scholarly journals Post-Islamism Redefined: Towards a politics of post-Islamism

Author(s):  
Milad Dokhanchi

Problematizing Asef Bayat’s notion of “post-Islamism,” this article proposes an alternative definition for the concept, having in mind the case of Iran. The current conception of the term “post-Islamism” may be challenged via a survey of post-revolutionary Islamist movements that resisted the state and as well as Ayatollah’s Khomeini’s concession to the concept maslahat (expediency), through which state expressed preference for modern reason over sharia law. The case of Islamists contesting state power questions the monolithic image of Islamism drawn by Bayat as movements longing to create a state based on the doctrine of velāyat-e faqih. Also Khomeini’s concession to maslahat indicates that the Islamic state must be seen as one of the participants in “post”-Islamist secularizing trends in Iran. Hence, Bayat’s post-Islamism was more of an inevitable political phenomenon adopted by the state itself than a conscious project adopted by Muslim secularist intellectual figures seeking to put an end to Islamism. Unlike Bayat’s post-Islamism, which celebrates the end or a “break” from an Islamist paradigm, this article then invites readers to expose Islamism to post-modern critique, the result of which would not be a negation but rather a revival of Islamism that takes into account the contingencies of the post-modern condition. Similar to post-Marxism and post-anarchism, post-Islamism maintains the ethos of the traditional canon, Islamism in this case, while rejecting its authoritarian and universalist tendencies. A post-Islamist politics has yet to emerge, yet its introductory philosophical foundations have been already developed in the 1990s by figures such as Abdolkarism Soroush and Morteza Avini. Soroush’s post-Islamism, however, ultimately landed in a modernist liberal episteme, hence remained Islamist, while Avini, despite his support for the state, offered a much more radical critique of Islamism while remaining faithful to its ethos.

1991 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-234
Author(s):  
Louay M. Safi

IntroductionThe purpose of this paper is to delineate the basic elements involvedin the concept of the Islamic state and to clarify the basis and scope of politicalpower. More specifically, discussions will focus on the purpose of the Islamicstate, the source of political legitimacy, and the scope of state power. I willcontend that a clear distinction should be made between the role and purposeof the state and those of the ummah, for only through the separation of theresponsibilities and objectives of the two can the injunctions of the Shari‘ahand the principles of revelation be properly observed.Historical BackgroundAlthough the word “state” (dawlah) was first used in the Qur’an, almostsix centuries had to elapse before the word was given its first technical definitionby Muslim scholars. The word dawlah was mentioned once in the Qur’an(in 59:7) in connection with the distribution of the fay’ (the property Muslimsappropriated from the Banu al Nadr upon the latter‘s expulsion from Madinah).The Qur’an justified this departure from the usual practice of dividing thespoils among the fighters by referring to the divine intention of preventingthe circulation of wealth among a small group within the society?Up until the late fifth century, one could hardly find any reference tothe state in Muslim literature, or in Western literature for that matter. Otherterms such as al amsar or dar al Islam were employed whenever a referencewas made to the territories under Muslim control. Alternatively, the stateas a political body was identified by its political organs, i.e., al khilafah, ...


2020 ◽  
pp. 218-242
Author(s):  
James Pickett

This chapter assesses the ulama's relationship with state power. By the long nineteenth century, the ulama stood as a pillar of the state, limited though that state was. Islamic scholars systematically deployed their diverse Persianate skill set and leveraged Islamic knowledge on behalf of the Turkic nobility. Nevertheless, the ulama still envisioned the state as an Islamic state, and they carefully guarded their moral prerogative to speak for the religion both groups agreed had a total monopoly on politics and social life. Although in certain instances evidence exists of this most important of prerogatives — the authority to legitimately speak for religion — shifting in favor of the Turkic military elite, the ulama cultivated a spirit of moral independence and superiority to the state.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (5) ◽  
pp. 146-162
Author(s):  
Sead Bandžović ◽  

