Competitive Clientelism and the Political Economy of Mining in Ghana
This chapter highlights the centrality of clientelist political pressures in explaining why over 100 years of mineral resource extraction has failed to translate into broad-based development in Ghana. Contrary to studies that highlight the role of inclusive political settlements for the effective management of mineral rents, we find that broad-based elite inclusion also risks undermining the effective management of rents for long-term development in contexts where rents are deployed with the aim of ‘buying-off’ elites who can potentially undermine the stability of ruling coalitions. All ruling coalitions have allocated significant shares of mineral rents to chiefs not necessarily for the socio-economic development of mineral-rich communities, but mainly because political elites want to avoid provoking resistance from a group that brokers land and votes in rural areas. Under such circumstances, inclusive political settlements may at best result in unproductive peace, as substantial mineral resources are shared for consumption rather than development.