scholarly journals Mainstream Value Information Push Strategy on Chinese Aggregation News Platform: Evolution, Modelling and Analysis

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (19) ◽  
pp. 11121
Author(s):  
Guohui Song ◽  
Yongbin Wang
Keyword(s):  
User Behavior ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Macro Level ◽  
Personalized Recommendation ◽  
Model Parameters ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Evolutionary Analysis ◽  
User Groups ◽  
Survey Results ◽  
Platform Evolution

At present, most news aggregation platforms use personalized recommendation technology to push information in China, which is likely to cause the phenomenon of information cocoons. In order to alleviate the occurrence of this phenomenon, this paper studies the issue of mainstream value information push from different perspectives, which can be used as a supplement for personalized recommendation technology to promote the diffusion of mainstream value information. First, we constructed an evolutionary game model to simulate the game process between news aggregation platforms and users. Through the results of evolutionary analysis, the news platform can be guided at a macro level to formulate mainstream value information push strategies by adjusting model parameters. Second, we conducted research on user behavior, and the results show that different user groups have different demands for mainstream value information. Third, we constructed two models from the perspective of user demands and platform revenue. Experiments show that user sensitivity to mainstream value information and platform evaluation factors are important for finding the number of mainstream information pushes on each page. Finally, we investigated the effect of the mainstream value information from Toutiao. The survey results are consistent with the viewpoints presented in this paper.

scholarly journals How to Promote Compliance Management in the Electricity Market? An Analysis Based on the Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luosong Jin ◽  
Cheng Chen ◽  
Yun Li ◽  
Xiangyang Wang ◽  
Yuanyuan Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Electricity Market ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolution Process ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Dynamic Evolution ◽  
Model Parameters ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Compliance Cost ◽  
Compliance Management ◽  
The Government

In this paper, we aim to analyze how to effectively promote compliance management in the electricity market. We construct an evolutionary game model under the two different scenarios, i.e., the scenario without governmental supervision and the scenario with governmental supervision, and explicitly describes the strategic behaviors and dynamic evolution process of power enterprises and regulators in the power market. According to the results of the evolutionary stable strategy, we find that, in the absence of governmental supervision, the long-term stable equilibrium of power enterprises' choice of strategy “Compliance” and regulatory agencies' choice of strategy “Not bribery” is hard to be realized. Only if the government effectively supervises the compliance management of the electricity market can the ideal compliance behavior of the two stakeholders be achieved. Furthermore, we conduct a simulation study to analyze the impacts of the various model parameters on the dynamic evolution process. The specific results show that the lower compliance cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger profit loss of the power enterprises, as well as the lower inspection cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger rewards of the regulatory agencies, can promote the formation of compliance management. Besides, the larger penalty charged by the government is also conducive to the compliance management of the electricity market.

The Evolutionary Analysis of Agricultural Production Transaction Under The Price Subsidy Policy

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-97
Author(s):  
Jianhua Huang ◽  
YanDang Chen ◽  
Shan He
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Social Benefits ◽  
Small Scale ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Evolutionary Analysis ◽  
Scale Production ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
Price Subsidy

The scattered and small-scale production mode together with asymmetric business information results in the Chinese peasants' weak position in the agricultural supply chain. Chinese government has implemented some effective measures to safeguard the peasants' benefits. By establishing a tripartite evolutionary game model among the peasants, agricultural products dealers and government under the policy of price subsidy, the effects of social benefits, the size of the penalty and the transaction volume on the evolutionary stable strategy is discussed. A simulation instance is also given to demonstrate the evolutionary game model. The results shows that the probability of government regulation is not only related to the social benefits of regulation, but also affected by the transaction volume of agricultural products, the peasants benefits can be protected effectively by the price subsidy policy and the probability of the agricultural products dealers choosing fraud strategy declines with the increase of penalty and increases with the transaction volume of agricultural products.

