On Selected Issues Concerning Foundation Law in Poland

2019 ◽  
Vol 78 ◽  
pp. 280-295
Author(s):  
Edyta Litwiniuk

This paper is an attempt to assess selected aspects of the state of foundation law in Poland in relation to the legal position that the Constitution of the Republic of Poland has granted them. The text analyses selected statutory solutions in the light of separable patterns for reviewing their compliance with constitutional principles and values. In the author’s opinion, the provisions of the Polish Foundations Act and the regulations concerning the financing of foundations violate the constitutional standards of the Republic of Poland. In particular, it has been found that foundation law contains many loopholes, the filling of which requires the use of complicated interpretation techniques, which makes it impossible to ensure that the institution of the foundation is being and will be used properly as an element of civil society in a modern democratic state. Moreover, the opinion was presented that the functioning of foundations is excessively influenced by executive bodies, run by active politicians. This concerns, first of all, the unclear principles of supervision over foundations’ activities, and excessive powers to issue the executive regulations included in the Foundations Act, as well as the principles of the allocation of funds towards grants by the National Freedom Institute, based on a disproportionate freedom of decision making. For these reasons, the author postulates the adjustment of the Polish statutory regulation, dating back to the period of the Polish People’s Republic, to the constitutional standards introduced by the Constitution of 1997 and enshrined in the case law of the Constitutional Tribunal.

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 46-57
Author(s):  
Bartosz Zalewski

The aim of this article is to outline the arguments in favour of acknowledging an unborn child as a subject of constitutional law with the right to life (Article 38 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland). For this purpose, the article presents an overview of the case law of the Constitutional Tribunal as well as views of legal academics and commentators and judicial decisions concerning the right to life, the concept of subject of law, and the legal position of an unborn child. Furthermore, the article reviews the international law and the case law of international tribunals. Although the Constitutional Tribunal stipulates that every person, including an unborn child, is entitled to legal subjectivity (in the judgement on case No. K 26/96), it may seem that the reasoning in this judgement is still rejected in the literature regarding both constitutional and civil law.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 41-67
Author(s):  
Valentina Chekharina

The COVID-19 pandemic became widespread across the world throughout 2020 and 2021 in an emergency that gravely impacted the health and lives of people around the world. States have taken exceptional measures to combat the pandemic, including controversial decisions to introduce emergency regimes, which have been questioned in regards to their compliance with constitutional regulations. The fight against the COVID-19 pandemic requires special measures, however they must remain within the constitutional framework. Consequently, the pandemic and its effect upon the legality of regimes in a state of emergency has captured the attention of legal scholars. The aim of this study is to analyse the constitutional regulation of the state of emergency in the Republic of Poland which was introduced in the country during the COVID-19 pandemic. In Poland, an emergency regime was introduced following an order by the Minister of Health. However the state of emergency (here, natural disaster) as stated by the Constitution was not introduced, although, according to analysts, some state bodies and officials had confirmed that all the necessary conditions for this were met. On 2 March 2020, the so-called Special Law on Coronavirus was adopted, followed by other regulations to fight the pandemic. These analysts stated that the measures introduced by the new acts corresponded to a legal regime containing the constitutional characteristics of a state of emergency, but lacked the appropriate constitutional procedure for their introduction. Presidential elections were held at this time, however legally they cannot be held during a state of emergency, as it indicates the presence of political interests in the choice of the regime. The unconstitutional procedure of the introduction of emergency measures alongside their characteristics of the state of emergency make it possible to consider the epidemic regime introduced in Poland a “hybrid” state of emergency, which is not detailed by the Constitution or legislation. On this basis, the study concludes that reasons behind the unconstitutional response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Poland can be found in both the Constitution, and in the manifestations of the crisis of the constitutional and legal system, which began with the reform of Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal by the ruling Law and Justice party in 2015.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
NAVI GITA MAULIDA

The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) based on the historical trajectory of the struggle, has the only state construction in the world where the nation is born first, then forms the state. The first President of the Republic of Indonesia Ir. Soekarno emphasized that the Unitary State is a National State. The purpose of the Indonesian nation to be born, independent, and to form a state has one goal, the will to elevate the dignity and life of the Indonesian people (Indonesian People's Sovereignty). Through an analysis of the reality of today's life, the Indonesian nation has lived in a condition of life order as if it were the same as a democratic state, namely that the first state was formed and the nation was born later. So that the sovereignty of the Indonesian people based on the principles of deliberation and representation has not been able to be realized.


