The Jenkins Foundation and the Battle for the Soul of the PRI

Author(s):  
Andrew Paxman

During his final years, Jenkins set up a charity that introduced the US-style foundation to Mexico, bought the second-largest bank, and became a political football amid the left wing versus right-wing struggle for dominance within the ruling party. The Mary Street Jenkins Foundation echoed the noblesse oblige of the US robber barons, but it also facilitated Jenkins’s continued shaping of Puebla politics, keeping power in conservative hands. With the help of his film-industry deputy, Manuel Espinosa Yglesias, he performed the first major hostile takeover in Mexican history, buying number-two bank Bancomer. Under President López Mateos, he continued to loom large but as an ultracapitalistic symbol of how the Mexican Revolution had lost its way—and thus as a tool of politicized gringophobia. Impervious to criticism, Jenkins dedicated his remaining energy to philanthropy and a cotton plantation in Michoacán. Distanced from his daughters, he would daily visit Mary’s grave and read to her. He died in 1963.

2020 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 460-470 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sander van der Linden ◽  
Costas Panagopoulos ◽  
Jon Roozenbeek

Although the rise of fake news is posing an increasing threat to societies worldwide, little is known about what associations the term ‘fake news’ activates in the public mind. Here, we report a psychological bias that we describe as the ‘fake news effect’: the tendency for partisans to use the term ‘fake news’ to discount and discredit ideologically uncongenial media sources. In a national sample of the US population ( N = 1000), we elicited top-of-mind associations with the term ‘fake news’. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find evidence that both liberals and conservatives freely associate traditionally left-wing (e.g. CNN) and right-wing (e.g. Fox News) media sources with the term fake news. Moreover, conservatives are especially likely to associate the mainstream media with the term fake news and these perceptions are generally linked to lower trust in media, voting for Trump, and higher belief in conspiracy theories.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 146-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Hameleers

The discursive construction of a populist divide between the ‘good’ people and ‘corrupt’ elites can conceptually be linked to disinformation. More specifically, (right-wing) populists are not only attributing blame to the political elites, but increasingly vent anti-media sentiments in which the mainstream press is scapegoated for not representing the people. In an era of post-truth relativism, ‘fake news’ is increasingly politicized and used as a label to delegitimize political opponents or the press. To better understand the affinity between disinformation and populism, this article conceptualizes two relationships between these concepts: (1) blame attributions to the dishonest media as part of the corrupt elites that mislead the people; and (2) the expression of populist boundaries in a people-centric, anti-expert, and evidence-free way. The results of a comparative qualitative content analysis in the US and Netherlands indicate that the political leaders Donald Trump and Geert Wilders blame legacy media in populist ways by regarding them as part of the corrupt and lying establishment. Compared to left-wing populist and mainstream politicians, these politicians are the most central players in the discursive construction of populist disinformation. Both politicians bypassed empirical evidence and expert knowledge whilst prioritizing the people’s truth and common sense at the center stage of honesty and reality. These expressions resonated with public opinion on Facebook, although citizens were more likely to frame mis- and disinformation in terms of ideological cleavages. These findings have important implications for our understanding of the role of populist discourse in a post-factual era.


Fascism ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-212
Author(s):  
Francisco Sales Trajano Filho

This article considers key developments in Brazilian architecture which occurred under the ambiguous and contradictory Vargas’ regime (1930–1945), when it was exposed to both internal and external political contingencies, including the crisis of liberalism, which affected its ability to expand and consolidate itself. This situation was not unique to Brazil, since many interwar dictatorships, including the Soviet and fascist regimes, shared the same characteristics. In the Brazilian twentieth century, both during democratic and dictatorial times, whether dominated by left-wing or right-wing ideologies, architecture and the State constantly sought to take advantage of the relationship between them. The demands, projects and interests of both spheres set up an intricate web of relationships that shaped national identity and embodied its material representation. Investigating the place of architecture within a broader context, that of the Brazilian nation-building process, the article establishes that the architectural representation of the Brazilian state was never straight forward, combining a set of breakthroughs and setbacks, and always leaving the quest for a uniform and coherent aesthetic language unsolved. This anomalous situation has led scholarship to disregard the complex relationship between the State and architecture, between ideology and aesthetics and, simultaneously, to ignore the profound contradictions within Vargas’s government, both in the political and architectural field, and to underestimate the role played by the modernism of European fascism in acting as one of the poles of attraction acting on how building projects were conceived.


