The Game Analysis of Emergency Disposal of Government from the Perspective of Information Transmission

2014 ◽  
Vol 687-691 ◽  
pp. 5052-5056
Author(s):  
Jian Tao Zhao ◽  
Li Min Zhou ◽  
Tao Gao ◽  
He Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Information Transmission ◽  
Emergency Treatment ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Reasonable Explanation ◽  
Transmission Of Information ◽  
The Government ◽  
Use Of Internet

With the wide use of internet and we-media, the process of emergency treatment of government developed into the process of information transmission and the game of the stakeholders. Firstly, the formation of this process has been demonstrated. Then from the perspective of government we analyzed the constitution of game, the types and the interest demands of stakeholders. And then from the perspective of the game we analyzed the emergency behavior and the profit of the government. The game model was constructed based on the transmission of information, so as to provide a reasonable explanation for the emergence disposal of government. Finally, according to the study some suggestions for government have been given.

Game Model of Homebuyer’s Behavior under Housing Security System

2011 ◽  
Vol 204-210 ◽  
pp. 1239-1244
Author(s):  
Wei Qi Guo ◽  
Shao Rong Sun ◽  
Xiao Li Cui
Keyword(s):  
Affordable Housing ◽  
Theoretical Basis ◽  
Economic Benefit ◽  
Critical Value ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Effective Management ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Housing Security ◽  
Economically Affordable Housing ◽  
The Government

Economically affordable housing (EAH) system is aimed to resolve the housing problem for people without housing or poorly-housed families. However, driven by the economic benefit, increasing homebuyers ineligible to purchase EAH provide fake materials to acquire EAH, which makes EAH system deviate from its original aim. In the paper, we put forth the critical value of surveillance intensity by the government through the game analysis on the government and the fraudulent purchasers and conclude that the fraudulent purchase can be effectively controlled as long as the critical value is satisfied. Based on this, punishment measures and intensities for the fraudulent purchase are surveyed and quantified, and thus come up with the various supervision and surveillance intensities needed by the government for each punishment measure. This provides a theoretical basis and quantitative standard for the government to formulate an effective management system.

scholarly journals The Game Analysis of Manufacturers’ Political Connections on Product Safety in Supply Chain: Evidence from China

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhao Na ◽  
Wang Fusheng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Product Safety ◽  
Political Connections ◽  
The Political ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Product Protection ◽  
The Government ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

This paper studied the political connections on product safety in supply chain. In market economy, information asymmetry exists throughout the entirety of supply chains that ought to ensure product safety. Due to the existence of game relations between the government and manufacturers in the aspects of product safety and regulation, the formation of market equilibrium depends on political connections between the government and manufacturers. Based on study and analyses of a static game model and a dynamic game model, this paper reveals that governments and manufacturers must use positive political connections to achieve product protection and supervision of safety throughout the supply chain. On the other hand, negative political connections lead to losses of both governmental credibility and social profits. This study indicates that inherent mechanism of political connections exists in the supply chain; it will help to enrich the theory of supply chain.

Evolutionary game analysis of information sharing by institutional investors

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Hua Li ◽  
Qingqing Lou ◽  
Qiubai Sun ◽  
Bowen Li
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Relationship Network ◽  
The Relationship

In order to solve the conflict of interests of institutional investors, this paper uses evolutionary game model. From the point of view of information sharing, this paper discusses four different situations. Only when the sum of risk and cost is less than the penalty of free riding, the evolution of institutional investors will eventually incline to the stable state of information sharing. That is, the phenomenon of hugging. The research shows that the institutional investors are not independent of each other, but the relationship network of institutional investors for the purpose of information exchange. The content of this paper enriches the research on information sharing of institutional investors.

scholarly journals Government Reward-Penalty Mechanism in Closed-Loop Supply Chain Based on Dynamics Game Theory

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoqing Zhang ◽  
Yingsheng Su ◽  
Xigang Yuan
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Fixed Cost ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Recovery Ratio ◽  
Sale Price ◽  
Product Sale ◽  
Weee Recycling ◽  
The Government ◽  
Buy Back

