scholarly journals voix du "moi" dans Enfance de Nathalie Sarraute

2021 ◽  
pp. 723-745
Author(s):  
Antonella Lipscomb

Si la autobiografía constituye el reino privilegiado del relato en primera persona, Nathalie Sarraute adopta en Enfance(1983) un procedimiento original: el diálogo. En su relato, la alternancia de la primera y la segunda persona del singular permite simular un diálogo entre dos instancias de un mismo “yo”. El presente artículo analizará este desdoblamiento interior orquestado por dos voces narrativas donde afloran las voces implícitas que han marcado el pasado de la autora – las voces de la madre, del padre y de la madrastra, Véra. Toda una polifonía de voces vivas, tan intactas como los recuerdos evocados. If autobiography is the privileged field of the first person narrative, Nathalie Sarraute adopts in Enfance(1983) an original procedure: the dialogue. In her autobiography, the alternation between first and second person singular enable to simulate a dialogue between two instances of the self. This article entitled “Voices of the self in Nathalie Sarraute’s Enfance” aims to analyse this interior duality orchestrated by the two narrative voices where the implicit voices that have shaped the writer’s childhood – voices of the mother, the father and the stepmother Véra – emerge from the past. A polyphony of living voices, as intact as the memories evoked. Si l’autobiographie est le domaine privilégié du récit à la première personne, Nathalie Sarraute adopte dans son autobiographie Enfance (1983) un procédé original: le dialogue. Dans son récit, l’alternance du début à la fin de la première et deuxième personnes du singulier est là pour simuler un dialogue entre deux instances d’un même "moi". Un dédoublement intérieur orchestré par deux voix narratives où se glissent les voix implicites qui ont marqué le passé de l’auteur, à savoir les voix de la mère, du père et de la belle-mère Véra. Tout une polyphonie de voix vivantes, aussi intactes que les souvenirs évoqués.

2019 ◽  
pp. 91-104
Author(s):  
Allan Metcalf

Chapter 8 interrupts the narrative to explain the importance of the further development of “Guy” to “guy” or “guys.” It tells about the second-person personal pronouns of English from Old English times, a thousand years ago, to the present. These are words we regularly use in speech and writing: first-person singular “I” and plural “we,” third person “he, she, it” and “they,” and then the second person, which happens to have undergone major changes in the past few centuries. Originally the second-person singular was “thou,” the plural “you.” But then, like several other European languages, the second-person plural was seen as more polite than “thou,” so “you” became second-person singular too. That was fine, except now a listener couldn’t tell whether a speaker was referring just to the listener or to the whole group. So with “you” solidly entrenched as second-person singular, a substitute had to be found for second-person plural. One possibility was “y’all,” still preferred in the American South, but that can be used for the singular too. Eventually, while the vacancy remained empty two centuries later, a successful substitution emerged, none other than the “guys” most of use as second-person plural today.


Mnemosyne ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 10
Author(s):  
Christina Schoenberger

Autobiographical writing has been an integral part of literary research for decades. Which innovations does contemporary life writing contribute to the narration of the past? This paper focuses on the impact of narratological characteristics on the reconstruction of memory and self in Paul Auster’s Winter Journal (2012), an innovative autobiographical work which deviates from traditional life writing in that it is written in the second person. Considering Lejeune’s and Genette’s takes on second-person autobiography, this paper examines how the narrative situation in Winter Journal shapes subjectivity and temporality. As both protagonist and observer, the narratee oscillates between a distanced state of (critical) self-reflection and intimacy. This paper argues that by « reliving » the past through a dynamic dialogue with the self and the simultaneously addressed reader, the appellative function and the predominant use of the present tense enable a telescopic encounter with the past.