2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 527-543
Author(s):  
Jadranko Jug

This paper deals with the problems related to the legal position of honest and dishonest possessors in relation to the owner of things, that is, it analyses the rights belonging to the possessors of things and the demands that possessors may require from the owners of things to whom the possessors must submit those things. Also, in contrast, the rights and requirements are analysed of the owners of things in relation to honest and dishonest possessors. In practice, a dilemma arises in defi ning the essential and benefi cial expenditure incurred by honest possessors, what the presumptions are for and until when the right of retention may be exercised for the sake of remuneration of that expenditure, when the statute of limitations expires on that claim, and the signifi cance of the provisions of the Civil Obligations Act in relation to unjust enrichment, management without mandate and the right of retention, and which provisions regulate these or similar issues. The answers to some of these dilemmas have been provided in case law, and therefore the basic method used in the paper was analysis and research of case law, especially decisions by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia. The introduction to the paper provides the basic characteristics of the concept of possession and possession of things, and the type and quality of possession, to provide a basis for the subsequent analysis of the legal position of the possessor of a thing in relation to the owner of that thing.


2020 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-119
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Daniluk

Abstract In the science of administrative and constitutional law, administration science and many other sciences, including political science, it is widely accepted that the basic, inherent feature of a municipality, deciding the essence of the territorial self-government unit as an entity of public administration, is the self-reliance it is entitled to. The self-reliance of territorial self-government units is even defined as a constitutional norm. In principle, self-reliance is perceived as a fundamental attribute of a decentralised public authority and constitutes one of the fundamental systemic principles of the Republic of Poland. It was formulated expressis verbis in art. 165 par. 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, which states that the self-reliance of territorial self-government units is subject to judicial protection, meaning that TSGUs can defend themselves against illegal attempts, not grounded in the law to interfere in their self-reliance. This protection seems to encompass both the private-law and public-law spheres of territorial self-government activity. The essence and guarantees of territorial self-government units’ self-reliance also arise from other constitutional principles, including the aforementioned decentralisation principle, subsidiarity principle, separation of powers, supremacy of the nation and democratic state under rule of law. The goal of this article is to interpret the principle of municipal self-reliance in the context of constitutional principles of law, in the light of the Polish Constitution. The studies were conducted based on analysis of normative acts, doctrinal views and case law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 239-255
Author(s):  
Wojciech Bożek

The author’s goal is to determine the consequences of implementing treaty solutions concerning public debt to the Polish Constitution and to define the differences between the methodology of counting public debt in the European Community and Polish legal order. The raised issues concern important problems from the substantive and practical point of view, therefore the study’s content is important for science and practice. The research methodology was based on the analysis of the EU and Poland’s normative solutions, opinions expressed in the international and national literature on the subject, and the case law of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. The paper applies mostly the dogmatic-analytic and legal-comparative method with reference to available statistical data on Poland’s public debt. The study allowed the author to gain an understanding of the significance of fiscal rules implemented at the EU level to ensure stability. Article 216(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland indicates that the treaty solutions regarding the reference value (public debt-to-GDP ratio) were reenacted. However, until this day, the EU and Poland’s debt measurement methods do not fully correspond. In order to counteract excessive debt incursion, a state is required to take not only efficient actions but also ones that are adequate and, to some extent, flexible. This is an expression of acceptance of the EU’s preventive assumptions. However, there is still no full correlation in the methodology of calculating public debt in the EU and the Republic of Poland.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 1104-1115
Author(s):  
Stanisław Biernat

AbstractA concern was voiced in commentaries after the PSPP judgment that the BVerfG’s position regarding the refusal to apply in Germany the CJEU judgment as issued on an ultra vires basis might be used in EU Member States infringing the rule of law, and the independence of the judiciary in particular. This issue is presented in relation to Poland. The article sets out the constitutional provisions which proclaim openness to European integration, as well as the union-friendly case-law of the Constitutional Tribunal (CT) until 2016. The CT jurisprudence at that time provided, however, for the possibility of refusing to apply EU law in exceptional situations, even though this never happened. Next, the article discusses endeavors of the new Polish authorities since the end of 2015 which drastically breach the rule of law in the field of the judiciary, as well as the measures taken by EU institutions to counteract these adverse phenomena. The Polish authorities argue that the competence to define the legal position of the judiciary has not been conferred on the Union and remains within the exclusive competence of the Member States. Such a stance was also taken by the politically dependent CT in April 2020. The PSPP judgment was therefore welcomed with joy by Polish politicians. There are major differences, however, between the rulings of the BVerfG and those of the Polish CT in its current composition, and the hopes pinned on the PSPP judgment by the Polish authorities are unfounded.


