastics, and still central to Catholic institutional thought, has in recent years been criticized as being internally incoherent and externally counterfactual. These difficulties may be perceived within the frame of reference provided by Thomas Kuhn to be anomalies such as those that can be expected to appear during a transition from normal science to a new paradigm for explaining the data once satisfactorily accounted for by that science. A new paradigm or conceptual frame of reference is proposed for the sacramentality of marriage, and evidence is presented that this new paradigm is in fact emerging in the theological literature on marriage. The reader is cautioned, however, that the emerging paradigm of marriage's sacrmentality is not what it is usually thought to be.


Aqlania ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 74
Author(s):  
Mamnunah Mamnunah ◽  
Sufyan Sauri

Thomas Khun's famous thought is about the paradigm, in which Khun states that all knowledge possessed by a person must be based on a paradigm that is believed. If there is a new thing that cannot be solved by this paradigm, then it happens that Thomas Khun is called the scientific revolution. Thomas Khun's thoughts on the Ilmiyah Revolution have concepts and characteristics of thinking and new philosophical models that lead to new knowledge. It is in this phase that Thomas Kuhn calls it the historical phase of the birth of new knowledge, which starts with normal science, then anomalies and crises occur, after which a scientific revolution emerges as a form of birth of new knowledge. If examined more deeply, then Thomas Kuhn's thought has relevance to Islamic science, especially in the application of sources of Islamic laws, namely the application of ijma ', which is the paradigm that is possessed by Muslims in carrying out amaliyah and ubudiyah certainly based on the Qur'an and hadith , this is what Kuhn called normal science. However, when there are problems in daily life in matters of ubudiyah and amaliyah for Muslims who do not have texts or texts in the Koran and hadiths then from here anomaly and crisis will occur which will result in much debate among the scholars before obtaining a solution from the problems faced by Muslims, and then they do ijma 'which after the ijma results' have been obtained then there is the so-called scientific revolution, which reflects the shift of the paradigm of the Muslims from the old to the new paradigm, in the sense of where the Muslims in run amaliyah ubudiyah if there is no text or text in the alqu'an they will look for it in ijma 'ulama that has been done.


JIPSINDO ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-45
Author(s):  
Sudrajat Sudrajat ◽  
Hamka Mujahid Ma'ruf ◽  
Ajat Sudrajat ◽  
Septi Nur Damayanti
Keyword(s):  

Pada fase normal science, paradigma yang mapan sudah tidak dilihat secara kritis. Paradigma tersebut sudah dianggap benar begitu saja, taken for granted. Sampai akhirnya, paradigma yang mapan ini digugat karena ada anomali dimana muncul masalah atau pertanyaan-pertanyaan yang tidak sanggup lagi dijawab oleh paradigma lama. Kemudian masuklah pada fase krisis. Pada fase krisis, paradigma lama bertarung dengan paradigma baru. Jika paradigma baru menang dan masyarakat ilmiah menyepakati kebenaran paradigma baru tersebut maka lahirlah apa yang disebut sebagai revolusi saintifik dimana paradigma lama tergeser oleh paradigma baru. Thomas Kuhn tidak melihat klaim objektivitas pengetahuan dari sisi perkembangan pengetahuan itu sendiri. Kuhn melihat objektivitas pengetahuan dan keilmuan itu sendiri di dalam perkembangan pengetahuan di dalam pertemuan antarmanusia di dalam masyarakat. Sumber pertumbuhan dan pemekaran bukan saja dari masalah-masalah internal pengetahuan, tetapi dari faktor-faktor sosial yang majemuk dan dinamis. Akibatnya, tidak ada klaim objektivitas yang bersifat tunggal (kumulatif) di dalam pengetahuan atau keilmuan. Oleh karena itu, semestinya tidak ada ilmu normal yang bertahan terus apalagi menjadi abadi karena pengetahuan atau ilmu selalu berada pada tuntutan dinamika sosial kemanusiaan yang dinamis dan majemuk. Fase normal science cepat atau lambat, akan mengalami anomali, krisis, dan akhirnya terjadilah revolusi dimana paradigma lama digantikan oleh paradigma baru.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 107
Author(s):  
Azwar Asrudin