With the overthrow of the regime of Reza Pahlavi in 1979, the Iranian revolution ended the existence of the 2,500-year-old Persian Empire and built the Islamic Republic of Iran on its foundations. The revolution was the product of three independent social structures that merged at one point. One was the structure of constitutionalism that grew out of a century-long struggle for democracy supported by modernists; the second was Islamism as a movement to set Sharia law as the primary law supported by rural elements in society in response to Western urban elites and accepted by merchants; and the third is the nationalist structure, driven by rage fueled by Iran's long subordination to European powers. The basic principle of the Islamic Republic of Iran, proclaimed by the new constitution from 1979, is the positioning of God as the supreme bearer of people's sovereignty and people who are only marginal representatives of his power on Earth. Ayatollah Homenini, the supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution and the Iranian state, in this regard created a thesis about the Islamic State as a political representation, created on the basis of the people's will, in order to enforce God's laws. In practice, such system meant setting up Sharia (religious) laws as the only source of law in regulating social, legal and other relations within the community. A dichotomy has been created in the management of the state, so there are two groups of authorities. The first, the conciliar, consists of the Supreme leader, the Council of Guardians (Shora-ye Negahban-e Qanun-e assassi), the Council of Experts (Majles-e Khobragan Rahbari) and the Judgment Council. The task of these councils is to oversee the activities of all levels of government in order to preserve the unity, sovereignty and integrity of the Iranian political system. The conciliar government supervises and advises the republican part of the government, ie. its legislative, executive and judicial aspects. In addition to conciliar government, there is a republican government that creates laws and political decisions in accordance with religious teachings and under the supervision of theocratic political institutions. All laws and court decisions must be based on the principles of the Qur'an, and their proper interpretation requires an understanding of religious principles. On the basis of the constitution, a special High Judicial Council was established, which amended the pre-revolutionary laws (criminal, commercial, civil and procedural), thus creating the so-called “Transitional law”. The biggest changes affected the area of criminal law, where the principle of talion revenge was introduced (“an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”) and the strict punishment of extramarital relations and same-sex relationships. In the domain of marital and family law, a man is given a number of rights, thus putting the woman, as a marital partner, in a more unequal position. Husbands were facilitated in divorce, temporary marriages with more than one woman were allowed, while on the other hand women were allowed the right to divorce only if it was explicitly allowed by her husband during the marriage. The revolution also introduced new sources in the regulation of legal relations. Thus, by an order of the Supreme Judicial Council of 23 August 1982, judges were ordered to use direct authoritative Islamic texts or sources on which to base their judgments in resolving disputes. Judges are required by this Order to address the Council of Guardians of the Constitution if they cannot determine with certainty whether a regulation is in accordance with Sharia law or not. If the judge does not know which law to apply, he must contact the Office of Ayatollah Khomeini for further instructions. In addition to the internal one, the revolution caused radical changes in the foreign policy field, positioning Iran as an important participant in numerous international processes at the regional and global level.


1970 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 284-295
Author(s):  
Muridan Muridan

M. Natsir was one of the most prominent figures in religious discourse and movement in Indonesia. He was ada’wa reformer as well as a politician and a statesman.His most well known ideas were about the relationship between Islamand state, Islam and Pancasila, and his idea on da’wa. He stated that a country would be Islamic because of neither itsformal name as an Islamic state nor its Islamic state principles. The principles of the state could be generally formulated aslong as they referred to the Islamic values. Natsir also stated that the essence of Pancasila didn’t contradict with Islam; evensome parts of it went after the goals of Islam. However, it didn’t mean that Pancasila was identical with Islam. In relation toda’wa, he stated that it should be the responsibility of all Muslims, not only the responsibility of kiai or ulama. To make a da’wamovement successful, he suggested that it needed three integrated components; masjid, Islamic boarding school, andcampus.


1970 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-74
Author(s):  
Muridan Muridan

M. Natsir was one of the most prominent figures in religious discourse and movement in Indonesia. He was ada’wa reformer as well as a politician and a statesman. His most well known ideas were about the relationship between Islamand state, Islam and Pancasila, and his idea on da’wa. He stated that a country would be Islamic because of neither itsformal name as an Islamic state nor its Islamic state principles. The principles of the state could be generally formulated aslong as they referred to the Islamic values. Natsir also stated that the essence of Pancasila didn’t contradict with Islam; evensome parts of it went after the goals of Islam. However, it didn’t mean that Pancasila was identical with Islam. In relation toda’wa, he stated that it should be the responsibility of all Muslims, not only the responsibility of kyai or ulama. To make ada’wamovement successful, he suggested that it needed three integrated components; masjid, Islamic boarding school, andcampus.


