scholarly journals From Perception to Subject: The Bergsonian Reversal

2014 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-123
Author(s):  
Messay Kebede
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
External World ◽  
Common Belief ◽  
Sensorimotor Theory ◽  
The World ◽  
Perceived Reality ◽  
The Common ◽  
Opening Paragraph ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Independent Existence

In lieu of an abstract, here is the opening paragraph to the essay:What singles out philosophical analyses of perception is the challenge to common sense, that is, to the spontaneous, instinctive belief that an external world exists and that it is similar to the perception we have of it. Even those theories that refrain from questioning the independent existence of the world concede that the resemblance of whatever is out there to the perceived reality is anything but assured. Henri Bergson proposes a theory of perception that not only restores the common belief in the existence of an external world, but also goes a long way in narrowing the alleged disparity between perception and the objective world. With few exceptions, Bergson’s theory of perception has been either ignored or misunderstood. Through a close reading of the first chapter of Matter and Memory, the paper argues, in addition to correcting misreadings, that the strength and originality of Bergson’s theory lie in the reversal of the method of explaining perception from the premise of a given subject, a premise shared by all idealist and realist theories as well as phenomenology. This de-subjectification proposes an approach deriving perception from the interactions of objects while countering the materialist theory of the brain as an organ of representation. The paper contends that the Bergsonian elucidation of the brain as an organ of simulation both anticipates the findings of the sensorimotor theory and overcomes its limitation by showing how simulation inserts indetermination into materiality, thereby actualizing consciousness.

Some thoughts on lexemes, the dome, and inner speech

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
William Benzon
Keyword(s):  
Language Development ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Cognitive Structure ◽  
External World ◽  
Inner Speech ◽  
Neural Systems ◽  
The Common

Sydney Lamb’s model focuses our attention on the physicality of language, of the signs themselves as objects in the external world and the neural systems the support them. By means of the metaphor of a cognitive dome, he demonstrates that there is no firm line between linguistic and cognitive structure. In this context, I offer physically grounded accounts of Jakobson’s metalingual and emotive functions. Drawing on Vygotsky’s account of language development, I point out that inner speech, corresponding to the common sense notion of thought, originates in a circuit that goes through the external world and is then internalized.

Causality Then and Now

1993 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-177
Author(s):  
Karen Harding
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Theory ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Mechanical Model ◽  
Physical World ◽  
Scientific Data ◽  
The World ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Universe ◽  
The Way

Ate appearances deceiving? Do objects behave the way they do becauseGod wills it? Ate objects impetmanent and do they only exist becausethey ate continuously created by God? According to a1 Ghazlli, theanswers to all of these questions ate yes. Objects that appear to bepermanent are not. Those relationships commonly tefemed to as causalare a result of God’s habits rather than because one event inevitably leadsto another. God creates everything in the universe continuously; if Heceased to create it, it would no longer exist.These ideas seem oddly naive and unscientific to people living in thetwentieth century. They seem at odds with the common conception of thephysical world. Common sense says that the universe is made of tealobjects that persist in time. Furthermore, the behavior of these objects isreasonable, logical, and predictable. The belief that the univetse is understandablevia logic and reason harkens back to Newton’s mechanical viewof the universe and has provided one of the basic underpinnings ofscience for centuries. Although most people believe that the world is accutatelydescribed by this sort of mechanical model, the appropriatenessof such a model has been called into question by recent scientificadvances, and in particular, by quantum theory. This theory implies thatthe physical world is actually very different from what a mechanicalmodel would predit.Quantum theory seeks to explain the nature of physical entities andthe way that they interact. It atose in the early part of the twentieth centuryin response to new scientific data that could not be incorporated successfullyinto the ptevailing mechanical view of the universe. Due largely ...

scholarly journals Extending the extended consciousness debate: perception, imagination, and the common kind assumption

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Deery
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Psychological Theory ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
Mental Event ◽  
The World ◽  
Predictive Approach ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Brain

AbstractFor some, the states and processes involved in the realisation of phenomenal consciousness are not confined to within the organismic boundaries of the experiencing subject. Instead, the sub-personal basis of perceptual experience can, and does, extend beyond the brain and body to implicate environmental elements through one’s interaction with the world. These claims are met by proponents of predictive processing, who propose that perception and imagination should be understood as a product of the same internal mechanisms. On this view, as visually imagining is not considered to be world-involving, it is assumed that world-involvement must not be essential for perception, and thus internalism about the sub-personal basis is true. However, the argument for internalism from the unity of perception and imagination relies for its strength on a questionable conception of the relationship between the two experiential states. I argue that proponents of the predictive approach are guilty of harbouring an implicit commitment to the common kind assumption which does not follow trivially from their framework. That is, the assumption that perception and imagination are of the same fundamental kind of mental event. I will argue that there are plausible alternative ways of conceiving of this relationship without drawing internalist metaphysical conclusions from their psychological theory. Thus, the internalist owes the debate clarification of this relationship and further argumentation to secure their position.

