scholarly journals Heterogeneity in Farmers’ Social Preferences and the Design of Green Payment Schemes

2021 ◽  
Vol 78 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-226
Author(s):  
Prasenjit Banerjee ◽  
Rupayan Pal ◽  
Ada Wossink ◽  
James Asher
Keyword(s):  
Choice Experiment ◽  
Lower Cost ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Social Reward ◽  
Monetary Incentives ◽  
Private Land ◽  
Social Image ◽  
Biodiversity Protection ◽  
Symmetric Information ◽  
Payment Schemes

AbstractWe examine how social preferences affect the workings of voluntary green payment schemes and show that a regulator could use facilitation services along with a social reward to generate better ecological outcome at less cost by exploiting a farmer’s social preferences to gain a green social-image/reputation. To motivate our model, we first present the results of an incentivized elicitation survey in Scotland which shows that there is a social norm of biodiversity protection on private land among farmers. Moreover, the results of a discrete choice experiment reveal that farmers are willing to give up economic rents for more publicity of their conservation activities; this confirms the relevance of reputational gain in the context of green payment schemes. Our model assumes two types of farmers, green and brown, with a green farmer taking more biodiversity protection actions than a brown farmer. We design a menu of contracts that offers both monetary incentives and non-monetary incentives (a facilitation service with social reward) to induce both type of farmers to join the scheme and to exert first-best levels (i.e., symmetric information levels) of action. Results show that under asymmetric information the regulator can implement the symmetric information equilibrium levels of biodiversity protection actions with only non-monetary incentives for the green farmer and only monetary incentives for the brown farmer. This implies that a regulator can ensure better environmental outcomes, at a lower cost, by exploiting farmers’ social preferences and by offering non-monetary incentives.

scholarly journals Individual goals and social preferences in operational decisions

2019 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 116-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nienke Hofstra ◽  
Wout Dullaert ◽  
Sander De Leeuw ◽  
Eirini Spiliotopoulou
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Operational Planning ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Monetary Incentives ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Planning Decisions ◽  
Multiple Data ◽  
Human Decision ◽  
Insight Into

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to develop propositions explaining the influence of individual goals and social preferences on human decision making in transport planning. The aim is to understand which individual goals and social preferences planners pursue and how these influence planners’ decisions. Design/methodology/approach Propositions are developed based on investigation of decision making of transport planners in a Dutch logistics service provider using multiple data collection methods. Findings The study shows how decision making of transport planners is motivated by individual goals as well as social preferences for reciprocity and group identity. Research limitations/implications Further research including transaction data analysis is needed to triangulate findings and to strengthen conclusions. Propositions are developed to be tested in future research. Practical implications Results suggest that efforts to guide planners in their decision making should go beyond traditional (monetary) incentives and consider their individual goals and social preferences. Moreover, this study provides insight into why transport planners deviate from desired behaviour. Originality/value While individual decision making plays an essential role in operational planning, the factors influencing how individuals make operational planning decisions are not fully understood.

scholarly journals Social Preferences, Public Policy, and Gender

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philipp Zahn ◽  
Evguenia Winschel
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Prosocial Behavior ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Policy Reform ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Detailed Knowledge ◽  
Symmetric Information ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
And Gender ◽  
Ex Post Analysis

In most laboratory experiments concerning prosocial behavior subjects are fully informed how their decision influences the payoff of other players. Outside the laboratory, for instance when voting for a policy reform proposal, individuals typically have to decide without such detailed knowledge. To assess the effect of information asymmetries on prosocial behavior, we conduct a laboratory experiment with a simple non-strategic interaction. A dictator has only limited knowledge about the benefits his prosocial action generates for a recipient. We observe subjects with heterogenous social preferences, in particular inequalityaverse and efficiency-concerned individuals. While under symmetric information only individuals with the same type of preferences transfer, under asymmetric information different types transfer at the same time. As a consequence and the main finding of our experiment, uninformed dictators behave more prosocially than informed dictators. In an ex-post analysis of our experiment we also find that the differences in behavior under symmetric information are mostly driven by gender: women tend to be more inequality-averse, men tend to be more efficiency-concerned. Yet, both transfer under asymmetric information.