2019 ◽  
Vol 35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Quraysha Bibi Ismail Sooliman

This paper considers the effect of violence on the emotions of IS fighters and the resultant consequences of those emotions as a factor in their choice to use violence. By interrogating the human aspect of the fighters, I am focusing not on religion but on human agency as a factor in the violence. In this regard, this paper is about reorienting the question about the violence of IS not as “religious” violence but as a response to how these fighters perceive what is happening to them and their homeland. It is about politicising the political, about the violence of the state and its coalition of killing as opposed to a consistent effort to frame the violence into an explanation of “extremist religious ideology.” This shift in analysis is significant because of the increasing harm that is caused by the rise in Islamophobia where all Muslims are considered “radical” and are dehumanised. This is by no means a new project; rather it reflects the ongoing project of distortion of and animosity toward Islam, the suspension of ethics and the naturalisation of war. It is about an advocacy for war by hegemonic powers and (puppet regimes) states against racialised groups in the name of defending liberal values. Furthermore, the myth of religious violence has served to advance the goals of power which have been used in domestic and foreign policy to marginalise and dehumanise Muslims and to portray the violence of the secular state as a justified intervention in order to protect Western civilisation and the secular subject.


Author(s):  
Оlena Fedorіvna Caracasidi

The article deals with the fundamental, inherent in most of the countries of the world transformation of state power, its formation, functioning and division between the main branches as a result of the decentralization of such power, its subsidiarity. Attention is drawn to the specifics of state power, its func- tional features in the conditions of sovereignty of the states, their interconnec- tion. It is emphasized that the nature of the state power is connected with the nature of the political system of the state, with the form of government and many other aspects of a fundamental nature.It is analyzed that in the middle of national states the questions of legitima- cy, sovereignty of transparency of state power, its formation are acutely raised. Concerning the practical functioning of state power, a deeper study now needs a problem of separation of powers and the distribution of power. The use of this principle, which ensures the real subsidiarity of the authorities, the formation of more effective, responsible democratic relations between state power and civil society, is the first priority of the transformation of state power in the conditions of modern transformations of countries and societies. It is substantiated that the research of these problems will open up much wider opportunities for the provi- sion of state power not as a center authority, but also as a leading political structure but as a power of the people and the community. In the context of global democratization processes, such processes are crucial for a more humanistic and civilized arrangement of human life. It is noted that local self-government, as a specific form of public power, is also characterized by an expressive feature of a special subject of power (territorial community) as a set of large numbers of people; joint communal property; tax system, etc.


2019 ◽  
pp. 27-37
Author(s):  
V.A. Morozov

The article analyzes the state of public health on the example of domestic and foreign statistics, as well as prospects for its development and improvement. The state of relations and forms of interaction of budgetary medical institutions (state, municipal) with private clinics, as well as directly private clinics with the structures of municipal and state power are considered. The directions and ways of interaction of power and business structures for improvement of methods and forms of service of patients on the basis of indicators of values and innovations are offered.


Author(s):  
Arjun Chowdhury

This chapter offers an alternative view of the incidence and duration of insurgencies in the postcolonial world. Insurgencies and civil wars are seen as the primary symptom of state weakness, the inability of the central government to monopolize violence. Challenging extant explanations that identify poverty and low state capacity as the cause of insurgencies, the chapter shows that colonial insurgencies, also occurring in the context of poverty and state weakness, were shorter and ended in regime victories, while contemporary insurgencies are longer and states are less successful at subduing them. The reason for this is the development of exclusive identities—based on ethnicity, religion, tribe—in the colonial period. These identities serve as bases for mobilization to challenge state power and demand services from the state. Either way, such mobilization means that popular demands for services exceed the willingness to disarm and/or pay taxes, that is, to supply the state.


Author(s):  
Eva Steiner

This chapter examines the law of contract in France and discusses the milestone reform of French contract law. While this new legislation introduces a fresh equilibrium between the contracting parties and enhances accessibility and legal certainty in contract, it does not radically change the state of the law in this area. In addition, it does not strongly impact the traditional philosophical foundations of the law of contract. The reform, in short, looks more like a tidying up operation rather than a far-reaching transformation of the law. Therefore, the chapter argues that it is questionable whether the new law, which was also intended to increase France's attractiveness against the background of a world market dominated by the Common Law, will keep its promise.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document