Plato on the Grades of Perception: Theaetetus 184–186 and the Phaedo

Author(s):  
Gail Fine

In a fascinating passage, Descartes distinguishes three grades of perception. The first is wholly and only physiological; the second and third essentially involve the mind or soul, but differ in that the first has non‐conceptual content, whereas the third is conceptual and propositional. I ask at which if any of these three grades Plato places perception in Theaetetus 184‐6 and in the Phaedo. I argue that the former passage places perception at Descartes’s second grade. I also argue that it is unclear what grade perception is at in the Phaedo. I suggest that, while Theaetetus 184‐6 and the Phaedo do not clearly conflict on the powers of perception, neither do they clearly agree; rather, they focus on different issues.

2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-171
Author(s):  
Nāṣir Al-Dīn Abū Khaḍīr

The ʿUthmānic way of writing (al-rasm al-ʿUthmānī) is a science that specialises in the writing of Qur'anic words in accordance with a specific ‘pattern’. It follows the writing style of the Companions at the time of the third caliph, ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān, and was attributed to ʿUthmān on the basis that he was the one who ordered the collection and copying of the Qur'an into the actual muṣḥaf. This article aims to expound on the two fundamental functions of al-rasm al-ʿUthmānī: that of paying regard to the ‘correct’ pronunciation of the words in the muṣḥaf, and the pursuit of the preclusion of ambiguity which may arise in the mind of the reader and his auditor. There is a further practical aim for this study: to show the connection between modern orthography and the ʿUthmānic rasm in order that we, nowadays, are thereby able to overcome the problems faced by calligraphers and writers of the past in their different ages and cultures.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-113
Author(s):  
Nathalia Gleyce dos Santos Salazar

Resumo:  Apresenta-se uma discussão sobre o conhecimento e a tese dos três mundos no qual a interação entre estes nos aproxima da verdade do problema corpo-mente, tendo em vista, uma nova proposta de solução. O terceiro mundo é uma peça importante neste trabalho; sendo assim, analisaremos o que Popper designa como Mundo 3, em que ele consiste e o papel da linguagem como diferencial do ser humano. Apresentamos as críticas popperianas às correntes monistas e dualistas, ousando fazer uma crítica a Teoria do Conhecimento tradicional. Desta forma, a proposta apresentada por este filósofo da ciência diferencia-se de tudo que estava sendo feito até então, por isso, o interesse de apresentar essa abordagem pouco trabalhada de Popper. Palavras-chave: Conhecimento. Corpo-Mente. Mundo 3.Abstract: In this work, we present a discussion about knowledge and the theory of the three worlds in which the interaction between them approaches to the truth of the mind-body problem, in view of a proposed solution. The third world is an important piece in this work. Therefore, we will analyze what Popper describes as World 3, what it is and the role of language as a differential of human beings. We present Popper’s criticisms to the monistic and dualistic currents, daring to criticize the theory of traditional knowledge. Thus, the proposal of science presented by this philosopher differs from everything that was being done until then. This explains the interest in presenting this unusual approach to Popper.Keywords: Knowledge. Body-Mind.  World 3. REFERÊNCIASLEAL-TOLEDO, Gustavo . Popper e seu Cérebro. Revista da Faculdade de Letras. Série Filosofia, v. XXIII, p. 59-68, 2007.POPPER, Karl Raimund. A Lógica da Pesquisa Científica. Tradução de Leonidas Hegenberg e Octanny Silveira de Mota.  São Paulo: editora Cultrix. 2007.POPPER, Karl Raimund. Conhecimento Objetivo: uma abordagem evolucionária. Tradução de Milton Amado.  Belo Horizonte, Ed. Itatiaia Ilimitada. São Paulo, Ed. Da Universidade São Paulo, 1975._______.  O Conhecimento e o Problema Corpo –Mente. Tradução Joaquim Alberto Ferreira Gomes. Lisboa, Ed. 70. 1996.   _______. Conjecturas e Refutações: o desenvolvimento do conhecimento científico. Trad. Benedita Bettencourt. Ed. Livraria Almedina, 2006._______.  O Eu e Seu Cérebro. Karl Popper, Jonh C. Eccles;Tradução Silvio Meneses Garcia, Helena Cristina F. Arantes e Aurélio Osmar C. de Oliveira. – Campinas, SP: Papirus; Brasília, DF: Editora Universidade de Brasília. 1991.   _______. O Racionalismo Crítico na Política. Tradução de Maria da Conceição Côrte – Real. Brasília, Editora Universidade de Brasília, 2ª edição, 1994, 74p.SEARLE, John R. La construcción de la realidad social. Trad. Antoni Domènech. Barcelona: Paidós Ibérico, 1995.  