The Impact of Direct Cash Payments on Whole Blood Supply

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. e973-e1001 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Becker ◽  
Harald Klüter ◽  
Alexandra Niessen-Ruenzi ◽  
Martin Weber
Keyword(s):  
Blood Supply ◽  
Whole Blood ◽  
Blood Donation ◽  
Monetary Incentives ◽  
Payment Scheme ◽  
Monetary Compensation ◽  
Payment Schemes ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
Complex Question

Abstract This paper investigates the impact of monetary incentives on whole blood donations. We take advantage of a quasi-natural experiment in Germany, in which one blood donation site changes its payment scheme from remunerated to non-remunerated. All other donation sites maintain their payment schemes. We show that donation volumes drop significantly after the pay drop and do not recuperate. At the same time, donation volumes increase at other paid donation sites, which is partly due to donor migration to these sites. We do not find any impact of the changed payment scheme on blood quality. Our results offer additional insight into the complex question whether it is efficient to ensure blood supply by paying donors a direct monetary compensation.

scholarly journals The Value of Social Interactions and Incentives on the Use of a Digital Contact Tracing Tool Post COVID-19 Lockdown in Singapore

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhilian Huang ◽  
Huiling Guo ◽  
Hannah YeeFen Lim ◽  
Kia Nam Ho ◽  
Evonne Tay ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Interactions ◽  
Discrete Choice ◽  
Logit Model ◽  
Choice Experiment ◽  
Public Hospital ◽  
Contact Tracing ◽  
Monetary Incentives ◽  
Conditional Logit Model ◽  
Conditional Logit ◽  
Trade Offs

Abstract BackgroundWe assessed the preferences and trade-offs for social interactions, incentives, and being traced by a digital contact tracing (DCT) tool post lockdown in Singapore.MethodsWe conducted a discrete choice experiment (DCE) among visitors of a large public hospital in Singapore between July 2020 – February 2021. Respondents were sampled proportionately by gender and four age categories (21 – 80 years). The DCE questionnaire had three attributes (1. Social interactions, 2. Being traced by a DCT tool, 3. Incentives to use a DCT tool) and two levels each. The final dataset comprised 3839 respondents after dropping 53 with “irrational” responses. Panel fixed conditional logit model was used to analyze the data.ResultsRespondents were more willing to trade being traced by a DCT tool for social interactions than incentives and unwilling to trade social interactions for incentives. The proportion of respondents preferring no incentives and could only be influenced by their family members increases with age. Among proponents of monetary incentives, the preferred median value for a month’s usage of DCT tools amounted to S$10 (USD7.25) and S$50 (USD36.20) for subsidies and lucky draw.ConclusionsDCE can be used to elicit profile-specific preferences to optimize the uptake of DCT tools during a pandemic. Social interactions are highly valued by the population, who are willing to trade them for being traced by a DCT tool during the COVID-19 pandemic. Although a small amount of incentive is sufficient to increase the satisfaction of using a DCT tool, incentives alone may not increase DCT tool uptake.

scholarly journals Valuation of Viticultural Adaptation to Climate Change in Vineyards: A Discrete Choice Experiment to Prioritize Trade-Offs Perceived by Citizens

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-112
Author(s):  
Verónica Farreras ◽  
Laura Abraham
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Discrete Choice Experiment ◽  
Discrete Choice ◽  
Water Availability ◽  
Choice Experiment ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Chemical Fertilizers ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Percentage Points ◽  
Conservation Of Biodiversity

On a climate change scenario, a discrete choice experiment was applied to elicit the trade-off values for three environmental impacts of current viticultural management practices in vineyards of Mendoza, Argentina. Water availability for other uses was found to be the most concerning topic for the population, followed by use of chemical fertilizers and then by use and conservation of biodiversity. An increase of one percentage point in water availability was estimated to add each citizen on average 13.05 Argentinean pesos – 0.74 US dollars – per year in terms of increased welfare, a figure equivalent to the welfare drop a citizen would experience after an increase of 1.45 percentage points in the use of chemical fertilizers annually per hectare, or a decrease of 2.69 percentage points in the use and conservation of biodiversity. These trade-off values may help policy makers, planners, regional managers, and ecologists to take social preferences into account in setting resource allocation priorities intended to support viticulture. This study approach provides a framework that could guide similar assessments in other regions.