scholarly journals Some 'Philosophicall Scribbles' attributed to Robert Hooke

1980 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-32 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Trinity College ◽  
Robert Hooke ◽  
Separate Sheet ◽  
The World ◽  
The Common ◽  
Almost All

Among the Hooke manuscripts held in the Library of Trinity College, Cambridge, is an undated document of four pages, entitled (on a separate sheet): XVI Philosophicall Scribbles’. We shall offer here an edition of this hitherto unpublished document; its contents will be discussed and compared with Hooke’s published theories of the soul, mind action and memory in his ‘Lectures of light’ (I); and some consideration will be given to the general adequacy of Hooke’s epistemology, as revealed in the ‘Scribbles’ and the ‘Lectures of light’, and its place in history. A transcription of the ‘Philosophicall scribbles’ reads as follows: It has pleased y e al wise contriuer of y e Universe to send man into the world almost/ready tempered,/like a peice of soft wax to receiue those impressions and stamps, which he has though[t] it most conuenient to receiue, though altogether unfit for/some/other perhaps, which his infinite wisdom saw good to w th hold. Those stamps are only of five kinds. And are generally comprisd under one name, to wit The Objects of Sense, /and this ? is calld the common sense,/But this is only that passiue facully [ sic ] w ch this lump or mass of bodys come furnished w th all, w ch is much y e same w th what y e bodys of almost all animalls are as well if not in a better manner endowed.

Figurations of the Ecstatic

Janus Head ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 203-221
Author(s):  
David D. Dillard-Wright ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Aesthetic Experience ◽  
Daily Life ◽  
Consumer Society ◽  
The World ◽  
The Common

Descriptions of “aesthetic arrest,” those ecstatic moments that lift the common sense subject-object dichotomy, abound in Merleau-Ponty’s writings. These special experiences, found in both artistic and mystical accounts, arise from the daily life of ordinary perception. Such experiences enable the artist, philosopher, or mystic to overturn received categories and describe phenomena in a creative way; they become dangerous when treated as the sine qua non of aesthetic experience. Aesthetic arrest, though rare in consumer society, need not be overwhelmed by the flood of information and can still provide fresh glimpses into the world as lived.

The Genesis of Mind

1862 ◽  
Vol 8 (41) ◽  
pp. 61-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Maudsley
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Golden Age ◽  
The World ◽  
Gradual Development ◽  
The Common ◽  
Rudimentary Form

It might seem unaccountable that, notwithstanding the common sense of mankind has in all ages recognised the existence of intellect in animals, certain philosophers should always have been found to repudiate the vulgar opinion; were it not that experience proves there is much truth in the description which Condillac gives of the philosophers, as “men who love much better an absurdity that they imagine than a truth which all the world adopts.” Though Plato tells us that in the golden age men derived all their knowledge from communication with beasts, and though the little understood and much misunderstood Egyptians of old paid divine honours to certain animals—not, as is sometimes superficially concluded, on account of their brute wisdom, but really as living symbols of Divine intelligence, which they embodied and instinctively displayed—yet the Cartesian philosophy actually denied sensibility to animals, and designated them living machines. For such unmerited ignominy they have, however, been more than compensated by writers who, like M. Charles Bonnet, maintain the existence of immortal souls in them, and predict for them a future world and a happier destiny. The ancients would appear generally to have entertained a somewhat similar opinion; for, without referring to the doctrine of metempsychosis, we have the authority of Homer, who represents Orion as chasing the souls of stags over the plains of hell. And modem instinct, when not perverted by the prejudices and conceit of learning, never fails to acknowledge the rationality of brutes. According to a Scandinavian aphorism, the bear has the strength of ten men and the sense of twelve; and the Red Indians are so impressed with the intellectual powers of this animal that, whenever they have killed one, they scrupulously strive to appease its manes with various important ceremonies. They deck out its head with various trinkets, and make a long speech in which the courage of the departed is praised, its living relatives profusely complimented, and a hope expressed that the conduct of its slayer has been satisfactory both to itself and them. The intelligence of civilisation may dismiss with a smile of pity or contempt such barbarous displays; but the most advanced intelligence will not forget that there is some substratum of truth beneath every superstition, by virtue of which it lives. As no nation ever yet worshipped a piece of carved wood or chiselled stone otherwise than as a symbol of the Great Incomprehensible, by which both barbarous and civilised men are surrounded; so we may rest satisfied that the Red Indian only labours to propitiate the ghost of the bear because he has at times found, to his cost, that its intelligence has surpassed his own. The extremes of attributing too much and too little intelligence to animals will, however, be alike avoided by that sincere and unbiassed observation which, while discrediting all exaggerated theories, willingly recognises the undoubted existence in them of intelligence in its rudimentary form, and strives to point out the evidences of its gradual development through them.

scholarly journals Vínculos entre la Escuela Austriaca de Economía y el método de la inversión en valor

2021 ◽  
pp. 255-304
Author(s):  
Diego E. Quijano Durán
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Austrian School ◽  
Economic Calculation ◽  
Austrian School Of Economics ◽  
Value Investing ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
The World ◽  
The Common