Author(s):  
Nora Goldschmidt ◽  
Barbara Graziosi

The Introduction sheds light on the reception of classical poetry by focusing on the materiality of the poets’ bodies and their tombs. It outlines four sets of issues, or commonplaces, that govern the organization of the entire volume. The first concerns the opposition between literature and material culture, the life of the mind vs the apprehensions of the body—which fails to acknowledge that poetry emerges from and is attended to by the mortal body. The second concerns the religious significance of the tomb and its location in a mythical landscape which is shaped, in part, by poetry. The third investigates the literary graveyard as a place where poets’ bodies and poetic corpora are collected. Finally, the alleged ‘tomb of Virgil’ provides a specific site where the major claims made in this volume can be most easily be tested.


Author(s):  
Mohammed Najjar Al Otaibi

This study aimed to find out the relevance of mathematics books in the intermediate stage of Van Hill levels of geometric thinking, in order to achieve this goal, the researcher utilized the analytical descriptive method, using the analysis card as a tool to conduct this study and prepared a list of skills in which Van Hill's levels of geometric thinking (conceptual, analytical, quasi- Inductive, Inductive, abstract). A number of results were found, most notably: the incompatibility of the engineering subjects in the second- grade books as well as the third- grade average with the hierarchy of Van Hill levels of geometric thinking. Failure to observe mathematics books in the middle stage, to include engineering activities at the induction level, to equip students to deal with secondary engineering topics. The researcher recommended a number of recommendations, the most important of which are: To reconsider the hierarchy of the levels of engineering thinking in the engineering activities included in the mathematics books in the intermediate stage. The work on enriching mathematics books in the second grade is average of engineering activities of semi- inductive level, to match the hierarchy of the levels of engineering thinking of the intermediate stage. The work of enriching mathematics books in the third grade is an average of engineering activities of semi- inductive and indicative level to match the hierarchical level of the engineering thinking of the middle stage, which is the basis for higher levels of engineering thinking in the secondary stage. The inclusion of additional topics in engineering and measurement in mathematics books for the third- grade, to contribute to the development of levels of engineering thinking for students.  


2021 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  

The current research aims to analyze the content of the economics book for the second grade commercial according to the habits of the mind, the researcher adopted the descriptive approach as an approach to his research, and to achieve the goal of the research, the researcher prepared a questionnaire for the habits of the mind consisting of sixteen main habits and (49) indicators, presented to a group of referees to clarify Their opinions and observations about the tool, honesty and consistency were extracted for it, and appropriate statistical means were used, and after applying the tool, the following results were reached: 1- The content of the economics book includes habits of the mind. 2- The imbalance of percentages of the habits of the mind in the content of the book, economics, which was analyzed Key words: (Content analysis, economics textbook, Habits of Mind).


Author(s):  
Howard Robinson

Materialism – which, for almost all purposes, is the same as physicalism – is the theory that everything that exists is material. Natural science shows that most things are intelligible in material terms, but mind presents problems in at least two ways. The first is consciousness, as found in the ‘raw feel’ of subjective experience. The second is the intentionality of thought, which is the property of being about something beyond itself; ‘aboutness’ seems not to be a physical relation in the ordinary sense. There have been three ways of approaching these problems. The hardest is eliminativism, according to which there are no ‘raw feels’, no intentionality and, in general, no mental states: the mind and all its furniture are part of an outdated science that we now see to be false. Next is reductionism, which seeks to give an account of our experience and of intentionality in terms which are acceptable to a physical science: this means, in practice, analysing the mind in terms of its role in producing behaviour. Finally, the materialist may accept the reality and irreducibility of mind, but claim that it depends on matter in such an intimate way – more intimate than mere causal dependence – that materialism is not threatened by the irreducibility of mind. The first two approaches can be called ‘hard materialism’, the third ‘soft materialism’. The problem for eliminativism is that we find it difficult to credit that any belief that we think and feel is a theoretical speculation. Reductionism’s main difficulty is that there seems to be more to consciousness than its contribution to behaviour: a robotic machine could behave as we do without thinking or feeling. The soft materialist has to explain supervenience in a way that makes the mind not epiphenomenal without falling into the problems of interactionism.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 411-435
Author(s):  
Michael S. Matthews ◽  
Heather A. Rhodes