Deferred Compensation in Multiperiod Labor Contracts: An Experimental Test of Lazear's Model

2011 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 819-843 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steffen Huck ◽  
Andrew J Seltzer ◽  
Brian Wallace
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Test ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Monetary Incentives ◽  
Labor Contracts ◽  
Deferred Compensation ◽  
Ex Ante

This paper provides the first experimental test of Edward Lazear's (1979) model of deferred compensation. We examine the relation ship between firms' wage offers and workers' effort supply in a multi-period environment. If firms can ex ante commit to a wage schedule with deferred compensation, workers should respond by supplying sufficient effort to avoid dismissal. We contrast this full-commitment case to controls with no commitment and computer-generated wages in order to examine the roles of monetary incentives, social preferences, and reciprocity. Finally, we examine a setup without formal commitment, but where firms can build a reputation for paying deferred wages. (JEL D86, J22, J31, J33, J41)

scholarly journals How social preferences provide effort incentives in situations of financial support

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. e0244972
Author(s):  
Christian Knoller ◽  
Stefan Neuß ◽  
Richard Peter
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Strong Evidence ◽  
Financial Support ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Monetary Incentives ◽  
Material Efficiency ◽  
Preventive Effort ◽  
Effort Provision ◽  
Level Effect

When people anticipate financial support, they may reduce preventive effort. We conjecture that the source of financial support can mitigate this moral hazard effect due to social preferences. We compare effort choices when another individual voluntarily provides financial support against effort choices under purely monetary incentives. When financial support is provided voluntarily by another individual, we expect recipients to exert more effort to avoid bad outcomes (level effect) and to reduce effort provision to a lesser degree as financial support becomes more generous (sensitivity effect). We conducted an incentivized laboratory experiment and find some evidence for the level effect and strong evidence for the sensitivity effect. This leads to significant gains in material efficiency with expected wealth being 5.5% higher and 37.3% less volatile.

Do Ethical Leadership, Visibility, External Regulation, and Prosocial Impact Affect Unethical Behavior? Evidence From a Laboratory and a Field Experiment

2017 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-371 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicola Belle ◽  
Paola Cantarelli
Keyword(s):  
Public Administration ◽  
Task Performance ◽  
Discrete Choice ◽  
Ethical Leadership ◽  
Unethical Behavior ◽  
Choice Experiment ◽  
The Self ◽  
Monetary Incentives ◽  
External Regulation ◽  
Financial Gain

This article investigates the effects that ethical leadership, visibility of task performance and conduct, external regulation, and prosocial impact have on revealed and observed preferences for unethical behavior in public administration settings. Experiment 1 engages university students in a laboratory experiment and observes misconduct in two tasks. Ethical messages and visibility reduced subjects’ dishonesty in declaring the outcome of the task that affected their pay but did not influence the self-reported performance in the exercise tied to raising donations. For the latter task, ethical leadership and visibility interacted negatively. Monetary incentives and prosocial impact increased individuals’ unethical behavior consistently across the two tasks. Experiment 2 is a discrete choice experiment exploring public sector workers’ preferences for misbehaving on the job. While ethical leadership and visibility did not affect their preferences, a significant financial gain and the opportunity to improve the life of many people increased the willingness to behave unethically.

scholarly journals Social Preferences for Orphan Drugs: A Discrete Choice Experiment Among the French General Population

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mondher Toumi ◽  
Aurélie Millier ◽  
Olivier Cristeau ◽  
Katia Thokagevistk-Desroziers ◽  
Julie Dorey ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
General Population ◽  
Discrete Choice Experiment ◽  
Discrete Choice ◽  
Choice Experiment ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Orphan Drugs

scholarly journals Investigating Monetary Incentives for Environmentally Friendly Residential Landscapes

Water ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (11) ◽  
pp. 3023
Author(s):  
Xumin Zhang ◽  
Hayk Khachatryan
Keyword(s):  
Discrete Choice ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Choice Experiment ◽  
Environmentally Friendly ◽  
Monetary Incentives ◽  
Low Input ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Experiment Method ◽  
State And Local ◽  
Practical Implications

State and local governments develop policies that promote environmentally friendly landscaping practices with the goal to mitigate adverse environmental impacts from heavily maintained residential lawns. One of the mechanisms to achieve low-input landscaping practices in the urban environment is to promote the conversion of monoculture turfgrass lawns into partial turfgrass, low-input landscapes. Rebate incentives are used as an instrument to encourage the adoption of such landscapes. This study investigates the effects of households’ monetary incentive requirement on households’ preferences and willingness to pay for low-input landscapes. The discrete choice experiment method was used to analyze responses from households categorized into low, medium, and high incentive requirement groups. The results show that rebate incentives may have significant positive effects on individuals’ intentions to adopt low-input landscapes. Participants with low incentive requirement were willing to pay more for environmentally friendly attributes, compared with their counterparts in the medium and high incentive requirement groups. Practical implications for relevant stakeholders are discussed.

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