The problem of trust and modern Russian pension system
The paper attempts to identify the relationship between trust viewed through private good, club good, private external effects and public good, and pension systems, presented in the form of vertical and horizontal social contracts. Guided by the typology of benefits in the analysis of trust, the author argues: trust in a horizontal pension contract develops in a network of transactions regarding the production of a pension good and is a combination of its various types. In a vertical contract, the possibilities of individuals' retirement planning and the position of private structures in the pension market are limited, that reduces the role of trust as a private and club good and strengthens the importance of trust in the form of a public good. The author shows that in a horizontal pension contract, trust is a basic prerequisite for all pension interactions. The effectiveness of a horizontal pension contract depends on the level of trust: low trust increases transaction costs and makes pension planning unviable. The author concludes that in conditions of low confidence, satisfaction of pension needs is easier to organize through a vertical type contract in which pension needs are satisfied centrally. At the same time, low trust of Russians to pension institutions is the result of a vertical pension contract.