Go West: Georgia's European identity and its role in domestic politics and foreign policy objectives

2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (6) ◽  
pp. 923-941 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donnacha Ó Beacháin ◽  
Frederik Coene

This article sheds light on the Euro-Atlantic discourse in Georgia by situating it in a wider frame. It provides an analysis of its Euro-Atlantic orientation by presenting it as a continuation of past efforts to involve European powers in Georgian affairs and highlights changing trends in this aspect of contemporary foreign policy. Far from determining whether or not the Georgians are European, the different arguments that have been used to support Georgian “Europeanness” are evaluated to assess its role in the national identity construction process. Focusing primarily on the United National Movement government led by Mikheil Saakashvili, we demonstrate how the Euro-Atlantic discourse has been employed domestically by the political elite as a legitimacy management strategy and explore its function in seeking Western patronage, a key foreign policy goal.

2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 60-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan McCormick

The Reagan administration came to power in 1981 seeking to downplay Jimmy Carter's emphasis on human rights in U.S. policy toward Latin America. Yet, by 1985 the administration had come to justify its policies towards Central America in the very same terms. This article examines the dramatic shift that occurred in policymaking toward Central America during Ronald Reagan's first term. Synthesizing existing accounts while drawing on new and recently declassified material, the article looks beyond rhetoric to the political, intellectual, and bureaucratic dynamics that conditioned the emergence of a Reaganite human rights policy. The article shows that events in El Salvador suggested to administration officials—and to Reagan himself—that support for free elections could serve as a means of shoring up legitimacy for embattled allies abroad, while defending the administration against vociferous human rights criticism at home. In the case of Nicaragua, democracy promotion helped to eschew hard decisions between foreign policy objectives. The history of the Reagan Doctrine's contentious roots provides a complex lens through which to evaluate subsequent U.S. attempts to foster democracy overseas.


Author(s):  
Leilah Danielson

Peace activism in the United States between 1945 and the 2010s focused mostly on opposition to U.S. foreign policy, efforts to strengthen and foster international cooperation, and support for nuclear nonproliferation and arms control. The onset of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union marginalized a reviving postwar American peace movement emerging from concerns about atomic and nuclear power and worldwide nationalist politics that everywhere seemed to foster conflict, not peace. Still, peace activism continued to evolve in dynamic ways and to influence domestic politics and international relations. Most significantly, peace activists pioneered the use of Gandhian nonviolence in the United States and provided critical assistance to the African American civil rights movement, led the postwar antinuclear campaign, played a major role in the movement against the war in Vietnam, helped to move the liberal establishment (briefly) toward a more dovish foreign policy in the early 1970s, and helped to shape the political culture of American radicalism. Despite these achievements, the peace movement never regained the political legitimacy and prestige it held in the years before World War II, and it struggled with internal divisions about ideology, priorities, and tactics. Peace activist histories in the 20th century tended to emphasize organizational or biographical approaches that sometimes carried hagiographic overtones. More recently, historians have applied the methods of cultural history, examining the role of religion, gender, and race in structuring peace activism. The transnational and global turn in the historical discipline has also begun to make inroads in peace scholarship. These are promising new directions because they situate peace activism within larger historical and cultural developments and relate peace history to broader historiographical debates and trends.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 737-755 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel Marie Blum ◽  
Christopher Sebastian Parker

President Trump is often at odds with the conservative establishment over a range of issues, not least of which is foreign policy. Yet it remains unclear whether supporting “Trumpism” is commensurate with coherent foreign policy views that are distinct from conventionally conservative positions. We evaluate whether the foreign policy views of Trump’s supporters, both in the voting public and among activists, differ from those of other Republicans. We use the 2016 ANES to examine Republican primary voters and the new 2016 State Convention Delegate Study to assess Republican activists. In doing so, we reveal systematic differences in foreign policy preferences between Trump supporters and more establishment conservatives. We demonstrate that the status-threat model need not be confined to domestic politics. Indeed, it may be extended to explain foreign policy preferences on the political right, that of Trump’s supporters in the present case. In doing so, we also find evidence that status threat may well be the source of fracture in the Republican Party.