2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (142) ◽  
pp. 81-94
Author(s):  
Ana Garcia

The Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) could not be set up in the way and time the US-Government firstly wanted. Among others, one of the main reasons was the wide spread network resistance that involved trade unions, social movements and grass roots organizations from North and South America, who worked together to pressure their governments to stop negotiations. A new space for action has emerged in the last few years with the election of left-wing Presidents in South America, converging interest of governments with demands from social movements to overcome neoliberal regional integration. A concrete alternative project against FTAA came up from the cooperation agreement between Venezuela und Cuba, but extended to other countries: The "bolivarian" Alternative for the Americas and Caribbean (ALBA) seeks to establish solidary ways of integration in Latin America.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-118
Author(s):  
Albrecht Koschorke

Auf dem Feld der Theorie ist es zu einer Umpolung der politischen Vorzeichen gekommen. Was fünfzig Jahre lang Gegenstand einer linksemanzipatorischen Kritik war, ist zur Zielscheibe nationalistisch-autoritärer Bewegungen geworden: der Liberalismus, der Kapitalismus, die Globalisierung, das politische Prinzip der Repräsentation, der hegemoniale Charakter von Wahrheitsansprüchen. Lieblingsvokabeln der French Theory wie ›Dekonstruktion‹ und ›Simulation‹ sind in die Machtpraxis von Rechtspopulisten übergegangen. Kulturwissenschaftler dagegen finden sich in der ungewohnten Lage wieder, fact checking zu betreiben und gegen die Relativierung universell gültiger wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse zu demonstrieren. Der Beitrag fragt danach, wie angesichts dieser ›feindlichen Übernahme‹ das emanzipatorische Potenzial und die Erkenntnisleistungen des Poststrukturalismus verteidigt werden können. There has been a reversion of political signs in the (academic) field of theory. What has been the subject of left-wing emancipatory critique during the 1950s has become the target of nationalist- authoritarian movements: liberalism, capitalism, globalization, the political principle of representation, the hegemonial character of truth claims. Favoured words of French Theory like ›deconstruction‹ and ›simulation‹ have assimilated with the exercise of power of right-wing populists. Cultural scientists on the other hand now find themselves in the completely foreign position of being tasked with fact checking and to rally against relativization of universally acknowledged scientific findings. This article asks how the emancipatory potential and the gaining of knowledge of poststructuralism can be defended against a ›hostile takeover‹


Author(s):  
Joseph Lowndes

Populism in the United States has been the subject of continual argument. Depicted alternately as a politics of provincial agrarianism, participatory democracy, or market-oriented modernizers; it has been all these things. Populism in the US is typically aimed at wealthy elites, yet populists tend to prefer the language of popular sovereignty to class, blurring distinctions in a broad definition of the people. While populism has had various iterations in the United States, it can be roughly divided between left-wing and right-wing variants according to how each defines the principal foe of the people: for left populists it is economic elites; for right populists it is non-white others and by extension the state itself.