scholarly journals A Study of Taxi Service Mode Choice Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Zhu Bai ◽  
Mingxia Huang ◽  
Shuai Bian ◽  
Huandong Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Mode Choice ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable States ◽  
Taxi Service ◽  
Service Mode ◽  
The Impact

The emergence of online car-hailing service provides an innovative approach to vehicle booking but has negatively influenced the taxi industry in China. This paper modeled taxi service mode choice based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The modes included the dispatching and online car-hailing modes. We constructed an EGT framework, including determining the strategies and the payoff matrix. We introduced different behaviors, including taxi company management, driver operation, and passenger choice. This allowed us to model the impact of these behaviors on the evolving process of service mode choice. The results show that adjustments in taxi company, driver, and passenger behaviors impact the evolutionary path and convergence speed of our evolutionary game model. However, it also reveals that, regardless of adjustments, the stable states in the game model remain unchanged. The conclusion provides a basis for studying taxi system operation and management.

Evolutionary game analysis of information sharing by institutional investors

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Hua Li ◽  
Qingqing Lou ◽  
Qiubai Sun ◽  
Bowen Li
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Relationship Network ◽  
The Relationship

In order to solve the conflict of interests of institutional investors, this paper uses evolutionary game model. From the point of view of information sharing, this paper discusses four different situations. Only when the sum of risk and cost is less than the penalty of free riding, the evolution of institutional investors will eventually incline to the stable state of information sharing. That is, the phenomenon of hugging. The research shows that the institutional investors are not independent of each other, but the relationship network of institutional investors for the purpose of information exchange. The content of this paper enriches the research on information sharing of institutional investors.

scholarly journals Research on Cooperative Innovation Behavior of Industrial Cluster Based on Subject Adaptability

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaohui Jia ◽  
Minghui Jiang ◽  
Lei Shi
Keyword(s):  
Steady State ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Industrial Cluster ◽  
Industrial Clusters ◽  
Government Support ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Cooperative Innovation ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

From the perspective of the interactive cooperation among subjects, this paper portrays the process of cooperative innovation in industrial cluster, in order to capture the correlated equilibrium relationship among them. Through the utilization of two key tools, evolutionary stable strategy and replicator dynamics equations, this paper considers the cost and gains of cooperative innovation and the amount of government support as well as other factors to build and analyze a classic evolutionary game model. On this basis, the subject’s own adaptability is introduced, which is regarded as the system noise in the stochastic evolutionary game model so as to analyze the impact of adaptability on the game strategy selection. The results show that, in the first place, without considering subjects’ adaptability, their cooperation in industrial clusters depends on the cost and gains of innovative cooperation, the amount of government support, and some conditions that can promote cooperation, namely, game steady state. In the second place after the introduction of subjects’ adaptability, it will affect both game theory selection process and time, which means that the process becomes more complex, presents the nonlinear characteristics, and helps them to make faster decisions in their favor, but the final steady state remains unchanged.

scholarly journals Analysis of Smooth Implementation of Industry Poverty Alleviation considering Government Supervision

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Haifeng Yao ◽  
Jiangyue Fu
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Poverty Alleviation ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Parameter Design ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
The Government

Vigorous implementation of industrial poverty alleviation is the fundamental path and core power of poverty alleviation in impoverished areas. Enterprises and poor farmers are the main participants in industry poverty alleviation. Government supervision measures regulate their behaviors. This study investigates how to smoothly implement industry poverty alleviation projects considering government supervision. A game model is proposed based on the evolutionary game theory. It analyses the game processes between enterprises and poor farmers with and without government supervision based on the proposed model. It is shown that poverty alleviation projects will fail without government supervision given that the equilibrium point (0, 0) is the ultimate convergent point of the system but will possibly succeed with government supervision since the equilibrium points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are the ultimate convergent point of the system, where equilibrium point (1, 1) is our desired results. Different supervision modes have different effects on the game process. This study considers three supervision modes, namely, only reward mode, only penalty mode, and reward and penalty mode, and investigates the parameter design for the reward and penalty mode. The obtained results are helpful for the government to develop appropriate policies for the smooth implementation of industry poverty alleviation projects.