2015 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Octavio Amorim Neto ◽  
Andrés Malamud

AbstractIs it domestic politics or the international system that more decisively influences foreign policy? This article focuses on Latin America's three largest powers to identify patterns and compare outcomes in their relations with the regional hegemon, the United States. Through a statistical analysis of voting behavior in the UN General Assembly, we examine systemic variables (both realist and liberal) and domestic variables (institutional, ideological, and bureaucratic) to determine their relative weights between 1946 and 2008. The study includes 4,900 votes, the tabulation of 1,500 ministers according to their ideological persuasion, all annual trade entries, and an assessment of the political strength of presidents, cabinets, and parties per year. The findings show that while Argentina's voting behavior has been determined mostly by domestic factors and Mexico's by realist systemic ones, Brazil's has a more complex blend of determinants, but also with a prevalence of realist systemic variables.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 68-87
Author(s):  
Ju. V. Roknifard

This paper analyzes the Islam’s impact on the Malaysian politics. Islam as an instrument of Malaysia’s foreign policy has been used by the political elite of the state for decades. Observers note the Islamization of the country’s foreign policy, especially during the premiership of Najib Razak (2008– 2018). However, the trend towards Islamization can be traced back to the moment Malaysia gained independence from Great Britain in 1957 and especially during the premiership of Mahathir Mohamad (1981–2003). The formation of such a foreign policy of Malaysia took place against the background of the Islamization of the political and social environment within the country, which, in turn, was the result of an internal political struggle. Thus, the projection of Malaysia’s identity into the outside world and the foreign policy corresponding to this identity was often motivated by the need to retain or attract the support of the malay-muslim majority in the domestic political arena. Since many of the issues raised in the article relate to identity both at the national and global level, a constructivist paradigm is used to conceptualize Malaysia’s foreign policy with a special emphasis on the identity of states. Particularly important in this process is the formation of domestic and foreign policy discourse. Malaysia’s Islamic identity is viewed externally in three dimensions: the Sunni state, the activist state in the Islamic world and the standard of moderate Islam. Consideration of these dimensions reveals quite obvious contradictions between them, as well as between rhetoric and real politics.


Author(s):  
D. I. Yefremov

The article establishes the relationship between the interests of the Ukrainian establishment and the foreign policy vector of Kyiv. The author identified the main actors who determined the specifics of the transformation of the strategic course of Ukraine. On the one hand, the author revealed the critical problems of European integration and on the other hand, the improvement/ degradation of relations with the Russian Federation. The author evaluated the strategic doctrines used by the Ukrainian elite and analysed main changes in the approaches of the Ukrainian establishment. This article considers the reaction of Russian and Ukrainian political elites to the correction of the foreign policy imperatives of the Russian Federation and Ukraine, respectively. Also, the author, using the theory of the “heavy” and “light” fractions of Ukrainian political elites as an example, identifies specific features of the correlation between the replacement/renewal of key elite groups and the adaptation of the strategic vector, including a qualitative rethinking of the approaches inherent in the replaced establishment. On the other hand, the author compared between the declared positions/slogans and specific doctrines/concepts, initiated, for example, by individual actors of the political elite. The author analyses the main reasons for the soft dismantling of the so-called multi-vector diplomacy in favour of the Euro-Atlantic course. Also, in the article, concerning the realities of Ukraine, the influence of the political model of “shapeless pluralism” of hybrid regimes on the transformation of the foreign policy’ agenda.