The paper discusses the government reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) between two competing manufacturers and a recycler in closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) under asymmetric information. According to the dynamics game theory and principal-agent theory, three decision-making models are built: (1) decentralized dynamics game model without RPM, (2) decentralized dynamics game model with carbon emission RPM, and (3) decentralized dynamics game model with carbon emission RPM and recovery ratio RPM. The results show that (1) the carbon emission RPM increases product sale price, while it decreases the WEEE buy-back price and the WEEE recovery ratio, besides the profit of recycler. To some extent, it cannot motivate WEEE recycling. (2) Recovery ratio RPM improves the WEEE recovery ratio and lowers the product sale price; it also benefits manufacturer-1’s and recycler’s profits and consumers’ surplus. So it strongly proved effectiveness in guiding WEEE recycling. (3) In any case, the product sale price of manufacture-1 is lower than that of manufacturer-2. Similarly, the WEEE buy-back price and WEEE recovery ratio with H type are higher than those of L type, respectively. Apparently, it is suggested that the manufacturer participating in WEEE recycling and remanufacturing can gain competitive advantages; meanwhile, the recycler with high fixed cost has the scale advantages. (4) The competition can benefit improving WEEE recovery ratio. A numerical simulation is given to examine the theoretical results. According to the main conclusions, we propose that taking active part in recycling and remanufacturing WEEE and choosing the recycler with high fixed cost to cooperate are the wise choices for manufacturers. The recycler should expand fixed recovery cost investment, which will contribute to getting the scale effect; the government needs to balance the carbon emission RPM and recovery ratio RPM so as to cut down environmental pollution and guide the CLSC into WEEE recycling and remanufacturing. The most important carbon emission reward-penalty intensity should be set appropriately in case of discouraging members of CLSC recycling WEEE.

scholarly journals Analysis of Smooth Implementation of Industry Poverty Alleviation considering Government Supervision

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Haifeng Yao ◽  
Jiangyue Fu
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Poverty Alleviation ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Parameter Design ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
The Government

Vigorous implementation of industrial poverty alleviation is the fundamental path and core power of poverty alleviation in impoverished areas. Enterprises and poor farmers are the main participants in industry poverty alleviation. Government supervision measures regulate their behaviors. This study investigates how to smoothly implement industry poverty alleviation projects considering government supervision. A game model is proposed based on the evolutionary game theory. It analyses the game processes between enterprises and poor farmers with and without government supervision based on the proposed model. It is shown that poverty alleviation projects will fail without government supervision given that the equilibrium point (0, 0) is the ultimate convergent point of the system but will possibly succeed with government supervision since the equilibrium points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are the ultimate convergent point of the system, where equilibrium point (1, 1) is our desired results. Different supervision modes have different effects on the game process. This study considers three supervision modes, namely, only reward mode, only penalty mode, and reward and penalty mode, and investigates the parameter design for the reward and penalty mode. The obtained results are helpful for the government to develop appropriate policies for the smooth implementation of industry poverty alleviation projects.

scholarly journals DEFENDING THE STATE THROUGH LOCAL FOOD CAMPAIGN ON INTERNET MEDIA

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lusia Handayani ◽  
Munawar K. Nahrawi
Keyword(s):  
Local Food ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Political Stability ◽  
The State ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Internet Media ◽  
The Government ◽  
State Defense ◽  
Use Of Internet

<p>Food is the fundamental right of every human being. Communities or nations that are not satisfied with food sufficiency will have the potential to cause economic instability and even to bring down a government. Dependence on rice as a staple food can threaten economic and political stability when food is not adequately covered. One alternative that can be made to avoid the threat is to switch to other carbohydrates-based foods that grow in Indonesia, including sweet potato, cassava, arrowroot, and ganyong. However, those local food variety is still considered as second-class food, due to the persistence to rice-eating culture. Therefore, there is a necessity to create a local food campaign on internet media. The Internet is now growing into a medium capable to reach all kinds of people in a quick and precise manner. This descriptive study uses secondary data such as books and journals related to state defense and food security. The study finds that the use of internet as a medium for local food campaign to the community has not been implemented optimally, both by the government and non-government. In line with the rapid development of the internet and the importance of defending the country in all aspects, local food campaigns through internet media require the participation of all stakeholders.</p><p align="left"> </p><strong>Keywords</strong>: defending of the state, local food campaign, internet

scholarly journals Can Digitalization Help Deter Corruption in Africa?