scholarly journals A Geological and Spatial Approach to Prehistoric Archaeological Surveys on Small Islands: Case Studies from Maluku Barat Daya, Indonesia

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shimona Kealy ◽  
Lucas Wattimena ◽  
Sue O'Connor
Keyword(s):  
Satellite Images ◽  
Ground Truth ◽  
Develop Model ◽  
Archaeological Sites ◽  
Model Parameters ◽  
Small Islands ◽  
Archaeological Survey ◽  
Spatial Approach ◽  
Island Group ◽  
Survey Results

Survei arkeologi sangat penting untuk penemuan dan interpretasi sisa-sisa yang ditinggalkan oleh aktivitas manusia prasejarah. Saat ini penginderaan jarak jauh dan model prediktif telah meningkatkan jangkauan dan keberhasilan survei arkeologi, namun survei pejalan kaki untuk mengembangkan parameter model dan prediksi kebenaran dasar masih penting untuk keberhasilan suatu penemuan. Penelitian ini merupakan hasil survei arkeologi tahun 2017 di Pulau Babar Besar dan Pulau Wetang yang termasuk dalam bagian dari kelompok Kepulauan Babar, Maluku Barat Daya, Indonesia. Tercatat sebanyak 62 situs arkeologi ditemukan di kedua pulau tersebut, tujuh diantaranya merupakan situs lukisan cadas baru yang ditemukan di Pulau Wetang. Hasil survei ini menunjukkan keberhasilan penggunaan peta geologi dan topografi di samping citra satelit dalam mendeteksi daerah prospektif untuk survei. Hasil penelitian ini juga menunjukkan bahwa pemahaman karakteristik geologi daerah yang lebih rinci dan komparatif diperlukan sebelum dilakukan survei jarak jauh yang lebih lanjut di wilayah Maluku Barat Daya, Indonesia.Archaeological surveys are essential to the discovery and interpretation of remains left by past human activities. While remote sensing and predictive models have greatly improved the reach and success of archaeological survey, pedestrian surveys to develop model parameters and ground-truth predictions is still imperative for successful discoveries. Here we present the results of the 2017 archaeological survey of islands Babar Besar and Wetang in the Babar Island Group, Maluku Barat Daya, Indonesia. A total of 62 archaeological sites were recorded between the two islands; seven of which represent new rock art sites on Wetang island. Our survey results indicate the successful use of geological and topographic maps alongside satellite images in detecting prospective regions for survey. Results also indicate however that a more detailed and comparative understanding of the regions geology is required before more advanced forms of remote survey are conducted in the Maluku Barat Daya region.

scholarly journals Research on the Collaborative Application of BIM in EPC Projects: The Perspective of Cooperation between Owners and General Contractors

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Chengshuang Sun ◽  
Min Wang ◽  
Fengyong Zhai
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Simulation ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Dynamic Method ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
Game Model ◽  
General Contractors ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
Reducing Costs ◽  
Collaborative Application

As an effective way to reduce costs and increase efficiency of EPC projects, BIM technology has drawn a lot of attention in numerous countries. Existing studies have failed to reveal the BIM decision-making mechanisms of owners and general contractors in EPC projects in a dynamic method. This study investigates the underlying logic of the collaboration application of BIM by analyzing the dynamic behaviors of owners and general contractors based on evolutionary game model. The results show that the most effective suggestions to promote the BIM collaboration application in EPC projects are “increasing the proportion of BIM application initially strategies,” “increasing incremental revenue of BIM collaborative application,” “reducing costs of BIM collaboration application,” “avoiding excessive hitchhiking,” and “establishing reasonable reward and punishment mechanism.” On the basis of numerical simulation to illustrate the influence of the different initial strategies and parameters on the final decision in different situations, five solutions were proposed for the effective BIM collaboration application between owners and general contractors. This article can facilitate researchers pondering the dynamics of collaboration among stakeholders in projects, and it can also facilitate participants picking up proper strategies for improved collaboration.

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