This writing is the writer’s objections against Peter Van Ness’ claim on realist paradigm. In reference to Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm shift, Van Ness argued that realism, as what Kuhn would call “normal science” in international relations theory, is in a crisis because of its inability to explain some anomalies. According to Van Ness, rampant number of states doing security cooperation is enough to call realism is in a crisis as a paradigm. Through several cases on international anarchy, the writer argues that realism is still relevant and worthy to be called a paradigm in Kuhnian category.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 120
Author(s):  
Septi Nur Damayanti
Keyword(s):  

Pada fase normal science, paradigma yang mapan sudah tidak dilihat secara kritis. Paradigma tersebut sudah dianggap benar begitu saja, taken for granted. Sampai akhirnya, paradigma yang mapan ini digugat karena ada anomali dimana muncul masalah atau pertanyaan-pertanyaan yang tidak sanggup lagi dijawab oleh paradigma lama. Kamudian masuklah pada fase krisis. Pada fase krisis, paradigma lama bertarung dengan paradigma baru. Jika paradigma baru menang dan masyarakat ilmiah menyepakati kebenaran paradigma baru tersebut maka lahirlah apa yang disebut sebagai revolusi saintifik dimana paradigma lama tergeser oleh paradigma baru. Thomas Kuhn tidak melihat klaim objektivitas pengetahuan dari sisi perkembangan pengetahuan itu sendiri. Kuhn melihat objektivitas pengetahuan dan keilmuan itu sendiri di dalam perkembangan pengetahuan di dalam pertemuan antarmanusia di dalam masyarakat. Sumber pertumbuhan dan pemekaran bukan saja dari masalah-masalah internal pengetahuan, tetapi dari faktor-faktor sosial yang majemuk dan dinamis. Akibatnya, tidak ada klaim objektivitas yang bersifat tunggal (kumulatif) di dalam pengetahuan atau keilmuan. Oleh karena itu, semestinya tidak ada ilmu normal yang bertahan terus apalagi menjadi abadi karena pengetahuan atau ilmu selalu berada pada tuntutan dinamika sosial kemanusiaan yang dinamis dan majemuk. Fase normal science cepat atau lambat, akan mengalami anomali, krisis, dan akhirnya terjadilah revolusi dimana paradigma lama digantikan oleh paradigma baru.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 171
Author(s):  
Michael Sunday Sasa

The present paper is a representation of a systematic inquiry as well as an application of the main thrust in Thomas Kuhn’s discourse concerning the growth of human knowledge represented in philosophy of science. The paper begins by stating the points of tradition and normal science in Thomas Kuhn’s analysis of the growth of scientific knowledge. This is juxtaposed with the notions of discontinuity and revolution. A fundamental point in the paper is that Thomas Kuhn presents an analysis that bring to the fore a tradition of continuous discontinuity. This he expounded in the philosophy of paradigm shifts brought about by crisis and revolution, resulting in the overthrow of an existing hegemony and the birth of a new one. In all, Thomas Kuhn believes that science does not represent a paradigm of rationality because going through the history of science; we are not able to discover a particular paradigm or rationality that runs through the entirety of the history of science. If anything at all, science is made up of different paradigms of rationality, models of knowledge systems of method such that, the change from one scientific epoch to another cannot be a lineal rational or methodic one. Rather, it is a shift from one model to an opposing one; what he calls a gestalt switch which is a change in ‘form of life’, ‘language game’ or ‘conceptual scheme’. The paper however, presents the thesis that even if there is no outstanding form of rationality the history of science is seen to contain a certain continuous tradition. This has to do with the aim of any science. And so, be it the science of Ptolemy, Copernicus or Galileo, Einstein or Newton, there is the aim of human interest transcending all the epochs. To this extent, the paper argues a rationality of any scientific epoch or paradigm must derive from the quality of human interest it potent. Any science be it religion, mysticism or positivism that does not aim at human flourishing is not rational. The paper employs the method of text-analysis, conceptual clarification, constructive criticism and reconstructivism to bring forth its central argument.   


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document