Pragmatics ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-112
Author(s):  
Hironori Nishi

Abstract The present study provides an overview of the quotative utterances made with itta (past form of iu ‘to say’) and itte ita (the combination of iu and the past form of the -te iru construction) in naturally occurring conversations in Japanese. The examination of approximately 13 hours of conversations shows that itta is used in 91.1% of first-person quotations (‘I said that…’). In second-person (‘you said that…’) and third-person (‘he/she said that…’) quotations, itte ita is used in 90.0%, and 77.3% of the cases, respectively. The present study argues that the high percentage of itte ita for second- and third-person quotative utterances is due to the fact that the -te iru construction, which is included in itte ita, is used as an evidential marker. The present study also analyzes the deviant cases from the dominant pattern (i.e. using itta for third-person utterances), and demonstrates how -te iru’s evidential function is utilized manipulatively in conversation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 189-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renatus Ziegler ◽  
Ulrich Weger

Abstract. In psychology, thinking is typically studied in terms of a range of behavioral or physiological parameters, focusing, for instance, on the mental contents or the neuronal correlates of the thinking process proper. In the current article, by contrast, we seek to complement this approach with an exploration into the experiential or inner dimensions of thinking. These are subtle and elusive and hence easily escape a mode of inquiry that focuses on externally measurable outcomes. We illustrate how a sufficiently trained introspective approach can become a radar for facets of thinking that have found hardly any recognition in the literature so far. We consider this an important complement to third-person research because these introspective observations not only allow for new insights into the nature of thinking proper but also cast other psychological phenomena in a new light, for instance, attention and the self. We outline and discuss our findings and also present a roadmap for the reader interested in studying these phenomena in detail.


This book addresses different linguistic and philosophical aspects of referring to the self in a wide range of languages from different language families, including Amharic, English, French, Japanese, Korean, Mandarin, Newari (Sino-Tibetan), Polish, Tariana (Arawak), and Thai. In the domain of speaking about oneself, languages use a myriad of expressions that cut across grammatical and semantic categories, as well as a wide variety of constructions. Languages of Southeast and East Asia famously employ a great number of terms for first-person reference to signal honorification. The number and mixed properties of these terms make them debatable candidates for pronounhood, with many grammar-driven classifications opting to classify them with nouns. Some languages make use of egophors or logophors, and many exhibit an interaction between expressing the self and expressing evidentiality qua the epistemic status of information held from the ego perspective. The volume’s focus on expressing the self, however, is not directly motivated by an interest in the grammar or lexicon, but instead stems from philosophical discussions of the special status of thoughts about oneself, known as de se thoughts. It is this interdisciplinary understanding of expressing the self that underlies this volume, comprising philosophy of mind at one end of the spectrum and cross-cultural pragmatics of self-expression at the other. This unprecedented juxtaposition results in a novel method of approaching de se and de se expressions, in which research methods from linguistics and philosophy inform each other. The importance of this interdisciplinary perspective on expressing the self cannot be overemphasized. Crucially, the volume also demonstrates that linguistic research on first-person reference makes a valuable contribution to research on the self tout court, by exploring the ways in which the self is expressed, and thereby adding to the insights gained through philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science.


Author(s):  
András Bárány

This chapter turns to object agreement with personal pronouns in Hungarian. Pronouns are interesting because they do not always trigger agreement with the verb: first person objects never trigger object agreement (morphology), and second person pronouns only do with first person singular subjects. It is proposed that the distribution of object agreement is a morphological effect and argues that all personal pronouns do in fact trigger agreement, but agreement is not always spelled out. This means that Hungarian has an inverse agreement system, where the spell-out of agreement is determined by the relative person feature (or person feature sets) of the subject and the object. A formally explicit analysis of the syntax and the morphological spell-out of agreement is provided.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Philipp Klar ◽  
Georg Northoff

The existential crisis of nihilism in schizophrenia has been reported since the early days of psychiatry. Taking first-person accounts concerning nihilistic experiences of both the self and the world as vantage point, we aim to develop a dynamic existential model of the pathological development of existential nihilism. Since the phenomenology of such a crisis is intrinsically subjective, we especially take the immediate and pre-reflective first-person perspective’s (FPP) experience (instead of objectified symptoms and diagnoses) of schizophrenia into consideration. The hereby developed existential model consists of 3 conceptualized stages that are nested into each other, which defines what we mean by existential. At the same time, the model intrinsically converges with the phenomenological concept of the self-world structure notable inside our existential framework. Regarding the 3 individual stages, we suggest that the onset or first stage of nihilistic pathogenesis is reflected by phenomenological solipsism, that is, a general disruption of the FPP experience. Paradigmatically, this initial disruption contains the well-known crisis of common sense in schizophrenia. The following second stage of epistemological solipsism negatively affects all possible perspectives of experience, that is, the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives of subjectivity. Therefore, within the second stage, solipsism expands from a disruption of immediate and pre-reflective experience (first stage) to a disruption of reflective experience and principal knowledge (second stage), as mirrored in abnormal epistemological limitations of principal knowledge. Finally, the experience of the annihilation of healthy self-consciousness into the ultimate collapse of the individual’s existence defines the third stage. The schizophrenic individual consequently loses her/his vital experience since the intentional structure of consciousness including any sense of reality breaks down. Such a descriptive-interpretative existential model of nihilism in schizophrenia may ultimately serve as input for future psychopathological investigations of nihilism in general, including, for instance, its manifestation in depression.