Author(s):  
Heorhii Potulnytskyi ◽  

Being at the political and diplomatic service of King of France Louis XV for more than three decades (from 1729 to 1759) Hryhor Orlyk, the son of the Ukrainian Hetman Pylyp Orlyk, was committed to furthering the cause of his father. Traditionally, in the context of the political tasks of the French kingdom, he addressed, on the one hand, the incorporation of the Cossack factor into the foreign policy of the Versailles Cabinet, and, on the other hand, the Crimean question. At every stage of his diplomatic service, which we have distinguished (the 1730s, 1740s, and 1750s respectively), the Hetman’s son set different tasks to resolve the Crimean issue and, accordingly, tried to implement them. Through his consistent, permanent, and persistent actions, Hryhor Orlyk contributed to the traditional matter of Hetman’s Ukraine integration into the international policy of the Versailles Cabinet, along with the Cossack and Crimean factors. In the 1750s, one of the last representatives of the Mazepian emigration Fedir Myrovych and Fedir Nakhymovskyi joined the corps of Orlyk’s son Hryhor. They became his effective assistants in the matter of political and legal recognition of the Cossack factor as one of the dominant foreign policy activities of the Versailles Cabinet by the French political elite. Being in Crimea in the 1750s, Myrovych and Nakhymovskyi acted as special emissaries of the Versailles Cabinet maintaining contacts with it directly through Hryhor Orlyk. They contributed in every way to the policy of the kingdom in Crimea in connection with the activation of the Cossack factor there. Old Mazepa’s supporters assisted the Hetman’s son in the implementation of the military and political cooperation between France and Crimea and the Ottoman Empire, but they also attempted to explain the essence of Russian policy aimed at terminating the independence of the Kosh both to the Khan and to Zaporozhian Cossacks in Crimea. The author concludes that as the envoy of the French Crown in Crimea, Hryhor Orlyk made the last attempt to involve the Crimean Khanate to the problems related to the restoration of the Cossack statehood solving the Crimean-Cossack problem, which had been consistent since the sixteenth century. All Mazepa supporters by conducting their activities in Crimea not only contributed to raising the issue of integrating the Cossack factor as an integral part into the international policy of the Versailles Cabinet, but also helped to legitimize and substantiate the latter in the concept of involving Turkey and the Crimean Khanate into the struggle for Ukraine’s liberation from Russian domination


2020 ◽  
pp. 46-63
Author(s):  
Melissa M. Lee

This chapter presents the core theoretical argument of this book: states with incompatible policy interests subvert state authority in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives against their adversaries. This conflictual behavior weakens state authority and impedes state consolidation. The chapter then describes the use of subversion as an instrument of statecraft and the political benefits of delegating disruption to local proxies in the target state. It explores the strategic and operational advantages of subversion, and considers how this foreign policy lever can help states increase the probability that they will prevail in their disputes with adversaries. Because subversion is not costless, the chapter also examines the constraints that would-be sponsors face when considering this tool of statecraft. Finally, it introduces three mechanisms through which subversion undermines state authority, showing how foreign support plays a pivotal role in these processes. Target states are hardly passive victims of subversion, yet their efforts to respond to foreign subversion rarely recapture the authority losses imposed on them by the sponsor state.


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergio Fabbrini ◽  
Amr Yossef

The existing literature explains the wavering course of President Barack Obama's policy on the 2001–03 Egyptian crisis as attributed to either his personal characteristics (lack of an international experience, predisposition to sermonize rather than to strategize) or to the impact of the decline of the United States as a global superpower (inability to influence foreign actors and contexts). Although both explanations are worthy of consideration, this article seeks to demonstrate that they are insufficient when accounting for the uncertainties shown by the United States during the Egyptian crisis. Domestic factors, particularly the internally divided US political elite and a foreign policy team with different views, played a crucial intervening role in defining the features of US foreign policy. It was domestic politics that made the Obama administration ineffective in dealing with the new scenario that emerged in the Middle East and in Egypt in particular.


2008 ◽  
Vol 41 (03) ◽  
pp. 551-555 ◽  
Author(s):  
Natascha Zowislo-Grünewald

The lack of enthusiasm for the European Union and its proposed constitution among the European people surprised the political elite of Europe. Codifying common beliefs and values seemed to be a good way to represent the European identity in written form. The signing of the constitutional treaty should have become an important symbolic act, demonstrating the willingness of the people to bond together. Instead, a so-called Reform Treaty was passed in Lisbon in 2007 (to be ratified by all member states by 2009) that specifically abandoned any allusion to symbolic forms of European representation such as the termconstitution, the flag, or a European anthem.


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