Positive vs. Negative Emotions and Network Size

This chapter looks at the relationship between the expression of positive and negative emotions in Twitter and users' network size. The questions that guided this study are: Do users who tweet twice or more “I am bored,” “I am excited,” “I feel lonely,” “I feel loved,” “I feel sad,” and “I feel happy” gain more followers and friends or lose them? Do users who express positive emotions twice or more have more followers and friends compared to users who express negative emotions or less? Do users who express boredom, excitement, loneliness, feeling loved, sadness, and happiness twice or more interact more with their networks or less? To address these questions, the study collected 35,096 English tweets in 2016. The findings indicate that users who tweeted these emotions, their number of followers and number of friends have increased, not decreased and that only users who expressed excitement had more followers and friends than users who expressed boredom. The study contributes to the literature on the benefits that lonely, sad, and bored users can reap from expressing emotions in Twitter.

Detecting DDoS Attacks on Multiple Network Hosts

The proliferation of low security internet of things devices has widened the range of weapons that malevolent users can utilize in order to attack legitimate services in new ways. In the recent years, apart from very large volumetric distributed denial of service attacks, low and slow attacks initiated from intelligent bot networks have been detected to target multiple hosts in a network in a timely fashion. However, even if the attacks seem to be “innocent” at the beginning, they generate huge traffic in the network without practically been detected by the traditional DDoS attack detection methods. In this chapter, an advanced pattern detection method is presented that is able to collect and classify in real time all the incoming traffic and detect a developing slow and low DDoS attack by monitoring the traffic in all the hosts of the network. The experimental analysis on a real dataset provides useful insights about the effectiveness of the method by identifying not only the main source of attack but also secondary sources that produce low traffic, targeting though multiple hosts.

Big Data Analysis for Terroristic Behavior Identification and Study Using Social Networks

This chapter aimed to consider of approaches to big data (social network content) utilization for understanding social behavior in the conflict zones, and analysis of dynamics of illegal armed groups. The analysis directed to identify of structure of illegal armed groups, and detection of underage militants. The probabilistic and stochastic methods of analysis and classification of number, composition, and dynamics of illegal armed groups in active conflict areas are proposed. Data of armed conflict in Donbas (Eastern Ukraine) in the period 2014-2015 is used for analysis. The numerical distribution of age, gender composition, origin, social status, and nationality of militants among illegal armed groups has been calculated. Conclusions on the applicability of described method in criminological practice, as well as about the possibilities of interpretation of obtaining results in the context of study of terrorism are proposed.

On Cyber Crimes and Cyber Security

The world has become more advanced in communication, especially after the invention of the internet. A key issue facing today's society is the increase in cybercrime or e-crimes (electronic crimes), another term for cybercrime. Thus, e-crimes pose threats to nations, organizations, and individuals across the globe. It has become widespread in many parts of the world, and millions of people are victims of e-crimes. Given the serious nature of e-crimes, its global nature, and implications, it is clear that there is a crucial need for a common understanding of such criminal activity internationally to deal with it effectively. This chapter covers the definitions, types, and intrusions of e-crimes. It has also focused on the laws against e-crimes in different countries. Cybersecurity and searching methods to get secured are also part of the study.

Russian Information Warfare and 9/11 Conspiracism

Following the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, several “prophecies” circulated on the internet claiming the 16th century French seer Nostradamus predicted the crisis, leading to “Nostradamus” being the top search on Google and other search engines in 2001. Considering Nostradamus prophecies as popular eschatology, a dimension of political conspiracism, it is observed that while the hoaxes have never been attributed to a specific actor(s), the provenance of the prophecies which circulated on 9/11 are connected to a legacy of Russian Cold War-era propaganda. Additionally, several other conspiracy theories which circulated following 9/11 can be connected to Russia and its military proxy Syria. Considering conspiracy theories as a “populist theory of power,” leveraged by Russia in order to diminish American global dominance, a case is made that Russia is likely responsible for the Nostradamus hoax of 9/11 and similar “active measures” in Poland in 2010, Ukraine in 2014, and Hungary in 2015.