1999 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 375-388
Author(s):  
Charles Lindholm

In his influential work, Max Weber argued that the Middle East was fatally hampered in the development of a modern civil society by the existence of arbitrary Qadi justice, based on the personalized decisions of a judiciary reliant only on case law for precedent and lacking any form of rational organization. This individualistic judicial structure (or lack of structure) allowed authoritarian regimes to subvert the courts for their own purposes, destroying the possibility of the development of an autonomous citizenry; meanwhile, in Europe the evolution of a rationally codified legal system acted as a check on governmental tyranny and provided a space for the evolution of independent civic organizations.


Author(s):  
Baurzhan ABZHANOV

The article examines the specifics of the activities of the state and military management bodies of the Republic of Kazakhstan to counter terrorism at the present stage. The necessity of using the Armed Forces in countering terrorism in the context of military security has been substantiated. The interaction of various state structures, power structures and civil society institutions is analyzed.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (55) ◽  
pp. 485
Author(s):  
Mauricio Godinho DELGADO ◽  
José Roberto Freire PIMENTA ◽  
Ivana NUNES

RESUMOO constitucionalismo ocidental caracteriza-se pela presença de três paradigmas mais destacados. O mais antigo, denominado de Estado Liberal de Direito, originário dos documentos constitucionais do século XVIII dos EUA e da França, foi antecedido pelo pioneirismo constitucional britânico, de origem costumeira, jurisprudencial e parlamentar, desde o século XVII. No Brasil, teve influência na Constituição de 1891. O paradigma do Estado Social de Direito, oriundo dos documentos constitucionais da segunda década do século XX, como a Constituição do México, de 1917, e a Constituição da Alemanha, de 1919. No Brasil, despontou na Constituição de 1934, desenvolvendo-se também na Constituição de 1946. Por fim, o paradigma do Estado Democrático de Direito, também chamado de Constitucionalismo Humanista e Social, foi arquitetado em países da Europa Ocidental a partir de 1945/46, logo depois do término da Segunda Grande Guerra. Esses três paradigmas são estudados neste texto, com o objetivo de melhor compreender as características inerentes ao paradigma do Estado Democrático de Direito. Tal paradigma, a propósito, chegou ao Brasil apenas por intermédio da Constituição da República de 1988. O presente estudo também analisa as adversidades e os desafios que tem sido antepostos ao novo paradigma constitucional nas últimas décadas no Ocidente. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Paradigmas Constitucionais; O Estado Democrático de Direito como Novo Paradigma Constitucional; Desafios ao Constitucionalismo Humanista e Social. ABSTRACT Western constitutionalism is characterized by the presence of three main paradigms. The oldest, known as the Liberal State, arising from the constitutional documents of the eighteenth century in the United States and France, was preceded by the pioneering British constitutionalism, of customary, case law, parliamentary origins, since the seventeenth century. In Brazil, it influenced the Constitution of 1891. The Social State paradigm originated in the constitutional documents of the second decade of the twentieth century, such as the Mexican Constitution of 1917 and the German Constitution of 1919. In Brazil, this paradigm emerged in the Constitution of 1934 as well as in the Constitution of 1946. Finally, the Democratic State paradigm, also called Humanist and Social Constitutionalism, was designed in Western Europe from 1945/46 onwards, shortly after the end of the Second World War. These three paradigms are studied in this text in order to better understand the inherent characteristics of the Democratic State paradigm. This paradigm, incidentally, only reached Brazil through the Constitution of the Republic of 1988. The present study also analyzes the adversities and challenges faced by the new constitutional paradigm over the past decades in the West. KEYWORDS: Constitutional Paradigms; The Democratic State as a New Constitutional Paradigm; Challenges to Humanist and Social Constitutionalism.


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