The Austrian school of economics and the investment method known as value investing have a similar conception of the world, so that it is possible to find multiple links between them and form a coherent structure. To the economist, this allows for a much deeper understanding of the entrepreneurial function and the manner in which economic calculation is actually performed. To the investor, it offers a theoretical framework that explains economic phenomena, permitting him to better understand the role of the entrepreneur and to protect his investment when dangerous patterns can be observed. In this essay, we begin from the common stance of both schools of thought towards common sense, the use of realistic assumptions, the importance of prudence and the low value of complex mathematics in the fields of economics and finance. We then proceed to develop in greater depth nine aspects that have strong philosophical and scientific links. Key words: Value investing, Austrian school of economics, entrepreneurship, dynamic efficiency, economic calculation. JEL Classification: A12, G17, M20. Resumen: La Escuela Austriaca de Economía y el método de inversión en valor tienen una concepción similar del mundo que permite entrelazarlas coherentemente. Al economista, le permite profundizar el conocimiento del ejercicio de la función empresarial y la realización del cálculo económico en la práctica. Al inversor, le ofrece un marco teórico para comprender mejor el papel del empresario y los fenómenos económicos y detectar temprano patrones peligrosos y así protegerse. En este trabajo partimos de la base de que ambas escuelas de pensamiento tienen sus raíces en el sentido común y los supuestos realistas, que son prudentes a la hora de ver el futuro y que dudan de la utilidad de las matemáticas complejas en los campos económicos y financieros. Sobre ello, desarrollamos nueve aspectos en los cuales hay fuertes conexiones como, por ejemplo, la manera en que el ejercicio de la empresarialidad mejora la eficiencia del mercado y coordina los planes de las personas. Palabras clave: Inversión en valor, escuela austriaca de economía, empre-sarialidad, eficiencia dinámica, cálculo económico. Clasificación JEL: A12, G17, M20.

Transcendental Philosophy and Its Specific Demands

1998 ◽  
pp. 100-107
Author(s):  
Manfred Gawlina
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Common Sense View ◽  
The World ◽  
The Common ◽  
Ultimate Ground

One needs specific initiation into the classics of transcendental philosophy (Kant’s "Criticism," Descartes’s "Metaphysics," and Fichte’s "Doctrine of Science") because all say farewell to the common sense view of things. The three types of transcendental thinking converge in conceiving rational autonomy as the ultimate ground for justification. Correspondingly, the philosophical pedagogy of all three thinkers is focused on how to seize and make that very autonomy (or active self-determination) intellectually and existentially available. In the concrete way of proceeding, however, the three models diverge. Descartes expects one to become master of oneself and "the world" by methodologically suspending his judgement on what cannot qualify itself to be undoubtable. Kant leads us to the point where we can triangulate universal conditions of the possibility of knowledge through individually acquiring the competence to judge the legitimacy of encountered propositional claims. Finally, Fichte confronts us with the idea of the identity of self-consciousness and objectivity.

INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW SERIES: UNCOMMON “COMMON SENSE”

2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-49
Author(s):  
Akinobu Kuroda
Keyword(s):  
East Asia ◽  
Opposite Direction ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Short Supply ◽  
Modern Times ◽  
The Past ◽  
The People ◽  
The World ◽  
The Common

The common sense of modern times was not always “common” in the past. For example, if it is true that inflation is caused by an oversupply of money, a short supply of money must cause deflation. However logical that sounds, though, it has not been so uncommon in history that rising prices were recognized as being caused by a scarcity of currency. Even in the same period, a common idea prevailing in one historical area was not always common in another; rather, it sometimes appeared in quite the opposite direction. It is likely that the idea that a government gains from bad currencies, while traders appreciate good ones, is popular throughout the world. In the case of China, however, its dynasties sometimes intentionally issued high-quality coins without regard to their losses. East Asia shared the idea that cheap currency harms the state, while an expensive currency harms the people. This is in considerable contrast with a common image in other regions that authorities gained profits from seigniorage.

Enacting Actions in Simulated Environments

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Devin Pierce ◽  
Shulan Lu ◽  
Derek Harter
Keyword(s):  
Human Body ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Real World ◽  
Mental Representations ◽  
The Past ◽  
Simulated Environments ◽  
The World ◽  
The Common ◽  
Bodily States ◽  
Real World Problems

The past decade has witnessed incredible advances in building highly realistic and richly detailed simulated worlds. We readily endorse the common-sense assumption that people will be better equipped for solving real-world problems if they are trained in near-life, even if virtual, scenarios. The past decade has also witnessed a significant increase in our knowledge of how the human body as both sensor and as effector relates to cognition. Evidence shows that our mental representations of the world are constrained by the bodily states present in our moment-to-moment interactions with the world. The current study investigated whether there are differences in how people enact actions in the simulated as opposed to the real world. The current study developed simple parallel task environments and asked participants to perform actions embedded in a stream of continuous events (e.g., cutting a cucumber). The results showed that participants performed actions at a faster speed and came closer to incurring injury to the fingers in the avatar enacting action environment than in the human enacting action environment.

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