The New Front Line (Enhanced)

In the hyperconnected world new questions rise about the evolution of global terrorism. This especially refers to the increasing role of the lone actors in terrorist assaults, a phenomenon particularly relevant within the frame of the Islamic State (2014-2017). The perpetrators update not only the global terrorism dynamics, especially ordinariness, but also the category of enemy, in the social media age, where the internet has cancelled any distinction between public and private space, giving rise to a blurring configuration that calls for the rethinking of the referential frame on which the global terrorism narratives are built.

The Evolution of Cyber Warfare in Information Operations Targeting Estonia, the U.S., and Ukraine

This comparative international case study provides a context for considering the evolution of cyber technologies as elements of hybrid warfare, including information operations (IO), capable of killing people, as well as impacting political elections and physical infrastructure (such as power grids and satellite-based communications and weapons systems). Threatened by “autonomous battle networks,” the “Internet of Battle Things” has been considered a domain of modern warfare by the United States since 2011 and by NATO since 2016. Focusing on three historic cyberattacks against three modern democracies—Estonia in 2007, the United States in 2012, and Ukraine during the 2013-2015 conflict—the study shows how computer warfare, first reported in the 1990s, has become integral in warfare for both state and non-state actors—particularly for information warfare waged by proxies to create confusion and manipulate public opinion via satellites that can penetrate national boundaries and firewalls with armies of zombies and botnets.

The Opportunities for a National Cyber Strategy and Social Media in the Rhizome Networks

Securing society is a central task of the state. In the present day as well as in the future, knowledge and information are ever more closely tied to electronic data transfer. Finland's published Cyber Security Strategy depicts how the government safeguards electronic data transfer, that is, information security against different threat and risk scenarios. Cyber Security Strategy was introduced 2013 and has provided guidance to all governmental actors how to implement security activities to be able to respond to increased security threats in networks. Visuality has increasing importance in strategic communications, not least because it is faster than the written word and globally distributed via social media. Relatedly, camera drones are becoming increasingly important tools in the security economy, especially when it comes to enhancing military capability through combat cameras. The main challenge facing society is that the cyber domain in general, and social media in particular, is moving out of the control of the nation-state.

The Double Edge of the Information Sword

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West became increasingly confident that globalization, supported by an information technology network, the internet, would increase openness, liberalism, and democracy – the core values of the “free world.” Western leaders knew then, just as they do now, a quarter of a century later, that the power of the internet would grow as the technology that controls its use develops. However, no development is wholly good, and the internet is no exception. It seems that the technology that has enabled us to create a “global village” where people are able to communicate in a way that is open and free, and that bypasses the encumbrances of class and ethnicity, has also brought with it a very dark underworld, an uncontrolled rhizome or meshwork, where propaganda, trolling, and hate speeches are rife. After the 2016 US elections, cyber warfare is no longer just about the technical details of computer ports and protocols. Propaganda as disinformation distributed via social media is rapidly becoming the best hacking tool.

Building Blocks and Measurement of National Cyberpower

Cyberspace and cyber threats are increasingly recognized to pose a significant risk to a state's security. Cyberpower is central to national power and thus a driver towards the attainment of national security. The authors decompose national cyberpower by analyzing the elements of cyberspace as part of national security. David Jablonsky distinguishes between natural and social determinants of power in his discussion of national power and refers to Ray Cline's formula to determine a rough estimate of “perceived” national power by focusing primarily on a state's capacity to wage war. The authors present an adaptation of the formula for perceived power for use in cyberspace to create a similar formula for perceived cyberpower that focuses primarily on a state's capacity for cyberwarfare. Military cyberpower is one of the critical elements of cyberpower but little attention has been paid to this concept in the literature. In this chapter, concepts such as cyber effectiveness and the operationalization of military cyberpower are also addressed.