Author(s):  
Jacqueline Avila

Cinesonidos: Film Music and National Identity During Mexico’s Época de Oro is the first book-length study concerning the function of music in the prominent genres structured by the Mexican film industry. Integrating primary source material with film music studies, sound studies, and Mexican film and cultural history, this project closely examines examples from five significant film genres that developed during the 1930s through 1950s. These genres include the prostitute melodrama, the fictional indigenista film (films on indigenous themes or topics), the cine de añoranza porfiriana (films of Porfirian nostalgia), the revolutionary melodrama, and the comedia ranchera (ranch comedy). The musics in these films helped create and accentuate the tropes and archetypes considered central to Mexican cultural nationalism. Distinct in narrative and structure, each genre exploits specific, at times contradictory, aspects of Mexicanidad—the cultural identity of the Mexican people—and, as such, employs different musics to concretize those constructions. Throughout this turbulent period, these tropes and archetypes mirrored changing perceptions of Mexicanidad manufactured by the state and popular and transnational culture. Several social and political agencies were heavily invested in creating a unified national identity to merge the previously fragmented populace owing to the Mexican Revolution (1910–ca.1920). The commercial medium of film became an important tool in acquainting a diverse urban audience with the nuances of national identity, and music played an essential and persuasive role in the process. In this heterogeneous environment, cinema and its music continuously reshaped the contested, fluctuating space of Mexican identity.


2020 ◽  
pp. 003329411989990
Author(s):  
Burcu Tekeş ◽  
E. Olcay Imamoğlu ◽  
Fatih Özdemir ◽  
Bengi Öner-Özkan

The aims of this study were to test: (a) the association of political orientations with morality orientations, specified by moral foundations theory, on a sample of young adults from Turkey, representing a collectivistic culture; and (b) the statistically mediating roles of needs for cognition and recognition in the links between political orientation and morality endorsements. According to the results (a) right-wing orientation and need for recognition were associated with all the three binding foundations (i.e., in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity); (b) right-wing orientation was associated with binding foundations also indirectly via the role of need for recognition; (c) regarding individualizing foundations, left-wing orientation and need for cognition were associated with fairness/reciprocity, whereas only gender was associated with harm/care; and (d) left-wing orientation was associated with fairness dimension also indirectly via the role of need for cognition. The cultural relevance of moral foundations theory as well as the roles of needs for cognition and recognition are discussed.


2021 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 163-185
Author(s):  
Sung Min Han ◽  
Mi Jeong Shin

AbstractIn this article, we argue that rising housing prices increase voter approval of incumbent governments because such a rise increases personal wealth, which leads to greater voter satisfaction. This effect is strongest under right-wing governments because those who benefit from rising prices—homeowners—are more likely to be right-leaning. Non-homeowners, who are more likely to vote for left-leaning parties, will view rising housing prices as a disadvantage and therefore feel the government does not serve them well, which will mitigate the advantage to left-wing governments. We find support for our arguments using both macro-level data (housing prices and government approval ratings in 16 industrialized countries between 1960 and 2017) and micro-level data (housing prices and individuals’ vote choices in the United Kingdom using the British Household Panel Survey). The findings imply that housing booms benefit incumbent governments generally and right-wing ones in particular.


Genealogy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 60
Author(s):  
Anna Miglietta ◽  
Barbara Loera

We analyzed the relationship between modern forms of populism and citizen support for exclusive welfare policies and proposals, and we focused on support for left-wing- and right-wing-oriented welfare policies enacted or proposed during the Lega Nord (LN)–Five Star Movement (FSM) government in Italy (2018–2019). In light of the theoretical perspective of political ideology as motivated by social cognition, we examined citizens’ support for the two policies considering adherence to populist attitudes, agreement on the criteria useful to define ingroup membership, and personal values. We also took into account the role of cognitive sophistication in populism avoidance. A total of 785 Italian adults (F = 56.6; mean age = 35.8) completed an online survey in the summer of 2019 based on the following: support for populist policies and proposals, political ideologies and positioning, personal values, and ingroup boundaries. We used correlation and regression analyses. The results highlight the relationships between populism and political conservatism. Populism was related to the vertical and horizontal borders defining the “people”; cognitive sophistication was not a relevant driver. We identified some facilitating factors that could promote adherence to and support for public policies inspired by the values of the right or of the left, without a true ideological connotation.


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