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (68) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rasmané Ouedraogo ◽  
Amadou Sy
Keyword(s):  
Information And Communication Technology ◽  
Communication Technology ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Local Level ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Information And Communication ◽  
The Government ◽  
Submarine Cables ◽  
Use Of Internet

This paper studies the effect of digitalization on the perception of corruption and trust in tax officials in Africa. Using individual-level data from Afrobarometer surveys and several indices of digitalization, we find that an increase in digital adoption is associated with a reduction in the perception of corruption and an increase in trust in tax officials. Exploiting the exogeneous deployment of submarine cables at the local level, the paper provides evidence of a negative impact of the use of Internet on the perception of corruption. Yet, the paper shows that the dampening effect of digitalization on corruption is hindered in countries where the government has a pattern of intentionally shutting down the Internet, while countries that successfully promote information and communication technology (ICT) enjoy a more amplified effect.

scholarly journals How to Promote Compliance Management in the Electricity Market? An Analysis Based on the Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luosong Jin ◽  
Cheng Chen ◽  
Yun Li ◽  
Xiangyang Wang ◽  
Yuanyuan Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Electricity Market ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolution Process ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Dynamic Evolution ◽  
Model Parameters ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Compliance Cost ◽  
Compliance Management ◽  
The Government

In this paper, we aim to analyze how to effectively promote compliance management in the electricity market. We construct an evolutionary game model under the two different scenarios, i.e., the scenario without governmental supervision and the scenario with governmental supervision, and explicitly describes the strategic behaviors and dynamic evolution process of power enterprises and regulators in the power market. According to the results of the evolutionary stable strategy, we find that, in the absence of governmental supervision, the long-term stable equilibrium of power enterprises' choice of strategy “Compliance” and regulatory agencies' choice of strategy “Not bribery” is hard to be realized. Only if the government effectively supervises the compliance management of the electricity market can the ideal compliance behavior of the two stakeholders be achieved. Furthermore, we conduct a simulation study to analyze the impacts of the various model parameters on the dynamic evolution process. The specific results show that the lower compliance cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger profit loss of the power enterprises, as well as the lower inspection cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger rewards of the regulatory agencies, can promote the formation of compliance management. Besides, the larger penalty charged by the government is also conducive to the compliance management of the electricity market.

scholarly journals Game analysis of stakeholders’ actions affecting the development of green buildings

2018 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 03081
Author(s):  
Shuyuan Zhao ◽  
Yihui Huang
Keyword(s):  
Green Buildings ◽  
Ecological Environment ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
The Government

As the government pays more attention to the ecological environment, the momentum of green buildings in China has developed rapidly in recent years. However, the continuous and good development of green buildings is also related to the attitude of developers and consumers. This paper analyzes the game from the perspectives of the government, developers and consumers, and provides feasible suggestions for the development of green buildings in China.

An evolutionary game analysis of user-pay public–private partnership projects

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Danrong Song ◽  
Jinbo Song ◽  
Hehui Yuan ◽  
Yu Fan
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Successful Implementation ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
The Public

PurposeWith the growing demand for infrastructure and public services in recent years, PPP-UP have attracted a great deal of attention. However, while the user focuses on the payment for use and the private sector is concerned with its return on investment, the public sector pays more attention to the efficient utilization of public funds. In order to analyze the willingness of each stakeholder to join PPP-UP, an evolutionary game model involving the three parties is constructed.Design/methodology/approachAn evolutionary game model is established that considers the users and the public and private sectors in user-pay public-private-partnership projects (PPP-UP). Eight scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. A situation where all three players are willing to cooperate in theory is also examined. The key influencing parameters that affect cooperation behaviors are further discussed.FindingsFirst, the results illustrate that by properly adjusting the influencing factors, the cooperation status among the three parties can be changed along with certain evolutionary trends. Second, it is hard to modify unsatisfactory evolutionary stability by small changes in both the price compensation of and the construction and operation compensation. Third, it is necessary to involve the users in the decision-making process in PPP-UP and take their demands regarding benefits and payments into account.Originality/valueIn this paper, we focus on PPP-UP to research interactions among the public and private sectors and the users. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, to facilitate the successful implementation and development of a project, several conditions are needed to ensure tripartite cooperation. Several recommendations are then proposed for decision-makers in PPP-UP.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document