Because schools often do not begin formal processes to identify students with gifts and talents until the third grade, many kindergarten through second-grade teachers face challenges in identifying and meeting the needs of these learners. We examined gifted education plans from a sample of seven districts in and around the Charlotte, North Carolina, region to learn how these districts address gifted or advanced learners in kindergarten, first, and second grades in their policies. We summarize the content and range of these policies, and recommend that effective approaches should include universal screening, early identification (i.e., in kindergarten), and the use of additional pathways to identification and differentiated educational services to meet the needs of young advanced learners. We conclude with recommendations for future study in this underinvestigated area.


2016 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-213
Author(s):  
Karolina Krawczak

Subjectivity and intersubjectivity have long been recognized as central to the understanding of the relations between language, mind and society. They arise in an interactive world for the mind of the individual and shape his/her (inter)personal reality. In present-day linguistics, there are two major approaches to subjectivity. One is associated with Langacker and focuses on cognitive construal. The other framework, which was developed by Traugott, zooms in on diachronic changes on the conceptual level. Naturally, diachronic developments are intimately related to synchronic variation and the conceptual content of an utterance hinges on its presentation and perspectivization. This paper, therefore, argues that, rather than being discrepant and treating distinct phenomena, as is widely suggested (e.g. Brisard 2006; Nuyts 2001, 2012), the two frameworks can be reconciled. By so doing, the ensuing discussion yields an integrated view on objectivity and (inter)subjectivity, a view that will be organized around four main arguments.


2001 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-101
Author(s):  
J. P. MORELAND

In an important paper, Clifford Williams advanced a Lockean-style argument to justify the parity thesis, viz., that there is no intellectual advantage to Christian physicalism or Christian dualism. In an article in Religious Studies I offered a critique of Williams's parity thesis and he has published a rejoinder to me in the same journal centring on my rejection of topic neutrality as an appropriate way to set up the mind–body debate. In this surrejoinder to Williams, I present his three main arguments and respond to each: (1) The dualist rejection of topic neutrality is flawed because it expresses a conceptual approach to the mind–body problem instead of the preferable empirical approach. The latter favours physicalism and, in any case, clearly supports topic neutrality. (2) If the dualist rejects the first argument, then a second parity thesis can be advanced in which an essentialist view of soul and the brain are presented in which each is essentially a thinking and feeling entity. Thus, an essentialist parity thesis is preserved. (3) If the dualist rejects the second argument, a new topic neutrality emerges in the dialectic, so topic neutrality is unavoidable. Against the first argument, I claim that Williams makes two central confusions that undermine his case and that he fails to show how the mind–body debate can be settled empirically. Against the second argument, I claim that it leaves Williams vulnerable to a topic-neutral approach to God and it merely proffers a verbal shift with a new dualism between normal and ‘special’ matter. Against the third argument, I point out that it misrepresents the dualist viewpoint and leads to two counterintuitive features that follow from topic neutrality.


1996 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 413-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sonia Sedivy

The idea of nonconceptual contents proposes that there are mental contents at the level of the experiencing person that are individuated independently of ‘anything to do with the mind.’ Such contents are posited to meet a variety of theoretical and explanatory needs concerning concepts and conceptual mental contents which are individuated in terms having to do with the mind. So to examine the idea of nonconceptual content we need to examine whether we really need to posit such content and whether there is a coherent, viable way of doing so. I will examine the idea of nonconceptual contents by considering Christopher Peacocke's attempt, in his Study of Concepts, to posit such contents.Three principal kinds of considerations motivate positing non-conceptual content: epistemological, phenomenological, and explanatory-psychological. A theory of knowledge might posit nonconceptual content in order to show that our experience contains the justificatory base for empirical thought as its own proper part. Non-conceptual content might also be posited in order to account for the finely detailed or determinate phenomenological character of perceptual experience.


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