2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-41
Author(s):  
Fabian A. Harang ◽  
Marc Lagunas-Merino ◽  
Salvador Ortiz-Latorre

AbstractWe propose a new multifractional stochastic process which allows for self-exciting behavior, similar to what can be seen for example in earthquakes and other self-organizing phenomena. The process can be seen as an extension of a multifractional Brownian motion, where the Hurst function is dependent on the past of the process. We define this by means of a stochastic Volterra equation, and we prove existence and uniqueness of this equation, as well as giving bounds on the p-order moments, for all $p\geq1$. We show convergence of an Euler–Maruyama scheme for the process, and also give the rate of convergence, which is dependent on the self-exciting dynamics of the process. Moreover, we discuss various applications of this process, and give examples of different functions to model self-exciting behavior.


2021 ◽  
pp. 036168432110134
Author(s):  
Kheana Barbeau ◽  
Camille Guertin ◽  
Kayla Boileau ◽  
Luc Pelletier

In this study, we examined the effects of body-focused daily self-compassion and self-esteem expressive writing activities on women’s valuation of weight management goals, body appreciation, bulimic symptoms, and healthy and unhealthy eating behaviors. One-hundred twenty-six women, recruited from the community and a university participant pool ( Mage = 29.3, SD = 13.6), were randomly allocated to one of the three writing conditions: body-focused self-compassion, body-focused self-esteem, or control. Women reflected on a moment within the past 24 hours that made them feel self-conscious about their bodies, eating, or exercise habits (self-compassion and self-esteem conditions) or on a particular situation or feeling that occurred in the past 24 hours (control condition) for 4–7 days. At post-treatment (24 hours after the intervention), women in the self-compassion group demonstrated decreased bulimic symptoms, while women in the self-esteem and control conditions did not. Furthermore, clinically significant changes in bulimic symptoms were associated with being in the self-compassion condition but not in the self-esteem or control conditions. Results suggest that body-focused writing interventions may be more effective in temporarily reducing eating disorder symptoms in women if they focus on harnessing self-compassion. Additional online materials for this article are available on PWQ ’s website at http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/03616843211013465


Rhizomata ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-217
Author(s):  
Matthew Sharpe

Abstract This paper examines the central criticisms that come, broadly, from the modern, ‘analytic’ tradition, of Pierre Hadot’s idea of ancient philosophy as a way of life.: Firstly, ancient philosophy just did not or could not have involved anything like the ‘spiritual practices’ or ‘technologies of the self’, aiming at curing subjects’ unnecessary desires or bettering their lives, contra Hadot and Foucault et al. Secondly, any such metaphilosophical account of putative ‘philosophy’ must unacceptably downplay the role of ‘serious philosophical reasoning’ or ‘rigorous argument’ in philosophy. Thirdly, claims that ancient philosophy aimed at securing wisdom by a variety of means including but not restricted to rational inquiry are accordingly false also as historical claims about the ancient philosophers. Fourthly, to the extent that we must (despite (3)) admit that some ancient thinkers did engage in or recommend extra-cognitive forms of transformative practice, these thinkers were not true or ‘mainline’ philosophers. I contend that the historical claims (3) and (4) are highly contestable, risking erroneously projecting a later modern conception of philosophy back onto the past. Of the theoretical or metaphilosophical claims (1) and (2), I argue that the second claim, as framed here, points to real, hard questions that surround the conception(s) of philosophy as a way of life.


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